Hayes Family Trust v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. , 688 F. App'x 551 ( 2017 )


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  •                                                                                 FILED
    United States Court of Appeals
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                        Tenth Circuit
    FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT                         April 19, 2017
    _________________________________
    Elisabeth A. Shumaker
    Clerk of Court
    HAYES FAMILY TRUST, on behalf of
    itself and all others similarly situated;
    CLAYTON A. HAYES, II, individually
    and as co-trustee of the Hayes Family
    Trust; CHAD A. HAYES, individually,
    Plaintiffs - Appellants,
    v.                                                        No. 15-6231
    (D.C. No. 5:14-CV-00106-C)
    STATE FARM FIRE AND CASUALTY                              (W.D. Okla.)
    COMPANY, a corporation,
    Defendant - Appellee.
    _________________________________
    ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
    _________________________________
    Before BRISCOE, LUCERO, and HARTZ, Circuit Judges.
    _________________________________
    In this insurance dispute, the Hayes Family Trust and two individuals sued
    State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., alleging breach of contract and bad faith. Summary
    judgment favoring State Farm was granted by the district court. Exercising
    jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm.
    *
    After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
    unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of
    this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
    ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding
    precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral
    estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with
    Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
    I
    Plaintiffs filed a claim with State Farm after their building was damaged
    during a storm. The parties could not agree on the amount of loss, prompting
    plaintiffs to demand an appraisal under a provision of their insurance policy.
    Oklahoma law mandates that standard fire insurance policies include this appraisal
    provision. Okla. Stat. tit. 36, § 4803; see also Massey v. Farmers Ins. Grp., 
    837 P.2d 880
    , 881 (Okla. 1992). State Farm objected, arguing that the appraisal clause was not
    implicated because the dispute concerned coverage issues.
    Plaintiffs brought two actions in state court, both of which were removed to
    federal court on diversity grounds. In the first case, plaintiffs sought appointment of
    an umpire to proceed with the appraisal. Although State Farm eventually agreed to
    an appraisal, the court was forced to appoint an umpire because of disputes between
    the parties’ appointed appraisers. State Farm later made full payment of the loss
    amount determined in that process, which plaintiffs accepted.1
    In the second case, the subject of this appeal, plaintiffs asserted that State
    Farm breached the duty of good faith and fair dealing by declining to arrange an
    appraisal when plaintiffs made their initial demand, and by failing to adequately
    investigate their claim. After the district court granted summary judgment favoring
    State Farm, plaintiffs timely appealed.
    1
    That case was later reopened and the ensuing judgment was appealed to this
    Court. See Hayes Family Tr. v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 
    845 F.3d 997
    (10th Cir.
    2017). The issues in that case are not relevant to this appeal.
    2
    II
    We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo.
    Philadelphia Indem. Ins. Co. v. Lexington Ins. Co., 
    845 F.3d 1330
    , 1336 (10th Cir.
    2017). Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no
    genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
    matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
    A
    Plaintiffs contend that State Farm acted in bad faith by unreasonably delaying
    an appraisal. In Oklahoma, an insurer has an implied duty “to act in good faith and
    deal fairly with the insured to ensure that the policy benefits are received.” Newport
    v. USAA, 
    11 P.3d 190
    , 195 (Okla. 2000) (quotation omitted). A violation of this
    duty gives rise to an action in tort. Skinner v. John Deere Ins. Co., 
    998 P.2d 1219
    ,
    1223 (Okla. 2000). However, “the tort of bad faith does not prevent the insurer from
    resisting payment or resorting to a judicial forum to resolve a legitimate dispute.” 
    Id. “Whether an
    insurer’s actions reasonably give rise to an inference of bad faith must
    be determined in light of all facts known or knowable concerning the claim at the
    time plaintiff requested the company to perform its contractual obligation.” Oulds v.
    Principal Mut. Life Ins. Co., 
    6 F.3d 1431
    , 1439 (10th Cir. 1993) (quotation omitted).
    “[T]he essence of the intentional tort of bad faith is the insurer’s unreasonable
    bad faith conduct.” Manis v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 
    681 P.2d 760
    , 761 (Okla. 1984)
    (citation omitted). To establish a bad faith claim, “the insured must present evidence
    from which a reasonable jury could conclude that the insurer did not have a
    3
    reasonable good faith belief for” its conduct. 
    Oulds, 6 F.3d at 1436
    (citation
    omitted). An insurer is entitled to summary judgment on a bad faith claim if it acts in
    accordance with a legitimate dispute concerning coverage, and the insured fails to
    produce additional evidence of bad faith to support sending the issue to the jury.
    Bannister v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 
    692 F.3d 1117
    , 1127-28 (10th Cir.
    2012).
    To support their contention that State Farm acted unreasonably, plaintiffs cite
    the use of “shall” in the appraisal provision, as well as Massey’s statement that
    “when one party demands that the appraisal process begin, the other party is
    compelled to submit to it whether they want to or 
    not.” 837 P.2d at 883
    . But Massey
    did not involve a coverage issue. See LeBlanc v. The Travelers Home & Marine Ins.
    Co., No. CIV-10-00503-HE, 
    2011 WL 1107126
    , at *4 (W.D. Okla. Mar. 23, 2011)
    (unpublished) (“[T]here was no dispute that the policy [in Massey] covered fire
    losses. . . . The sole question was the extent of those losses, i.e. what it would take to
    repair the house.”). Plaintiffs offer no authority for the proposition that an appraisal
    is required before the insurer and insured have agreed on the scope of coverage.
    Further, plaintiffs concede that authority on the topic is sparse, and no reported
    Oklahoma or Tenth Circuit case holds that an insurer’s denial or delay of an appraisal
    based on a coverage question constitutes bad faith. See 
    Skinner, 998 P.2d at 1223
    .
    Because there was a legitimate dispute as to whether an appraisal was proper, we
    cannot say that State Farm acted in bad faith. Plaintiffs have not shown that State
    Farm relied on some reason other than its legitimate dispute for its actions. See Sims
    4
    v. Great Am. Life Ins. Co., 
    469 F.3d 870
    , 891 (10th Cir. 2006) (the presence of a
    legitimate dispute “shifts the burden to the insured to present additional evidence of
    bad faith”).
    B
    Plaintiffs also contend that State Farm acted in bad faith by failing to conduct
    an adequate investigation into their claim. “[W]hen a bad faith claim is premised on
    inadequate investigation, the claimant must make a showing that material facts were
    overlooked or that a more thorough investigation would have produced relevant
    information that would have delegitimized the insurer’s dispute of the claim.”
    
    Bannister, 692 F.3d at 1128
    (alteration and quotation omitted). An investigation may
    amount to bad faith “if the manner of investigation suggests that the insurer has
    constructed a sham defense to the claim or has intentionally disregarded undisputed
    facts supporting the insured’s claim.” 
    Oulds, 6 F.3d at 1442
    .
    This is not a case in which the insurer refused payment after failing to conduct
    any investigation whatsoever. Nor have plaintiffs shown that State Farm disregarded
    relevant information. Instead, plaintiffs concede that State Farm inspected the
    property on multiple occasions and prepared two estimates as to the amount of
    covered losses. Moreover, plaintiffs admit that all of the items listed in State Farm’s
    second estimate were included in the appraisal award. Although plaintiffs disagree
    with State Farm about the investigators’ findings and the estimated losses, they have
    not shown that further investigation would have produced additional relevant
    information or led to different conclusions. See 
    Sims, 469 F.3d at 893
    (“[T]he
    5
    operative inquiry is whether additional [investigation] . . . would have led to new or
    significant information.”).
    III
    After paying the appraisal award, State Farm filed a motion to stay discovery.
    The district court held a hearing on all pending motions twelve days later. Plaintiffs
    contend that they did not have sufficient time to prepare a proper response before the
    hearing, and that the district court erred by staying discovery while State Farm’s
    summary judgment motion was pending.
    We review a district court’s discovery rulings for abuse of discretion. Regan-
    Touhy v. Walgreen Co., 
    526 F.3d 641
    , 647 (10th Cir. 2008). “In the discovery
    context, the range of permissible choices available to the district court is notably
    broad.” 
    Id. Moreover, plaintiffs
    have not shown what additional argument they
    would have set forth in their response or what material evidence they might have
    procured through additional discovery. Therefore, we discern no abuse of the district
    court’s discretion.
    IV
    AFFIRMED.
    Entered for the Court
    Carlos F. Lucero
    Circuit Judge
    6