Betts v. Work Zone Traffic Control ( 2020 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT February 6, 2020
_________________________________
Christopher M. Wolpert
Clerk of Court
DAVID BETTS,
Plaintiff Counterclaim Defendant -
Appellant,
v. No. 18-1199
(D.C. No. 1:16-CV-01890-CMA-MJW)
WORK ZONE TRAFFIC CONTROL, (D. Colo.)
INC., a Colorado corporation,
Defendant Counterclaimant -
Appellee.
_________________________________
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
_________________________________
Before HARTZ, MATHESON, and CARSON, Circuit Judges.
_________________________________
David Betts, proceeding pro se, 1 appeals the district court’s grant of summary
judgment to his former employer, Work Zone Traffic Control, Inc., in his suit for
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding
precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral
estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with
Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
1
Although Betts is proceeding pro se in this appeal, he was represented by
counsel below. So we construe his appellate filings liberally, but do not afford the
same liberal construction to counsel’s filings in the underlying case. See Celli v.
Shoell, 40 F.3d 324, 327 (10th Cir. 1994).
retaliation in violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C.
§ 215(a)(3). Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we reverse.
I. Background
Work Zone employed Betts as a full-time Traffic Control Supervisor for more
than eight years. His job duties included loading signage and equipment on to
company trucks, driving to job sites, and unloading and placing equipment at job
sites according to written traffic control plans. For most of those years, Betts worked
as a nonexempt employee under the FLSA and received time-and-one-half for hours
worked over 40 hours in a single work week.
In April 2015, Work Zone reclassified Betts as a salaried employee, which
meant he received no overtime pay. Betts objected to this classification. When
Work Zone refused to pay him overtime, he hired an attorney who, in September
2015, sent Work Zone a demand letter. In December 2015, the parties reached a
settlement under which Work Zone reclassified Betts as a nonexempt hourly
employee and paid him overtime amounts he claimed.
In May and June 2016, Work Zone assigned Betts to the Marksheffel Road job
site in Colorado Springs, Colorado. During the week of May 22-28, 2016, the
company assigned him to work a double shift, for which he claimed 92 hours of pay,
including 52 hours of overtime. This prompted Work Zone to review Betts’
timesheet and the GPS for the company truck he was driving and determine Betts was
claiming hourly pay for drive time between his home in Pueblo, Colorado and the
2
Marksheffel Road job site. Work Zone paid Betts in full for the week ending
May 28, 2016.
According to Work Zone’s Drive Time Policy and its official rules for
claiming mileage, employees do not receive hourly pay for the drive from their
homes to job sites. Instead, Work Zone pays them 10 cents per mile. But the
company pays employees hourly for drive time at the beginning of a project when
they haul equipment to set up a new job and at the end of a project when they pick up
a completed job. Work Zone also pays by the hour when workers return to an
existing job site if they are hauling additional equipment—more than a few cones or
a sign—needed for the project.
During the week of May 29-June 4, 2016, Betts claimed 59 hours of pay,
including 19 hours of overtime. Work Zone did not pay Betts for 15 hours of
overtime. On June 10, 2016, Betts called Work Zone owner, John Volk, to complain
about the 15 hours missing from his paycheck.
During the week of June 5-11, 2016, Betts claimed 75.5 hours of pay,
including 35.5 hours of overtime. On June 15, 2016, Volk sent Betts the following
text:
Hey Betts, no more weekend time for paperwork and shop stuff make sure
and get that done daily when your working! Also make sure if you are
scheduled to work Sat you check with [Work Zone Managers] Mike and
David as to whom is available and who had the least amount of hours will
work.
Then on the message Boards make sure if you have several to move
around you get assistance working overtime for 7 hrs to move message
boards at night buy yourself is not acceptable. If it was down for 5 weeks
3
we should be getting it done during normal working hours. That time like
discussed is not billable time to our customers so it comes out of Wz
pocket which in turn cost us to much money. Please try and maintain
better time management and make sure we are keeping the hours down as
much as possible.
Thanks
Jv
R. Vol. 3 at 528-29.
Betts claimed 72.25 hours of pay per week for each of the next two weeks—
June 12-18, 2016 and June 19-25, 2016—which included drive time between his
home and job site and replacing a headlight on his company truck at the shop on a
Sunday.
The morning of June 29, 2016, Betts said the following in a text to Bob
Andrews, a Work Zone safety manager:
I hate to tell you Bob. But life short I’m getting ready to go round two
with JV he arbitrary three weeks ago took 15 hours off my weeks time
sheet I can’t find where this 15 hrs are extra He’s going to have to prove
it. I hope he’s wright. Pray for me.
Thanks.
R. Vol. 4 at 193. That same afternoon, Work Zone terminated Betts’ employment.
The “Explanation of Violation” on the Employee Termination Form given to Betts
contains a single word: “Insubordination.” R. Vol. 3 at 536. Work Zone eventually
paid Betts for all the disputed hours he claimed for the week ending June 4, 2016.
Betts sued under the FLSA alleging that Work Zone terminated his
employment in retaliation for complaining that Work Zone failed to pay him for all
the hours he worked during the week ending June 4, 2016. He also claimed the
4
company fired him because he hired a lawyer and demanded payment for unpaid
overtime in September 2015. Work Zone counterclaimed for civil theft, conversion,
and unjust enrichment, based on Betts’ claiming drive time between his home and job
site.
The district court granted summary judgment to Work Zone on Betts’ FLSA
claim. Betts sought to appeal this summary judgment ruling in 2017, but we
dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction because Work Zone’s counterclaims
remained pending. See Betts v. Work Zone Traffic Control, Inc., No. 17-1463
(10th Cir. Mar. 7, 2018).
Work Zone dismissed its counterclaims without prejudice, and Betts filed this
appeal. But a dismissal without prejudice of the remaining claims in a multi-claim
action does not render a judgment final. Heimann v. Snead, 133 F.3d 767, 769
(10th Cir. 1998). After we notified Betts of the still existing jurisdictional defect,
Betts moved the district court to enter final judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 54(b). The district court certified its summary judgment ruling under
Rule 54(b), which gave us jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 to review the district
court’s grant of summary judgment to Work Zone on Betts’ FLSA claim. See Lewis
v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 850 F.2d 641, 645 (10th Cir. 1988).
II. Discussion
We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, applying
the same legal standard as the district court. Pacheco v. Whiting Farms, Inc.,
365 F.3d 1199, 1201 (10th Cir. 2004). Summary judgment is appropriate if the
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moving party shows “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). We
construe the record and all reasonable inferences from it, in a light most favorable to
the party opposing summary judgment. See Conner v. Schnuck Markets, Inc.,
121 F.3d 1390, 1392 n.2 (10th Cir. 1997).
Under the FLSA, it is unlawful for any person “to discharge or in any other
manner discriminate against any employee because such employee has filed any
complaint or instituted or caused to be instituted any proceeding under or related to
[the FLSA].” 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3). When a plaintiff cannot provide direct evidence
of retaliation, we apply the burden-shifting framework set forth in McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Conner, 121 F.3d at 1394. Under this
framework,
a plaintiff must first establish a prima facia case of retaliation. The burden
then shifts to the employer to offer a legitimate [nonretaliatory] reason
for the plaintiff’s termination. Once the employer offers such a reason,
the burden then shifts back to the plaintiff to show that there is a genuine
dispute of material fact as to whether the employer’s proffered reason for
the challenged action is pretextual.
Id. (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).
To establish a prima facie claim for retaliation under the FLSA, a plaintiff
must show (1) he engaged in activity protected by the FLSA; (2) he suffered adverse
action by the employer subsequent to or contemporaneous with that activity; and
(3) a causal connection exists between the employee’s activity and the employer’s
adverse action. Id.
6
The district court concluded that Betts established a prima facie claim for
retaliation. First, the court found Betts engaged in protected activity when he called
Volk on June 10 to complain about the 15 hours missing from his June 4 paycheck. 2
Second, the court noted the parties did not dispute that Betts suffered an adverse
employment action when Work Zone terminated him on June 29. Finally, the court
concluded that the temporal proximity between Betts’ June 10 complaint and June 29
termination sufficiently established a causal connection between Betts’ protected
activity and his termination. Thus, the burden shifted to Work Zone to offer a
legitimate, nonretaliatory reason for the termination.
The district court concluded that Work Zone proffered a legitimate,
nonretaliatory reason for terminating Betts—“insubordination because [Betts]
disregarded company drive time policies and defied Mr. Volk’s June 15 text
instructing [Betts] not to perform overtime shop work during weekends.” R. Vol. 4
at 369. The court then determined that Betts failed to provide sufficient evidence
from which a rational jury could conclude Work Zone’s stated reason was pretextual.
We discuss each of these determinations in turn. 3
2
The court also suggested that Betts’ text expressing his intent to “go round
two” with Volk could also constitute protected activity under the FLSA.
3
We do not review the district court’s determination that Betts established a
prima facie case because Work Zone has not argued, as an alternative basis for
affirming the summary judgment in its favor, that the district court erred in this
determination, and we will not craft arguments for a party. See Perry v. Woodward,
199 F.3d 1126, 1141 n.13 (10th Cir. 1999) (declining to consider whether there was
an alternative basis to affirm where the appellee failed to develop an argument for
affirming on an alternative basis).
7
A. Work Zone’s Proffered Reason for Terminating Betts.
The Supreme Court has described the defendant’s burden under the McDonnell
Douglas framework as follows:
The burden that shifts to the defendant, therefore, is to rebut the
presumption of [retaliation] by producing evidence that the plaintiff was
[terminated] . . . for a legitimate, non[retaliatory] reason. The defendant
need not persuade the court that it was actually motivated by the proffered
reasons. It is sufficient if the defendant’s evidence raises a genuine issue
of fact as to whether it [retaliated] against the plaintiff. To accomplish
this, the defendant must clearly set forth, through the introduction of
admissible evidence, the reasons for the plaintiff’s [termination]. The
explanation provided must be legally sufficient to justify a judgment for
the defendant. If the defendant carries this burden of production, the
presumption raised by the prima facie case is rebutted, and the factual
inquiry proceeds to a new level of specificity. Placing this burden of
production on the defendant thus serves simultaneously to meet the
plaintiff’s prima facie case by presenting a legitimate reason for the
action and to frame the factual issue with sufficient clarity so that the
plaintiff will have a full and fair opportunity to demonstrate pretext. The
sufficiency of the defendant’s evidence should be evaluated by the extent
to which it fulfills these functions.
Texas Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254-56 (1981) (emphasis
added and internal citation and footnotes omitted) (modified to reflect the retaliation
terminology applicable to this suit).
The district court accepted Work Zone’s contention that it terminated Betts for
“insubordination because [Betts] disregarded company drive time policies and defied
Mr. Volk’s June 15 text instructing [Betts] not to perform overtime shop work during
weekends.” R. Vol. 4 at 369 (emphasis added). But Work Zone offered no evidence
8
on the nature of Betts’ insubordination. 4 For example, Work Zone did not offer an
affidavit or deposition testimony from John Volk, or anyone else involved in the
decision to terminate Betts, identifying how Betts was insubordinate. Work Zone
articulated the nature of Betts’ insubordination in its answer to Betts’ complaint and
its motion for summary judgment. But, “[a]n articulation not admitted into evidence
will not suffice. . . . [T]he defendant cannot meet its burden merely through an
answer to the complaint or by argument of counsel.” Burdine, 450 U.S. at 255 n.9.
The only evidence cited by the district court was the Employee Termination Form
containing only the single word “insubordination.” See R. Vol. 4 at 369 (citing
Doc. No. 16, Work Zone’s Answer, Doc. No. 48-4, which does not exist, and
Doc. No. 48-3, the Employee Termination Form).
Insubordination can serve as a legitimate nonretaliatory reason for discharge to
rebut a prima facie case. See Brown v. Parker-Hannifin Corp., 746 F.2d 1407, 1411
(10th Cir. 1984). Even so, the generic term “insubordination,” without evidence
identifying the act of insubordination, is inadequate to satisfy Work Zone’s burden.
See Whatley v. Skaggs Cos., 707 F.2d 1129, 1135 n.4 (10th Cir. 1983) (noting that
Burdine requires the defendant’s evidence regarding its reason for the plaintiff’s
dismissal to be reasonably specific); accord, e.g., DePaula v. Easter Seals
4
Work Zone’s reliance on Betts’ deposition testimony is misplaced. At his
deposition, Betts repeatedly denied Work Zone told him it was terminating him for
violating the Drive Time Policy, and he repeatedly stated that Work Zone did not
explain his termination beyond giving him the Employee Termination Form
containing the word “insubordination.”
9
El Mirador, 859 F.3d 957, 972-73 (10th Cir. 2017) (noting the termination letter
recounted performance issues); Bird v. W. Valley City, 832 F.3d 1188, 1201
(10th Cir. 2016) (considering decisionmaker’s deposition testimony about plaintiff’s
insubordination); Brown, 746 F.2d at 1411 n.5 (considering affidavit evidence about
the plaintiff’s insubordination).
To support its articulated reason for the discharge, Work Zone must rely on an
inference: because Volk sent Betts a text two weeks earlier directing him to practice
better time management and not to perform shop work on weekends,
“insubordination” must refer to defiance of that directive. But we do not draw
inferences in favor of the moving party on summary judgment. Betts sent Work Zone
safety manager Bob Andrews a text the morning Work Zone terminated him, saying
he was getting ready to “go round two with JV” in a second FLSA complaint for
unpaid overtime. One could also infer that “insubordination” referred to Betts’ threat
to “go round two” with Volk by challenging the refusal to pay overtime. 5
The defendant’s burden under the McDonnell Douglas framework at summary
judgment is “exceedingly light.” DePaula, 859 F.3d at 970 (internal quotation marks
omitted). It need not persuade the court that its articulated reason for the termination
is true. Id. But it must produce admissible evidence of the articulated reason
5
Work Zone argued to the district court that Betts offered no evidence that
John Volk knew Betts sent the text to Andrews. We mention Betts’ text to highlight
the problem with Work Zone’s inference: the word “insubordination,” alone, does not
necessarily reflect a nonretaliatory reason. And Work Zone, not Betts, had the
burden of producing evidence at this stage of the McDonnell Douglas analysis.
10
sufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether it retaliated against
the plaintiff. Id. As the moving party, Work Zone cannot rely on inferences to meet
its burden. Because Betts presented a prima facie case sufficient to survive summary
judgment, and Work Zone did not produce sufficient evidence to rebut Betts’ prima
facie case and shift the burden back to Betts, the district court should have denied
Work Zone’s motion for summary judgment at this point.
B. Betts’ Evidence of Pretext.
Even assuming Work Zone produced sufficient evidence of a legitimate
nonretaliatory reason to shift the burden to Betts, we conclude Betts produced
sufficient evidence of pretext to survive summary judgment.
A plaintiff can withstand a motion for summary judgment by demonstrating “a
genuine dispute of material fact as to whether the employer’s proffered reason for the
challenged action is pretextual—i.e. unworthy of belief.” Randle v. City of Aurora,
69 F.3d 441, 451 (10th Cir. 1995). A plaintiff can make this showing with a variety
of evidence, including evidence: (1) “that the defendant’s stated reason for the
adverse employment action was false,” (2) “that the defendant acted contrary to a
written company policy prescribing the action to be taken by the defendant under the
circumstances,” or (3) “that the defendant acted contrary to an unwritten policy or
contrary to company practice when making the adverse employment decision.”
Kendrick v. Penske Transp. Servs., Inc., 220 F.3d 1220, 1230 (10th Cir. 2000). “A
plaintiff who wishes to show that the company acted contrary to an unwritten policy
or to company practice often does so by providing evidence that he was treated
11
differently from other similarly-situated employees who violated work rules of
comparable seriousness.” Id.
In response to Work Zone’s motion for summary judgment, Betts argued that
Work Zone’s reason for terminating him (1) was false because he had not defied
Volk’s directive not to perform shop work on weekends and he had not violated
Work Zone’s Drive Time Policy and (2) contradicted Work Zone’s established drive
time practices and Work Zone had not terminated other employees who claimed drive
time like Betts.
The district court determined that Betts failed to respond adequately to Work
Zone’s stated reason for his termination indicating, “it is undisputed that Mr. Volk
sent [Betts] a text on June 15 instructing [him] not to perform shop work during
weekends,” R. Vol. 4 at 369, and “[i]t is also undisputed that [Betts] defied
Mr. Volk’s instruction by, among other things, performing work at the Pueblo shop
on a Sunday four days after receiving the text,” id. at 370. 6 This is not an accurate
statement of the evidence before the district court.
1. Volk’s Directive Not to Perform Shop Work on Weekends
Betts offered evidence that he did not defy Volk’s directive not to perform
shop work on weekends. The only specific instance of shop work on a weekend
identified by either Work Zone or the district court was one hour on Sunday, June 19,
2016. Betts testified at his deposition that he went to the shop in Pueblo on Sunday,
6
The district court did not specifically address Work Zone’s Drive Time
Policy.
12
June 19, 2016, to change a headlight on his company truck. He testified this was not
shop work; it was vehicle maintenance. He offered Work Zone’s policy on the use of
its trucks, which provides, “All scheduled maintenance and repairs shall be
performed as soon as possible. Any failures, concerns, questions or problems with
the truck or any of the truck’s equipment should be reported to the employee’s
superior IMMEDIATELY.” R. Vol. 4 at 194 (emphasis in original). Betts testified
that he told his general manager, David Ranney, about the headlight, and Ranney told
him to get it fixed. Betts’ timesheet for June 19, 2016, reflects that Betts went to the
Pueblo shop to “replace [a] head lite.” R. Vol. 3 at 504. Betts offered sufficient
evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether Work Zone’s
claim that it terminated him for performing shop work on a weekend was pretextual.
2. Work Zone’s Drive Time Policy
As noted, Work Zone’s Drive Time Policy allows employees to claim an
hourly rate for drive time when they are hauling equipment to set up a job site and
after picking up a site. In addition, its mileage rules allow employees to claim an
hourly rate (rather than mileage) for drive time when they are hauling additional
equipment needed for a job “and it’s more than a few cones or a sign.” Id. at 458.
Betts testified at his deposition that he charged hourly for his drive to and from the
Marksheffel Road job site when he was hauling equipment needed for the job and it
was more than a few signs and cones. He also testified that, sometimes, he would
haul cones and signs from the Marksheffel Road job site, south to his home in Pueblo
so he could set them back up the next morning on his way north. He testified that the
13
crew set up cones and signs starting at the southern end of the project, and this was
more efficient than driving to the Marksheffel Road equipment yard at the end of the
day, unloading the cones and signs, driving home to Pueblo, then driving back to the
equipment yard the next morning to pick up the necessary equipment before heading
to the southern end of the project again to set up. Betts understood this to comply
with Work Zone’s Drive Time Policy.
In considering whether the employer’s proffered reason is pretextual, “we
examine the facts as they appear to the person making the decision; we do not look to
the plaintiff’s subjective evaluation of the situation.” EEOC v. C.R. England, Inc.,
644 F.3d 1028, 1044 (10th Cir. 2011) (emphasis and citations and internal quotation
marks omitted). Thus, Betts’ subjective view about whether his timekeeping violated
Work Zone’s policy does not demonstrate a genuine dispute regarding pretext. That
said, Betts also offered evidence that his timekeeping followed Work Zone’s
established practices for claiming drive time. For example, Betts offered evidence
that he had been claiming drive time the same way for years, including the months in
2015 that were the subject of his September 2015 FLSA complaint, for which Work
Zone eventually paid all the overtime he claimed. He offered evidence that Work
Zone paid other Traffic Control Supervisors drive time who claimed it on their
timesheets, even when their timesheets did not reflect that they were hauling
equipment. Finally, Betts argued that the fact that Work Zone imposed different
drive time rules on him after he complained about the 15 hours deducted from his
14
June 4 paycheck is evidence that he was treated differently than other Traffic Control
Supervisors after he complained.
Betts’ evidence creates a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Work
Zone’s reason for terminating him was worthy of belief. The district court erred in
concluding that he had not offered sufficient evidence of pretext.
III. Conclusion
For these reasons, we REVERSE the district court’s order granting summary
judgment to Work Zone on Betts’ FLSA claim, and REMAND this matter to the
district court for further proceedings consistent with this decision.
Entered for the Court
Joel M. Carson III
Circuit Judge
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