United States v. Palomino-Rodriguez , 301 F. App'x 822 ( 2008 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
December 9, 2008
TENTH CIRCUIT
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. No. 07-2273
(D.N.M.)
GABRIEL PALOMINO- (D.C. No. CR-07-1139-BB)
RODRIGUEZ,
Defendant-Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before LUCERO, TYMKOVICH, and HOLMES, Circuit Judges.
Defendant-Appellant Gabriel Palomino-Rodriguez, a New Mexico federal
prisoner, pleaded guilty to a one-count indictment for illegal reentry after
deportation subsequent to a conviction for an aggravated felony in violation of 8
U.S.C. § 1326(a) and (b)(2). The Presentence Report (“PSR”) computed his
Guidelines range to be 46 to 57 months’ imprisonment. The district court
*
This Order and Judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited,
however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th
Cir. R. 32.1. After examining the briefs and the appellate record, this three-judge
panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not be of material
assistance in the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th
Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
sentenced him to 46 months. Mr. Palomino-Rodriguez challenges the substantive
reasonableness of his sentence. 1 Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291
and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a), we AFFIRM.
I. BACKGROUND
Mr. Palomino-Rodriguez pleaded guilty to one count of illegal reentry in
violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) and (b)(2). Given his offense level and prior
criminal history, the PSR calculated a Guidelines range of 46 to 57 months. Mr.
Palomino-Rodriguez filed a sentencing memorandum in which he sought a
downward variance from the Guidelines range. He submitted four letters on his
behalf and argued that his family circumstances justified a variance.
At sentencing, the district court acknowledged these materials and stated:
All right. Well, even taking that at face value, I don’t see this as
being a case that really requires a deviation. He has difficult
family circumstances, but . . . that is frequently the case in these
[illegal re-entry] situations, where there is an inconvenien[ce] at
best, and misery imposing the worst barrier.
1
Mr. Palomino-Rodriguez does not purport to challenge the procedural
reasonableness of his sentence, but his sentencing argument bears significant
procedural stripes in that he seems to allege that the district court did not properly
consider the sentencing factors of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2) in light of the
overarching parsimony principle of § 3553(a). See United States v. Martinez-
Barragan, 545 F.3d 894, 904 (10th Cir. 2008) (discussing the parsimony principle
embedded in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)). In Martinez-Barragan, we treated a similar
argument as a challenge to the procedural reasonableness of the district court’s
sentence. Id. at 904-05. For purposes of this appeal, we will accept Mr.
Palomino-Rodriguez’s characterization of his challenge but in the context of our
analysis we will address any procedural implications of his challenge.
-2-
R., Vol. III, Tr. at 11 (Sentencing Hearing, dated Nov. 1, 2007).
In justifying Mr. Palomino-Rodriguez’s sentence, the district court referred
to the length of the sentence imposed for his prior burglary offense (i.e., seven
years, with five suspended). After considering the PSR’s factual findings, United
States Sentencing Guidelines, and the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, the district
court imposed a 46-month sentence, the bottom of the Guidelines range. Mr.
Palomino-Rodriguez now challenges the substantive reasonableness of his
sentence.
II. DISCUSSION
We review criminal sentences for reasonableness, applying a deferential
abuse of discretion standard. Gall v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 586, 594 (2007)
(“Our explanation of ‘reasonableness’ review in the Booker opinion made it
pellucidly clear that the familiar abuse-of-discretion standard of review now
applies to appellate review of sentencing decisions.”). Reasonableness has “both
procedural and substantive dimensions.” Martinez-Barragan, 545 F.3d at 898.
That is, we consider both “the length of the sentence, as well as the method by
which the sentence was calculated.” United States v. Kristl, 437 F.3d 1050, 1055
(10th Cir. 2006).
Generally, a sentence is procedurally reasonable if the district court
accurately calculates the recommended Guidelines range, properly considers the §
3553(a) factors, and abides by the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. United
-3-
States v. Geiner, 498 F.3d 1104, 1107 (10th Cir. 2007); see also United States v.
Alapizco-Valenzuela, __F.3d__, No. 07-3327, 2008 WL 4866609, at *3 (10th Cir.
Nov. 12, 2008) (“Procedural review asks whether the sentencing court committed
any error in calculating or explaining the sentence.”). “A sentence is
substantively reasonable when it ‘reflects the gravity of the crime and the §
3553(a) factors as applied to the case.’” Geiner, 498 F.3d at 1107 (quoting
United States v. Atencio, 476 F.3d 1099, 1102 (10th Cir. 2007), overruled in part
on other grounds by Irizarry v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 2198, 2201 n.1, 2203-04
(2008)). The district court has wide discretion in balancing the § 3553(a) factors.
See United States v. Smart, 518 F.3d 800, 808 (10th Cir. 2008) (“We may not
examine the weight a district court assigns to various § 3553(a) factors, and its
ultimate assessment of the balance between them, as a legal conclusion to be
reviewed de novo.”).
On appeal, a within-Guidelines sentence is presumed to be substantively
reasonable. See United States v. Sells, 541 F.3d 1227, 1237 (10th Cir. 2008);
United States v. Verdin-Garcia, 516 F.3d 884, 898 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 129
S. Ct. 161 (2008). The burden is on the defendant to rebut the presumption “by
demonstrating that the sentence is unreasonable when viewed against the other
factors delineated in § 3553(a).” Kristl, 437 F.3d at 1054. We conclude that Mr.
Palomino-Rodriguez has not satisfied this burden.
Mr. Palomino-Rodriguez contends that he is entitled to a downward
-4-
variance because his dire economic circumstances and, more specifically, his
concern about his ability to shoulder the medical expenses of his unborn child, led
him to unlawfully reenter the United States, and because there were ameliorating
circumstances relating to the prior burglary conviction. He alleges that the
district court’s failure to take these circumstances into account implies that the
district court violated the parsimony clause of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). “When
crafting a sentence, the district court must be guided by the ‘parsimony
principle’—that the sentence be sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to
comply with the purposes of criminal punishment, as expressed in § 3553(a)(2).”
Martinez-Barragan, 545 F.3d at 904 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)).
The district court, in imposing Mr. Palomino-Rodriguez’s sentence, took
note of the § 3553(a) factors. We have no reason to believe that the district court
did not consider all of Mr. Palomino-Rodriguez’s arguments, and it was not
required to specifically address each argument to properly carry out its sentencing
duties. See United States v. Mendoza, 543 F.3d 1186, 1193 (10th Cir. 2008)
(“[W]e have generally held that ‘when the district court adheres to the advisory
Guidelines range,’ § 3553(c)(1) ‘does not impose upon district courts a duty to
engage in . . . particularized analysis.’” (quoting United States v. A.B., 529 F.3d
1275, 1289 (10th Cir., cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 440 (2008))); see also United
States v. Ruiz-Terrazas, 477 F.3d 1196, 1203 n.4 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 128 S.
-5-
Ct. 113 (2007) (noting a lack of authority for the proposition that a judge must
specifically address a defendant’s arguments before imposing sentence).
Here, the district court balanced Mr. Palomino-Rodriguez’s family
circumstances against his prior criminal activity and the § 3553(a) factors. In
striking this balance, the district court did not find that any deviation from the
applicable Guidelines range was justified. The court deemed Mr. Palomino-
Rodriguez’s circumstances to be similar to those of other defendants convicted of
the same offense. And it was permissible for the court to make such comparisons
in considering whether to grant a variance. See Martinez-Barragan, 545 F.3d at
900 (“[H]eartland analysis is also a legitimate part of the district court’s analysis
of whether to vary from the Guidelines.”). Mr. Palomino-Rodriguez has not
demonstrated that the district court’s sentence is unreasonable in light of the §
3553(a) factors—viz., he has not rebutted the presumption of reasonableness that
attaches to his within-Guidelines sentence. See id. at 905 (“[W]e cannot say that
Mr. Martinez-Barragan has demonstrated that his criminal history and family
circumstances, when viewed in light of § 3553(a), renders a bottom of the
Guidelines sentence an abuse of discretion.”). Accordingly, we cannot conclude
that the court abused its discretion in sentencing Mr. Palomino-Rodriguez.
-6-
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the district court’s sentencing
order.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Jerome A. Holmes
Circuit Judge
-7-