Valentine v. PNC Financial Services ( 2020 )


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  •                                                                                   FILED
    United States Court of Appeals
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                         Tenth Circuit
    FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT                           July 14, 2020
    _________________________________
    Christopher M. Wolpert
    Clerk of Court
    ELET VALENTINE,
    Plaintiff - Appellant,
    v.                                                     Nos. 19-1007 & 19-1466
    (D.C. No. 1:18-CV-01934-CMA-SKC)
    THE PNC FINANCIAL SERVICES                                    (D. Colo.)
    GROUP, INC.; PNC BANK, NATIONAL
    ASSOCIATION, a/k/a PNC Bank, NA;
    PNC MORTGAGE,
    Defendants - Appellees.
    _________________________________
    ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
    _________________________________
    Before BRISCOE, MATHESON, and EID, Circuit Judges.
    _________________________________
    Elet Valentine, appearing pro se, appeals from the district court’s orders
    denying her motion for a preliminary injunction (No. 19-1007) and dismissing her
    action with prejudice as a sanction (No. 19-1466). Exercising jurisdiction under
    28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm the order in No. 19-1466 and dismiss No. 19-1007 as
    moot.
    *
    After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
    unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of
    these appeals. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The cases are
    therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not
    binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and
    collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with
    Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
    BACKGROUND
    This case arises from a dispute between Ms. Valentine and PNC Financial
    Services Group, Inc., PNC Bank, N.A., and PNC Mortgage (collectively “PNC”)
    concerning her default on a residential mortgage loan and subsequent foreclosure
    proceedings. In 2018, a Colorado state court issued an order authorizing the sale of
    Ms. Valentine’s home. While the foreclosure proceedings were pending,
    Ms. Valentine filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of
    Colorado alleging eleven claims for relief. She also asked the court to issue a
    preliminary injunction to prevent the sale of her home and require PNC to preserve
    documents pending determination of the merits. The court denied the motion, and
    Ms. Valentine appealed, which is No. 19-1007 (the “Injunction Appeal”).
    Following the denial of preliminary injunctive relief, PNC sold the property
    and moved to dismiss the Injunction Appeal as moot. Immediately thereafter,
    Ms. Valentine filed an amended notice of appeal in which she attempted to appeal
    from several procedural orders. PNC moved to dismiss the amended notice arguing
    that none of the orders were final and therefore could not be appealed.
    While the Injunction Appeal was pending, PNC filed a motion to dismiss
    Ms. Valentine’s amended complaint. The magistrate judge issued a recommendation
    to dismiss all claims except Ms. Valentine’s breach of contract claim. The magistrate
    judge further rejected Ms. Valentine’s argument that the pending Injunction Appeal
    divested the court of jurisdiction. The district court adopted the recommendation,
    noting Ms. Valentine did not challenge the magistrate judge’s substantive analysis;
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    instead, she continued to maintain the pending Injunction Appeal divested the court
    of jurisdiction.
    Shortly thereafter, the magistrate judge set a status conference and asked PNC
    to take the lead in preparing a draft proposed scheduling order. Days later,
    Ms. Valentine filed yet another amended notice of appeal in the Injunction Appeal in
    which she tried to expand the scope of the appeal to include the district court’s order
    to dismiss all but one of Ms. Valentine’s claims. This court deemed the amended
    notice was a new appeal and assigned it No. 19-1350 (the “Second Appeal”).
    In the meantime, Ms. Valentine refused to follow the magistrate judge’s order
    to work with PNC to develop a scheduling order. Despite Ms. Valentine’s failure to
    participate, PNC timely filed a proposed order and further asked the court to find the
    Second Appeal was frivolous.
    On the day set for the status conference, the magistrate judge waited fifteen
    minutes after the scheduled start time, but Ms. Valentine failed to appear. He set a
    further conference in three weeks and warned Ms. Valentine she must appear or risk
    dismissal of her suit.
    A few days later, the district court entered an order certifying the Second
    Appeal as frivolous: “Because it is obvious [that an order dismissing some but not
    all of Ms. Valentine’s claims] is not appealable, the Court hereby certifies the
    [Second Appeal] as frivolous. As a result, this Court retains jurisdiction to consider
    the merits of this case.” No. 19-1466, R., Vol. 5 at 114 (footnote omitted).
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    Undeterred, Ms. Valentine filed motions to reconsider the magistrate judge’s
    order setting a further status conference and the court’s order certifying the Second
    Appeal as frivolous. The court denied both motions, explaining once again that it
    had jurisdiction, and issuing another warning to Ms. Valentine to comply with the
    court’s orders or face dismissal.
    When Ms. Valentine failed to appear at the second status conference, the
    magistrate judge entered a written recommendation to dismiss the case with
    prejudice. The district court overruled Ms. Valentine’s objections and adopted and
    affirmed the recommendation. As backdrop, the court outlined Ms. Valentine’s
    failure to comply with the court’s orders and “meaningfully engage in the litigation
    process,” along with her refusal to “accept any interpretation of the law other than
    her own.”
    Id. at 196.
    “The Court has had enough.”
    Id. at 197.
    Using the five factors announced in Ehrenhaus v. Reynolds, 
    965 F.2d 916
    , 921
    (10th Cir. 1992)—namely “(1) the degree of actual prejudice to the defendant; (2) the
    amount of interference with the judicial process; (3) the culpability of the litigant;
    (4) whether the court warned the party in advance that dismissal of the action would
    be a likely sanction for noncompliance; and (5) the efficacy of lesser sanctions”
    (internal quotation marks, ellipsis, and citations omitted)—the district court
    determined dismissal as a sanction was appropriate.
    As to the first factor, the court noted Ms. Valentine’s “conduct has resulted in
    substantial prejudice to [PNC],” No. 19-1466, R., Vol. 5 at 199. “[PNC] ha[s] been
    diligent in [its] attempt[] to bring this litigation to a close, but these efforts have been
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    stymied by Ms. Valentine’s disregard for hearings and Court Orders.”
    Id. (internal quotation
    marks omitted). “In addition to being deprived of any finality in this
    matter, [PNC] ha[s] also expended considerable resources in what has become a
    futile effort to move this case forward.”
    Id. at 199-200.
    Regarding the second factor, the court found Ms. Valentine’s “conduct has
    stalled the judicial process.”
    Id. at 200.
    “[Ms. Valentine’s] refusal to comply with
    court orders has inhibited the Court’s ability to perform straightforward tasks.”
    Id. “Moreover, [her]
    refusal to recognize this Court’s authority to interpret the law has
    forced the Court to expend valuable time in an unnecessary and repetitive exercise of
    explaining to [her] why her frivolous arguments regarding this Court’s jurisdiction
    are incorrect.”
    Id. “This Court
    has limited resources and an extensive docket.
    Accordingly, the consequences that result from [Ms. Valentine’s] ongoing
    interference with the judicial system cannot be understated.”
    Id. Considering the
    third factor, the court found Ms. Valentine “is culpable for her
    conduct,” noting “[e]ven after [she] filed her second Notice of Appeal and stopped
    appearing at proceedings . . . [the] Magistrate Judge . . . and this Court provided [her]
    with multiple detailed explanations of the legal principles that refute her position
    regarding . . . jurisdiction.”
    Id. “Nevertheless, [Ms.
    Valentine] has remained
    obstinate, and her choice to maintain her strategy under the circumstances shows that
    her conduct is intentional.”
    Id. As to
    the fourth factor, the court found Ms. Valentine “had ample notice of the
    possibility of dismissal due to her conduct.”
    Id. at 201.
    And regarding the final
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    factor, the court found “[s]anctions less than dismissal with prejudice would not be
    effective,” noting an award of attorney fees against Ms. Valentine “based on her
    frivolous attempt to remove a [separate] case to federal court” was an ineffective
    deterrent against her “insistence on pursuing arguments even after they have been
    demonstrated to be frivolous.”
    Id. The Court
    also found “that sanctions other than
    dismissal with prejudice are unlikely to change what [the] Magistrate Judge . . .
    correctly described as [Ms. Valentine’s] willful bad faith in repeatedly disregarding
    the Court’s rules and orders.”
    Id. (internal quotation
    marks omitted).
    Ms. Valentine filed a notice of appeal from the district court’s entry of a final
    judgment dismissing the case as a sanction, which is No. 19-1466 (the “Sanction
    Appeal”). Shortly thereafter, this Court dismissed the Second Appeal for lack of
    jurisdiction.
    SANCTION APPEAL
    “The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorize sanctions, including
    dismissal, for failing to appear at a pretrial or scheduling conference . . . and for
    failing to comply with court rules or any order of the court.” Gripe v. City of Enid,
    
    312 F.3d 1184
    , 1188 (10th Cir. 2002). “We review for an abuse of discretion the
    district court’s decision to impose the sanction of dismissal for failure to follow court
    orders and rules.”
    Id. “It is
    within a court’s discretion to dismiss a case if, after
    considering all the relevant factors, it concludes that dismissal alone would satisfy
    the interests of justice.” 
    Ehrenhaus, 965 F.2d at 918
    . The district court considered
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    the relevant factors in deciding to dismiss Ms. Valentine’s case, and its decision was
    not an abuse of discretion.
    But Ms. Valentine does not challenge the merits of the district court’s sanction
    order; instead, she maintains the court lacked jurisdiction to enter any orders upon
    the filing of her Injunction Appeal and Second Appeal, including the sanction order.
    Ms. Valentine is mistaken.
    An appeal from an interlocutory order denying a preliminary injunction does
    not divest the district court of jurisdiction to proceed with the underlying action on
    the merits. See Colorado v. Idarado Mining Co., 
    916 F.2d 1486
    , 1490 & n.2
    (10th Cir. 1990). Likewise, “so long as the district court takes the affirmative step of
    certifying an appeal as frivolous or forfeited, it retains jurisdiction.” McCauley v.
    Halliburton Energy Servs., Inc., 
    413 F.3d 1158
    , 1162 (10th Cir. 2005). Because the
    court certified Ms. Valentine’s Second Appeal as frivolous, it retained jurisdiction.
    Last, Ms. Valentine incorporates by reference her arguments in a proposed
    supplement to her opening brief in the Injunction Appeal concerning eight alleged
    procedural errors committed by the district court. Whether to accept the proposed
    supplement was referred to this panel. We grant Ms. Valentine’s motion to file the
    proposed supplement but deny the arguments in view of our ruling on the dispositive
    issue—the district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing Ms. Valentine’s
    case as a sanction for her failure to comply with the court’s orders. The issues in the
    supplement, which include whether PNC’s motion to dismiss was timely filed and
    whether the court properly denied Ms. Valentine’s motion to file a second amended
    7
    complaint, do not “affect the outcome[,]” and therefore, “[w]e will not undertake to
    decide [them].” Griffin v. Davies, 
    929 F.2d 550
    , 554 (10th Cir. 1991).
    INJUNCTION APPEAL
    Ms. Valentine’s appeal from the denial of the preliminary injunction is mooted
    by the fact that the district court proceeded to adjudicate the underlying action on the
    merits. When a court proceeds to adjudicate the merits of the underlying action and
    enters a final judgment, an appeal from the denial of a preliminary injunction is moot
    because a preliminary injunction is by its nature a temporary measure intended to
    furnish provisional protection while awaiting a final judgment on the merits. See
    United States ex rel. Bergen v. Lawrence, 
    848 F.2d 1502
    , 1512 (10th Cir. 1988).
    CONCLUSION
    We affirm the district’s court’s order in No. 19-1466. We deny
    Ms. Valentine’s motion to reconsider this court’s order denying her motion to
    consolidate.
    We dismiss No. 19-1007 as moot. We grant Ms. Valentine’s motions to file a
    supplement to her opening brief and to extend the time for filing that supplement, and
    we direct the Clerk to file the supplement as of the date it was received. We deny
    Ms. Valentine’s motions to: (1) reconsider this court’s order to supplement the
    record; (2) preserve the record; (3) oppose PNC’s entry of appearance; and
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    (4) reconsider this court’s order denying her motion to consolidate. We deny PNC’s
    motions to dismiss the appeal and amended notice of appeal as moot.
    Entered for the Court
    Allison H. Eid
    Circuit Judge
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