Cooper v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. ( 2008 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS October 16, 2008
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
KENNETH E. COOPER,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 07-2290
(D.C. No. 1:06-cv-00468-JAP-RLP)
WAL-MART STORES, INC., (D. N.M.)
a Delaware corporation,
Defendant-Appellee.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before GORSUCH, ANDERSON, and BALDOCK, Circuit Judges.
Kenneth E. Cooper appeals from the district court’s grant of summary
judgment in favor of Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., on his claim of racial discrimination
in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-2(a)(1). Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm.
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding
precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and
collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent
with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
Background
Mr. Cooper, who is African American, became the manager of a Wal-Mart
store in Silver City, New Mexico, in 1998. As the store manager, he was
responsible for abiding by and enforcing all Wal-Mart policies, including
avoiding situations and relationships that involve even the appearance of a
conflict of interest, and rules against misappropriation of company funds. In
September 2005, Wal-Mart’s ethics hotline received an anonymous complaint
regarding alleged misconduct by Mr. Cooper. Wal-Mart investigated the
allegations, interviewing approximately 21 employees and examining dozens of
pages of documents. The lead investigator drafted a summary of findings,
concluding that the allegations of harassment, inappropriate conduct,
misappropriation of company funds, and conflict of interest were substantiated.
Specifically, the investigation found that Mr. Cooper violated several
Wal-Mart policies in connection with a trip beginning on June 23, 2005, to tour
the company’s distribution center in Buckeye, Arizona. First, he was the only
member of management accompanying an otherwise all-female group of hourly
employees on the overnight trip, circumstances that Wal-Mart concluded were a
violation of its conflict of interest policy. Second, instead of returning to Silver
City on June 24 with the rest of the group, Mr. Cooper and several other
employees went shopping and spent an additional night in Tucson, Arizona,
before returning home on June 25. Mr. Cooper charged to Wal-Mart the cost of
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meals and the hotel rooms for the extra night, and he allowed the employees who
did not return to Silver City on June 24 to claim eight working hours on their time
sheets for that day.
In addition, the investigation also found substantial evidence that
Mr. Cooper was engaging in an inappropriate relationship with and directing
favoritism toward a department manager, Ms. Quintana, specifically:
• Visiting her home several times, for up to 30 minutes;
• Awarding her a $250 gift card;
• Putting items on layaway for her in his name;
• Increasing her pay substantially more than any other department
manager; and
• Offering to remove a disciplinary action from another employee’s
file if she agreed not to tell anyone that she saw Mr. Cooper leaving
Ms. Quintana’s neighborhood.
The investigation concluded further that Mr. Cooper threatened employees with
retaliation if they reported information to his supervisor, Mr. Andrade, or to the
company’s loss-prevention supervisor; that he made inappropriate, sexually
suggestive comments during store meetings; that he ordered the demotion of an
employee without following the Wal-Mart disciplinary process; that he awarded
$25 gift cards to employees who danced with him at a company party; and that he
direct-billed Wal-Mart for his wife’s stay at a hotel in Silver City.
The investigators provided their findings and documentation to Michael
Moore, Senior Vice President, Operations West of Wal-Mart. Mr. Moore was
responsible for all aspects of store operations in his district, including personnel
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issues. He reviewed the investigation and concluded that it had been conducted
properly. According to his affidavit, he believed that the findings were accurate
and true, and he made the decision to terminate Mr. Cooper’s employment for
gross misconduct. He did not seek a statement from Mr. Cooper before reaching
his decision.
At Mr. Moore’s direction, Mr. Andrade met with Mr. Cooper, informed him
that he was being terminated for gross misconduct, and reviewed with him written
bullet points summarizing the specific reasons for his termination. Mr. Andrade
also presented Mr. Cooper with an Exit Interview form indicating that the reason
for his termination was “Gross Misconduct - Integrity Issue,” which was defined
on the form to include “Misappropriation of Company Assets.” Aplt. App. at 149.
Mr. Cooper wrote a response indicating his disagreement with each of the reasons
given and he signed the Exit Interview form, indicating his denial of all
allegations of misconduct.
Mr. Cooper used Wal-Mart’s Open Door policy to express his disagreement
with the bases for his termination. He also reported allegations of misconduct
against other Wal-Mart employees, including several store managers. In
response, Wal-Mart conducted an investigation involving numerous investigators,
interviews of dozens of associates, and examination of hundreds of pages of
documents. Once again, the investigators provided their findings and
documentation to Mr. Moore.
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Two of the other store managers were not disciplined because the
investigators determined that the allegations against them could not be
substantiated. But they concluded that some of the allegations against three other
store managers were substantiated. One manager had given gifts to Mr. Andrade
and to another employee. The investigators also found that this manager
socialized with Mr. Andrade and that employees were reluctant to use the Open
Door policy because of his perceived friendship with his supervisor. The record
does not reflect whether or how this store manager was disciplined based on these
findings. The investigators concluded that two allegations against a second store
manager were substantiated, but had been previously addressed by Wal-Mart.
Finally, the investigators found that six allegations against a third store manager
were substantiated, including four allegations related to inappropriate conduct and
favoritism toward female associates, as well as two allegations regarding his
failure to maintain password and keyword control. Mr. Moore concluded that
these were serious violations of Wal-Mart policy, but that this store manager’s
conduct was not as recent or severe as Mr. Cooper’s conduct and involved fewer
substantiated allegations. This third store manager was demoted two steps to
assistant manager, but was later promoted back to store manager.
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Mr. Cooper filed this action in district court, asserting that his termination
was motivated by racial discrimination. 1 The district court granted summary
judgment in favor of Wal-Mart, concluding that Mr. Cooper failed to raise a
genuine issue of fact whether Wal-Mart’s proffered non-discriminatory reasons
were pretextual. Mr. Cooper filed a timely appeal.
Standard of Review
“We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo.”
Young v. Dillon Cos., 468 F.3d 1243, 1249 (10th Cir. 2006). Summary judgment
is appropriate “if the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file,
and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and
that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
“In conducting our analysis, we view all of the facts in the light most favorable to
the non-movant and draw all reasonable inferences from the record in favor of the
non-moving party.” Young, 468 F.3d at 1249.
Discussion
Mr. Cooper did not present direct evidence of racial discrimination, so we
examine his claim under the familiar burden-shifting framework set forth in
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). See Young, 468 F.3d at
1249. Under that framework, Mr. Cooper carried the initial burden of
1
Mr. Cooper asserted other claims in his complaint, which are not at issue in
this appeal.
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establishing a prima facie case of racial discrimination. See id. Wal-Mart
concedes that Mr. Cooper made out a prima facie case of discrimination under
Title VII. “Once the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the burden shifts to
the employer to articulate some legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the
adverse employment action. If the defendant makes this showing, the burden then
shifts back to the plaintiff to show that the defendant’s proffered justification is
pretextual.” Id. (citation omitted). Mr. Cooper does not contend that Wal-Mart
failed to meet its burden to articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for
his termination. Thus, the issue before this court is whether plaintiff has shown a
genuine issue of material fact as to whether Wal-Mart’s proffered reasons for
discharging Mr. Cooper were a pretext for discrimination. See id.Pretext
“Pretext exists when an employer does not honestly represent its reasons
for terminating an employee.” Miller v. Eby Realty Group LLC, 396 F.3d 1105,
1111 (10th Cir. 2005). “To show that the defendant’s proffered race-neutral
reasons were actually a pretext for discrimination, this Court has held that the
plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant’s proffered race-neutral reasons
were so incoherent, weak, inconsistent, or contradictory that a rational factfinder
could conclude the reasons were unworthy of belief.” Young, 468 F.3d at 1250(quotation and brackets omitted). “The relevant inquiry is not whether the
employer’s proffered reasons were wise, fair or correct, but whether it honestly
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believed those reasons and acted in good faith upon those beliefs.” Rivera v. City
& County of Denver, 365 F.3d 912, 924-25 (10th Cir. 2004) (quotation and
brackets omitted); see also Pastran v. K-Mart Corp., 210 F.3d 1201, 1206
(10th Cir. 2000) (“The pertinent question in determining pretext is not whether
the employer was right to think the employee engaged in misconduct, but whether
that belief was genuine or pretextual.” (quotation and brackets omitted)). “The
reason for this rule is plain: our role is to prevent intentional discriminatory
hiring practices, not to act as a ‘super personnel department,’ second guessing
employers’ honestly held (even if erroneous) business judgments.” Young,
468 F.3d at 1250.
Because there seems to be some confusion on plaintiff’s part, 2 we note that,
although intermediate evidentiary burdens shift back and forth under the
McDonnell Douglas framework, “the ultimate burden of persuading the trier of
fact that the defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff remains at
all times with the plaintiff.” Swackhammer v. Sprint/United Mgmt. Co., 493 F.3d
1160, 1173 (10th Cir. 2007) (quotation and alteration omitted). Thus, Mr. Cooper
bears the burden to produce evidence at the pretext phase sufficient to support an
inference of discrimination. See id.2
In his appeal brief Mr. Cooper refers to Wal-Mart’s failure to meet its
burden of showing good faith.
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Mr. Cooper attempts to show pretext in three different ways: (1) with
evidence that Wal-Mart’s stated reasons for his termination were false, see
Kendrick v. Penske Transp. Servs., Inc., 220 F.3d 1220, 1230 (10th Cir. 2000);
(2) with evidence that Wal-Mart treated him differently than similarly situated
employees whose policy violations were of comparable seriousness, see
Timmerman v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 483 F.3d 1106, 1120 (10th Cir. 2007); and
(3) with evidence of procedural irregularities in Wal-Mart’s investigation, see id.
at 1122.
Evidence of Falsity of Wal-Mart’s Proffered
Reasons for Termination
Mr. Cooper contends that he presented sufficient evidence disputing the
facts underlying Wal-Mart’s findings regarding his misconduct, such that there
exist material issues of fact regarding whether Wal-Mart honestly believed those
reasons and acted in good faith upon that belief. “The Supreme Court has
recognized that ‘in appropriate circumstances, the trier of fact can reasonably
infer from the falsity of the explanation that the employer is dissembling to cover
up a discriminatory purpose.’” Young, 468 F.3d at 1250 (brackets omitted)
(quoting Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 147 (2000)).
“But the nature and quantum of plaintiff’s proof is key, for the Supreme Court has
also explained that evidence about the falsity of an employer’s proffered
race-neutral explanation for termination will not always be adequate to sustain
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liability.” Id. (quotation and ellipsis omitted). Thus, the plaintiff’s evidence
must be both relevant to the issue of pretext, and sufficient to raise a substantial
doubt about the veracity of the employer’s reasons.
Mr. Cooper contends that he has shown material issues of fact in dispute
with respect to each and every reason Wal-Mart proffered for his termination.
The district court concluded that he failed to dispute the facts underlying
Wal-Mart’s finding that he misappropriated company funds in connection with the
trip to Buckeye, Arizona. It also suggested that this was Wal-Mart’s dominant
reason for terminating Mr. Cooper. See Aplt. App. at 189 (stating that he failed
to “dispute what is arguably the most significant of Defendant’s findings
involving misappropriation of funds–the payment of hotel and meal expenses
incurred during the unauthorized trip to Tucson”). We agree.
First, Mr. Cooper does not dispute the facts found in Wal-Mart’s
investigation regarding this incident. 3 Instead, he contends that his supervisor,
Mr. Andrade, authorized the Buckeye trip. But he fails to show that the aspects
of the trip to which Wal-Mart objected–the shopping outing recorded as work
3
Mr. Cooper’s testimony regarding the events is consistent with Wal-Mart’s
findings. Although he asserted in the district court that the evidence showed the
employees appropriately recorded a flat eight hours on their time sheets for June
24 for the driving time associated with the return trip from Buckeye, whether or
not they actually drove home on that day, this is a mischaracterization of his own
testimony. He stated that the time spent by the employees who chose to travel
back home on June 24 was considered work time, but he admitted that his group
did not spend any time that day returning to Silver City. See Aplt. App. at 134.
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time, the extra meals, and the extra night’s stay in Tucson–were authorized. He
presents no evidence disputing Mr. Andrade’s testimony that he was never
informed about Mr. Cooper and other employees staying an additional night on
the Buckeye trip.
Nor does Mr. Cooper present any evidence that his misappropriation of
funds in connection with the Buckeye trip was not a dominant–if not the most
dominant–issue in Wal-Mart’s decision to terminate his employment. 4 The
relative importance of an employer’s multiple reasons for the adverse action must
enter into our analysis, because “[t]he pretext inquiry about whether a plaintiff
raises substantial doubt about a number of the employer’s reasons is not limited to
just a numeric quantitative assessment of the proffered reasons, but also includes
a qualitative assessment that takes into account which reasons dominated the
employer’s decision making process.” Bryant v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 432 F.3d
1114, 1127 n.6 (10th Cir. 2005) (quotation and brackets omitted). Thus, when a
plaintiff casts doubt on the dominant reason for termination put forth by the
employer, his failure to address other, less consequential reasons does not entitle
the employer to summary judgment. Id. at 1126-27. On the other hand, if the
employer offers one reason which, standing alone, would have caused it to
4
The record shows that Mr. Cooper was terminated for gross misconduct,
which includes misappropriation of company assets. And the dollar amount
misappropriated in connection with the Buckeye trip far exceeded the other
allegations of misappropriation of funds.
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terminate the plaintiff, then debunking the employer’s other reasons will not
defeat summary judgment. See Jaramillo v. Colo. Judicial Dep’t, 427 F.3d 1303,
1310 (10th Cir. 2005). Mr. Cooper does not contend that this reason for his
termination was intertwined with the other reasons proffered by Wal-Mart. Thus,
his failure to debunk a dominant, stand-alone reason for Wal-Mart’s decision to
terminate his employment supports the district court’s grant of summary
judgment. See id.Mr. Cooper argues that summary judgment is nonetheless unavailable to
Wal-Mart for two reasons. First he contends that he has raised substantial doubt
about many of Wal-Mart’s numerous reasons for terminating him. See Tyler v.
RE/MAX Mountain States, Inc., 232 F.3d 808, 814 (10th Cir. 2000) (holding an
inference of pretext may be drawn “when the plaintiff casts substantial doubt on
many of the employer’s multiple reasons, [such that] the jury could reasonably
find the employer lacks credibility”). Second, he argues that “the pretextual
character of one explanation is so fishy and suspicious, that a jury could find that
the employer (or its decision-maker) lacks all credibility.” Jaramillo, 427 F.3d at
1310 (citation and quotation omitted). As to both contentions, we disagree.
Mr. Cooper was required to show “that the evidence of [his] misconduct
presented to [Mr. Moore] was so implausible, incoherent, or internally
contradictory that [Mr. Moore] must have made his decision on some other basis.”
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Rivera, 365 F.3d at 925. 5 According to the materials submitted to Mr. Moore, the
Wal-Mart investigators made their findings regarding Mr. Cooper’s verbal threats
of retaliation, his sexually suggestive comments, and his inappropriate offer to
remove a disciplinary action from an employee’s file, based upon witnesses’s
statements as to what he said and did. In response, he simply denies that he ever
made the verbal threats, the offer, and some of the comments. And while he
admits to making other remarks, he asserts that they must have been misconstrued
because he did not intend them to be sexually suggestive, two employees testified
they did not interpret the statements in that manner and were not offended by
them, and Mr. Andrade had not received any complaints.
These conflicts in the evidence fail to create an inference that Mr. Moore’s
articulated motivating reasons were a pretext for discrimination. This is so
because “conflicting evidence only affects summary judgment if it is relevant to
the inquiry.” Piercy v. Maketa, 480 F.3d 1192, 1201 (10th Cir. 2007) (holding
that, despite conflicting versions of what occurred leading up to plaintiff’s
termination, she failed to show a reason to believe that her employer’s proffered
reason for termination masked a retaliatory motive). “Perhaps a reasonable
5
We note at the outset that Mr. Cooper fails to even address on appeal
several of Wal-Mart’s misconduct findings. He does not mention in his opening
appellate brief the all-female aspect of the Buckeye trip, his visits to
Ms. Quintana’s home, or his placement of an item on layaway for her. Nor does
he address Wal-Mart’s finding that he told assistant managers it was none of their
business who he was seeing outside of the store.
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factfinder could observe all the witnesses and believe Plaintiff’s version of the
events . . . . [but] that is not the issue. What is at issue is whether the evidence of
Plaintiff’s misconduct presented to [Mr. Moore] was so weak that a rational
factfinder could infer that [Mr. Moore’s] expressed reason for terminating
Plaintiff must have been pretextual.” Rivera, 365 F.3d at 925. Mr. Cooper’s
denials and his disagreement with Wal-Mart’s conclusions that certain remarks
were sexually suggestive fail to support an inference of pretext.
Wal-Mart also cited as a reason for Mr. Cooper’s termination that he
ordered the demotion of an employee without following the company’s
disciplinary process. There is no dispute that, without following that process,
Mr. Cooper decided to remove an employee from her position in the cash office
and reassign her to a sales clerk/cashier position. He contends, however, that
there is a factual dispute whether the employee was actually demoted and that the
disciplinary procedures only come into play if the action taken was disciplinary in
nature. But he admits that the basis for the employee’s “reassignment” was
because she had been rude to employees and was divulging confidential
information about payday loans. Moreover, Wal-Mart noted in its investigative
findings that Mr. Cooper’s co-manager–the person who carried out the
reassignment at his direction–characterized it as a demotion. We conclude that
Mr. Cooper has failed to show sufficient weakness in the evidence presented to
Mr. Moore regarding this issue to allow a factfinder to infer pretext.
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Similarly, Mr. Cooper denies that he dictated a letter posted in the cash
office that threatened to fire or “re-arrange” anyone who provided information to
his superiors before going to him first. Aplt. App. at 95. Mr. Moore was
presented with evidence that Mr. Cooper was aware of this letter and intended to
enforce the admonitions in it. 6 Thus, a dispute regarding whether Mr. Cooper
dictated the letter is insufficient to support an inference of pretext.
Mr. Cooper also attempts to debunk two of Wal-Mart’s findings of
improper favoritism related to Ms. Quintana. He contends that he did not exceed
his discretion as the store manager in raising her salary, and that his award of a
$250 gift card to her was not a violation of the conflict of interest policy because
it was approved by Mr. Andrade. These arguments ignore Wal-Mart’s concern
not only with actual conflicts of interest, but also with the appearance of a
conflict created by the instances of favorable treatment of and fraternization with
Ms. Quintana. Thus, regardless of his authority to do so, Wal-Mart concluded
that Mr. Cooper’s decision to raise her salary significantly more than any other
department manager was a real or apparent conflict of interest. Likewise,
Mr. Andrade’s assent to his request to award Ms. Quintana the gift card is not
relevant in the absence of evidence that Mr. Cooper disclosed to his supervisor
6
Wal-Mart’s investigative findings included a statement from a witness that,
when Mr. Cooper asked her whether she had seen the letter, she responded, “Yes,
I saw your threat,” and he replied, “It’s not a threat, it’s a promise.” Aplt. App.
at 86 (quotations omitted).
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the full extent of his fraternization with her. Moreover, despite Mr. Cooper’s
assertion that the gift card was an appropriate award for Ms. Quintana’s
disclosure of a potential fraud scheme by another employee, the investigators
presented Mr. Moore with evidence that she had no involvement in that
investigation. Again, he has not shown that the evidence Mr. Moore relied on
was so weak as to create an inference of pretext. See Rivera, 365 F.3d at 925.
Mr. Cooper also attempts to show that there is relevant conflicting evidence
regarding Wal-Mart’s two other findings that he misappropriated company funds.
He does not deny giving out $25 gift cards to employees at a holiday party, but he
contends that Wal-Mart’s finding of misconduct was mistaken because the cards
were actually awarded to employees who participated in a line dance. He points
to a witness’s testimony supporting his position that it was a “group thing,” rather
than one-on-one dancing with him. Aplt. App. at 125. But Wal-Mart’s
investigative finding did not state that he was dancing one-on-one with the gift
card recipients and he does not deny that he participated in the dancing. See id.(same witness testifying that “everybody was dancing”). Thus, he has not shown
any factual dispute regarding this finding of misconduct.
Finally, Mr. Cooper asserts that Wal-Mart’s finding that he direct-billed the
cost of his wife’s hotel room to the company is not only wrong, but “so fishy and
suspicious” that it casts doubt on all of the other reasons for his termination, and
a jury could therefore reasonably find that Wal-Mart lacks all credibility.
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Jaramillo, 427 F.3d at 1310 (quotation omitted). We agree with Mr. Cooper that,
based on the record before us, he has shown a substantial weakness in the
evidence presented to Mr. Moore on this issue. He points to testimony that he
gave cash to another Wal-Mart employee who paid for the hotel room. 7 On the
other hand, Wal-Mart’s investigative findings state only that Mr. Cooper “direct
billed” Wal-Mart for the cost of the hotel room, id. at 66, 85, without any
indication in the record what that conclusion means, what it is based upon, or
whether any evidence was presented to Mr. Moore to support it. Wal-Mart does
not even address this reason for Mr. Cooper’s termination in its appeal brief.
We cannot conclude, however, that the pretextual character of this one
reason for Mr. Cooper’s termination is sufficient to undermine the veracity of the
numerous other reasons proffered by Wal-Mart, which remain uncontested. With
no evidence that Mr. Moore’s true motivation was racial, no reasonable jury could
infer solely from the uncertainty whether this one reason was real or phony, that
the true motivation for Mr. Cooper’s termination was indeed his race. See Russell
v. Acme-Evans Co., 51 F.3d 64, 70 (7th Cir. 1995). Moreover, having failed to
7
The district court dismissed this evidence based on the witness’s suggestion
that the money had come from the Wal-Mart cash office, but there is no such
suggestion in the testimony. The witness simply answered “No” when asked if
Mr. Cooper ever indicated that the money had been taken from a Wal-Mart
account. Aplt. App. at 126.
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cast substantial doubt on many of Wal-Mart’s reasons, Mr. Cooper has failed to
show pretext on that basis. See Tyler, 232 F.3d at 814.
Evidence that Similarly Situated Employees
Were Treated Differently
A plaintiff may show pretext “by providing evidence that he was treated
differently from other similarly-situated, nonprotected employees who violated
work rules of comparable seriousness.” Kendrick, 220 F.3d at 1232. Wal-Mart
conducted an investigation in response to the allegations Mr. Cooper made against
other store managers in the Open Door complaint he submitted following his
termination. He argues that four other store managers, all of whom are Hispanic,
were charged with similar misconduct, but received less-severe discipline. He
asserts that the evidence of disparate treatment supports an inference that
Wal-Mart’s reasons for terminating him were a pretext for discrimination.
The parties do not dispute that these other store managers reported to the
same supervisor and were subject to the same standards of performance and
discipline as Mr. Cooper. See id. But Wal-Mart contends that he has failed to
proffer evidence showing that their violations of work rules were of comparable
seriousness to his violations. “This is crucial because in order to infer that the
disparate treatment of two similarly situated employees was tinged with
discriminatory animus, the two employees’ violations of company policy must be
of comparable seriousness.” Timmerman, 483 F.3d at 1121. Mr. Cooper “bears
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the burden of producing evidence that these employees were similarly situated.”
Riggs v. AirTran Airways, Inc., 497 F.3d 1108, 1121 n.4 (10th Cir. 2007).
Although Mr. Cooper focuses on the allegations of misconduct against the
other employees, the relevant evidence pertains to Wal-Mart’s findings of
violations and resulting discipline. At best, the undisputed evidence in the record
shows findings of misconduct by the other store managers that were both less
severe and less frequent than Mr. Cooper’s misconduct. None of the four had as
many findings of misconduct against them as Mr. Cooper did. 8 And none of the
allegations substantiated against the other store managers involved offenses as
serious as misappropriation of company funds. 9
Mr. Cooper protests that the degree of severity of misconduct is always a
question for the jury, but we have upheld summary judgment where a plaintiff’s
pretext argument based on disparate discipline fails to present evidence of a
violation of comparable severity. See, e.g., Timmerman, 483 F.3d at 1121 (noting
plaintiff failed to establish that other employees’ violations were as frequent and
8
Mr. Cooper contends that, like him, one other store manager “was charged
with a litany of misconduct,” which he characterizes as “similar to claims
Wal-Mart is making against Cooper.” Aplt. Opening Br. at 31-32. But the record
indicates that only six of seventeen allegations against this store manager were
substantiated.
9
Although Mr. Cooper asserts that another store manager “was also accused
of misconduct involving misappropriation, similar to claims made against [him],”
Aplt. Opening Br. at 31, he fails to support this contention with a citation to the
record. Nor did our review of the record reveal evidence of a finding of
misappropriation of company funds involving this other store manager.
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involved a comparable dollar amount as her own misconduct); Kendrick, 220 F.3d
at 1232 (holding plaintiff failed to show pretext based on disparate discipline
because physical pushing of a superior constituted a violation of greater severity
than verbal abuse by other employees).
Furthermore, we rejected the same argument in Riggs, 497 F3d at 1116-17.
We acknowledged that, “at the summary judgment stage, the plaintiff need only
produce evidence that similarly situated employees were treated differently.” Id.
at 1117. But we rejected the plaintiff’s premise that the district court must have
made improper factual findings in support of its determination that other
employees were not similarly situated, concluding that “[t]he district court was
plainly allowed to make the determination that Ms. Riggs did not produce
sufficient evidence of disparate treatment to create a genuine issue of material
fact for trial.” Id. Thus, we upheld the district court’s distinction between the
plaintiff’s misconduct involving customers and the other employees’ offenses,
noting that she proffered no evidence suggesting that the employer considered the
other offenses to be as egregious as hers. Id. at 1120-21.
We reach the same conclusion here. Mr. Cooper has not proffered evidence
of violations by other store managers’ violations of comparable seriousness to his
own misconduct sufficient to carry his burden of persuasion in showing pretext
based on Wal-Mart’s disparate discipline of similarly situated employees.
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Evidence of Procedural Irregularities
in Wal-Mart’s Investigation
Mr. Cooper’s final contention is that Wal-Mart’s failure to seek his
response to the allegations of misconduct, and its failure to interview additional
employees in its investigation, are sufficient procedural irregularities to show that
its reasons for terminating him were a pretext for discrimination. “We have
previously held that disturbing procedural irregularities surrounding an adverse
employment action may demonstrate that an employer’s proffered
nondiscriminatory business reason is pretextual.” Timmerman, 483 F.3d at 1122.
But “[t]he mere fact that an employer failed to follow its own internal procedures
does not necessarily suggest that the substantive reasons given by the employer
for its employment decision were pretextual.” Berry v. T-Mobile USA, Inc.,
490 F.3d 1211, 1222 (10th Cir. 2007) (quotation and ellipsis omitted).
In order to establish pretext based on a procedural irregularity, a plaintiff
must identify an applicable written or unwritten policy or procedure that the
employer failed to follow. See id. (noting plaintiff pointed to no written policy
and no evidence of an unwritten specific approach to progressive discipline);
Jaramillo, 427 F.3d at 1312-13 (holding failure to administer examination that
was not required “is not a procedural irregularity”). Here there is no dispute that
Wal-Mart did not seek out Mr. Cooper’s side of the story before Mr. Moore
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decided to terminate him. 10 Mr. Cooper asserts that three policies required
Wal-Mart to do so: the Open Door policy, the Respect for the Individual policy,
and Wal-Mart’s progressive discipline policy called “The Coaching For
Improvement Process.” Aplt. App. at 168. Mr. Cooper fails to point us to the
text of either of the first two policies in the record, and unlike the district court,
we will not assume that he correctly characterizes their requirements in his
argument.
Mr. Cooper does not dispute that, under Wal-Mart’s progressive discipline
policy, it could terminate him immediately for gross misconduct, without
applying step discipline. But he contends that the Coaching for Improvement
policy required Wal-Mart to obtain his statement before determining whether he
engaged in gross misconduct. One of the “Guidelines for Administering the
Coaching for Improvement Process” is to “Discuss the situation with the
Associate to get their side and any additional facts.” Id. at 169. But as Wal-Mart
notes, the policy also states that “Associates who are deemed to have engaged in
Gross Misconduct are subject to immediate termination. This is not part of the
10
Wal-Mart argues that Mr. Cooper was given ample opportunity to give his
statement after his termination and that Mr. Moore considered that statement, as
evidenced by the further investigation conducted. But there is no indication in
Mr. Moore’s affidavit that he reviewed Mr. Cooper’s post-termination responses
to the misconduct allegations with an eye toward potentially reevaluating his prior
decision, and the subsequent investigation focused solely on Mr. Cooper’s
allegations against other employees.
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Coaching for Improvement process.” Id. at 170. We agree with the district court
that the guideline to seek out the employee’s side of the story appears to apply to
all investigations, “as the determination of whether the misconduct is ‘gross’ does
not occur until after the step allowing the employee to provide input.” Id. at 193.
But plaintiff failed to present any evidence that Wal-Mart believed its policy
mandated getting his side of the story before he was terminated. See Aplt.
Opening Br. at 29 (reciting Wal-Mart’s explanation that it did not get a statement
from him because the violations were so numerous he could not possibly rebut
every one). We have held that, if the decision makers did not believe that a rigid
policy existed, their mistake in failing to follow it does not show pretext. See
Berry, 490 F.3d at 1222.
Moreover, Mr. Cooper ignores that the standard for establishing pretext
requires evidence of not just any procedural shortfall, but of a “disturbing
procedural irregularity,” Timmerman, 483 F.3d at 1122, often exemplified by an
employer’s “falsifying or manipulating of relevant criteria,” Plotke v. White,
405 F.3d 1092, 1104 (10th Cir. 2005) (quotation and brackets omitted). In Plotke
we held that the plaintiff’s evidence supported an inference that her employer had
fabricated a memo after the fact to support its decision to terminate her, raising a
genuine doubt about the employer’s motivation. Id. at 1104-05.
In contrast, on facts similar to those presented here, we concluded that an
employer’s a failure to follow its normal investigative practice of seeking out the
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employee’s side of the story was insufficient to suggest that its reasons for
terminating the plaintiff were false. In Riggs the employer admitted that an
investigation of misconduct typically included obtaining a statement from the
employee, 497 F.3d at 1114, but the employer failed to do so before terminating
Ms. Riggs, id. at 1119. Her supervisor explained that, after receiving a customer
complaint, she did not discuss the issue further with Ms. Riggs because the
plaintiff was on vacation at the time and the customer’s description of the
employee involved in the misconduct fit only the plaintiff. Id. We concluded
that, “[a]lthough allowing Ms. Riggs to complete her side of the story would seem
to be the most fair way of addressing the situation, we cannot say that [her
supervisor’s] failure to do so in these circumstances constitutes a disturbing
procedural irregularity sufficient to prove pretext.” Id. (quotation omitted). We
reach the same conclusion here: Mr. Cooper has not proffered evidence of a
disturbing procedural irregularity based upon Wal-Mart’s failure to get his side of
the story before deciding to terminate him.
Finally, Mr. Cooper argues that Wal-Mart’s investigation was biased
because, out of over 400 employees, it chose to interview only those few who
could corroborate the allegations against him. He contends this demonstrates that
Wal-Mart’s proffered reasons for his termination were a pretext for
discrimination. The record shows that Wal-Mart interviewed approximately 21
employees in its investigation, including Ms. Quintana and Mr. Cooper’s
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co-manager, both of whom were also terminated. Although Mr. Cooper asserts
that “[s]ignificant employees who could or would dispute the claims were
apparently not interviewed,” Aplt. Opening Br. at 27, he fails to identify a single
additional witness or present any evidence that the witnesses Wal-Mart
interviewed were biased. Nor does he identify any policy, written or unwritten,
that required Wal-Mart to interview more or different witnesses. Thus, he fails to
carry his burden to present evidence of a disturbing procedural irregularity based
on the witnesses that Wal-Mart interviewed, or failed to interview, in its
investigation. 11
Conclusion
Although Mr. Cooper did not have a burden to establish conclusively at the
summary judgment stage whether Wal-Mart’s stated reasons for his termination
were pretextual, he “was required to establish that there is a genuine factual
dispute with regard to the truth.” Swackhammer, 493 F.3d at 1170 (quotation
omitted). That genuine factual dispute must relate to whether Mr. Moore “acted
in good faith upon the beliefs he held.” Id. Viewed in the light most favorable to
plaintiff’s position, the evidence in the record does not call into question whether
Mr. Moore or Wal-Mart actually relied, honestly and in good faith, upon the
11
In light of our previous conclusions, we also reject Mr. Cooper’s assertion
that his evidence of procedural irregularities, when considered in combination
with his other evidence, is sufficient to show pretext.
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misconduct findings in the investigation in making the decision to terminate
Mr. Cooper’s employment. See id.The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
Entered for the Court
Bobby R. Baldock
Circuit Judge
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