Baker v. General Chemical ( 1998 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
JUL 22 1998
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
JEFF A. BAKER,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 97-8036
(D.C. No. 96-CV-51-D)
GENERAL CHEMICAL (D. Wyo.)
CORPORATION, a Delaware
Corporation,
Defendant-Appellee.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before BALDOCK, EBEL, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f) and 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
This appeal arises from plaintiff’s diversity action against defendant for
wrongful termination, promissory estoppel, misrepresentation, interference with
advantageous business relations, and breach of the implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing. The district court dismissed all but the promissory estoppel
claim under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim, and it denied
plaintiff’s motion for leave to amend his complaint. Defendant moved for
summary judgment on the promissory estoppel claim, and the district court
granted the motion.
We review the district court’s 12(b)(6) dismissals de novo. See Chemical
Weapons Working Group, Inc. v. United States Dep’t of the Army, 111 F.3d
1485, 1490 (10th Cir. 1997). We accept plaintiff’s well-pleaded allegations as
true, construe them in his favor, and will affirm the dismissal of plaintiff’s claims
only if he can prove no set of facts that would entitle him to relief. See Yoder v.
Honeywell, Inc., 104 F.3d 1215, 1224 (10th Cir. 1997). We also review the grant
of summary judgment de novo, and, like the district court, we apply Fed. R. Civ.
P. 56(c). See Thomas v. Wichita Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 968 F.2d 1022, 1024
(10th Cir. 1992). We will affirm if, reading the factual record in the light most
favorable to plaintiff, there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Kaul v. Stephan, 83
F.3d 1208, 1212 (10th Cir. 1996). Guided by these standards, we affirm.
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Plaintiff holds a college degree in mechanical engineering from the
University of Wyoming, his home state, and he was employed by Monsanto as a
project engineer in Houston. Plaintiff enjoyed his work, but he and his family
wished to relocate. Through a headhunter, plaintiff arranged an interview with
defendant in Green River, Wyoming. Shortly after the interview, defendant
extended a written offer of employment as the maintenance engineer at its Green
River facility. Defendant also agreed to pay plaintiff’s relocation expenses,
which plaintiff agreed to reimburse in the event plaintiff voluntarily terminated
his employment within one year. Plaintiff signed a Letter of Agreement regarding
the relocation, specifically acknowledging that the “agreement shall not be
construed as a guarantee of employment for any period of time following [his]
relocation.” App. at 222. Plaintiff accepted the job offer, resigned his position at
Monsanto, and moved to Green River to assume the duties of his new job.
Plaintiff stayed in the job one year to avoid repayment of the relocation expenses.
One year after he accepted the job, plaintiff resigned and is now employed by
another company.
We will first address the grant of summary judgment on plaintiff’s
promissory estoppel claim. Plaintiff claims that defendant’s employees
represented to him that he would be permanently employed as the only
maintenance engineer and that he would be “in line” for the position of
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superintendent of maintenance. App. at 3. Plaintiff complains that he was, in
fact, hired as a planner and that was the job he performed. He maintains that
accepting and performing an inferior position to that which he was promised was
detrimental to his engineering career.
To establish a claim for promissory estoppel under Wyoming law, plaintiff
must show three things: (1) a clear and definite agreement existed; (2) he acted to
his detriment in reasonable reliance on the agreement; and (3) the equities support
enforcement of the agreement. See Terry v. Pioneer Press, Inc., 947 P.2d 273,
276-77 (Wyo. 1997); Duart v. FMC Wyoming Corp., 859 F. Supp. 1447, 1462
(D. Wyo. 1994), aff’d, 72 F.3d 117 (10th Cir. 1995). We agree with the district
court that the record in this case simply does not evidence that a clear and definite
agreement existed. Defendant extended a written offer of employment “as
Maintenance Engineer at our Green River Soda Ash Operation.” App. at 221.
Nowhere in the record is there evidence of a clear and definite agreement that
plaintiff would be the only maintenance engineer or that he would continue in that
position permanently. In fact, the job application plaintiff submitted specifically
acknowledged that “this employment application and any other company
documents are not contracts of employment and that any individual who is hired
may voluntarily leave employment upon proper notice and may be discharged by
General Chemical at any time with or without cause.” Id. at 177. Neither is there
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evidence of a clear and definite agreement that plaintiff would eventually assume
the plant supervisor position. Plaintiff’s claims that he did not perform the duties
of maintenance engineer are also to no avail. There is no evidence of any clear
and definite agreement regarding what duties plaintiff was to perform when
defendant offered him the position of maintenance engineer. 1
In addition to promissory estoppel, plaintiff claims he is entitled to relief
on the similar basis of equitable estoppel. Plaintiff’s complaint raises no such
claim, and the district court did not address equitable estoppel. We, therefore,
decline to address this claim raised for the first time on appeal. See Walker v.
Mather (In re Walker), 959 F.2d 894, 896 (10th Cir. 1992).
We now turn to plaintiff’s claims that the district court erred in dismissing
three of his claims under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). 2 Defendant argues that we lack
1
Because we hold that plaintiff has not made the required showing of a clear
and definite agreement, discussion of the remaining two requirements is not
necessary. We note, however, that we also agree with the district court that
plaintiff has not met the third requirement for relief under promissory estoppel.
The record does not show that the equities support enforcement of any agreement:
plaintiff and his family wished to relocate out of Texas, a goal which defendant
facilitated and financed; plaintiff earned more money while employed by
defendant than he had in his previous job; and plaintiff is currently employed with
another company and, even though it may not be his ideal job, his present
employment pays a higher base salary than his previous two jobs and offers other
benefits he did not have with either defendant or Monsanto.
2
The district court also dismissed count four of plaintiff’s complaint,
interference with advantageous business relations. Plaintiff does not argue on
appeal that the district court erred in dismissing this claim, and, therefore, he has
(continued...)
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jurisdiction to consider these claims because plaintiff did not specify in either his
notice of appeal or the docketing statement that he was appealing from the district
court’s grant of defendant’s motion to dismiss. Plaintiff’s notice of appeal from
the grant of summary judgment was sufficient to include appeal from all
previously decided interlocutory orders, however; consequently, we will address
the claims dismissed under 12(b)(6) and denial of the motion to amend. See Cole
v. Ruidoso Municipal Sch., 43 F.3d 1373, 1382 n.7 (10th Cir 1994).
The district court was correct in dismissing plaintiff’s claim for breach of
the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. “An implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing is a substitute for an express or implied-in-fact promise by the
employer and tests a defendant’s compliance with a duty imposed by law rather
than with a promise voluntarily made.” Terry, 947 P.2d at 277. It applies only
where a special relationship of trust and reliance exists between the employer and
employee, a condition that is both rare and exceptional. See id. Such a
relationship can be evidenced by the existence of “separate consideration, rights
created by common law or statute, or rights accruing with longevity of service.”
Id. at 278; see also Duart, 859 F. Supp. at 1463. None of those factors are present
in this case.
2
(...continued)
waived the issue. See State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Mhoon, 31 F.3d 979, 984 n.7
(10th Cir. 1994).
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The district court was also correct in dismissing plaintiff’s breach of
contract claim. Plaintiff argues that the at-will employment presumption was
altered by defendant’s promise of permanent employment. This is true only if
plaintiff “supplied additional consideration or if the employment contract contains
explicit language stating that [plaintiff] can only be terminated for cause.” Terry,
947 P.2d at 276. Nothing in defendant’s offer of employment or any other
document alters the at-will presumption. The job application specifically
acknowledges the at-will nature of the employment. In addition, the relocation
agreement does not supply additional consideration. As was the case in Davis v.
Wyoming Med. Ctr., Inc., 934 P.2d 1246, 1250-51 (Wyo. 1997), the relocation
agreement language obligated plaintiff, in exchange for relocation money, either
to work for one year or to repay the relocation assistance. “The consideration
exchanged by the parties does not include job security or [plaintiff’s] assurance
that [he] would not resign in less than a year and is, therefore, not an agreement
for employment for one year and does not alter [defendant’s] unfettered right to
discharge at any time and without cause.” Id. In addition, we note that the
relocation agreement contains a specific disclaimer that it cannot be construed as
a guarantee of employment for any specific period of time following relocation.
See Duart, 859 F. Supp. at 1459-62 (discussing Wyoming law regarding effect of
disclaimers).
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Similarly, plaintiff’s misrepresentation claims were properly dismissed.
We agree with the district court that plaintiff did not plead facts with sufficient
particularity to support a claim for fraudulent misrepresentation. See Duffy v.
Brown, 708 P.2d 433, 437 (Wyo. 1985) (listing elements of fraudulent
misrepresentation). Neither did plaintiff plead facts sufficient to support a claim
of negligent misrepresentation. See Verschoor v. Mountain West Farm Bureau
Mut. Ins. Co., 907 P.2d 1293, 1299 (Wyo. 1995) (listing elements of negligent
misrepresentation). Plaintiff alleges that defendant misrepresented to him that he
would be the only maintenance engineer at the Green River operation and that he
would be “in line” for the plant supervisor position. These general allegations are
insufficient to survive a 12(b)(6) motion and, in fact, when plaintiff was the only
maintenance engineer at the Green River operation when he was hired.
Finally, contrary to plaintiff’s assertion, the district court did not abuse its
discretion in denying plaintiff’s motion to amend. See Ramirez v. Oklahoma
Dep’t of Mental Health, 41 F.3d 584, 596 n.9 (10th Cir. 1994). Because the
amendment added nothing new, the district court found that permitting
amendment would be futile. Further, it found that the motion was “untimely and
unduly prejudicial” because it was filed “well after the close of discovery and
only three months prior to trial.” App. at 60. In light of these findings, the
district court acted within its discretion in refusing to allow amendment.
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The judgment of the United States District Court for the District of
Wyoming is AFFIRMED.
Entered for the Court
Michael R. Murphy
Circuit Judge
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