Silvey v. Severson ( 1997 )


Menu:
  •                                                                           F I L E D
    United States Court of Appeals
    Tenth Circuit
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    DEC 22 1997
    FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
    PATRICK FISHER
    Clerk
    In re: ROMAN G. WENINGER and
    MARY MADELEINE WENINGER,
    Debtors,
    No. 97-1238
    CORAL SILVEY,                                    (D.C. No. 96-Z-2552)
    (D. Colo.)
    Appellant,
    v.
    ROBERT SEVERSON, Trustee,
    Appellee.
    ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
    Before ANDERSON, McKAY, and LUCERO, Circuit Judges.
    After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
    unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
    this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore
    ordered submitted without oral argument.
    *
    This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
    doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
    generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
    and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
    Appellant Coral Silvey appeals the district court’s order affirming an order
    of the bankruptcy court granting appellee-trustee Robert Severson’s motion for
    approval of sale of certain pieces of property from the bankruptcy estate of
    debtors Roman G. and Mary Madeleine Weninger. The district court determined
    that Ms. Silvey’s claims were barred by res judicata. Ms. Silvey appeals, and we
    affirm.
    The three parcels of property in Kansas in which Ms. Silvey claims an
    interest have been in bankruptcy litigation since March 1989 when debtors filed
    for Chapter 11 protection. The bankruptcy court issued orders in 1990 and 1993,
    determining that the debtors’ actions in quit claiming the property to Ms. Silvey
    several weeks before filing the bankruptcy action were fraudulent pursuant to
    
    11 U.S.C. § 548
    , and the transfers should be avoided pursuant to 
    11 U.S.C. § 550
    .
    In both orders, the bankruptcy court declared Ms. Silvey’s interest in the property
    to be null and void.
    Despite the bankruptcy court’s determination that Ms. Silvey had no legal
    interest in the property, in August 1995, Ms. Silvey sold the property to
    Melvin M. and Colleen R. Nelson in exchange for a mortgage in the amount of
    $80,000. On January 16, 1996, the bankruptcy court entered an order granting the
    trustee’s motion for summary judgment, and declaring the subject property to be
    part of the bankruptcy estate. The court imposed a constructive trust upon all
    -2-
    cash and other consideration received by Ms. Silvey as a result of her sale of the
    property. Ms. Silvey did not appeal this order.
    On October 21, 1996, the bankruptcy court entered another order declaring
    Ms. Silvey’s attempted sale null and void, and approving the sale of the property
    by the bankruptcy estate to the Nelsons for the purchase price of $80,000, free
    and clear of all interests, liens, and encumbrances. Ms. Silvey appealed this order
    to the district court.
    On appeal, the district court held that in attempting to convey the property
    to the Nelsons, Ms. Silvey had ignored the prior orders of the bankruptcy court
    declaring her interest in the property to be null and void. In dismissing Ms.
    Silvey’s appeal, the court concluded that because she had failed to appeal from
    the January 1996 order, her claims were precluded as res judicata.
    We review a district court’s conclusions of law as to the applicability of the
    doctrine of res judicata de novo. See State Bank of S. Utah v. Gledhill (In re
    Gledhill), 
    76 F.3d 1070
    , 1082 (10th Cir. 1996). “Under res judicata, a final
    judgment on the merits of an action precludes the parties or their privies from
    relitigating issues that were or could have been raised in that action.” Allen v.
    McCurry, 
    449 U.S. 90
    , 94 (1980). In Colorado, the doctrine of res judicata
    absolutely bars later actions “when the later action involves the same parties,
    subject matter, and claims, as determined in a former proceeding.” Swisher v.
    -3-
    Phillips, 
    897 P.2d 914
    , 916 (Colo. App. Ct. 1995). “The doctrine of res judicata
    applies generally to bankruptcy proceedings.” Griego v. Padilla (In re Griego), 
    64 F.3d 580
    , 584 (10th Cir. 1995); accord Swisher, 
    897 P.2d at 916
    .
    Here, the bankruptcy court considered Ms. Silvey’s claims of interest in the
    property numerous times since the institution of the bankruptcy proceeding in
    1989. All of the decisions on the issue involved the same parties, subject matter,
    and cause of action. Because she failed to appeal, these orders are now final, and
    under the doctrine of res judicata, Ms. Silvey’s claims are foreclosed from further
    consideration. Therefore, the district court was correct in refusing to consider the
    claims and in dismissing Ms. Silvey’s appeal.
    The judgment of the United States District Court for the District of
    Colorado is AFFIRMED.
    Entered for the Court
    Monroe G. McKay
    Circuit Judge
    -4-