Newton v. Socorro County ( 1998 )


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  •                                                                           F I L E D
    United States Court of Appeals
    Tenth Circuit
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    JUL 2 1998
    FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
    PATRICK FISHER
    Clerk
    EDWARD RICHARD NEWTON,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    v.                                                   No. 97-2174
    (D.C. No. CIV-97-236-BB)
    SOCORRO COUNTY,                                       (D. N.M.)
    Defendant-Appellee.
    ORDER AND JUDGMENT            *
    Before BALDOCK , EBEL , and MURPHY , Circuit Judges.
    After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
    unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
    this appeal.   See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore
    ordered submitted without oral argument.
    *
    This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
    doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
    generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
    and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
    Plaintiff appeals the district court’s sua sponte dismissal of his civil rights
    complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
    A district court may dismiss an     in forma pauperis complaint under
    § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i), (ii) if it determines that the action is frivolous or malicious or
    that it fails to state a claim on which relief can be granted. A dismissal under
    Rule 12(b)(6) is proper “when it appears that the plaintiff can prove no set of
    facts in support of the claims that would entitle him to relief, accepting the
    well-pleaded allegations of the complaint as true and construing them in the light
    most favorable to the plaintiff.”    Yoder v. Honeywell, Inc. , 
    104 F.3d 1215
    , 1224
    (10th Cir.) (quotation omitted),    cert. denied , 
    118 S. Ct. 55
    (1997). A sua sponte
    dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is proper when “it is patently obvious that the
    plaintiff could not prevail on the facts alleged, and allowing him an opportunity to
    amend his complaint would be futile.”      Hall v. Belmon , 
    935 F.2d 1106
    , 1110
    (10th Cir. 1991) (quotation omitted). Because plaintiff is a pro se litigant,
    we construe his allegations liberally.    See Haines v. Kerner , 
    404 U.S. 519
    , 520
    (1972).
    In his complaint, plaintiff alleged that during his nine-month pretrial
    detention in the Socorro County jail, his repeated requests for corrective surgery
    for his chronically painful varicose veins were denied pursuant to an unidentified
    county policy. The district court concluded that, even if one assumed that
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    plaintiff’s varicose veins constituted a serious medical condition, his allegations
    did not show deliberate indifference to his condition.
    As a pretrial detainee, the Eighth Amendment standard for medical
    attention applies to plaintiff.   See Barrie v. Grand County, Utah , 
    119 F.3d 862
    ,
    867 (10th Cir. 1997). Only the “unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain”
    violates the Eighth Amendment.        Estelle v. Gamble , 
    429 U.S. 97
    , 102-03 (1976).
    Therefore, to state a cognizable claim plaintiff “must allege acts or omissions
    sufficiently harmful to evidence deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.”
    
    Id. at 106.
    “[A]n official acts with deliberate indifference if its conduct (or
    adopted policy) disregards a known or obvious risk that is very likely to result
    in the violation of a prisoner’s constitutional rights.”   Barrie , 119 F.3d at 869.
    The conclusory allegations in plaintiff’s complaint do not state an Eighth
    Amendment claim. Moreover, even if we were to consider the additional facts
    provided by plaintiff on appeal, they demonstrate that plaintiff suffered at most
    only a delay in medical treatment. After he returned to the custody of the
    Colorado Department of Corrections, plaintiff received the corrective surgery.
    A delay in medical treatment for a serious medical need does not violate a
    prisoner’s constitutional rights unless the prisoner can show that the delay
    resulted in substantial harm.     See Olson v. Stotts , 
    9 F.3d 1475
    , 1477 (10th Cir.
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    1993). Plaintiff has made no showing of substantial harm resulting from the delay.
    Therefore, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court dismissing
    plaintiff’s complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and Rule 12(b)(6). We
    note that plaintiff’s appeal is frivolous or fails to state a claim under 28 U.S.C.
    § 1915(e)(2)(B) for purposes of counting “prior occasions” under 28 U.S.C.
    § 1915(g). Plaintiff is hereby notified that three filings of cases that are
    dismissed or affirmed on the basis that they are frivolous or fail to state a claim
    under § 1915(g) will result in him being unable to proceed    in forma pauperis
    under the provisions of § 1915(g).   1
    Defendant’s motion to strike is DENIED
    as moot.
    Entered for the Court
    Bobby R. Baldock
    Circuit Judge
    1
    On June 24, 1997, this court entered an order assessing plaintiff fees and
    costs in the amount of $105.00 for this appeal. Plaintiff has yet to pay any
    portion of the assessment. While it appears that plaintiff is unable to pay the
    assessment at this time, plaintiff is hereby notified that he remains under a
    continuing obligation to pay the fees and costs assessed. Failure to pay the fees
    and costs as required will be recorded by the Clerk of the Court of the United
    States Court of Appeals and such information will be provided to this court upon
    the filing of any future appeals in the Tenth Circuit.
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