United States v. Jarvis , 299 F. App'x 804 ( 2008 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
November 13, 2008
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
No. 08-2223
v. (D.C. No. 1:05-CR-01849-JCH-1)
(D. N.M.)
DANA JARVIS,
Defendant-Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before O’BRIEN, EBEL, and TYMKOVICH, Circuit Judges.
Dana Jarvis faces numerous criminal charges in a complex, multi-defendant
case pending in the district court. He sought to be released from pretrial
detention on the ground that his detention, which has now exceeded three years,
has become so protracted as to violate his rights under the Due Process Clause of
the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The district court denied
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is
not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata,
and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value
consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
his motion; he appealed. We have jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3145 and
28 U.S.C. § 1291.
Jarvis did not seek statutory relief under Bail Reform Act of 1984,
18 U.S.C. §§ 3141-3156, or the Speedy Trial Act of 1974, 18 U.S.C. §§
3161-3174. Nor did he raise a Sixth Amendment speedy trial issue. Instead he
made only a due process argument. Thus, we do not have the benefit of the
district court’s statutory or Sixth Amendment analysis. The Supreme Court left
open the question of whether a substantive due process right to pre-trial release
not authorized by statute exists simply because of the passage of time. We
decline to plow new ground under the Due Process Clause until there is no
alternative. Accordingly, we vacate the district court’s decision and remand for a
disciplined statutory and Sixth Amendment analysis, should such be requested,
before addressing the due process issue. We decline Jarvis’s request to assign the
matter to a new district court judge.
I.
Jarvis was arrested on August 25, 2005, after being indicted on charges of
conspiracy to distribute 1,000 kilograms or more of marijuana in violation of
21 U.S.C. § 846, engaging in a continuing criminal enterprise in violation of
21 U.S.C. § 848, and money laundering in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956. He had
his initial appearance on August 26, and on August 29, the magistrate judge
conducted an arraignment and detention hearing.
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The Bail Reform Act provides that a defendant shall be detained pending
trial if a “judicial officer finds that no condition or combination of conditions will
reasonably assure the appearance of the person as required and the safety of any
other person and the community.” 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e). Section 3142(e) further
establishes a rebuttable presumption in cases involving particularly serious
charges that no conditions or combinations of conditions will be sufficient to
allow release pending trial. Id. The magistrate judge found there were risks that
Jarvis would not appear and that he would endanger the safety of another person
or the community if released and found he had not rebutted the rebuttable
presumption. Accordingly, the magistrate judge ordered Jarvis detained. Jarvis
did not appeal to the district court or to this court. See 18 U.S.C. § 3145 (setting
forth process for appealing detention decisions).
In mid-October, 2005, Jarvis filed a motion for release on conditions. On
November 7, 2005, the magistrate judge held a bail review hearing. After
considering the exhibits and testimony presented, the magistrate judge again
concluded Jarvis had not rebutted the rebuttable presumption. Particularly, the
magistrate judge found Jarvis to be a flight risk (by a preponderance of the
evidence) and he presented a danger to the community if released (by clear and
convincing evidence). The court determined “no condition or combination of
conditions will reasonably assure the appearance of defendant at Court
proceedings as required, or, reasonably assure the safety of others and the
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community.” R. Doc. 248 at 1. Accordingly, the magistrate judge denied the
motion for release. Jarvis did not seek review from the district court or this court,
so the detention order remained in effect.
For various reasons, the proceedings before the district court have been
protracted. Most recently, the trial was continued to March 23, 2009, due at least
in part to several defense attorneys’ scheduling conflicts. In July 2008, Jarvis
again moved for release. He did not seek relief under the Bail Reform Act, which
provides for a reopening of the release/detention hearing if there is new evidence
materially bearing on whether conditions of release will reasonably assure
appearance at trial and the safety of other people and the community. 18 U.S.C.
§ 3142(f). He essentially claimed the passage of time, alone, required his release
under the Due Process Clause. The district court proceeded in accord with our
unpublished decision in United States v. Cos, 198 F. App’x 727, 732 (10th Cir.
2006) (per curiam), which this court remanded for the district court to consider
whether an extended pretrial detention violated the Due Process Clause. Cos
identified three relevant factors: “1) the length of detention; 2) the extent of the
prosecution’s responsibility for the delay of trial; and 3) the strength of the
evidence upon which the detention was based.” Id. Having analyzed the Cos
factors, the district court decided Jarvis’s continued detention did not violate the
Due Process Clause and denied his release motion. From that order Jarvis
appeals. The government has filed a brief in opposition.
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II.
Our review of the district court’s detention decision is de novo, although
we defer to the district court’s factual findings. See United States v. Stricklin,
932 F.2d 1353, 1355 (10th Cir. 1991) (per curiam) (“Appellate review of
detention or release orders is plenary as to mixed questions of law and fact and
independent, with due deference to the district court’s purely factual findings.”).
“[U]nder the Due Process Clause, a detainee may not be punished prior to
an adjudication of guilt in accordance with due process of law.” Bell v. Wolfish,
441 U.S. 520, 535 (1979). In United States v. Salerno, the Supreme Court
concluded “that the pretrial detention contemplated by the Bail Reform Act is
regulatory in nature, and does not constitute punishment before trial in violation
of the Due Process Clause.” 481 U.S. 739, 748 (1987). One of the factors on
which the Salerno Court relied in reaching its decision is that “the maximum
length of pretrial detention is limited by the stringent time limitations of the
Speedy Trial Act [of 1974, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161-3174].” Id. at 747. 1 Because
Jarvis has not tested whether statutory or Sixth Amendment remedies would
afford relief his due-process challenge is premature.
It is “a fundamental rule of judicial restraint” that “[p]rior to reaching any
constitutional questions, federal courts must consider nonconstitutional grounds
1
In Salerno, the Court “intimate[d] no view as to the point at which
detention in a particular case might become excessively prolonged, and therefore
punitive, in relation to Congress’ regulatory goal.” 481 U.S. at 747 n.4.
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for decision.” Jean v. Nelson, 472 U.S. 846, 854 (1985) (citations and quotations
omitted). Jarvis has at least one available nonconstitutional remedy – the Bail
Reform Act – that may end his pretrial detention. The Bail Reform Act provides a
means of reopening a bail hearing “at any time before trial” upon a showing of
material new evidence. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f). And the Bail Reform Act may
require pretrial release on conditions even in circumstances in which continued
detention is not unconstitutional. See United States v. Infelise, 934 F.2d 103, 105
(7th Cir. 1991).
Further, in some circumstances, the Speedy Trial Act explicitly provides
for automatic review of detention. See 18 U.S.C. § 3164(c). Even where section
3164 is inapplicable, the Speedy Trial Act may provide relief where ending a
protracted pretrial detention is a primary concern of a defendant, either through
an order requiring trial to commence or bail to be granted, see United States v.
Theron, 782 F.2d 1510, 1516-17 (10th Cir. 1986), or through an outright
dismissal of the charges, see 18 U.S.C. § 3162(a)(2); United States v.
Abdush-Shakur, 465 F.3d 458, 462 (10th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 1321
(2007).
Another factor that favors allowing district courts the opportunity to
consider nonconstitutional forms of relief in the first instance is that Jarvis’s
motion is grounded in substantive due process. See Salerno, 481 U.S. at 746
(analyzing the facial constitutionality of the Bail Reform Act under substantive
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due process). “The history of substantive due process counsels caution and
restraint.” Regents of Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 229 (1985)
(Powell, J., concurring) (quotation omitted).
[T]he Court has always been reluctant to expand the concept of
substantive due process because guideposts for responsible
decisionmaking in this unchartered area are scarce and open-ended.
The doctrine of judicial self-restraint requires us to exercise the
utmost care whenever we are asked to break new ground in this field.
Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125 (1992). “Exercis[ing]
utmost care” logically includes evaluating less drastic forms of relief before
reaching substantive due process.
The Supreme Court also has indicated a preference for proceeding under
more specific constitutional rights before resorting to substantive due process.
See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989) (holding that Fourth
Amendment standards, not substantive due process, should be applied in cases
involving excessive force during a law enforcement “seizure”). In this regard, in
contrast to Salerno, which deferred the question of when due process might come
into play with regard to extended pretrial detentions, see 481 U.S. at 747 n.4, the
Supreme Court has established a balancing test for evaluating deprivations of the
Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial, see Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530
(1972). We recognize that defendants may have reasons for preferring not to
invoke their Sixth Amendment right, see id. at 521, and that demanding a speedy
(or at least speedier) trial under the Constitution does not precisely redress the
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fact of pretrial detention, since the defendant may still remain in custody. But
invoking the Sixth Amendment right may shorten the duration of pretrial
detention, if that is of primary concern to a defendant, and thus the Sixth
Amendment right to a speedy trial may also be a source of relief in appropriate
circumstances.
Other courts have adopted particular tests for analyzing protracted pretrial
detentions under the Due Process Clause. See, e.g., United States v. Millan,
4 F.3d 1038, 1043 (2d Cir. 1993) (“To determine whether the length of pretrial
detention has become constitutionally excessive, we must weigh three factors:
(I) the length of detention; (ii) the extent of the prosecution’s responsibility for
the delay of the trial; and (iii) the strength of the evidence upon which the
detention was based[.]” (quotation omitted)); United States v. Accetturo, 783 F.2d
382, 388 (3d Cir. 1986) (listing appropriate factors to consider). In unpublished,
nonbinding decisions, this court has approved the Second Circuit’s three-factor
test either explicitly, see Cos, 198 F. App’x at 732, or implicitly, see United
States v. Peters, No. 94-2107, 1994 WL 325419, at * 1 (10th Cir. July 7, 1994).
We need not decide today whether these tests appropriately determine when a
protracted pretrial detention becomes “punishment.” We note, however, that any
record created as a result of analyzing challenges under the Bail Reform Act, the
Speedy Trial Act, and/or the Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial inevitably
would inform a due-process analysis.
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Finally, we emphasize that we are neither instituting an exhaustion
requirement for due-process claims regarding extended pretrial detention nor
requiring defendants to bring their challenges separately and serially. Defendants
may choose to present a due process claim in addition to claims under the Bail
Reform Act, the Speedy Trial Act, and/or the Sixth Amendment right to a speedy
trial, as appropriate, and the district court may consider the narrowest grounds of
relief first. We simply hold that, where established nonconstitutional and
constitutional remedies exist, defendants should not force the district court into a
substantive due process analysis without also allowing it to evaluate more
restrained means of granting relief.
III.
Jarvis also requests that his matter be assigned to a new district court judge.
This court exercises its power to assign a new judge when (1) there is evidence of
actual bias or prejudice against the party or (2) on the basis of a three-part test:
(1) whether the original judge would reasonably be expected upon
remand to have substantial difficulty in putting out of his or her mind
previously-expressed views or findings determined to be erroneous or
based on evidence that must be rejected, (2) whether reassignment is
advisable to preserve the appearance of justice, and (3) whether
reassignment would entail waste and duplication out of proportion to
any gain in preserving the appearance of fairness.
Mitchell v. Maynard, 80 F.3d 1433, 1450 (10th Cir. 1996) (quotation omitted).
Jarvis does not allege that the district judge harbors personal bias against him, but
instead relies on the three-part test. We do not agree that the district judge
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appears to have had difficulty putting out of her mind this court’s reversal of one
of her previous rulings or that reassignment would be necessary to preserve the
appearance of justice. Moreover, in this complicated, multi-defendant case with
numerous pending issues, “reassignment would entail waste and duplication out
of proportion to any gain” that would be realized. Id. (quotation omitted).
Accordingly, we deny the request for reassignment to a new district judge.
IV.
Jarvis’s motion for release under the Due Process Clause did not adequately
allow the district court to consider other avenues of relief before relying on
substantive due process. Accordingly, we decline to consider his appeal of the
denial of that motion at this time, vacate the district court’s decision, and remand
to allow Jarvis the opportunity to pursue narrower grounds for relief in the first
instance.
Entered for the Court,
Terrence L. O’Brien
Circuit Judge
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