United States v. Price , 298 F. App'x 779 ( 2008 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
October 31, 2008
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
TENTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee, No. 08-5048
v. (N.D. Oklahoma)
WARD LARAY PRICE, (D.C. No. 4:89-CR-00091-HDC-1)
Defendant - Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before BRISCOE, MURPHY, and HARTZ, Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this court has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
In 1989, Ward Laray Price was convicted of conspiracy to distribute
cocaine base (Count 1) and possession of cocaine with intent to distribute (Count
2). United States v. Price (Price I), 945 F.2d 331, 331-32 (10th Cir. 1991). Price
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited,
however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th
Cir. R. 32.1.
was sentenced under the then-mandatory Sentencing Guidelines to life
imprisonment on Count 1 and thirty years’ imprisonment on Count 2, with the
sentences to run concurrently. Id. at 332. Price’s sentence was reversed on direct
appeal based on a procedural error. Id. at 333. On remand, the district court
imposed the same sentence, basing it on a Criminal History Category I and a total
offense level of forty-four. That sentence was affirmed on appeal. United States
v. Price (Price II), No. 92-5033, 1993 WL 191841, at *4 (10th Cir. June 4, 1993).
On March 10, 2008, Price filed a motion pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2)
seeking a reduction in his term of imprisonment. Price’s motion was based on
Amendment 706 which was promulgated by the United States Sentencing
Commission on November 1, 2007. 1 Amendment 706 revised the § 2D1.1(c)
Drug Quantity Table and, consequently, the guidelines ranges applicable to
offenses involving crack cocaine. See U.S.S.G. app. C supp., amend. 706;
U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c) (Supp. May 1, 2008). The district court denied Price’s
motion, concluding a reduction in his sentence was not authorized under 18
U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) because Amendment 706 does not have the effect of lowering
his applicable guideline range. See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) (providing a court
may only modify a sentence “in the case of a defendant who has been sentenced
to a term of imprisonment based on a sentencing range that has subsequently been
1
Amendment 706 was made retroactive by Amendment 713. See U.S.S.G.
app. C, amend. 713 (Supp. May 1, 2008).
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lowered by the Sentencing Commission pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 994(o)” if the
“reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the
Sentencing Commission”). Price then brought this appeal.
This court reviews a district court’s decision whether to reduce a sentence
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) for abuse of discretion. United States v.
Dorrough, 84 F.3d 1309, 1311 (10th Cir. 1996). When a district court’s decision
involves a legal interpretation, however, the review is de novo. United States v.
Todd, 515 F.3d 1128, 1135 (10th Cir. 2008). Here, the district court concluded
Amendment 706 was inapplicable because it did not lower Price’s applicable
guidelines range. See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2); see also U.S.S.G.
§ 1B1.10(a)(2)(B) (Supp. May 1, 2008) (providing a reduction in a defendant’s
sentence is not authorized pursuant to § 3582(c)(2) if the applicable guidelines
amendment “does not have the effect of lowering the defendant’s applicable
guideline range”). The district court reasoned that “the sentencing Court found
[Price] conspired to distribute in excess of seven kilograms of crack cocaine” and
the base offense level for seven kilograms of crack was unchanged by
Amendment 706.
Price argues Amendment 706 had the effect of lowering his base offense
level from thirty-six to thirty-four, consequently reducing his applicable
guidelines range from life imprisonment to 360 months to life. As support for
this argument, Price correctly identifies an error in the district court’s
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analysis—when he was sentenced in 1992, the court did not find that he conspired
to distribute seven kilograms of cocaine base.
Although the Presentence Investigation Report states that Price distributed
seven kilograms of cocaine base, the finding made at his 1992 sentencing was
only that Price had distributed in excess of 500 grams of crack. Price II, 1993
WL 191841, at *1. That finding was based on the following argument made by
the government:
I know there has been a lot of objections to the amount and the
finding by the presentence report of seven kilos. Well, it’s not
important that Your Honor find that there was seven kilos, only that
you find that there was evidence in the record of over 500 grams, and
that is a conservative viewpoint, but that is the view point the
government is adopting in this case, Judge. I’m not saying there
wasn’t evidence of seven kilos, we think that is also satisfied here if
you multiply it out, but certainly from Ward Price’s own mouth on
two occasions, we have evidence of over 500 grams.
The court then made the following finding: “The transcript at trial clearly
demonstrates, and the court believes that it is reliable that the amount exceeded
the 500 grams, and therefore the court so finds that it did in fact so exceed the
500 grams.” (emphasis added). When Price challenged the finding on direct
appeal, this court interpreted the district court’s ruling the same way Price does in
this appeal. We concluded the court did not clearly err “in finding by a
preponderance of the evidence that Mr. Price and his co-conspirators distributed
in excess of 500 grams of crack cocaine.” Id.-4-
Pursuant to the Drug Quantity Table, as revised by Amendment 706,
offenses involving 500 grams of cocaine base are assigned a base offense level of
thirty-four, two levels lower than the base offense level of thirty-six used to
determine Price’s applicable guidelines range at his sentencing. See U.S.S.G.
§ 2D1.1(c)(3) (Supp. May 1, 2008). Thus, Price is correct that Amendment 706
has the effect of lowering his applicable guidelines range to 360 months to life.
The district court erred when it concluded otherwise, leading to the court’s failure
to exercise its discretion under § 3582(c)(2).
The government makes two arguments in defense of the district court’s
ruling. First, the government asserts the district court’s conclusion that Price’s
applicable guidelines range was unchanged by Amendment 706 was based on a
new finding that Price was responsible for seven kilograms of cocaine base. 2 The
government also argues the district court did not abuse its discretion even if
Amendment 706 reduced Price’s base offense level because the court’s conclusion
that Price’s conduct involved seven kilograms of cocaine, rather than the 500
grams determined by the court at the 1992 sentencing, provided an ample basis to
deny Price’s motion. See United States v. Mueller, 27 F.3d 494, 497 n.5 (10th
Cir. 1994) (stating a court’s power under § 3582(c)(2) is discretionary and a
defendant “is not entitled to an automatic reduction”).
2
The government has not identified any support for the proposition that a
district court considering a § 3582(c)(2) motion can make factual findings that
differ from the findings made by the sentencing court.
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The problem with both of the government’s arguments is that they
mischaracterize the district court’s ruling. The court did not make any new
factual findings or draw new conclusions about the quantity of drugs involved in
the conspiracy. Instead, it simply stated, “The sentencing Court found [Price]
conspired to distribute in excess of seven kilograms of crack cocaine.” Thus, the
court’s decision was based on its erroneous conclusion that the sentencing court
found the conspiracy in which Price participated was responsible for distributing
at least seven kilograms of crack cocaine, not a new determination the conspiracy
distributed seven kilograms. The government’s arguments fail because they are
premised on the erroneous position that the district court determined Price’s
offense of conviction involved seven kilograms of cocaine base.
Because the district court’s error led to its failure to exercise the discretion
granted it under § 3582(c)(2), we reverse the order denying Price’s Motion to
Modify Term of Imprisonment and remand for further proceedings not
inconsistent with this opinion. 3 We deny Price’s request for appointment of
counsel to represent him on appeal as moot. 4
3
Our disposition of this appeal renders it unnecessary to consider Price’s
argument that the district court erred by not applying United States v. Booker, 543
U.S. 220 (2005) when it considered his § 3582(c)(2) motion. See United States v.
Hicks, 472 F.3d 1167 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding that when a defendant’s sentence
qualifies for reconsideration pursuant to § 3582(c)(2), the resentencing must be
conducted in conformity with Booker).
4
Because the issue is not before us, we express no opinion on whether the
(continued...)
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ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Michael R. Murphy
Circuit Judge
4
(...continued)
district court must appoint counsel for Price on remand. See United States v.
Robinson, No. 08-10424, 2008 WL 4150128, at *5 (5th Cir. Sept. 10, 2008)
(discussing the constitutional and statutory questions involved in the issue and
then appointing counsel “in the interest of justice”); see also United States v.
Olden, No. 08-5060, 2008 WL 4596336, at *3 (10th Cir. Oct. 15, 2008)
(unpublished disposition) (concluding there is no constitutional right to counsel
for the purpose of bringing a § 3582(c)(2) motion).
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