Felmlee v. State of Oklahoma Defendant's , 620 F. App'x 648 ( 2015 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT July 14, 2015
_________________________________
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
RICHARD FELMLEE,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v. No. 14-5142
(D.C. No. 4:13-CV-00803-CVE-TLW)
STATE OF OKLAHOMA (N.D. Okla.)
DEFENDANT’S; STATE OF
OKLAHOMA BUREAU OF
NARCOTICS AND DANGEROUS
DRUGS; DIRECTOR OF THE
ATTORNEY GENERAL’S OFFICE
STATE OF OKLAHOMA; OKLAHOMA
ATTORNEY GENERAL’S OFFICE;
DARREL WEAVER, OBNDD Director;
SANDRA LAVENUE, Attorney OBNDD;
JAN PRESLAR, Senior Drug Agent,
previously named as Melton Edminsten
Senior Drug Agent; TRACIE MCKEDY,
Registration Officer previously named as
Traacy McKedy Registration Officer,
Defendants - Appellees.
_________________________________
ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
_________________________________
Before HARTZ, PHILLIPS, and McHUGH, Circuit Judges.
_________________________________
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding
precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral
estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with
Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
Plaintiff Richard Felmlee, an Oklahoma physician appearing pro se, filed a
complaint alleging Defendants—numerous Oklahoma state agencies and officials—
violated his federal and state rights when he was required to pay a fine as a condition
to renew his state registration to prescribe controlled substances. The district court
granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants on the federal claims. It
dismissed without prejudice the state-law claims, declining to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367. It also denied Plaintiff’s motion for
reconsideration. Plaintiff appeals these rulings, as well as the denial of several
motions. Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm.
I.
We briefly recite the facts, which are thoroughly described in the district
court’s order. Oklahoma law requires persons who dispense or prescribe controlled
substances to be registered with the Oklahoma Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous
Drugs (OBN). See Okla. Stat. tit. 63, § 2-302. An OBN registrant must renew his or
her registration annually. See Okla. Admin. Code § 475:10-1-9(b). Plaintiff did not
renew his OBN registration when it expired on October 31, 2008. In September
2012, Plaintiff applied for a late renewal and submitted late fees. OBN sent Plaintiff
a notice that it would hold an administrative hearing to give him an opportunity to
show cause why his registration should be renewed. See Okla. Stat. tit. 63,
§ 2-303(A) (describing registration requirements), id. § 2-304 (authorizing OBN to
deny, revoke or suspend registration); id. § 2-305(A) (requiring that show-cause
order be issued before refusing to renew registration and that administrative hearing
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be held within 30 days of service of the order). It is undisputed that Plaintiff
attended the hearing and admitted he had prescribed controlled substances twice after
his OBN registration expired. The hearing officer recommended Plaintiff’s OBN
registration be renewed on the condition that Plaintiff pay a $2,500 administrative
penalty for writing a prescription after his OBN registration expired. The OBN
Director adopted the recommendation. Plaintiff paid all the required fees and the
penalty, and his OBN registration was renewed.
Plaintiff then filed suit against the State of Oklahoma, the OBN, the Director
of the Oklahoma Attorney General’s Office, the Oklahoma Attorney General’s
Office, OBN Director Darrel Weaver, Oklahoma Assistant Attorney General Janis
Preslar, OBN Senior Drug Agent Melton Edminsten, OBN Deputy General Counsel
Sandra LaVenue, and OBN Registration Officer Tracie McKedy. Because Plaintiff
has been acting pro se throughout this litigation, we and the district court construe his
pleadings liberally. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam).
But we cannot read his mind or make legal arguments for him, see Garrett v. Selby
Connor Maddux & Janer, 425 F.3d 836, 840 (10th Cir. 2005), and in this case we
must struggle to make sense of his poorly framed allegations. It appears that
Plaintiff’s grievances are that his registration should have automatically been
renewed once he paid his renewal and late fees, that he should not have been required
to attend an administrative hearing, and that the hearing was conducted improperly.
The district court reasonably construed the complaint as alleging that Defendants’
conduct violated his procedural-due-process rights, the federal Controlled Substances
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Act (CSA), the federal Administrative Procedures Act (APA), Oklahoma’s Uniform
Controlled Dangerous Substances Act, and Oklahoma’s Model State Administrative
Procedures Act.
The district court rejected the CSA and APA claims because these statutes do
not govern the conduct of Defendants in granting or denying licenses under the state
licensing statutes. See 23 U.S.C. §§ 823, 824 (vesting registration responsibilities
under the CSA with the United States Attorney General); 5 U.S.C. § 551(a) (defining
an “agency” under the APA as “each authority of the Government of the United
States”). As for Plaintiff’s due-process claims, the district court construed them as
arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and ruled that none of the Oklahoma state agencies
and none of the individually named Defendants in their official capacities were
“persons” subject to § 1983 liability. See Duncan v. Gunter, 15 F.3d 989, 991
(10th Cir. 1994) (“Neither states nor state officers sued in their official capacity are
‘persons’ subject to suit under section 1983.”). On the merits of the due-process
claims against the individual Defendants in their personal capacities, it ruled that
Plaintiff had been provided due process because the undisputed evidence
demonstrated that he had been given the requisite notice of the OBN administrative
hearing and received a fair hearing before an unbiased tribunal, at which he was able
to present evidence and present his arguments. See LaChance v. Erickson, 522 U.S.
262, 266 (1998) (“The core of due process is the right to notice and a meaningful
opportunity to be heard.”). The court then exercised its discretion under
28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) to decline to take supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s
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state claims. See Smith v. City of Enid ex rel. Enid City Comm’n, 149 F.3d 1151,
1156 (10th Cir. 1998) (“When all federal claims have been dismissed, the court . . .
usually should[ ] decline to exercise jurisdiction over any remaining state claims.”).
II.
Plaintiff’s opening brief is as difficult to decipher as his pleadings in district
court. As best we can determine, he is arguing that the district court erred by
(1) denying his motions for default judgment, for a more definite statement, for leave
to amend his complaint to add additional parties, and for more time to conduct
additional discovery; (2) dismissing his due-process claims because he had
insufficient notice of the OBN hearing and insufficient time to conduct discovery and
review OBN’s evidence; and (3) dismissing his claims at the summary-judgment
stage because he wanted a jury trial. His opening brief also includes allegations and
arguments that we will not address because Plaintiff did not present them to the
district court.1 See McDonald v. Kinder-Morgan, Inc., 287 F.3d 992, 999 (10th Cir.
2002) (“[A]bsent extraordinary circumstances, we will not consider arguments raised
for the first time on appeal.”). We turn to the preserved arguments.
The district court did not err or abuse its discretion in denying Plaintiff’s
motions. It correctly denied his motion for default judgment because the Defendants
1
Plaintiff submitted a 67-page reply brief on May 26, 2014. But it was due on
April 20, 2014, and on May 6, 2014, we denied Plaintiff’s May 4, 2014 motion to file
an oversized reply brief. He did not seek or obtain permission to file an out-of-time
reply brief. Because the May 26 reply was filed substantially out of time without
permission and did not comply with the page and type-volume limits of
Fed. R. App. P. 32(a)(7), the court will not accept it for filing.
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did not, as Plaintiff mistakenly asserts, file an untimely answer. The Defendants first
filed a motion to dismiss and were not required to file an answer to the complaint
before the district court ruled on that motion. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(a)(4). The court
properly denied Plaintiff’s motion requesting the court to explain its orders and
Defendants’ motions because the orders and motions were clear and unambiguous.
The court properly denied Plaintiff’s motion to add new parties to his complaint
because the proposed amendment would neither cure the fatal flaws in the original
complaint nor add facts sufficient to state any claim for relief. See Hertz v. Luzenac
Grp., 576 F.3d 1103, 1117 (10th Cir. 2009) (“the trial court may deny leave to amend
where amendment would be futile” (internal quotation marks omitted)). And the
court did not abuse its discretion in denying Plaintiff’s motion to take additional
discovery under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d) because he failed to identify any specific facts
or issues for which he needed additional discovery or to explain how additional
discovery would enable him to rebut Defendants’ assertion that there were no
genuine issues of material fact. See Ellis v. J.R.’s Country Stores, Inc., 779 F.3d
1184, 1206 (10th Cir. 2015) (discussing required substance and specificity of
Rule 56(d) affidavit seeking additional discovery).
On the merits, we review the district court’s decision to grant summary
judgment de novo, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiff and
drawing all reasonable inferences in his favor. See Tabor v. Hilti, Inc., 703 F.3d
1206, 1215 (10th Cir. 2013). Our review of the record shows that the court correctly
ruled that the undisputed facts entitled Defendants to judgment as a matter of law on
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all the federal claims. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) (setting forth the legal standard for
granting summary judgment). Plaintiff was afforded sufficient due process
throughout the OBN registration renewal process and he has not alleged any
cognizable CSA or APA claim against Defendants. He was therefore not entitled to a
jury trial.
Given the dismissal of all federal claims, it was proper for the district court to
decline to exercise jurisdiction over the state-law claims. See Smith, 149 F.3d
at 1156. We also find no error in the court’s order denying Plaintiff’s Rule 59(e)
motion for reconsideration.
We affirm the judgment for substantially the same reasons relied on by the
district court in its well-reasoned Opinions and Orders of September 15 and
November 3, 2014.
Entered for the Court
Harris L Hartz
Circuit Judge
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