United States v. Jaramillo ( 1998 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
AUG 18 1998
TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs. No. 98-2005
(D.C. No. CR-97-450-BB)
RICHARD T. JARAMILLO, (D.N.M.)
Defendant-Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before TACHA, BALDOCK, and KELLY, Circuit Judges.
Defendant-Appellant Richard T. Jaramillo pleaded guilty to one count of
maliciously conveying false information. See 18 U.S.C. § 844(e). The district
court sentenced Mr. Jaramillo to time served, a sentence which exceeded the
maximum Guideline range by 7 days, and, as a condition of his supervised
release, ordered Mr. Jaramillo to have no contact with his ex-wife or children
except as provided by the New Mexico state court. On appeal, Mr. Jaramillo
challenges the length of his sentence and the district court’s imposition of the
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. This court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
special supervised release condition. Our jurisdiction arises under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a). We dismiss as moot Mr. Jaramillo’s appeal of
the district court’s imposition of sentence and affirm the district court’s
imposition of the special condition of supervised release.
As a threshold matter, the government contends that Mr. Jaramillo’s
challenge of the sentence of time served is moot because he has been released
from confinement. Mr. Jaramillo counters that the appeal of his sentence is not
moot because the successful resolution of this appeal would affect the term of his
supervised release. Mr. Jaramillo’s contention, however, is based on the belief
that we can provide him the remedy he seeks, an earlier commencement of his
term of supervised release based on the date when a 180-day sentence should have
expired. Though neither party chose to brief this important issue, our research
indicates that neither the relevant statute nor case law allows us to grant such a
remedy.
In United States v. Reider, 103 F.3d 99, 102-03 (10th Cir. 1996), we held
that the plain language of 18 U.S.C. § 3624(e) requires a term of supervised
release to commence when the “person is released from imprisonment.” Id.
(quoting § 3624(e)); see United States v. Joseph, 109 F.3d 34, 36-38 (1st Cir.
1997) (holding supervised release does not run while a person is incarcerated for
a federal crime); United States v. Vallejo, 69 F.3d 992, 994 (9th Cir. 1995)
2
(holding that term of supervised release does not commence until day defendant is
subject to conditions of supervised release), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1148 (1996);
United States v. Douglas, 88 F.3d 533, 534 (8th Cir. 1996) (per curiam) (same);
Quinones v. United States, 936 F. Supp. 153, 154-55 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (same); but
see United States v. Blake, 88 F.3d 824, 825-26 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding
supervised release begins on date a prisoner’s term of imprisonment expires,
whether or not released on that date, in limited circumstances where Sentencing
Guidelines are retroactively amended); United States v. Monenegro-Rojo, 908
F.2d 425, 431 n.8 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that fairness requires that extra time in
prison should be counted toward term of supervised release).
It is undisputed Mr. Jaramillo was not released from imprisonment until
December 22, 1997. Thus, Mr. Jaramillo’s term of supervised release could not
have begun until that time, notwithstanding the seven extra days he spent in
prison. See Joseph, 109 F.3d at 37; Douglas, 88 F.3d at 534; Quinones, 936 F.
Supp. at 155; cf. United States v. Temple, 918 F.2d 134, 135 (10th Cir. 1990)
(interpreting prior statute governing credit for time served and concluding
“Congress did not intend criminal defendants to receive credit toward probation
for time spent in custody”). Moreover, even if the seven extra days could be
credited toward Mr. Jaramillo’s term of supervised release, we lack the authority
to award a sentence credit. See United States v. Jenkins, 38 F.3d 1143, 1143-44
3
(10th Cir. 1994).
Finally, though Mr. Jaramillo argues by implication that the district court
might shorten the term of supervised release if we vacated and remanded for
resentencing, see Aplt. Brief at 10-11, we do not remand in futility. Because of
Mr. Jaramillo’s brief sentence, this is not a case where a reduction of sentence
provides the district court with discretion over the term of supervised release that
it did not have under the greater sentence. See USSG § 5D1.1(b). Mr. Jaramillo
did not object to the length of the term of supervised release, and even were we to
review for plain error, we would likely find none. Moreover, it is clear from the
colloquies between the court and defense counsel during the plea and sentencing
hearings that all parties involved considered “time served” as the benchmark for
Mr. Jaramillo’s sentence, see II R. at 10, 23-24, and that despite defense
counsel’s failure to object the district court was aware of the length of Mr.
Jaramillo’s imprisonment. See I R. doc. 34, at 2. Thus, because the district court
had the same facts and law before it at sentencing that it would upon remand, we
are not convinced the length of Mr. Jaramillo’s term of supervised release would
be altered. Because neither we nor the district court have the authority to redress
Mr. Jaramillo’s injury, his challenge to the district court’s imposition of sentence
is moot. See Spencer v. Kemna, 118 S. Ct. 978, 983 (1998).
We review the district court’s imposition of a special condition of
4
supervised release for abuse of discretion, see United States v. Edgin, 92 F.3d
1044, 1047 (10th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 714 (1997), and find none.
The presentence report, which the district court incorporated in its findings, see
III R. at 7-8, provides ample justification for the imposition of restrictions on Mr.
Jaramillo’s contact with his ex-wife and children. Thus, Edgin is inapposite. See
Edgin, 92 F.3d at 1049. Further, the district court was well within its discretion
to order Mr. Jaramillo to comply with the state court’s temporary restraining order
as a condition of his release. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d); USSG § 5D1.3(b). We
accordingly DISMISS Mr. Jaramillo’s appeal of the district court’s imposition of
sentence as moot and AFFIRM the district court’s imposition of the special
condition of supervised release.
Entered for the Court
Paul J. Kelly, Jr.
Circuit Judge
5