Spahr v. Ferber Resorts, LLC ( 2011 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
March 23, 2011
TENTH CIRCUIT
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
E. JAMES SPAHR; COLLEEN
SPAHR,
Plaintiffs - Appellees, No. 10-4055
(D.C. No. 2:08-CV-00072-CW)
v. (D. Utah)
FERBER RESORTS, LLC, d/b/a
Rodeway Inn & Suites,
Defendant - Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before KELLY, TACHA, and LUCERO, Circuit Judges.
Defendant-Appellant Ferber Resorts, LLC (“Ferber Resorts”) appeals from
a judgment on a jury verdict awarding $393,001.45 to Plaintiff-Appellee James
Spahr on his negligence claim and $42,498.55 to Plaintiff-Appellee Colleen
Spahr, his wife, for loss of consortium. After trial, Ferber Resorts unsuccessfully
moved for judgment as a matter of law or, in the alternative, a new trial or
remittitur. Utah law applies in this diversity case, and our jurisdiction arises
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited,
however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th
Cir. R. 32.1.
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We affirm.
Background
Because this is an appeal from the denial of judgment as a matter of law,
we view the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party—here, Mr.
and Mrs. Spahr. Rocky Mountain Christian Church v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 613
F.3d 1229, 1235 (10th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted). Viewed in this light, the
evidence established the following facts.
From October 1-4, 2006, Mr. and Mrs. Spahr were guests at the Rodeway
Inn in Springdale, Utah, near Zion National Park. Aplt. App. 609-10, 941.
Ferber Resorts owned and operated the facility, which consisted of four separate
structures. Aplt. Br. 5; Aplee. Supp. App. 13. The main office—and an ice
machine—were housed in a building separate from that which contained the
Spahrs’ room. Aplee. Supp. App. 13. A ditch or wash that channeled runoff from
the surrounding hills ran between the two buildings. 1 Id. The hotel’s parking lot
extended from the main office to the front of the separate building, crossing the
wash. Id. at 13, 14. Guests in the separate building could safely access the main
office by walking through the center of the parking lot or by crossing the wash on
a small footbridge located a short distance north of the parking lot. Id. at 13. To
1
The Spahrs refer to the ditch as a “pit” or “hole,” while Ferber terms it a
“natural wash” or “culvert.” For purposes of this appeal, we use the terms
“ditch,” “wash” or “culvert” interchangeably.
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use the bridge, guests in the Spahrs’ room would have to walk behind the separate
building across concrete pavers in the grass—a route that was not illuminated at
night. Id. at 13, 15; Aplt. App. 523. By contrast, the parking lot was directly in
front of the Spahrs’ room and was designed to be lighted at night. Aplee Supp.
App. 13; Aplt. App. 970-71.
The wash flowed under the parking lot by means of a culvert. Aplee. Supp.
App. 13. Although it varied in width and depth, where the wash intersected the
parking lot it was approximately six feet deep and seven feet wide. Id. at 4, 11,
13. At this intersection concrete wingwalls—designed to funnel runoff into the
culvert and under the parking lot—bolstered the wash on three sides. Id. at 5, 14.
The asphalt surface of the parking lot surrounded the wingwalls—in other words,
the six-foot drop of the wash protruded into the parking lot for a distance of
several yards. Id. Large rocks shielded two sides of the wash, but not the side
facing the Spahrs’ building. Id. at 7, 14.
On the morning of October 4, 2006, the Spahrs awoke at 4:30 a.m. Aplt.
App. 515. Shortly before 6:00, Mr. Spahr left the room carrying a cooler,
intending to fill it with ice near the main office. Id. at 519-20, 581. Instead of
walking through the center of the parking lot or to the footbridge via the concrete
pavers—where it was dark—Mr. Spahr saw the lights of the main office and
headed directly towards them along the north edge of the parking lot. Id. at 522-
23; Aplee. Supp. App. 14. Ambient lighting illuminated the parking lot, but it
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was too dark for Mr. Spahr to distinguish between the black of the asphalt and the
darkness of the wash. Aplt. App. 523-24. Mr. Spahr stepped directly off the edge
of the parking lot into the six-foot drop of the wash. Id. at 524, 528-29.
Although there was a light pole adjacent to the wash, the light was not on when
Mr. Spahr fell. Id. at 543-44, 612; Aplee. Supp. App. 14. The lights in the
parking lot were controlled by means of a timer, which had to be manually
adjusted as the days grew shorter. Aplt. App. 970-71; Aplee. Supp. App. 16. On
October 4, the timer was set to extinguish the lights at 6:00 a.m.—even though it
was still dark at that time. Aplt. App. 612.
The fall severed the patellar tendon in Mr. Spahr’s left knee. Id. at 317,
613-14. After his fall, Mr. Spahr could not climb out of the wash, and he called
for help for twenty minutes before assistance arrived. Id. at 613. As a result of
his injuries, Mr. Spahr incurred approximately $30,000 in economic damages.
See id. at 101. He underwent four months of physical therapy; although he
regained some use of his knee, he did not fully recover. Id. at 561, 567-68, 573.
Mr. Spahr can no longer climb ladders or kneel down—activities necessary to his
hobbies, which included carpentry and gardening. Id. at 504, 506, 573.
Moreover, he cannot engage in activities he used to enjoy, such as jogging,
hiking, ice skating, or racquetball, without pain. Id. at 503-04, 567-70. The
injury also negatively affected his intimate life, id. at 571, and there remains a
large scar on his knee which Mr. Spahr describes as “traumatic.” Id. at 573-74;
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Aplee. Supp. App. 80-82.
In 2008, Mr. Spahr brought a negligence suit against Ferber Resorts. See
Aplt. App. 3, 19. Mrs. Spahr brought a derivative action for loss of consortium.
Aplt. App. 20; see Utah Code Ann. § 30-2-11. After a week-long trial, the jury
awarded $393,001.45 to Mr. Spahr on his negligence claim and $42,498.55 to
Mrs. Spahr for loss of consortium. Aplt. App. 103-04. The damage awards
reflect a downward adjustment of one percent to account for Mr. Spahr’s
comparative negligence. Spahr v. Ferber Resorts, LLC, 686 F. Supp. 2d 1214,
1217 (D. Utah 2010); Aplt. App. 100. After trial, Ferber Resorts moved for
judgment as a matter of law or, in the alternative, for a new trial or remittitur of
damages. See Spahr, 686 F. Supp. 2d at 1216; Doc. Nos. 96, 97. 2 The district
court denied the motion. See Spahr, 686 F. Supp. 2d at 1217; Aplt. App. 128.
On appeal, Ferber Resorts argues first that the district court erred in
submitting the case to the jury. According to Ferber, it owed no duty to warn or
protect Mr. Spahr because the wash and the darkness were open and obvious
conditions, and the lack of lighting was a temporary condition which it had no
notice of or opportunity to remedy. Aplt. Br. 14-15. Second, Ferber argues that
Mr. Spahr was not “injured” within the meaning of Utah Code § 30-2-11, which
2
Ferber did not include a copy of the motion in its appendix as required by
Fed. R. App. P. 30(a)(1)(B) and 10th Cir. R. 30.1(A)(1) and 10.3(D)(2). We have
accessed the motion through the district court’s docket, but do not recommend
relying upon this discretionary procedure. See Tenth Cir. R. 10.3(B); Allan v.
Springville City, 388 F.3d 1331, 1334 (10th Cir. 2004).
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governs loss of consortium. Id. Third, it claims that the district court should
have granted a new trial on the basis of counsel’s improper closing argument. Id.
at 15. Finally, Ferber contends that it is entitled to remittitur and a new trial
because the damages were excessive and not supported by the evidence. Id.
Discussion
A. Denial of Judgment as a Matter of Law.
Our review of the denial of a Rule 50 motion is de novo. Escue v. N. Okla.
College, 450 F.3d 1146, 1156 (10th Cir. 2006). Only when the evidence would
not permit a reasonable jury to find in favor of the non-movant would judgment
as a matter of law be required. Manzanares v. Higdon, 575 F.3d 1135, 1142 (10th
Cir. 2009). In evaluating the denial of a Rule 50 motion, we view the evidence
and its inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Palmer v.
City of Monticello, 31 F.3d 1499, 1503 (10th Cir. 1994). We may not “weigh
evidence, judge witness credibility, or challenge the factual conclusions of the
jury.” Manzanares, 575 F.3d at 1142 (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted).
In this case Ferber Resorts moved for judgment as a matter of law on two
issues: (1) whether sufficient evidence supported a finding that Ferber Resorts
owed a duty to Mr. Spahr, and (2) whether sufficient evidence supported a finding
that Mr. Spahr was “injured” within the meaning of Utah Code § 30-2-11. Doc.
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97 at 3. We address each in turn.
1. Legal Duty.
Ferber Resorts’ duty towards business invitees is governed by the
Restatement (Second) of Torts applicable in Utah. See Hale v. Beckstead, 116
P.3d 263, 265-66 (Utah 2005). Section 343 of the Restatement provides:
A possessor of land is subject to liability for physical harm caused to
his invitees by a condition on the land if, but only if, he
(a) knows or by the exercise of reasonable care would discover the
condition, and should realize that it involves an unreasonable risk of
harm to such invitees, and
(b) should expect that they will not discover or realize the danger, or
will fail to protect themselves against it, and
(c) fails to exercise reasonable care to protect them against the
danger.
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 343 (1965).
Restatement § 343A governs “known or obvious dangers.” Under that
section “[a] possessor of land is not liable to his invitees for physical harm caused
to them by any . . . condition on the land whose danger is known or obvious to
them, unless the possessor should anticipate the harm despite such knowledge or
obviousness.” Restatement (Second) of Torts § 343A; see Beckstead, 116 P.3d at
266 (applying § 343A).
In this case, the jury found that the injury-causing condition was not known
or obvious. Aplt. App. 98. Sufficient evidence supports the jury’s finding:
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photographs showed that rocks and parked cars obscured the wash from view,
see Aplee. Supp. App. 8; both Mr. and Mrs. Spahr testified that they did not
notice the wash where it intersected with the parking lot until after the accident,
see Aplt. App. 352, 508, 524; and Mr. Spahr testified that he did not see the wash
on the morning of the accident given low lighting. Id. at 523-24.
Because the jury found that the wash was not known or obvious—a
conclusion supported by the evidence presented at trial—Restatement § 343, not
§ 343A, governs. 3 See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 343; id. § 343A
(governing only known or obvious dangers); Beckstead, 116 P.2d at 266. The
record reveals ample evidence to support each element of § 343.
First, evidence supports the jury’s finding that Ferber Resorts knew or
should have known about the wash and should have realized that it involved an
unreasonable risk of harm. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 343(a). Stewart
Ferber—the principal of Ferber Resorts, LLC—testified that he bought the
3
In its reply brief, Ferber Resorts cites Pratt v. Mitchell Hollow Irrigation
Co., 813 P.2d 1172-73 (Utah 1991), for the proposition that in Utah drainage
ditches are “open and obvious” as a matter of law. Aplt. Reply Br. 4. As this
argument appears for the first time in reply, we need not consider it. See Planned
Parenthood of Rocky Mountain Servs., Corp. v. Owens, 287 F.3d 910, 927 n.18
(10th Cir. 2002). Likewise, Ferber Resorts’ argument that this case is governed
by attractive nuisance cases is raised for the first time in the reply brief. See
Aplt. Reply Br. 5. Regardless, those arguments are off base—the wash protruded
into the parking lot, which was an approved means of egress and ingress for
business invitees. An unlit, six-foot-deep chasm in an approved path of travel
differs significantly from the run-of-the-mill irrigation ditches discussed in Pratt
and other cases. See, e.g., Pratt, 813 P.2d at 1171; Trujillo v. Brighton-North
Point Irrigation. Co., 746 P.2d 780, 781 (Utah 1987).
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property and designed the layout of the hotel, that he knew the wash separated the
office from the guest rooms, and that he “accept[ed] 100% responsibility” for
safety at the hotel. Aplt. App. 921-25, 975. An employee of Ferber Resorts,
David Prisbrey, testified that he was directly involved in constructing the culvert
and that he thought the culvert should be covered to prevent people from falling
in. Id. at 731, 735. Evidence also showed that Ferber Resorts knew the lights
were controlled by an automatic timer that required manual adjustment to keep up
with changing daylight hours. Id. at 970-71. Finally, evidence showed that
Ferber Resorts considered the parking lot a safe means of ingress and
egress—even at night, and even though the wash protruded into the parking lot
and was surrounded by pavement on three sides. Id. at 972-74.
Second, there was sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude that Ferber
Resorts should have expected that the guests would not discover or realize the
danger, or that they would fail to protect themselves against it. See Restatement
(Second) of Torts § 343(b). Photographs admitted at trial show that the
wash—which protruded into the parking lot and was surrounded by asphalt or
concrete on three sides—was partially obscured by boulders, making it possible
that a guest would not notice it during the daylight. Aplee. Supp. App. 8, 14.
Witnesses testified that the parking lot was part of the approved means of egress
and ingress between the guest rooms and the office and that rocks had previously
surrounded the entire culvert but had been removed where Mr. Spahr fell. Aplt.
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App. 685-87, 689, 732. Mr. Spahr also testified that there was minimal light at
the time of the accident. Id. at 523-24. The lights were set to turn off at 6:00
a.m.—even though it was still dark at that time, id. at 670, 672, 701, 739—and in
the low-light conditions, Mr. Spahr could not distinguish between the black of the
asphalt and the darkness of the wash. Id. at 523-34.
Finally, evidence supports the jury’s conclusion that Ferber Resorts failed
to exercise reasonable care to protect the Spahrs against the danger.
See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 343(c). David Prisbrey testified that he
spoke to Mr. Ferber about his concerns that people might fall into the wash, Aplt.
App. 735-36, yet Ferber Resorts did not warn the guests or construct any sort of
barrier to protect them from injury. See Aplee. Supp. App. 13. Further, Ferber
Resorts did not ensure that the wash was illuminated in low-light
conditions—certainly a reasonable step that could have been taken. Finally,
Ferber Resorts surrounded the wash with boulders on two sides, but left one side
completely open. Id. at 11; Aplt. App. 958, 960.
In sum, there is ample evidence from which the jury could conclude that
Ferber Resorts was liable under the elements of the Restatement § 343.
Therefore, the district court did not err in denying Ferber Resorts’ motion for
judgment as a matter of law.
Ferber Resorts advances several arguments on appeal, each of which is
unavailing. First, Ferber Resorts argues that the wash is “unquestionably” an
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open and obvious hazard, thereby precluding any legal duty to Mr. Spahr. Aplt.
Br. 22-24. Although the existence of a legal duty is a question of law, Ottens v.
McNeil, 239 P.3d 308, 317 (Utah Ct. App. 2010), it must be answered “under all
the facts.” Downing v. Hyland Pharmacy, 194 P.3d 944, 948 (Utah 2008)
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). No matter how strenuously
Ferber Resorts may disagree with the jury’s finding on this issue, it is amply
supported by the evidence.
Second, Ferber Resorts argues that the darkness was open and obvious, and
therefore under the “step in the dark rule” it owed no legal duty to Mr. Spahr.
Aplt. Br. 25. However, like the prior argument, this ignores the jury’s finding
that the hazardous condition—whether that condition be the open wash, the
darkness, or some combination of the two—was not known or obvious. Aplt.
App. 98. Because this conclusion is supported by the evidence, any argument
premised on alternative factual findings must fail on appeal.
Even if Ferber Resorts’ argument comported with the jury’s factual
findings, it seriously misapprehends Utah law. The common law “step in the
dark” rule is one of contributory negligence. See Black v. Nelson, 532 P.2d 212,
214 & n.3 (applying the “step in the dark rule” as a complete bar to recovery);
62A Am. Jur. 2d Premises Liability § 760 (2010) (noting that the step in the dark
rule is one of contributory negligence); 65A C.J.S. Negligence § 742 (2010)
(same). Utah abandoned its contributory negligence framework in 1973. See
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Beckstead, 116 P.2d at 268. Black v. Nelson applied the step in the dark rule
only because the facts of that case occurred before passage of the Comparative
Negligence Act. See Nelson, 532 P.2d at 214 n.3. Tellingly, Ferber Resorts cites
no subsequent case applying the rule—and indeed there are none, because the rule
was abandoned in 1973 along with the rest of the old contributory negligence
regime.
Finally, Ferber Resorts argues that it cannot be liable because the
insufficient lighting was a temporary condition and the Spahrs did not prove
notice and an opportunity to remedy the condition. Aplt. Br. 28. However, Utah
courts have made it clear that notice and opportunity to remedy are necessary
only when a third party creates the temporary unsafe condition—“If the unsafe
condition or defect was created by the defendant himself or his agents or
employees, the notice requirement does not apply.” See Jex v. JRA, Inc., 196
P.3d 576, 582 (Utah 2008) (internal quotation marks, brackets, and citation
omitted); see also Canfield v. Albertsons, Inc., 841 P.2d 1224, 1226 (Utah Ct.
App. 1992) (plaintiff does not need to establish notice where defendant creates
the unsafe condition). Here, Ferber Resorts constructed the parking lot and the
culvert, positioned the buildings such that the wash was between the office and
guest rooms, and either directly or indirectly ordered the removal of rocks from
one side of the wash. Aplt. App. 731-32, 921-25. Ferber Resorts also installed an
automatic timer on the parking lot lights, and was in control of adjusting the timer
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along with waning daylight. Id. at 725-26, 970-71. Thus, the evidence
establishes that Ferber Resorts created the dangerous condition. Under these
circumstances, notice and opportunity to remedy are not required. See Jex, 196
P.3d at 582. For this same reason we reject Ferber Resorts’ argument that the
jury should have been instructed on the requirement of notice and opportunity to
remedy. See Aplt. Br. 30.
2. Utah Code § 30-2-11.
Utah Code § 30-2-11 governs recovery for loss of consortium claims. In
relevant part, § 30-2-11 provides:
(1) For purposes of this section:
(a) “injury” or “injured” means a significant permanent injury to a
person that substantially changes that person’s lifestyle and includes
the following:
(i) a partial or complete paralysis of one or more of the extremities;
(ii) significant disfigurement; or
(iii) incapability of the person of performing the types of jobs the
person performed before the injury . . . .
Utah Code Ann. § 30-2-11 (emphasis added).
The plain language of the statute indicates that the injuries listed in
subsections (i)-(iii) are illustrative, not exhaustive. See Black’s Law Dictionary
(9th ed. 2009) (defining “include” as “To contain as a part of something. The
participle including typically indicates a partial list. . . . But some drafters use
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phrases such as including without limitation and including but not limited
to—which mean the same thing”). The Utah Supreme Court has interpreted
statutes with similar language as providing an illustrative—not exhaustive—list.
See Devore v. Bostrom, 632 P.2d 832, 835 (Utah 1981) (“Although the foregoing
section lists many expenses that are included as incidental damages, the list is not
intended to be exhaustive but is merely illustrative of the kinds of incidental
expenses which can be recovered.”).
Despite the statute’s plain language, one Utah case gives us pause. In
Boyle v. Christenson, the Utah court of appeals addressed the same issue before
us, namely whether the plaintiff in a loss of consortium action produced sufficient
evidence of “injury” within the meaning of § 30-2-11. 219 P.3d 58, 62 (Utah Ct.
App. 2009). The court of appeals upheld the district court’s determination that
the plaintiff did not prove an “injury” under subsection (iii) because the plaintiff
maintained the same employment both before and after the injury. Id. at 63. The
plaintiff was also unable to prove either paralysis (subsection (i)) or significant
disfigurement (subsection (ii)). Id.However, Boyle does not dispose of the issue. The court specifically noted
that “both parties argued to the district court and on appeal that no loss of
consortium claim will lie unless the injured spouse suffers paralysis of an
extremity, significant disfigurement, or job incapacity. Accepting this
interpretation of the statute for purposes of this appeal, we agree with the district
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court.” Id. at 62-63 (underlining added). In a footnote, the court emphasized that
it “express[ed] no opinion on whether the parties are correct in their interpretation
of section 30-2-11(1)(a).” Id. at 63 n.3. Thus, the court of appeals was not
definitively interpreting the statute, but rather merely addressing the arguments
before it.
Without clear guidance from the Utah Supreme Court, we must anticipate
how that court might rule. Lamb v. Rizzo, 391 F.3d 1133, 1137 (10th Cir. 2004).
Given the plain language of § 30-2-11, the Utah Supreme Court’s interpretation of
similar statutes, and the absence of any authority to the contrary, we predict that
the Utah Supreme Court would treat the listed injuries in § 30-2-11(1)(a)(i)-(iii)
as illustrative, not exhaustive. Thus, denial of judgment as a matter of law was
appropriate so long as there is evidence from which a reasonable jury could
conclude that Mr. Spahr suffered a “significant permanent injury” that
“substantially change[d] [his] lifestyle.” Utah Code Ann. § 30-2-11.
The record reveals sufficient evidence for such a finding. Mrs. Spahr
testified that her husband used to enjoy hiking, tennis, and golf, Aplt. App. 348,
but no longer could, id. at 377-78. She also noted that Mr. Spahr’s “spirits are
broken,” that “[h]e’s not the same person that has the lightheartedness that he had
before,” and that when he does any landscaping or gardening he has to lie down
instead of kneel. Id. at 378-79. Similarly, Mr. Spahr testified that he used to
enjoy physical activities such as jogging, playing racquetball and tennis, golfing,
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and ice skating, see id. at 503-06, but since the accident he cannot, id. at 567-569.
Mr. Spahr also testified that the injury negatively effected other, more simple
activities, such as getting on the floor to play with his grandchild. Id. at 569-70,
573.
Even if § 30-2-11 sets forth an exhaustive list, our disposition remains the
same. Both Mr. and Mrs. Spahr testified as to the extent of the scarring on Mr.
Spahr’s knee. Specifically, Mrs. Spahr noted that for a period of time after the
injury Mr. Spahr refused to wear shorts because he did not want people looking at
the scars, id. at 392, 394-95, and Mr. Spahr testified that the scarring remained
and was ugly and “traumatic,” id. at 573. The jury could reasonably conclude
from this evidence that the fall resulted in a “significant disfigurement.” See
Utah Code Ann. § 30-2-11(1)(a)(ii). Therefore, the district court correctly denied
Ferber Resorts’ motion for judgment as a matter of law on Mrs. Spahr’s loss of
consortium claim.
Ferber Resorts argues that “significant disfigurement” requires “a
permanent and serious disfigurement, one that affects the earning capacity or
employment of an injured person, and it does not include an operative scar on a
body part—like the knee—that is not ordinarily visible.” Aplt. Br. 35 (citing
Stone v. Ware Shoals Mfg. Co., 7 S.E.2d 226 (S.C. 1940)). Stone—in addition to
being quite dated and from South Carolina instead of Utah—interpreted South
Carolina’s Workmen’s Compensation Act, which required compensation for “any
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serious bodily disfigurement.” Stone, 7 S.E.2d at 227 (emphasis added).
“Serious” suggests a higher standard than “significant.” Thus, Stone is of
marginal persuasive value in these circumstances.
Ferber Resorts makes no other arguments that Mr. Spahr is not
“significantly disfigured,” other than “there is no evidence that the scar to Mr.
Spahr’s knee still exists today . . . or that it is anything other than an operative
scar that is not ordinarily visible.” Aplt. Br. 35. However, this argument is
contrary to the evidence. Mr. and Mrs. Spahr testified as to the existence and
extent of scarring. Aplt. App. 392, 394-95, 573. Accordingly, we reject this
argument.
B. New Trial and/or Remittitur.
The district court’s decision to deny a motion for a new trial is reviewed
for abuse of discretion. M.D. Mark, Inc. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 565 F.3d 753, 762
(10th Cir. 2009). We are mindful of the vantage point of the district judge, who
is usually in the best position to determine any prejudice and the need for a new
trial. Whittenburg v. Werner Enterps., Inc., 561 F.3d 1122, 1127 (10th Cir.
2009). Repetition and emphasis of improper remarks may suggest a need for a
new trial. Id. at 1131. This is particularly true where the district court fails to
take corrective action, id., and where the size of the jury award suggests actual
prejudicial effect, id. at 1132.
Given state substantive law, whether the verdict was excessive is
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determined with reference to state law. In re Universal Serv. Tel. Billing Practice
Litig., 619 F.3d 1188, 1209 (10th Cir. 2010) (citing Century 21 Real Estate Corp.
v. Meraj Int’l Inv. Corp., 315 F.3d 1271, 1281 (10th Cir. 2003)). However, we
review the district court’s application of that state-law standard for abuse of
discretion. 4 Id. Under Utah law, a court may reduce the jury’s award of damages
if it is “so excessive as to be shocking to one’s conscience and to clearly indicate
passion or prejudice, and it abundantly appears that there is no evidence to
support or justify the verdict.” Stamp v. Union Pac. RR Co., 303 P.2d 279, 284
(Utah 1956) (Crockett, J., concurring) (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted); see also Utah R. Civ. P. 59(a)(5) (new trial may be granted upon
showing of “[e]xcessive . . . damages, appearing to have been given under the
influence of passion or prejudice”).
Ferber Resorts moved the district court for a new trial or remittitur on two
grounds: (1) allegedly improper statements by the Spahrs’ trial counsel during
closing argument and (2) excessive damages awarded by the jury. See Doc. 97 at
12-13, 17. The district court rejected both of these arguments. Spahr, 686 F.
Supp. 2d at 1221-24. We address each in turn.
4
The district court applied a federal-law standard in denying Ferber
Resorts’ motion for a new trial or remittitur. Spahr, 686 F. Supp. 2d at 1221.
However, for our purposes the two standards are the same—it makes no
difference which standard we apply on appeal, as the district court did not abuse
its discretion under either. Compare Blanke v. Alexander, 152 F.3d 1224, 1237
(10th Cir. 1998) (federal law standard) with Judd v. Drezga, 103 P.3d 135, 151
(Utah 2004) (state law standard).
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1. Closing Statement.
Before the district court and on appeal, Ferber Resorts asserts that closing
argument was improper for four reasons: counsel referred to matters not in the
record, interjected his personal opinions into the proceeding, implied intentional
malevolence on the part of Ferber Resorts, and attacked Ferber Resorts’ right to
defend the action. See Doc. 97 at 18; Aplt. Br. ii.
At the outset, we have serious concerns as to whether Ferber Resorts
preserved this issue for review. During closing argument, Ferber Resorts objected
only once, and only after the Spahrs’ counsel made several statements regarding
how difficult it was for the Spahrs “to sit here and tolerate these kinds of
accusations for one purpose only, so Ferber Resorts simply will not accept
responsibility.” Aplt. App. 1036. Ferber Resorts objected because those
statements “conflated litigation difficulty with . . . damages that are recoverable
under tort law.” Id. at 1036-37. The district court immediately sustained this
objection. Id. at 1037. Ferber Resorts did not request a limiting instruction,
immediately move for a mistrial, or object to any of the other allegedly improper
statements they challenged in their motion for a new trial.
To preserve an issue for review, a party must make a contemporaneous
objection or otherwise give the trial court the opportunity to remedy the claimed
error. See, e.g., United States v. Hernandez-Muniz, 170 F.3d 1007, 1011 (10th
Cir. 1999); Angelo v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 11 F.3d 957, 962 (10th Cir.
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1993). This is particularly true at closing argument: “a party may not wait and
see whether the verdict is favorable before deciding to object.” Computer Sys
Eng’g, Inc. v. Qantel Corp., 740 F.2d 59, 69 (1st Cir. 1984). In this case, had
Ferber Resorts objected, the objections might have been sustained and any error
avoided. Further, Ferber Resorts could have requested a limiting instruction or
moved for a mistrial immediately following closing.
Because Ferber Resorts failed to preserve the issue, we review it only for
plain error against the entire record. See, e.g., Therrien v. Target Corp., 617 F.3d
1242, 1257-58 (10th Cir. 2010). Thus, the error must be plain under current law
and affect substantial rights. Id. at 1253. If that is the case, an appellate court
may exercise its discretion to correct the error where it seriously affects the
fundamental fairness, integrity or reputation of the proceedings. Id. Ferber
Resorts relies heavily upon the facts in Whittenburg v. Werner Enterprises, Inc.,
but in that case the improper statements (a) were the subject of objection so an
abuse of discretion standard applied, and (b) included an out-of-bounds reading of
an “imaginary letter” by counsel with facts not supported by the record. 561 F.3d
at 1128. In this case, while some of counsel’s statements pushed the envelope,
they do have some basis in the evidence or its inferences. We note that the jury
was instructed that “statements and arguments of counsel are not evidence.” Aplt.
App. 994. After carefully considering the entire record, we do not think that this
argument rendered the proceedings fundamentally unfair or seriously affected the
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integrity or public perception of the proceedings.
2. Damages.
Ferber Resorts’ final argument on appeal is that the district court erred in
denying its motion for remittitur or a new trial based on the jury’s award of
damages, which it claims is unsupported in the evidence, excessive, or the result
of prejudice or bias. Aplt. Br. 51.
The jury awarded Mr. Spahr $31,216.41 in economic damages and
$375,855.76 in non-economic damages. Aplt. App. 101. It also awarded
$2,927.83 in economic and $40,000 in non-economic damages to Mrs. Spahr for
loss of consortium. Aplt. App. 101-02. Both were adjusted downward by one
percent to account for the jury’s conclusion that Mr. Spahr was slightly at fault.
See Spahr, 686 F. Supp. 2d at 1221; Aplt. App. 100.
The district court concluded that the damages were not excessive given the
evidence at trial. Spahr, 686 F. Supp. 2d at 1221-22. The court noted that the
Spahrs “put on a great deal of evidence” to support their claim for non-economic
damages, including extensive testimony regarding the pain, mental anguish, and
emotional suffering Mr. Spahr endured both with regard to the actual injury and
the resulting life changes. Id. at 1221. The court also detailed the testimony
regarding Mr. Spahr’s long and painful trip home, extensive rehabilitation, and
lingering effects on his personal life. Id. at 1221-22.
We see no abuse of discretion here. We agree with the district court that
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“while $393,000 is a considerable sum, it can hardly be called a windfall when
one considers the evidence put on about the incident and its consequences.” Id. at
1222. This conclusion is further bolstered by two cases in which we upheld
similar awards.
In Blanke v. Alexander, the jury awarded $500,000 to the plaintiff and
$17,000 for her daughter. 152 F.3d at 1228. The plaintiff had suffered a
fractured femur and ankle as well as extensive bruising. Id. at 1227. Her
daughter complained of pain in her hand and back, and testified that after the
accident she was sad and scared. Id. The plaintiff incurred $29,564.77 in
medical expenses and would incur approximately $5,000 for future medical
expenses. Id. at 1236-37. The defendant moved for remittitur of the damages,
which the district court refused, and the Tenth Circuit upheld the damage award
in the face of defendants’ arguments that the award was excessive.
Similarly, in Johnson v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., a jury awarded $407,603.92
to the plaintiff who had slipped, fallen, and injured her knee because of a spilled
beverage. No. 98-2062, 1998 WL 788821, at *1 (10th Cir. Nov. 10, 1998)
(unpublished). At trial, plaintiff testified that she experienced temporary knee
and back pain, and subsequently underwent two knee surgeries and physical
therapy. Id. Her medical bills totaled approximately $26,600, id. at *2, and the
plaintiff was not permanently disabled, id. at *1. In an unpublished order and
judgment we upheld the district court’s refusal to grant the defendant’s motion for
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remittitur. Id.Given the evidence in this case, we cannot say the district court abused its
discretion in refusing to grant a new trial or remittitur in this case. To the extent
that Ferber Resorts attempts to frame the issue as a substantive due process claim,
see Aplt. Reply Br. at 13, it raises that argument for the first time in its reply
brief and we will not consider it. See Planned Parenthood of Rocky Mountain
Servs., 287 F.3d at 927 n.18 (“Because this issue was raised for the first time in
the State’s reply brief, we do not address it here.”).
AFFIRMED.
Entered for the Court
Paul J. Kelly, Jr.
Circuit Judge
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