MacIntyre v. JP Morgan Chase Bank ( 2020 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT September 10, 2020
_________________________________
Christopher M. Wolpert
Clerk of Court
HOLLY MACINTYRE,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v. Nos. 19-1290 & 20-1016
(D.C. No. 1:19-CV-00172-DDD-NYW)
JP MORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A., (D. Colo.)
Defendant - Appellee.
_________________________________
ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
_________________________________
Before BRISCOE, MATHESON, and CARSON, Circuit Judges.
_________________________________
Holly MacIntyre, proceeding pro se,1 appeals in No. 19-1290 from the district
court’s dismissal of her action against JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. (Chase), in
which she claimed Chase committed fraud during a foreclosure proceeding in state
court. She further appeals in No. 20-1016 from the district court’s award of attorney
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously to honor the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent,
except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It
may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
1
We liberally construe Ms. MacIntyre’s pro se filings but “will not act as [her]
advocate.” James v. Wadas, 724 F.3d 1312, 1315 (10th Cir. 2013).
fees to Chase under Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-17-201. Exercising jurisdiction under
28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm.2
I. BACKGROUND
Ms. MacIntyre owned real property in Jefferson County, Colorado. In 2003,
she executed a $100,000 promissory note secured by a deed of trust on the property.
In 2014, Chase, asserting it was the note holder, sought a foreclosure judgment in
state court authorizing a sale of the property. During that proceeding, the court
rejected Ms. MacIntyre’s assertion that Chase’s note was forged, concluded Chase
was the note holder, and issued a judgment of judicial foreclosure. Ms. MacIntyre
appealed to the Colorado Court of Appeals (CCA) and filed three motions to stay
execution of the judgment—one in the trial court and two in the CCA. All three were
denied, which Ms. MacIntyre attributed to Chase’s “fraudulent misrepresentations of
fact and law.” R. Vol. 1 at 10 (internal quotation marks omitted). In January 2016,
while the appeal was pending, the property was sold at a sheriff’s sale. In April
2016, the CCA affirmed the foreclosure judgment. Ms. MacIntyre sought certiorari
review in the Colorado Supreme Court but later requested dismissal of her petition on
mootness grounds, and the court dismissed the petition in January 2017.
In January 2019, Ms. MacIntyre initiated this action, alleging that “Chase’s
fraud in the foreclosure proceeding has caused [her] extraordinary financial damage
2
These appeals are consolidated for procedural purposes only.
2
by the irreversible loss of her primary residence” and that “Chase’s foreclosure fraud
was solidified by the fraudulent tactics it used in thwarting the indispensable stay she
needed to have any possibility of reversing the foreclosure judgment on appeal.” Id.
at 11. She further alleged that “the mootness of her appeals . . . entitled [her] to have
her foreclosure judgment vacated” and that she intended to seek such vacatur in
Colorado’s appellate courts. Id.
Ms. MacIntyre did not immediately serve the complaint on Chase because she
believed “the viability of this lawsuit” largely hinged on the outcome of the motion
she intended to file in the CCA and that an order granting her motion “might obviate
the need for this lawsuit and entitle [her] to relief in the state courts of Colorado.”
Id. at 45. In February, however, before she served the complaint, counsel for Chase
entered an appearance, waived service, and moved to dismiss based on (1) lack of
subject-matter jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, see D.C. Court of
Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983); Rooker v. Fid. Tr. Co., 263 U.S. 413(1923); (2) lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under the Younger doctrine, see
Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971); (3) collateral estoppel; (4) judicial estoppel;
(5) statute of limitations; and (6) failure to adequately plead her claim for fraud.
At a status conference a month later, Ms. MacIntyre stated she believed
Chase’s motion was premature and did not require a response. Chase countered that
it had made a general appearance and that it was not required to wait until service
before filing a dispositive motion. The court allowed Ms. MacIntyre until April 9 to
3
file a response to the motion to dismiss and to raise any challenge to the propriety of
Chase’s appearance and motion to dismiss. Ms. MacIntyre also informed the court
she intended to file a motion to vacate the foreclosure judgment with the CCA by
March 22.
Ms. MacIntyre ultimately filed that motion on March 29. The CCA denied it
two weeks later, explaining that the mandate in her appeal had issued in January 2017
and that “[n]o further motion to vacate will be considered.” R. Vol. 1 at 90.
Meanwhile, after serving the complaint, Ms. MacIntyre filed (1) a motion to strike
Chase’s motion to dismiss as premature; and (2) a response to the motion to dismiss,
in which she provided only “a discreet response” to the issue of collateral estoppel
due to “her very delicate legal situation,” id. at 81-82.
In June 2019, the district court dismissed the action under the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine. The court did not address Chase’s other defenses, and it denied as moot
“[a]ll other pending motions,” id. at 141. Ms. MacIntyre moved for reconsideration
under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e), which the court denied, although it modified the
dismissal to be without prejudice. Chase then moved for clarification, as to whether
the dismissal was sua sponte or based on Chase’s motion to dismiss. The court
granted the motion and clarified it had granted Chase’s Rule 12(b)(1) motion to
dismiss. Ms. MacIntyre gave timely notice of appeal from the dismissal and the
post-judgment orders.
4
Meanwhile, Chase moved for attorney fees under Colo. Rev. Stat.
§ 13-17-201, which requires an award of attorney fees to the defendant when a tort
action brought for injury to person or property is dismissed on the defendant’s Rule
12(b) motion. The court granted the motion but imposed “a general reduction of 25%
of the requested hours.” R. Vol. 2 (20-1016) at 62. Ms. MacIntyre moved to
reconsider under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e), claiming that because the court dismissed the
action for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under Rooker-Feldman, it also lacked
jurisdiction to award attorney fees. The court denied the motion, and Ms. MacIntyre
timely appealed from the attorney fees orders.
II. DISCUSSION
In No. 19-1290, Ms. MacIntyre contends the district court erred in (1) denying
as moot her motion to strike Chase’s motion to dismiss; (2) dismissing her fraud
claim for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under Rooker-Feldman; (3) denying her
motion for reconsideration; and (4) clarifying it had granted Chase’s motion to
dismiss. In No. 20-1016, Ms. MacIntyre contends the district court erred in
(1) awarding attorney fees to Chase under Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-17-201; and
(2) denying her motion for reconsideration based upon lack of jurisdiction.
5
A. Appeal No. 19-1290
Denial of Ms. MacIntyre’s Motion to Strike as Moot
Ms. MacIntyre argues the district court erred in denying her motion to strike
Chase’s motion to dismiss as moot. We review this issue for an abuse of discretion.
See In re Gold Res. Corp. Sec. Litig., 776 F.3d 1103, 1119 (10th Cir. 2015).
In her motion, Ms. MacIntyre argued Chase’s motion to dismiss should have
been stricken because Chase filed it before she had served the complaint. The district
court did not reach this argument and instead explained: “[I]f Chase is correct that
the Court does not have jurisdiction, whether its motion to dismiss should be stricken
is immaterial considering the Court’s ongoing obligation to evaluate its own
jurisdiction.” R. Vol. 1 at 136. After concluding that Rooker-Feldman barred the
action, the court denied all pending motions, which included the motion to strike, as
moot. Ms. MacIntyre asserts that when the court later clarified the dismissal was the
result of granting Chase’s motion to dismiss and was not sua sponte, “the Motion to
Strike automatically became not immaterial, but very material,” because the motion
to dismiss “could not be [evaluated] until the Motion to Strike it had been decided.”
Aplt. Opening Br. (19-1290) at 19.
In effect, Ms. MacIntyre argues the district court abused its discretion by not
ruling on her motion to strike before ruling on Chase’s motion to dismiss. She offers
no authority for this position. See United States v. Garcia, 946 F.3d 1191, 1210 n.11
(10th Cir. 2020) (noting a “party who fails to develop or provide any authority in
6
support of [an] argument [has] waived it” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
Ms. MacIntyre thus has failed to show the court abused its discretion in denying her
motion to strike as moot.
Dismissal of the Fraud Claim Under Rooker-Feldman
Ms. MacIntyre next contends the court erred in dismissing her action for lack
of subject-matter jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. We review this
issue de novo. See Mann v. Boatright, 477 F.3d 1140, 1145 (10th Cir. 2007).
Under “the Rooker–Feldman doctrine, lower federal courts are precluded from
exercising appellate jurisdiction over final state-court judgments.” Lance v. Dennis,
546 U.S. 459, 463 (2006) (per curiam). The doctrine applies to federal cases
“brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court
judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting
district court review and rejection of those judgments.” Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi
Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005).
a. Finality of state court action
Ms. MacIntyre argues the state-court foreclosure proceeding was not final
under Rooker-Feldman when she filed her federal complaint. She further argues her
state-court proceeding does not satisfy any of the conditions for finality that we noted
in Guttman v. Khalsa, including:
(1) when the highest state court in which review is
available has affirmed the judgment below and nothing is
left to be resolved; (2) if the state action has reached a
7
point where neither party seeks further action; or (3) if the
state court proceedings have finally resolved all the federal
questions in the litigation, but state law or purely factual
questions (whether great or small) remain to be litigated.
446 F.3d 1027, 1032 n.2 (10th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted).
In Guttman, we held the plaintiff’s state-court proceeding was not final
because his certiorari petition with the New Mexico Supreme Court was pending
when he filed his federal action. See id. at 1032. Ms. MacIntyre characterizes her
situation as only “a slight variation on . . . Guttman.” Aplt. Opening Br. (19-1290) at
27. But the difference is dispositive. Two years before she filed her federal action,
the Colorado Supreme Court dismissed, at her request, her petition for a writ of
certiorari from the CCA’s decision affirming the foreclosure judgment. Thus, unlike
in Guttman, Ms. MacIntyre had no pending petition before the state’s highest court
when she filed her federal action.
Ms. MacIntyre also asserts her state-court proceeding was not final “because
the Colorado Supreme Court did not affirm the judgment of foreclosure” but, instead,
“dismissed the petition for certiorari on mootness grounds.” Id. at 25 (emphasis
added) (citation omitted). But we have cited Guttman for the broader principle that
Rooker-Feldman applies when the “state court appeals process has run its full
course.” Erlandson v. Northglenn Mun. Court, 528 F.3d 785, 788 n.3 (10th Cir.
2008). In Erlandson, we found the state-court proceeding final for purposes of
Rooker-Feldman when the Colorado Supreme Court did not affirm the trial-court
8
judgment but, instead, denied the federal plaintiff’s certiorari petition. See id.Similarly, when the Colorado Supreme Court dismissed Ms. MacIntyre’s certiorari
petition, the “state court appeals process ha[d] run its full course.” Id. The CCA’s
order denying her March 2019 motion to vacate, confirmed her appeal was final in
January 2017—two years before she commenced her federal action.
Finally, Ms. MacIntyre argues the state court action is not final because she
will “seek further action” by “filing a Petition for a Rule to Show Cause in the
Colorado Supreme Court to vacate the state-court-judgment.” Aplt. Opening Br. (19-
1290) at 25-26 (internal quotation marks omitted).3 But she concedes such a petition
would be subject to the appellate rule “govern[ing] supreme court original
proceedings” without “any time limit on filing,” and would not be “a continuation of
the concluded appellate process.” Id. at 26 (internal quotation marks omitted). She
offers no authority—and we know of none—for her claim that a party can avoid
finality under Rooker-Feldman by initiating, let alone expressing an intention to
initiate, an original proceeding in a state appellate court after an appeal has
concluded. See Garcia, 946 F.3d at 1210 n.11 (noting an argument unsupported by
authority is waived).
3
According to Chase, Ms. MacIntyre still “ha[d] not filed such petition” as of
January 2020. Aplee. Br. (19-1290) at 18 n.10.
9
b. Rooker-Feldman precludes review of state-court judgment
Ms. MacIntyre next argues her complaint does not implicate Rooker-Feldman
because she is not “complaining of injuries caused by [the] state-court judgment[]”
and is not “inviting district court review and rejection of [that] judgment[].” Exxon
Mobil Corp., 544 U.S. at 284. We disagree.
Her sole claim is that Chase fraudulently procured both the foreclosure
judgment and the orders denying her motions to stay execution of the judgment. For
a federal court to grant relief on her claim, it necessarily would have to find that the
judgment and post-judgment orders were fraudulently procured. Her claim therefore
depends on a federal court finding that the state courts erred in entering judgment for
Chase. Rooker-Feldman prohibits such review. See Exxon Mobil Corp., 544 U.S. at
284.
Ms. MacIntyre’s attempts to distance her claim from Rooker-Feldman are
unavailing. She contends she is seeking redress for injuries caused by the alleged
fraud and not by the state-court judgment itself. But her injuries are based entirely
on the court-ordered sale of her house. She has identified no injury independent of
the state-court orders, and she admitted that vacatur of the foreclosure judgment by
the state appellate courts “might obviate the need for this lawsuit,” R. Vol. 1 at 45.
Because “an element of [her] claim” is “that the state court wrongfully entered its
judgment,” Rooker-Feldman squarely applies. Campbell v. City of Spencer, 682 F.3d
1278, 1283 (10th Cir. 2012); cf. Mayotte v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 880 F.3d 1169,
10
1176 (10th Cir. 2018) (holding Rooker-Feldman did not apply because the plaintiff
could “prove her claims without any reference to the state-court proceedings”); P.J.
ex rel. Jensen v. Wagner, 603 F.3d 1182, 1193-94 (10th Cir. 2010) (holding Rooker-
Feldman did not apply because the claims did “not rest on any allegation concerning
the state-court proceedings or judgment” and “would be identical even if there were
no state-court orders” (internal quotation marks omitted)).4
Ms. MacIntyre also argues Rooker-Feldman does not apply because she is
seeking only monetary damages, not vacatur of the foreclosure judgment. But
seeking monetary damages without explicitly seeking to overturn or modify the
state-court judgment does not mean a claim can escape Rooker-Feldman’s reach. To
the contrary, claims for monetary damages can implicate Rooker-Feldman. See
Wagner, 603 F.3d at 1193 (distinguishing claims for monetary damages from claims
for prospective injunctive and declaratory relief for purposes of Rooker-Feldman). In
seeking monetary damages based on “the irreversible loss of her primary residence,
combined with her subsequent displacement due to eviction,” R. Vol. 1 at 11,
Ms. MacIntyre’s “requested relief would necessarily undo the [Colorado] state
4
Ms. MacIntyre contends the district court improperly conflated Rooker-
Feldman with preclusion. See Mayotte, 880 F.3d at 1175 (“[A]ttempts merely to
relitigate an issue determined in a state case are properly analyzed under issue or
claim preclusion principles rather than Rooker-Feldman.” (internal quotation marks
omitted)). We perceive no such doctrinal confusion in the district court’s order. And
in any event, our review of the dismissal is de novo.
11
court’s judgment because it would place [her] back in the position [she] occupied
prior to the [foreclosure],” Mo’s Express, LLC v. Sopkin, 441 F.3d 1229, 1237
(10th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Ms. MacIntyre further contends a claim for money damages based on a
fraudulent state-court foreclosure judgment is exempt from Rooker-Feldman. But in
Tal v. Hogan, 453 F.3d 1244 (10th Cir. 2006), we rejected the plaintiff’s similar
attempt to circumvent Rooker-Feldman by claiming the defendant “committed fraud
on appeal” in state court. Id. at 1255. We noted “new allegations of fraud might
create grounds for appeal, but that appeal should be brought in the state courts.” Id.
at 1256.
Ms. MacIntyre attempts to distinguish Tal by describing her claim as involving
“not new fraud” but rather the “same fraud that she argued before the state court.”
Aplt. Reply Br. (19-1290) at 10 (internal quotation marks omitted). But Tal not only
recognized that “new allegations of fraud” could come within the Rooker-Feldman
prohibition, but also allegations that the federal defendant “continue[d] to make false
claims.” Tal, 453 F.3d at 1256 (emphasis added). In particular, we observed that the
state appellate court “was confronted with and reviewed the same ‘fraud’ as the trial
court” and that “[i]ts holding is equally applicable to the ‘fraud’ alleged at the trial
court level . . . as it was to the ‘fraud’ allegedly perpetrated before its very eyes.” Id.
at 1257. The same is true with Ms. MacIntyre’s claim that Chase fraudulently
procured the foreclosure judgment and the denial of her motions for a stay. Her
12
attempt to distinguish Tal fails, and her “loss in state court precludes a second round
in federal court.” Id.* * * *
For Ms. MacIntyre to prevail on her fraud claim, the district court would have
had to review and reject the state-court judgment that she alleges Chase fraudulently
procured. Because Rooker-Feldman prohibits such review, the district court properly
dismissed her claim for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.
Denial of Ms. MacIntyre’s Rule 59(e) Motion to Reconsider
Ms. MacIntyre contends the district court erred in denying her Rule 59(e)
motion to reconsider except to the extent the court modified the dismissal to be
without prejudice. We review this issue for an abuse of discretion. See Nelson v.
City of Albuquerque, 921 F.3d 925, 929 (10th Cir. 2019).
“Grounds warranting a motion to reconsider include (1) an intervening change
in the controlling law, (2) new evidence previously unavailable, and (3) the need to
correct clear error or prevent manifest injustice,” including “where the court has
misapprehended the facts, a party’s position, or the controlling law.” Servants of
Paraclete v. Does, 204 F.3d 1005, 1012 (10th Cir. 2000). In her brief, Ms. MacIntyre
lists sixteen issues she included in her Rule 59(e) motion.5 In denying the motion,
5
Except for the Rooker-Feldman issues we have addressed, Ms. MacIntyre has
not raised on appeal the other arguments in her motion to reconsider. See Platt v.
Winnebago Indus., Inc., 960 F.3d 1264, 1271 (10th Cir. 2020) (“[F]ailure to raise an
issue in an opening brief waives that issue.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
13
the district court stated it “remain[ed] certain that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine
prohibit[ed] it from considering this matter.” R. Vol. 1 at 167. Although
Ms. MacIntyre faults the court for not providing “any analysis whatsoever” and for
incorrectly stating it had “previously considered” arguments that she had not raised
until her motion. Aplt. Opening Br. (19-1290) at 33-34 (internal quotation marks
omitted), she focuses on the Rooker-Feldman determination. As discussed above, we
have considered the issue de novo and agree with the court’s assessment. Because
the court properly concluded it lacked jurisdiction, Ms. MacIntyre cannot show that
the court erred in denying her motion to reconsider.
Clarification regarding the dismissal
Finally, Ms. MacIntyre contends the district court erred in granting Chase’s
motion and clarifying that it had “granted Defendant’s motion to dismiss pursuant to
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1),” R. Vol. 1 at 173. We review this issue for an abuse of
discretion. See Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough v. Cade, 510 F.3d 1277, 1278
(10th Cir. 2007).
As Ms. MacIntyre notes, the court’s clarification that the dismissal was based
on Chase’s Rule 12(b)(1) motion meant Chase was eligible for an award of attorney
fees under Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-17-201. She alleges no particular error with the
clarification but claims she “will be fatally prejudiced by [the clarification] if this
Court is inclined to uphold the dismissal” on one of the alternative grounds raised by
Chase that she strategically chose not to address in district court. Aplt. Opening Br.
14
(19-1290) at 36. Because we agree with the district court’s Rooker-Feldman ruling
and do not address Chase’s alternative grounds for dismissal, Ms. MacIntyre’s
prejudice argument fails. The district court did not abuse its discretion in granting
Chase’s motion to clarify the basis for dismissal.
B. Appeal No. 20-1016
Order awarding attorney fees under Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-17-201In No. 20-1016, Ms. MacIntyre contends the district court erred in awarding
attorney fees under Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-17-201. This statute applies when a federal
court, exercising diversity jurisdiction over a tort action under Colorado state law,
grants a defendant’s motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. See Jones v. Denver Post Corp., 203 F.3d 748, 757 (10th Cir. 2000),
abrogated on other grounds by Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101(2002). We review the district court’s factual findings for clear error and legal
conclusions de novo. See id. at 756.
Ms. MacIntyre initially opposed Chase’s motion for attorney fees on the
ground that, in a diversity action dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1919preempted Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-17-201. The federal statute provides: “Whenever
any action or suit is dismissed in any district court . . . for want of jurisdiction, such
court may order the payment of just costs.” 28 U.S.C. § 1919. The district court
concluded that although 28 U.S.C. § 1919 does not authorize an award of attorney
15
fees, it also does not prohibit a court from otherwise awarding fees. The court found
no conflict between the statutes and, thus, no preemption.
On appeal, Ms. MacIntyre reiterates her argument regarding preemption. But
her analysis is relegated entirely to a cursory footnote in her opening brief. We
therefore decline to consider the issue. See United States v. Hardman, 297 F.3d
1116, 1131 (10th Cir. 2002) (en banc) (“Arguments raised in a perfunctory manner,
such as in a footnote, are waived.” (emphasis added)).6
Denial of Ms. MacIntyre’s Rule 59(e) Motion to Reconsider
Ms. MacIntyre contests the denial of her Rule 59(e) motion to reconsider the
order awarding attorney fees. We review this issue for an abuse of discretion. See
Nelson, 921 F.3d at 929. And we review “jurisdictional arguments de novo in order
to ensure that the district court did not abuse its discretion by making a clear error of
judgment or exceeding the bounds of permissible choice in the circumstances.”
Devon Energy Prod. Co. v. Mosaic Potash Carlsbad, Inc., 693 F.3d 1195, 1201-02
(10th Cir. 2012) (alteration and internal quotation marks omitted).
In her motion to reconsider, Ms. MacIntyre argued the dismissal for lack of
subject-matter jurisdiction under Rooker-Feldman also meant that “diversity . . .
6
Ms. MacIntyre has cited no authority showing 28 U.S.C. § 1919 preempts a
state statute mandating attorney fees. She cites State v. Golden’s Concrete Co.,
962 P.2d 919, 926 (Colo. 1998), in which the Colorado Supreme Court held that
42 U.S.C. § 1988, which permits attorney fees for a prevailing party in a 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 action, preempts Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-17-201.
16
jurisdiction never attached” and that the court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to
award attorney fees under state law. R. Vol. 2 (20-1016) at 73. The court found the
argument was untimely raised and without merit. Ms. MacIntyre contends it was not
untimely because subject-matter jurisdiction can be raised at any time. In any event,
we agree with the court’s conclusion that it had jurisdiction to award fees.
“It is well established that a federal court may consider collateral issues after
an action is no longer pending.” Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384,
395 (1990); see also Willy v. Coastal Corp., 503 U.S. 131, 137 (1992) (upholding
Rule 11 sanctions after “[a] final determination of lack of subject-matter jurisdiction”
because “such a determination does not automatically wipe out all proceedings had in
the district court at a time when the district court operated under the misapprehension
that it had jurisdiction”). We therefore have held that “a district court may still
award attorney’s fees after dismissing the underlying action for lack of subject-matter
jurisdiction . . . because a claim for attorney’s fees gives rise to issues separate and
distinct from the merits of the original cause of action.” D.A. Osguthorpe Family
P’ship v. ASC Utah, Inc., 705 F.3d 1223, 1236 (10th Cir. 2013) (internal citation
omitted). This is equally true when a state statute forms the basis for an award of
attorney fees. See Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Engida, 611 F.3d 1209, 1217 (10th Cir.
2010) (“[A] district court need not have subject matter jurisdiction to award
attorney’s fees pursuant to [Colo. Rev. Stat. §] 13-17-102.”).
17
Ms. MacIntyre contends that her action was only a “would-be diversity case”
and that the dismissal under Rooker-Feldman meant the district court “was never for
a minute ‘sitting in diversity’” such that it had “access to a state fee-shifting statute.”
Aplt. Reply. Br. (20-1016) at 5. But she offers no applicable authority for this novel
argument. The fact that the court lacked jurisdiction over her sole claim for relief
does not mean it lacked jurisdiction to award attorney fees after the dismissal. The
district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the Rule 59(e) motion.
III. CONCLUSION
We (1) affirm the district court’s judgment, (2) deny Ms. MacIntyre’s motion
to strike Chase’s brief in No. 19-1290, and (3) grant Chase’s motion for leave to file
a response to Ms. MacIntyre’s motion to strike and her motion for leave to file a
reply to Chase’s response.
Entered for the Court
Scott M. Matheson, Jr.
Circuit Judge
18