Blackburn v. Brostrom ( 2020 )


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  •                                                                                  FILED
    United States Court of Appeals
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                         Tenth Circuit
    FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT                        January 14, 2020
    _________________________________
    Christopher M. Wolpert
    Clerk of Court
    MERLYON BLACKBURN,
    Plaintiff - Appellant,
    v.                                                         No. 19-1098
    (D.C. No. 1:18-CV-03015-LTB)
    MARK BROSTROM; AMY                                           (D. Colo.)
    HENDRICKSON; JOSEPH
    MAEHLTEENON; TODD BLUTH;
    DAVE COUTOUR; TOMAS RICHARD
    ENSOR; HERB ATCHISON; BRIAN
    FUSILAY,
    Defendants - Appellees.
    _________________________________
    ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
    _________________________________
    Before LUCERO, O’BRIEN, and CARSON, Circuit Judges.
    _________________________________
    Merlyon Blackburn, a Colorado state prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals the
    district court’s order dismissing his amended civil rights complaint, without
    prejudice, for failing to follow the court’s order to comply with the requirements to
    proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2). Mr. Blackburn also
    *
    After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
    unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of
    this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
    ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding
    precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral
    estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with
    Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
    appeals the court’s order denying his motion for reconsideration. We dismiss
    Mr. Blackburn’s appeal as it relates to the motion for reconsideration for lack of
    appellate jurisdiction. We affirm the dismissal of Mr. Blackburn’s cause of action.
    Mr. Blackburn filed his complaint on November 23, 2018. Three days later,
    the magistrate judge ordered Mr. Blackburn to cure these deficiencies within thirty
    days, or his action would be dismissed without further notice: (1) submit a motion to
    proceed IFP on the court-approved prisoner form that also contains authorization to
    calculate and disburse filing fee payments, or pay the $400.00 filing fee; and
    (2) submit an amended complaint on the court-approved prisoner complaint form,
    containing a caption listing all parties.
    Mr. Blackburn timely filed an amended complaint and motion. But the motion
    still did not contain the required authorization. The court therefore issued a second
    order stating Mr. Blackburn “will have one additional opportunity to cure [the
    deficiency],” R. at 67, giving him thirty days to comply, otherwise “the action will be
    dismissed without further notice,” 
    id. at 68.
    On February 13, 2019, Mr. Blackburn filed the required authorization. The
    district court, however, dismissed the action, without prejudice, “for failure to
    prosecute and cure the deficiencies” on time. 
    Id. at 75.
    The court also certified
    under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal of the order would not be taken in good
    faith and so denied IFP status for purposes of appeal.
    On March 1, 2019, Mr. Blackburn filed a pleading titled “Request for
    Reinstatement of the Action, Reconsideration for Failure to Cure Deficiencies for
    2
    Excusable Neglect,” 
    id. at 84,
    arguing he timely filed the authorization under the
    prison mailbox rule, and also maintaining “the failure to cure the deficiencies were
    beyond [his] control,” 
    id. at 85.
    While Mr. Blackburn’s motion for reconsideration
    was pending, he filed on March 15, 2019, a notice of appeal from the court’s
    February 14 order dismissing the action. The court denied the motion for
    reconsideration, which it construed as a motion under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e), on April
    4, 2019. Mr. Blackburn did not file a second notice of appeal or amend his first
    notice of appeal to include the April 4 order.
    “A timely filed notice of appeal is mandatory and jurisdictional.” Yost v.
    Stout, 
    607 F.3d 1239
    , 1242 (10th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted).
    There is no dispute that Mr. Blackburn’s premature notice of appeal filed on March
    15, 2019, ripened when the district court resolved the motion to reconsider. See
    Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4)(B)(i) (“If a party files a notice of appeal after the court
    announces or enters a judgment—but before it disposes of any motion listed in Rule
    4(a)(4)(A) [which includes Rule 59 motions]—the notice becomes effective to appeal
    a judgment or order, in whole or in part, when the order disposing of the last such
    remaining motion is entered.”).
    But to perfect an appeal from the district court’s April 4 decision denying
    Mr. Blackburn’s motion for reconsideration, Rule 4(a)(4)(A) required him to file a
    second notice of appeal or amend his first notice.1 See Breeden v. ABF Freight Sys.,
    1
    “A party intending to challenge an order disposing of any motion listed in
    Rule 4(a)(4)(A), [which includes a motion under Rule 59], must file a notice of
    3
    Inc., 
    115 F.3d 749
    , 752 (10th Cir. 1997) (exercising jurisdiction over the underlying
    case but not over an order disposing of a Rule 59(e) motion filed after the notice of
    appeal because the appellant did not amend his notice of appeal). Thus, although we
    have jurisdiction to consider the court’s February 14, 2019 order dismissing the
    action, we have no jurisdiction to review the court’s April 4, 2019 order denying
    Mr. Blackburn’s motion for reconsideration.
    A district court may dismiss an action sua sponte “[i]f the plaintiff fails to
    prosecute or to comply with . . . a court order.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b); Olsen v.
    Mapes, 
    333 F.3d 1199
    , 1204 n.3 (10th Cir. 2003) (“Although the language of Rule
    41(b) requires that the defendant file a motion to dismiss, the Rule has long been
    interpreted to permit courts to dismiss actions sua sponte for a plaintiff’s failure to
    prosecute or comply with the rules of civil procedure or court’s orders.”). “An abuse
    of discretion occurs when a district court makes a clear error of judgment or exceeds
    the bounds of permissible choice in the circumstances. This occurs when a district
    court relies upon an erroneous conclusion of law or upon clearly erroneous findings
    of fact.” Ecclesiastes 9:10-11-12, Inc. v. LMC Holding Co., 
    497 F.3d 1135
    , 1143
    (10th Cir. 2007) (citation, brackets, and internal quotation marks omitted).
    There was no abuse of discretion. On appeal, Mr. Blackburn argues the
    district court erred in finding he failed to timely file the required authorization to
    calculate and disburse filing fee payments. According to Mr. Blackburn, his
    appeal, or an amended notice of appeal—in compliance with [Fed. R. App. P.] 3(c)—
    within the time prescribed by this Rule.” Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4)(B)(ii).
    4
    authorization was timely under the prison mailbox rule because he gave it to prison
    officials for mailing before the filing deadline. We disagree.
    The prison mailbox rule makes the date on which a pro se prisoner presents a
    notice of appeal to prison officials for mailing the filing date for timeliness purposes.
    See Price v. Philpot, 
    420 F.3d 1158
    , 1163-64 (10th Cir. 2005). Although the rule
    was first applied to notices of appeal, “[w]e have . . . extended [the] mailbox rule
    beyond the notice of appeal context,” to apply to other filings. 
    Id. at 1164.
    Assuming, without deciding, the rule applies to Mr. Blackburn’s IFP authorization, it
    was untimely under the rule.
    On January 8, 2019, the district court entered its second order to cure, giving
    Mr. Blackburn thirty days to comply. That order made Mr. Blackburn’s response due
    on February 7, 2019. But the record establishes Mr. Blackburn did not give his
    response to prison officials until February 8, 2019, at the earliest, making it untimely
    under the prison mailbox rule. See R. at 70-73. The court thus did not abuse its
    discretion in dismissing Mr. Blackburn’s action for failing to timely comply with its
    order.
    The judgment of the district court is affirmed. We grant Mr. Blackburn’s
    motion to supplement his opening brief. We deny his motion to proceed IFP on
    appeal and remind Mr. Blackburn he must pay the filing fee in full.
    Entered for the Court
    Joel M. Carson III
    Circuit Court Judge
    5
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 19-1098

Filed Date: 1/14/2020

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 1/14/2020