Franks v. Newton-Embry ( 2011 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
January 31, 2011
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
TENTH CIRCUIT
DEBORAH FRANKS,
Petitioner - Appellant,
No. 10-6169
v. (D.C. No. 09-CV-00943-R)
(W.D. Okla.)
MILLICENT NEWTON-EMBRY,
Warden,
Respondent - Appellee.
ORDER
DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY
Before KELLY, EBEL, and LUCERO, Circuit Judges.
Deborah Franks, an Oklahoma state inmate appearing pro se, seeks a
certificate of appealability (“COA”) to challenge the district court’s denial of her
petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. A COA is
jurisdictional and may issue only “only if the applicant has made a substantial
showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). Because
this showing is lacking, we deny a COA and dismiss the appeal.
Ms. Franks was convicted of the first-degree murder of her husband, Randy
Franks, and conspiracy to commit murder. During the trial Ms. Franks’s co-
defendant, Joseph Scholz, testified that Ms. Franks conspired with Mr. Scholz to
kill Mr. Franks. 1 R. 428. Upon the jury’s recommendation, she was sentenced
to consecutive prison terms of life and ten years. Id. 427. On direct appeal, the
Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals (OCCA) affirmed her conviction and
sentence. Id. 204.
Ms. Franks then sought post-conviction relief in state court. Id. 207.
Included in her application was an affidavit of Mr. Scholz recanting his trial
testimony. The trial court denied Ms. Franks’s application. Id. 322. On appeal,
the OCCA remanded for an evidentiary hearing concerning the veracity and
materiality of the change in testimony. Id. 393. On remand, Mr. Scholz (upon
advice of counsel) did not testify, and the state district court found the veracity of
the allegations in the affidavit lacking. Id. 397. It also determined that the
allegations would have been known and should have been previously raised. Id.The OCCA affirmed. Id. 432. Ms. Franks then filed a second post-conviction
application in state court, which she voluntarily dismissed prior to filing her
federal habeas petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The magistrate judge
recommended Ms. Franks’s federal petition be denied. The district court
considered in turn Ms. Franks’s objections and adopted the magistrate judge’s
report and recommendation. Franks v. Newton-Embry, No. CIV-09-943, 2010
WL 2632022 (W.D. Okla. June 28, 2010).
A COA requires an applicant to demonstrate “that reasonable jurists could
debate whether (or, for that matter, agree that) the petition should have been
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resolved in a different manner or that the issues presented were adequate to
deserve encouragement to proceed further.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473,
484 (2000) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “Where a plain
procedural bar is present and the district court is correct to invoke it to dispose of
the case, a reasonable jurist could not conclude either that the district court erred
in dismissing the petition or that the petitioner should be allowed to proceed
further.” Id.On appeal, Ms. Franks argues that her counsel was ineffective based upon
incorrect jury instructions and an inadequate investigation. Aplt. Br. 3. She also
argues that prosecutorial misconduct deprived her of a fair trial. Id. We consider
these arguments in turn and assume without deciding the timeliness of Ms.
Franks’s petition.
Ms. Franks first argues that counsel failed to object to several incorrect
jury instructions and that the district court’s decision to apply anticipatory
procedural bar to this claim was error. As noted by the district court, this claim
was never raised before the Oklahoma courts (either on direct appeal or on post-
conviction) and is unexhausted. Franks, 2010 WL 2632022, at *1. The district
court also determined that Ms. Franks could not show cause or prejudice or a
fundamental miscarriage of justice. Id. at *3.
Ms. Franks argues that this obvious procedural bar should be excused
because she had the same counsel on direct appeal and at trial. See Welch v.
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Workman, 607 F.3d 674, 704 (10th Cir. 2010) (“The Oklahoma requirement that a
claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel be raised on direct appeal is an
adequate ground for procedural default if (1) the defendant’s counsel on direct
appeal is different from trial counsel and (2) the claims can be resolved on the
trial record alone.”); English v. Cody, 146 F.3d 1257, 1264 (10th Cir. 1998).
Even assuming that her jury instruction claims could not be resolved on the trial
record alone (excusing the procedural bar on direct appeal), these jury instruction
claims are procedurally barred because they were not raised in the first post-
conviction application. Okla. Stat. tit. 22, § 1086; Moore v. Reynolds, 153 F.3d
1086, 1097 (10th Cir. 1998). Although Ms. Franks argues that presenting these
claims would have been futile, our precedent is clear that such ineffectiveness
claims must be presented to the OCCA in the first post-conviction application
before presenting them in federal court. Cargle v. Mullin, 317 F.3d 1196, 1212
n.15 (10th Cir. 2003). The district court’s resolution of this claim is not
reasonably debatable.
Ms. Franks also argues that counsel was ineffective for failing to
investigate by not interviewing Mr. Scholz prior to trial. She suggests that this
prejudiced her defense because Mr. Scholz later recanted his testimony. The
magistrate judge rejected this claim on the basis that Ms. Franks could not
demonstrate prejudice, i.e. “a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.”
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Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984). We note that the OCCA
reached a similar conclusion on post-conviction, albeit in the context of rejecting
Ms. Franks’s claim that her counsel was ineffective due to a conflict of interest.
1 R. 431 (“Petitioner has not established [that] her trial and appellate counsel was
ineffective in handling the co-defendant, or that based on the results of the
evidentiary hearing the outcome of her trial and appeal would have been
different.”). The OCCA also rejected the recantation as unsupported by any
credible evidence. Id. (“[N]o evidence was presented that supported the affidavit
of the co-defendant.”). Whether on the merits or a result of deference paid to
state court resolution of claims and findings of fact, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) & (e),
this claim is not reasonably debatable.
Nor is Ms. Franks’s argument concerning prosecutorial misconduct. Ms.
Franks contends that the prosecutor’s statement, “There is enough evidence here
from her own words to convict her without Joe Scholz. But we wanted you to
have everything,” constitutes prosecutorial misconduct and deprived her of a fair
trial. The OCCA rejected a larger prosecutorial misconduct claim on the basis of
no plain error. 1 R. 117, 203-04. We agree with the magistrate judge that given
our deferential standard of review, the OCCA’s conclusion on this record is not
reasonably debatable, particularly given the context of the statement and the
strength of the evidence against Ms. Franks. See Douglas v. Workman, 560 F.3d
1156, 1177-78 (10th Cir. 2009) (per curiam) (analyzing state court plain error
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rejection of prosecutorial misconduct claim).
We DENY a COA and IFP status and dismiss the appeal.
Entered for the Court
Paul J. Kelly, Jr.
Circuit Judge
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