Gilbreath v. Ward ( 1997 )


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  •                                                                             F I L E D
    United States Court of Appeals
    Tenth Circuit
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    OCT 2 1997
    TENTH CIRCUIT
    PATRICK FISHER
    Clerk
    THOMAS HOWARD GILBREATH,
    No. 97-6010
    Petitioner-Appellant,                      (D.C. No. 96-CV-1234)
    (W.D. Okla.)
    v.
    RON WARD, Warden, Oklahoma                               No. 97-6011
    State Penitentiary,                                 (D.C. No. 96-CV-1238)
    (W.D. Okla.)
    Respondent- Appellee.
    ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
    Before BRORBY, EBEL and KELLY, Circuit Judges.
    Appellant Gilbreath (“Gilbreath”) is serving a 101-year state sentence for
    robbery with a deadly weapon and is subject to a consecutive 5-year state
    *
    After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
    unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
    argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f) and 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore
    ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding
    precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral
    estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments;
    nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th
    Cir. R. 36.3.
    sentence for uttering a forged instrument. 1 Gilbreath brings two petitions for
    writ of habeas corpus under 
    28 U.S.C. § 2254
     to challenge his forged instrument
    conviction. Specifically, Gilbreath claims that the trial court improperly
    enhanced his sentence in part on the basis of two prior convictions that were
    violative of his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. He also alleges that one
    of the two prior convictions was void for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
    Below, the magistrate judge and the district court found that because
    Gilbreath is no longer “in custody” for the two prior convictions of which he
    complains he cannot request relief under 
    28 U.S.C. § 2254
    . In order for a
    prisoner to seek relief under § 2254 the prisoner must satisfy the reviewing court
    that the prisoner is “in custody” due to the conviction that he appeals. “In
    custody” can take one of two forms: either the prisoner must be serving or facing
    a sentence imposed in the course of that conviction, see Maleng v. Cook, 
    490 U.S. 488
    , 490-92 (1989), or the prisoner must show that his sentence for another
    conviction was enhanced by the conviction he seeks to attack, see Gamble v.
    Parsons, 
    898 F.2d 117
    , 118 (10th Cir. 1990).
    Here, the two convictions Gilbreath challenges were imposed in 1973, for
    second degree forgery, and in 1962, also for second degree forgery. Each of these
    1
    Gilbreath has an additional 1-year sentence he must serve consecutively, as well
    as a 71-month federal sentence to be served consecutive to his state sentences. Gilbreath
    does not argue the validity of these convictions here.
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    convictions resulted in three-year sentences. Gilbreath had long since completed
    serving both sentences at the time of his conviction for uttering a forged
    instrument. A prisoner is no longer in custody for § 2254 purposes once his
    sentence has expired. See Maleng v. Cook, 
    490 U.S. at 491-92
    .
    Thus, in order to find that Gilbreath is “in custody” for the two prior
    convictions at issue, we must find that the trial court relied upon these allegedly
    unconstitutional convictions to enhance Gilbreath’s current forged instrument
    sentence. See Gamble v. Parsons, 
    898 F.2d at 118
    . Neither the magistrate judge
    nor the district court found any support for Gilbreath’s assertion that the trial
    court relied on the convictions at issue in reaching its sentencing decision. We
    have undertaken a thorough review of the record and we agree that there is no
    evidence that these convictions were used to enhance Gilbreath’s sentence for his
    current forged instrument conviction.
    Gilbreath was found guilty of uttering a forged instrument in violation of
    21 Okla. Stat. Ann. § 1592 (1983). The statute defines this crime as the
    equivalent of forgery in the second degree. Under Oklahoma law, forgery in the
    second degree is punishable by imprisonment up to seven years. 21 Okla. Stat.
    Ann § 1621. Five years for second degree forgery is within the statutory range.
    See Buzzard v. State, 
    509 P.2d 190
     (Okla. Crim. App. 1973) (five-year sentence
    for uttering a forged instrument within the statutory range and not so excessive as
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    to shock the conscience). Thus, the imposition of a five-year sentence for second-
    degree forgery does not by itself lead to a conclusion that the sentence was
    enhanced by the trial court. Moreover, even though the trial court had access to
    information regarding Gilbreath’s lengthy criminal record, including the two
    convictions at issue, it did not indicate in any way that it enhanced Gilbreath’s
    sentence based upon these or any other of his convictions. Gilbreath offers no
    evidence to the contrary. In short, Appellant has failed to show that his sentence
    was enhanced by the convictions he seeks to challenge. Therefore he is not “in
    custody” for those convictions and cannot seek review of those conviction under
    
    28 U.S.C. § 2254
    . See Gamble, 
    898 F.2d at 118-19
    . Appellant has failed to make
    “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right” as required by 
    28 U.S.C. § 2253
    (c)(2). His request for a Certificate of Appealability is denied.
    Gilbreath also requests that his appeal proceed without payment of fees.
    Because the mandatory filing fees enacted in the Prison Litigation Reform Act do
    not apply to habeas petitions, United States v. Simmonds, 
    111 F.3d 737
    , 744 (10th
    Cir. 1997), the standard for granting leave in forma pauperis on appeal is based
    upon whether the petitioner “has demonstrated a financial inability to pay and
    whether he has made a reasoned, nonfrivolous argument on the law and facts in
    support of the issues raised” in his petition. McIntosh v. United States Parole
    -4-
    Comm’n, 
    115 F.3d 809
    , 812-13 (10th Cir. 1997). Gilbreath meets both of these
    requirements and may proceed in forma pauperis.
    For the above reasons, Gilbreath’s request to proceed in forma pauperis is
    GRANTED, Gilbreath’s request for a Certificate of Appealability is DENIED and
    the appeal is DISMISSED.
    The mandate shall issue forthwith.
    ENTERED FOR THE COURT
    David M. Ebel
    Circuit Judge
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