Mobley v. Dillon Companies ( 1998 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
MAY 29 1998
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
TERRY W. MOBLEY and
CHERYL E. MOBLEY,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
No. 97-1411
v. (D.C. No. 97-WY-1220-AJ)
(D. Colo.)
DILLON COMPANIES, INC., doing
business as King Soopers, Inc., doing
business as Group Life and Health
Plan for King Soopers Employees--
Oil, Chemical, and Atomic Workers
International Union Local 2-920,
a Kansas corporation; JOHNELLA
JOHNSON; DOUG MALENOSKI;
OIL, CHEMICAL & ATOMIC
WORKERS UNION-INDUSTRY
PENSION FUND,
Defendants-Appellees.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before TACHA, LOGAN, and LUCERO, Circuit Judges.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument.
Plaintiffs Terry W. and Cheryl E. Mobley commenced this action against
Ms. Mobley’s employer, her union, pension fund, and two individuals. The
Mobleys alleged violations of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
(ERISA), 42 U.S.C. § 1981, and various state laws. Ms. Mobley also alleged
gender and race discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 and age discrimination in violation of 29 U.S.C. § 623.
The district court granted defendants’ motions to dismiss pursuant to Fed.
R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The Mobleys raise various claims of error, including the
district court’s holding that Mr. Mobley did not have standing to sue. Ms.
Mobley also contends that the district court erred when it determined she could
not sue her union or pension plan, could not assert claims under ERISA, and
could not sue the individual defendants. Ms. Mobley also argues that the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) does not require filing with the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) prior to bringing suit in federal
court. Finally, Ms. Mobley contends the district court erred in dismissing the
action under Rule 12(b)(6) after considering materials outside of the pleadings
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and without giving notice that it was treating those pleadings as summary
judgment motions.
In deciding whether to dismiss a complaint under Rule 12(b)(6), the court
must base its decision solely on materials contained in the pleadings. If matters
outside the pleadings are considered, the court must treat the motion as one for
summary judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. See Rule 12(b).
In its order, the district court quoted from the charges Ms. Mobley filed
with the EEOC attached to her employer’s motion to dismiss. The court’s
inclusion of these documents in its deliberations did not mandate conversion of
the motions to dismiss to ones for summary judgment. “[I]f a plaintiff does not
incorporate by reference or attach a document to its complaint, but the document
is referred to in the complaint and is central to the plaintiff’s claim, a defendant
may submit an indisputably authentic copy to the court to be considered on a
motion to dismiss.” GFF Corp. v. Associated Wholesale Grocers, Inc., 130 F.3d
1381, 1384 (10th Cir. 1997). The EEOC charges were matters of public record,
were referred to by number in plaintiffs’ amended complaint, were integral to the
claims alleged, and their authenticity was uncontested. No conversion occurred
and the district court properly ruled on the motion under Rule 12(b)(6).
We will uphold a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal only if it appears the plaintiff can
prove no set of facts to support the claims that would warrant relief. See Fuller v.
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Norton, 86 F.3d 1016, 1020 (10th Cir. 1996). We “accept[] the well-pleaded
allegations of the complaint as true and constru[e] them in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff.” Id.
We construe a pro se litigant’s pleadings liberally holding the litigant to
a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted by lawyers. See Haines v. Kerner,
404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972). To state a claim, however, even pro se litigants
must support their allegations with well-pleaded factual contentions, not just
conclusory allegations. See Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir.
1991). “[A] pro se plaintiff requires no special legal training to recount the facts
surrounding his alleged injury, and he must provide such facts if the court is to
determine whether he makes out a claim on which relief can be granted.” Id.
The defendant employer hired Ms. Mobley as a pharmacist in 1977. In
1991, she left her employment to care for her terminally ill grandparents. The
incidents alleged in the complaint began in 1993 when she returned to her job.
Ms. Mobley maintained she should have been reinstated with full seniority rights,
rather than treated as a new hire. She filed a grievance on that issue. In her
complaint, she alleged that, as a result of the grievance, her employer took
retaliatory actions by reducing her work hours and subjecting her to hostile and
harassing conditions. Ms. Mobley also alleged her employer retaliated after she
filed a complaint with the State Board of Pharmacy regarding some allegedly
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illegal practices engaged in by her employer. Ms. Mobley alleged that she was
physically assaulted by a white woman at work, and that her employer attempted
to cover up the incident with the police. She also alleged her employer arranged
to have a black female pharmacy manager supervise her.
We have reviewed the record on appeal and the parties’ briefs and for
substantially the reasons stated in the district court’s order of September 29,
1997, we affirm the dismissal of Mr. Mobley for lack of standing and the
dismissal of Ms. Mobley’s ADEA claims, her employment contract and pension
plan claims, and her charges against the individual defendants under Title VII.
The statute of limitations bars Ms. Mobley’s § 1981 claims. As § 1981
does not specify a time period in which claims under that statute must be brought,
we look to analogous state law for a limitations period. See 42 U.S.C. § 1988(a);
Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 462 (1975). We apply
Colorado’s residual two-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions,
Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-80-102(1)(i); Reynolds v. School Dist. No. 1, 69 F.3d 1523,
1532 n.12 (10th Cir. 1995). Ms. Mobley complains of events occurring in 1993
and 1994. She filed her complaint in 1997. Thus her § 1981 claims are untimely.
Title VII prohibits employment discrimination based on race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). To determine
whether a Title VII violation has occurred we must inquire “whether the
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defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff.” United States Postal
Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 715 (1983) (quotation omitted).
For sexual or racial harassment to be actionable, “it must be sufficiently
severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the [plaintiff]’s employment and
create an abusive working environment.” Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson,
477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986) (quotation omitted) (sexual harassment); see also Bolden
v. PRC Inc., 43 F.3d 545, 551 (10th Cir. 1994) (racial harassment). “General
harassment if not racial or sexual is not actionable.” Id. Further, a “plaintiff
must show more than a few isolated incidents of racial enmity.” Id. (quotation
omitted).
Ms. Mobley alleged to the EEOC 1 that, due to her sex and race, her
employer denied her long term leave and scheduled hours and a white pharmacy
manager cut her hours. She also alleged she was disciplined in retaliation for
opposing her employer’s allegedly illegal practices and for filing a prior EEOC
complaint. Neither these allegations, nor the other facts Ms. Mobley contained in
her complaint establish that any of the alleged illegal actions were taken due to
her race or gender or in retaliation for statutorily protected activities. Ms.
Mobley has merely stated that it is her belief these actions were so motivated. A
1
Federal courts lack jurisdiction to hear Title VII claims not first raised to
the EEOC. See Seymore v. Shawver & Sons, Inc., 111 F.3d 794, 799 (10th Cir.),
cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 342 (1997).
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plaintiff’s personal beliefs are insufficient to state a Title VII claim. Cf. Holt v.
KMI-Continental, Inc., 95 F.3d 123, 130 (2d Cir. 1996) (Title VII plaintiff cannot
establish pretext by relying on personal beliefs), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1819
(1997).
AFFIRMED. Ms. Mobley’s request for en banc review of the district
court’s dismissal of her claims against the individual defendants is DENIED.
Ms. Mobley has failed to comply with the requirements of Fed. R. App. P. 35.
Entered for the Court
James K. Logan
Circuit Judge
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