Fruitt v. Astrue , 418 F. App'x 707 ( 2011 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS March 30, 2011
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
MICHELLE K. FRUITT,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
No. 10-6222
v. (D.C. No. 5:07-CV-01167-R)
(W.D. Okla.)
MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, Commissioner
of the Social Security Administration,
Defendant-Appellee.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before MURPHY, HARTZ, and GORSUCH, Circuit Judges.
Michelle K. Fruitt appeals the denial of her application for attorney’s fees
under the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA), 28 U.S.C. § 2412. Ms. Fruitt
claims she is entitled to $5,210.80 in fees because the Commissioner’s opposition
to her previous EAJA motion was not substantially justified. We have
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and affirm. We conclude the Commissioner’s
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding
precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and
collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent
with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
position in the earlier EAJA proceedings was substantially justified, and thus the
district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Ms. Fruitt’s application.
I
This is the second time these parties have litigated the EAJA before us.
The first round was an appeal from the district court’s decision that Ms. Fruitt
could recover attorney fees but not $350.00 in costs incurred while contesting the
Commissioner’s denial of benefits. See Fruitt v. Astrue, 604 F.3d 1217, 1218
(10th Cir. 2010) (Fruitt I). Accepting a magistrate judge’s report and
recommendation, the district court had reasoned that Ms. Fruitt failed to file a
timely bill of costs within 14 days after entry of judgment, as required by the
court’s local civil rule 54.1. 1 But recognizing a split in the way judges of the
Western District of Oklahoma applied local rule 54.1, we reversed and held the
rule was inapplicable. Id. at 1220. Although the Commissioner had argued that
the 14-day deadline applied because Ms. Fruitt’s motion was made “pursuant to”
28 U.S.C. § 1920, as stated by the rule, see Aplt. App. at 30-32, we explained that
Ms. Fruitt did not file her request “pursuant to” § 1920 because that statute
1
Local rule 54.1 provides:
A prevailing party who seeks to recover costs against an
unsuccessful party pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1920 shall file a bill of
costs on the form provided by the Clerk and support the same with a
brief. The bill of costs and brief shall be filed not more than 14 days
after entry of judgment.
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simply enumerates the types of expenses that are classified as “costs,” Fruitt I,
604 F.3d at 1219-20. 2 Instead, Ms. Fruitt applied for costs “pursuant to”
§ 2412(a)(1) of the EAJA because the EAJA provides the statutory authorization
for the recovery of costs. 3 Id. at 1220. And since that provision does not
establish a time limit for cost requests, see id. at 1219 & n.2, we concluded there
was no applicable deadline, id. at 1220.
2
28 U.S.C. § 1920 provides:
A judge or clerk of any court of the United States may tax as costs the
following:
(1) Fees of the clerk and marshal;
(2) Fees for printed or electronically recorded transcripts necessarily
obtained for use in the case;
(3) Fees and disbursements for printing and witnesses;
(4) Fees for exemplification and the cost of making copies of any
materials where the copies are necessarily obtained for use in the
case;
(5) Docket fees under section 1923 of this title;
(6) Compensation of court appointed experts, compensation of
interpreters, and salaries, fees, expenses, and costs of special
interpretation services under section 1828 of this title.
A bill of costs shall be filed in the case and, upon allowance, included
in the judgment or decree.
3
28 U.S.C. § 2412(a)(1) states, in relevant part:
Except as otherwise specifically provided by statute, a judgment for
costs, as enumerated in section 1920 of this title, but not including
the fees and expenses of attorneys, may be awarded to the prevailing
party in any civil action brought by or against the United States or
any agency or any official of the United States acting in his or her
official capacity in any court having jurisdiction of such action.
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Having prevailed on appeal, Ms. Fruitt returned to the district court and
filed a second application for fees under the EAJA. This time she requested an
award of $5,210.80 for successfully prosecuting her cost appeal. She claimed the
fee amount was reasonable and the Commissioner had not been substantially
justified in opposing her cost request. In response, the Commissioner
acknowledged his position had been wrong. But he underscored the split among
the judges in the Western District of Oklahoma and pointed out that prior to our
reversal, the general practice in that jurisdiction had been to require, under local
rule 54.1, a timely bill of costs within 14 days of judgment. Additionally, the
Commissioner argued that an award would be unjust because Ms. Fruitt’s fees
greatly exceeded the costs she recovered, and her request was excessive because
she expended $5,210.80 to obtain $350.00 in costs. The district court agreed and
denied Ms. Fruitt’s application. Ms. Fruitt moved to alter or amend the judgment
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e), but the court denied her motion.
She then initiated this appeal.
II
We review the denial of both an EAJA claim and a Rule 59(e) motion for
an abuse of discretion. Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 558-59 (1988)
(EAJA claim); Lundahl v. Zimmer, 296 F.3d 936, 940 (10th Cir. 2002) (Rule
59(e) motion). Under the EAJA, Ms. Fruitt, as the prevailing party, is entitled to
reasonable attorney fees from the government “‘unless the court finds that the
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position of the United States was substantially justified or that special
circumstances make an award unjust.’” Al-Maleki v. Holder, 558 F.3d 1200, 1204
(10th Cir. 2009) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A)). “The test for substantial
justification in this circuit is one of reasonableness in law and fact.” Hackett v.
Barnhart, 475 F.3d 1166, 1172 (10th Cir. 2007) (quotation omitted). This means
that although “the government’s position must be justified to a degree that could
satisfy a reasonable person,” it need not be correct. Id. (quotation omitted).
We conclude the Commissioner’s position in Fruitt I was substantially
justified. The Commissioner ultimately was proven to be incorrect, but
reasonable minds clearly subscribed to his view of the interrelated rules and
statutes. Indeed, both the magistrate and district judges in the proceedings
underlying Fruitt I embraced the Commissioner’s position, and Ms. Fruitt herself
acknowledges that the district court’s “longstanding practice” misapplied local
rule 54.1, Aplt. Br. at 12. Although she correctly argued in Fruitt I that not all
the judges in the Western District of Oklahoma adopted the Commissioner’s
approach, see Aplt. App. at 7; Fruitt I, 604 F.3d at 1219 (citing Belveal v. Astrue,
No. CIV-07-731-C, 2009 WL 141879, at *1 (W.D. Okla. Jan. 20, 2009)), that lack
of clarity in the governing law increased the likelihood that the Commissioner’s
position was substantially justified, see Martinez v. Sec’y of Health & Human
Servs., 815 F.2d 1381, 1383 (10th Cir. 1987) (per curiam). So, whether the
Commissioner was advocating a position consistent with the district court’s
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longstanding practice, or one side of an intra-district split, either way, his position
was justified to a degree that could—and did—satisfy reasonable people.
Still, Ms. Fruitt insists the Commissioner’s position cannot be substantially
justified because he advanced flawed arguments in opposing her cost request,
only to partially retreat from those arguments on appeal in Fruitt I. The record
confirms, however, that the Commissioner maintained his position throughout the
proceedings underlying Fruitt I. It is not dispositive that the Commissioner was
wrong. Hackett, 475 F.3d at 1172. The relevant inquiry is whether the
Commissioner’s position was reasonable both in law and in fact. Given the state
of the law in the Western District of Oklahoma at the time the Commissioner
advanced his argument, we agree with the district court that the Commissioner’s
position was substantially justified. The district court therefore acted within its
discretion in denying Ms. Fruitt’s present EAJA application and Rule 59(e)
motion. This conclusion obviates any need to consider whether the fee request
was excessive or whether an award would have been unjust.
The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
Entered for the Court
Michael R. Murphy
Circuit Judge
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