Collins v. Chater ( 1997 )


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  •                                                                           F I L E D
    United States Court of Appeals
    Tenth Circuit
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FEB 27 1997
    FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
    PATRICK FISHER
    Clerk
    ROBERT L. COLLINS,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    v.                                                    No. 96-6153
    (D.C. No. CIV-94-1718-A)
    SHIRLEY S. CHATER, Commissioner                       (W.D. Okla.)
    of Social Security Administration, *
    Defendant-Appellee.
    ORDER AND JUDGMENT **
    Before PORFILIO, ANDERSON, and BRISCOE, Circuit Judges.
    After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
    unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
    argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f) and 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is
    therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
    *
    Although Shirley S. Chater, Commissioner of Social Security, has been
    substituted for Donna E. Shalala, Secretary of Health and Human Services, as the
    defendant in this action, in the text we continue to refer to the Secretary because
    she was the appropriate party at the time of the underlying decision.
    **
    This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
    doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
    generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
    and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
    Plaintiff Robert L. Collins appeals from an order of the district court
    affirming the Secretary’s determination that he is not entitled to disability
    benefits. We affirm.
    “We review the Secretary’s decision to determine whether her factual
    findings are supported by substantial evidence in the record viewed as a whole
    and whether she applied the correct legal standards. Substantial evidence is such
    relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
    conclusion.” Castellano v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 
    26 F.3d 1027
    ,
    1028 (10th Cir. 1994) (citations and quotation omitted).
    Mr. Collins claimed disability due to a mental impairment and depression.
    The administrative law judge (ALJ) determined at step four of the five-step
    sequential process, see Williams v. Bowen, 
    844 F.2d 748
    , 750-52 (10th Cir.
    1988), that Mr. Collins was not disabled because he could perform his past
    relevant work as a dishwasher or kitchen helper.
    On appeal, Mr. Collins contends he is disabled at step three as he meets the
    listing found at 20 C.F.R., Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1, § 12.05(C) for mental
    retardation. Mr. Collins asserts that his full-scale IQ is 65 and he has a mild
    organic defect and depression which meet the requirements of § 12.05(C).
    Disability listing 12.05(C) requires a claimant to meet a two-prong test: the
    claimant must (1) have “[a] valid verbal, performance, or full scale IQ of 60
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    through 70” and (2) have “a physical or other mental impairment imposing
    additional and significant work-related limitation of function.” Mr. Collins meets
    the first prong. The issue here is whether he has an impairment in addition to his
    IQ which significantly limits a work-related function.
    “[A]n impairment imposes a significant work-related limitation of function
    when its effect on a claimant’s ability to perform basic work activities is more
    than slight or minimal.” Fanning v. Bowen, 
    827 F.2d 631
    , 633 (9th Cir. 1987);
    accord Pullen v. Bowen, 
    820 F.2d 105
    , 109 (4th Cir. 1987); Cook v. Bowen, 
    797 F.2d 687
    , 690 (8th Cir. 1986); Nieves v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs.,
    
    775 F.2d 12
    , 14 (1st Cir. 1985); Edwards ex rel. Edwards v. Heckler, 
    755 F.2d 1513
    , 1515 (11th Cir. 1985). However, “the significant limitation under section
    12.05(C) need not be disabling in and of itself.” Branham v. Heckler, 
    775 F.2d 1271
    , 1273 (4th Cir. 1985); accord Warren v. Shalala, 
    29 F.3d 1287
    , 1291 (8th
    Cir. 1994).
    The record shows that while Mr. Collins has stated he is depressed, he has
    not received professional treatment for his depression. Mr. Collins’ depression
    appears to be related to the fact that he does not have a girl friend. The record
    contains general references to complaints of depression, but no objective medical
    evidence showing that Mr. Collins’s depression would have more than a slight or
    minimal effect on his ability to perform work.
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    A psychological evaluation performed in 1987 stated that one testing score
    reflected a mild organic defect such that “[h]e will experience some problems if
    placed in a vocational area which requires adequate ability to put parts of an
    object into a completed whole.” R. Vol. II at 254. This evaluation eliminates one
    type of job, but does not reflect any impact on Mr. Collins’s ability to perform
    jobs which do not require putting “parts of an object into a completed whole.”
    The mere presence of an impairment does not meet the requirement of § 120.5(C).
    Finally, the record contains no evidence of any physical impairment which would
    affect Mr. Collins’s ability to work.
    The judgment of the United States District Court for the Western District of
    Oklahoma is AFFIRMED.
    Entered for the Court
    John C. Porfilio
    Circuit Judge
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