Belleview Valley v. Walterscheid ( 1998 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
AUG 10 1998
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
BELLEVIEW VALLEY LAND
CO., INC.,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
No. 97-2307
v. (D.C. No. CIV 96-1304)
(D. N.M.)
WALTERSCHEID TRUCKING
AND FARMS, INC., a New Mexico
corporation; HENRY
WALTERSCHEID, individually,
Defendants-Appellees.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before TACHA and McKAY, Circuit Judges, and BROWN, ** Senior District
Judge.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
**
Honorable Wesley E. Brown, Senior District Judge, United States District
Court for the District of Kansas, sitting by designation.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument.
Belleview Valley Land Co. appeals from the district court’s grant of
summary judgment to defendants on Belleview’s claim of tortious interference
with contract.
“We review the grant or denial of summary judgment de novo,
applying the same legal standard used by the district court pursuant
to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). Summary judgment is appropriate if the
pleading, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on
file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine
issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.”
Kaul v. Stephan, 83 F.3d 1208, 1212 (10th Cir. 1996) (quotation omitted).
In 1994, Belleview entered into a contract for the purchase of farm property
under lease to defendants. Upon Belleview’s tender of the purchase price, the
sellers refused to accept the payment and refused to close the sale. Belleview
ultimately sued in state court for specific performance and, in 1995, the sellers
conveyed title of the property to Belleview. This suit, based on diversity
jurisdiction, followed. The parties stipulated that New Mexico law controls their
dispute. Our jurisdiction over this appeals arises from 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
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Before the district court, Belleview contended that defendants tortiously
interfered with the contract for the sale of the property. It argued that defendants
offered to buy the property should the contract fall through as an inducement to
break the contract, and that defendants threatened to sue the sellers should they
honor the contract. Further, it contended that defendants had no justification to
interfere because, beyond the term of the then-current lease to which the sale was
already subject, they had no legal rights in connection with the property.
Applying New Mexico law, the district court concluded that Belleview had
failed to present evidence demonstrating genuine issues of material fact as to the
existence of either improper means or improper motive. Specifically, it ruled
that Belleview’s evidence did not support its claims that defendants had
threatened to sue the sellers and that Belleview’s arguments on improper motive
fell short of precluding summary judgment because it had not shown that
defendants played an active role in causing the breach of contract, and because
there was no evidence that defendants acted solely to harm Belleview.
On appeal, Belleview contends that the district court misapplied New
Mexico law. It argues, for the first time on appeal, that New Mexico law
recognizes a claim for tortious interference with contract based upon either
improper means or improper motive or conduct interfering with a contract
performed without justification or privilege. Indeed, the district court quoted
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from Quintana v. First Interstate Bank, 737 P.2d 896, 898 (N.M. Ct. App. 1987)
in stating New Mexico law on tortious interference with contract: “[A] plaintiff
must demonstrate that the defendant ‘interfered [with contractual relations] with
an improper motive or by improper means, or acted without justification or
privilege.’” District Court Order at 4. However, Belleview did not present this
theory of recovery, namely that “[l]iability exists in the absence of an improper
motive or means if the interference by the defendant occurs in the absence of
justification or privilege,” Appellant’s Br. at 9, before the district court. It argued
generally that defendants were not justified in allegedly acting to interfere with
the contract, but not that a lack of justification alone was sufficient basis for
bringing suit for tortious interference with contract. Therefore, we do not
consider the argument on appeal. See Bancamerica Commercial Corp. v. Mosher
Steel of Kansas, Inc., 100 F.3d 792, 798-99 (10th Cir.) (appellate court will not
consider a new theory “that falls under the same general category as an argument
presented [below] or . . . a theory that was discussed in a vague and ambiguous
way” before the district court) (quotation omitted), opinion amended on other
grounds, 103 F.3d 80 (10th Cir. 1996). We note, however that Belleview’s
proposition contradicts other New Mexico authority on the issue. See M & M
Rental Tools, Inc. v. Milchem, Inc., 612 P.2d 241, 246, 247 (N.M. Ct. App. 1980)
(showing of improper means or improper motive “required for liability;” question
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of privilege arises only “if the acts charged would be tortious on the part of
an unprivileged defendant”) (quotation omitted).
Belleview also challenges the district court’s rulings that its evidence does
not establish genuine issues of material fact regarding the existence of improper
motive and improper means. As to improper motive, Belleview contends the facts
imply that defendants sought to defeat the contract between Belleview and the
sellers. This argument is not persuasive. Improper motive, as the district court
noted, requires some showing that defendants’ aim was solely to harm Belleview.
See M & M Rental Tools, 612 P.2d at 246. Belleview made no such showing
and, indeed, does not argue so on appeal.
As to improper means, Belleview maintains that testimony from the
underlying state action demonstrates that the defendants threatened to sue the
sellers if they honored the contract with Belleview. However, the only testimony
to which Belleview cites is hearsay and therefore cannot be relied on to defeat
summary judgment. See Aramburu v. Boeing Co., 112 F.3d 1398, 1401 n.1
(10th Cir. 1997) (citing Starr v. Pearle Vision, Inc., 54 F.3d 1548, 1555
(10th Cir. 1995)).
Finally, Belleview contends generally that numerous questions of fact
preclude summary judgment, especially questions regarding defendants’ intent
and good faith. It argues that intent is a question of fact precluding summary
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judgment. As discussed above, Belleview failed to demonstrate genuine issues
of material fact regarding either improper motive or improper means as those
terms are defined under New Mexico law. That intent is a question of fact and
does not relieve Belleview of its burden to meet the applicable legal standards.
The judgment of the United States District Court for the District of
New Mexico is AFFIRMED.
Entered for the Court
Deanell Reece Tacha
Circuit Judge
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