Darling v. Frank ( 1997 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
OCT 15 1997
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
TERESA DARLING,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. Nos. 96-6222 & 96-6296
(D.C. Nos. CIV-95-223-L &
RAY FRANK, an Individual; MIKE CIV-95-0223-M)
SPROUL, an Individual; RAY (W.D. Okla.)
FRANK and MIKE SPROUL, d/b/a
F & S INVESTMENTS; and F & S
INVESTMENT PROPERTIES, L.L.C.,
Defendants-Appellants.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before TACHA, MCKAY, and BALDOCK, Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The cases are therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
Plaintiff was employed as a resident manager by defendants at their
mini-storage facility in Stillwater, Oklahoma from August 3, 1992 through
October 24, 1994. After termination from employment, she filed claims under
the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219, and the Oklahoma
Minimum Wage Act, Okla. Stat. tit. 40, §§ 197.1-197.17, claiming that she was
not paid minimum wage or overtime for the hours she worked in 1992, 1993, and
1994. After a trial to the court, the district court determined that plaintiff was
underpaid $15,317.37 and was entitled to that amount as actual damages and,
additionally, to an equal amount as liquidated damages. The district court also
awarded attorney’s fees to plaintiff.
On appeal, defendants first argue that the FLSA does not apply because
they were not engaged in interstate commerce. 1 We review the district court’s
factual findings under the clearly erroneous standard and its legal conclusions
de novo. See Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 558 (1988).
1
Defendants suggest that the district court erroneously ruled before trial, on
summary judgment, that defendants were engaged in interstate commerce.
Defendants believe the ruling was premature since it was made before the record
was developed. See also Appellees’ Supp. App. at 23 (concluding at end of court
trial that defendants were engaged in commerce or in production of goods for
commerce). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(d) provides that a court may
determine on summary judgment which material facts have been established and
which must be decided at trial. Thus, we conclude the district court’s ruling was
not premature.
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An “[e]nterprise engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for
commerce . . . has employees engaged in commerce or in the production of goods
for commerce, or . . . has employees handling, selling, or otherwise working on
goods or materials that have been moved in or produced for commerce by any
person.” 29 U.S.C. § 203(s)(1)(A)(i). The district court found, and the record
reflects, that plaintiff used cleaning supplies manufactured outside of Oklahoma
and transported to Oklahoma, and accepted packages at the mini-storage facility
for customers who shipped and stored goods produced outside of Oklahoma.
Thus, plaintiff handled goods and materials that had moved in interstate
commerce. See Donovan v. Pointon, 717 F.2d 1320, 1322-23 (10th Cir. 1983);
Brennan v. Dillion, 483 F.2d 1334, 1336-37 (10th Cir. 1973); see also Dole v.
Odd Fellows Home Endowment Bd., 912 F.2d 689, 693 (4th Cir. 1990) (“Local
business activities are subject to the [FLSA] when the enterprise employs workers
who handle goods or materials that have moved in interstate commerce.”). It is
irrelevant whether plaintiff bought the cleaning supplies at a store or whether
someone brought her the supplies from Kansas, where defendant F & S is located.
See Donovan, 717 F.2d at 1322; see also Radulescu v. Moldowan, 845 F. Supp.
1260, 1265 (N.D. Ill. 1994) (determining that although purchased locally, supplies
had previously moved in interstate commerce and supplies were handled and used
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by defendant’s employees). The district court correctly concluded that defendants
engaged in interstate commerce.
Defendants further argue that the FLSA does not apply because plaintiff
failed to establish that there was a single “enterprise” with an annual gross
volume of sales of at least $500,000, as required by 29 U.S.C. § 203(s)(1)(A)(ii).
Because this requirement was not met for 1992, plaintiff sought and was awarded
relief under the Oklahoma Minimum Wage Act for 1992. The relevant issue is
whether this requirement was met for 1993 and 1994.
An “enterprise” is defined as “the related activities performed (either
through unified operation or common control) by any person or persons for a
common business purpose, and includes all such activities whether performed in
one or more establishments or by one or more corporate or other organizational
units . . . .” 29 U.S.C. § 203(r)(1). An “enterprise” has three elements:
(1) related activities; (2) unified operations or common control; and (3) a common
business purpose. See Brennan v. Arnheim & Neely, Inc., 410 U.S. 512, 518
(1973). Related activities are those which are the same or similar. See id.By 1994, defendants owned seven rental storage businesses in three states.
See Appellee’s Supp. App. at 5. This constitutes related activities. Cf. Dole,
912 F.2d at 692 (stating individual retail stores in chain are related). Defendant
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Frank admitted there was common control of the businesses. 2 See Appellee’s
Supp. App. at 16; see also 29 C.F.R. § 779.223 (recognizing control exists when
total ownership is vested in single partnership or corporation). The defendants’
activities at the different locations have the common business purpose of renting
storage units for a profit. See Brennan, 410 U.S. at 519; see also 29 C.F.R.
§ 779.213 (establishing common business purpose when activities directed to
same or similar business objective); Hodgson v. University Club Tower, Inc.,
466 F.2d 745, 748 (10th Cir. 1972) (indicating that common business purpose is
shown when organizational structure is horizontal, such as in chain stores).
Thus, defendants’ business activities should be aggregated as part of a single
“enterprise.”
Plaintiff’s evidence established defendants’ aggregate income from
ownership of the single “enterprise” met the statutory business volume
requirement of at least $500,000 for 1993 and 1994. See Appellee’s Supp.
App. at 11, 12. Because there was an “enterprise” and the business volume
requirement was met, the FLSA did apply. See Dunlop v. Industrial Am. Corp.,
516 F.2d 498, 501-02 (5th Cir. 1975) (recognizing that virtually every enterprise
doing requisite dollar volume of business is covered by FLSA).
2
Because defendants controlled the “enterprise,” whether there was unified
operation is unimportant. See Brock v. Hamad, 867 F.2d 804, 806-07 (4th Cir.
1989).
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In the alternative, defendants argue that plaintiff did not establish, and the
district court did not make a finding regarding, the number of hours she was
required to work. The evidence is to the contrary. Plaintiff testified that she was
required to be on the premises from 7:00 a.m. to 9:00 p.m., fourteen hours a day.
The district court found that plaintiff’s testimony was credible, but subtracted
four hours a day to account for her personal activities. “It is exclusively within
the district court’s province to . . . appraise credibility . . . .” FDIC v. Hamilton,
122 F.3d 854, ___, 1997 WL 430022, at *4 (10th Cir. 1997). Thus, the district
court made proper findings regarding plaintiff’s working hours.
Defendants argue that the amount of the judgment constituting wages, if
any, is properly subject to income tax and other tax withholding before it is
remitted to plaintiff. On May 9, 1996, fourteen days after the district court
entered judgment on April 25, 1996, defendants filed a motion under
Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) to alter or amend the judgment on the grounds that a part of
the amount payable to plaintiff was wages subject to withholding for income taxes
and FICA. Because the motion was not filed within ten days of the entry of
judgment, it was untimely. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e). The district court
apparently construed it as a motion for relief from judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P.
60(b) and denied the request to deduct some amount for taxes.
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Defendants submitted no evidence indicating the amount that should be
withheld. Cf. Tungseth v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 43 F.3d 406, 409 (8th Cir.
1994) (holding in diversity action that defendant had burden of showing propriety
of amounts of taxes withheld from judgment awarding damages for breach of
employment contract; defendant failed to present district court with explanation
for allocating jury award). Under the circumstances, we conclude the district
court did not abuse its discretion in denying relief from judgment. See Lyons v.
Jefferson Bank & Trust, 994 F.2d 716, 727 (10th Cir. 1993).
Finally, defendants argue that the award of attorney’s fees should be
reduced because it possibly included duplication of services by plaintiff’s two
attorneys and it did not reflect the amount of the judgment obtained as compared
with the judgment sought. After reviewing the briefs and appendices on appeal,
we conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding attorney’s
fees of $14,768.75, the full amount requested by plaintiff. See Mann v. Reynolds,
46 F.3d 1055, 1062 (10th Cir. 1995). Any duplication was minor, and plaintiff
obtained the relief, even though not the exact dollar amount, she sought under
both the FLSA and the Oklahoma Minimum Wage Act.
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The judgments of the United States District Court for the Western District
of Oklahoma are AFFIRMED.
Entered for the Court
Deanell Reece Tacha
Circuit Judge
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