Gonzales v. Montoya ( 1997 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
MAY 29 1997
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
ELMER M. GONZALES and
RUDOLFO J. GONZALES,
Plaintiffs-Third-Party-
Defendants-Appellants, No. 96-2207
(D.C. No. CIV-95-1348-BB)
v. (D. N.M.)
JOHN P. MONTOYA,
Defendant-Third Party-
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE,
Third-Party-
Defendant-Appellee.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before BRORBY, BARRETT, and LUCERO, Circuit Judges.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument.
The Internal Revenue Service seized real estate from Elmer and Rodolfo
Gonzales and sold it to satisfy a portion of their alleged tax deficiencies. The
Gonzales, representing themselves, filed suit in state court against the buyer, John
Montoya, challenging his right to title. Montoya later filed, also in state court, a
third-party complaint for indemnification against the Internal Revenue Service in
case he lost. On the basis of the third-party complaint and the fact that a
government employee was named as a defendant in it, the Internal Revenue
Service removed the entire action to federal court.
The federal magistrate judge issued an initial scheduling order requiring the
parties to appear at a hearing on January 25, 1996. Plaintiffs did not appear. The
magistrate judge then issued an order requiring plaintiffs to show cause why their
“action should not be dismissed, or [] other sanctions be imposed” for their
failure to obey the court’s order. R. doc. 9. After a hearing and additional
briefing from the parties, it appeared that plaintiffs chose not to attend the
January 25, 1996 hearing because, they claimed, they had not been served with
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the third-party complaint and therefore were not parties to the action. See R.
doc. 4 at 2, ¶ 7; id. doc. 16. The magistrate judge concluded that dismissal was
an appropriate sanction under Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(C) in response to
plaintiffs’ intentional failure to appear at the January 25, 1996 hearing, and
recommended that plaintiffs’ complaint be dismissed with prejudice. The district
court reviewed the record de novo, adopted the magistrate judge’s
recommendation, and dismissed plaintiffs’ complaint. Plaintiffs appeal. We have
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and affirm.
Plaintiffs argue on appeal that the district court abused its discretion by:
(1) dismissing their suit without first verifying that they had been served with the
third-party complaint; (2) failing to determine that it had subject matter
jurisdiction over the action; and (3) failing to resolve the issue of alleged fraud in
the tax sale.
Plaintiffs’ first contention is without merit. Under New Mexico law,
service is effected by and complete upon mailing. See S.C.R.A. Rule 1-005(B)
N.M. Stat. Ann. The record shows that defendant stated he mailed plaintiffs a
copy of the third-party complaint and that the envelope was not returned to him
by the Postal Service. Defendant also attached a certificate of service to the
third-party complaint indicating that a copy had been mailed to plaintiffs. This is
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competent evidence of service. Cf. Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Rogers (In re Eagle
Bus Mfg., Inc.), 62 F.3d 730, 735-36 (5th Cir. 1995) (holding court may consider
whether notice had correct address and postage, whether notice was mailed, and
whether certificate of service was filed to determine whether mailing was
accomplished); Chesson v. Jaquez, 986 F.2d 363, 365 (10th Cir. 1993) (holding
date on certificate of service accepted as date of service absent evidence to the
contrary). Plaintiffs assert here, as in the district court, that they did not receive
the third-party complaint even if it was mailed to them. This mere assertion of
nonreceipt, however, is insufficient to show that the magistrate judge’s finding is
clearly erroneous, or that the district court abused its discretion in adopting it.
Plaintiffs’ contention that the district court lacked subject matter
jurisdiction is also without merit. Because removal was not challenged, any
defects in removal procedure were waived. See Baris v. Sulpicio Lines, Inc., 932
F.2d 1540, 1543 (5th Cir. 1991). The only question is whether the federal court
would have had jurisdiction if the suit had been filed in federal court as the suit
was postured at the time of judgment. See Grubbs v. General Elec. Credit Corp.,
405 U.S. 699, 702 (1972). According to plaintiffs’ own admissions, their
complaint raised a federal question under the tax code. Thus, the district court
had federal subject matter jurisdiction at the time of judgment. To the extent
plaintiffs inartfully attempt to challenge the district court’s assertion of personal
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jurisdiction over them, we note that plaintiffs submitted to federal court
jurisdiction when they filed a removable complaint in state court.
Because the district court had subject matter jurisdiction over the action
and dismissed plaintiffs’ complaint as a sanction based on a factual finding that is
not clearly erroneous, we need not address plaintiffs’ merits argument. We do not
consider whether imposition of lesser sanctions is appropriate under Ehrenhaus v.
Reynolds, 965 F.2d 916 (10th Cir. 1992), and its progeny. The issue was neither
raised before us, nor noted below. We will not manufacture arguments on appeal
for litigants. See National Commodity & Barter Ass’n v. Gibbs, 886 F.2d 1240,
1244 (10th Cir. 1989).
The judgment of the United States District Court for the District of New
Mexico is AFFIRMED.
Entered for the Court
Wade Brorby
Circuit Judge
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