Lyda v. Gibson ( 1999 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FEB 26 1999
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
JOSEPH WAYNE LYDA,
Petitioner-Appellant,
v. No. 98-7024
(D.C. No. 96-CV-524-S)
GARY E. GIBSON, Warden of the (E.D. Okla.)
Oklahoma State Penitentiary,
Respondent-Appellee.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before TACHA , BARRETT , and MURPHY , Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination
of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
Petitioner-appellant Joseph Wayne Lyda appeals from the district court’s
order denying his petition for writ of habeas corpus which he brought pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 2254. We previously granted a certificate of appealability, see 28
U.S.C. § 2253(c), and we now affirm.
Petitioner was convicted by an Oklahoma jury of second degree murder and
sentenced to life imprisonment. In this appeal, he challenges the Oklahoma trial
court’s denial of his request for a self-defense instruction.
A federal court may only grant habeas relief to a person in state custody if
he shows that he is in custody “in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties
of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). No authority is granted to federal
courts to correct errors of state law made by state courts. See Jackson v. Shanks ,
143 F.3d 1313, 1317 (10th Cir.), cert. denied , 119 S. Ct. 378 (1998).
We employ a highly deferential standard of review in evaluating the
state trial court’s refusal to deliver [a] requested self-defense
instruction. As a general rule, errors in jury instructions in a state
criminal trial are not reviewable in federal habeas corpus
proceedings, unless they are so fundamentally unfair as to deprive
petitioner of a fair trial and to due process of law.
Tyler v. Nelson , 163 F.3d 1222, 1227 (10th Cir. 1999) (citations and quotations
omitted). Moreover, “[t]he burden of demonstrating that an erroneous instruction
was so prejudicial that it will support a collateral attack on the constitutional
validity of a state court’s judgment is even greater than the showing required to
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establish plain error on direct appeal.” Henderson v. Kibbe , 431 U.S. 145, 154
(1977).
Petitioner argues that there was sufficient evidence, under Oklahoma law, to
warrant the giving of a self-defense instruction and that the state court’s refusal to
give it deprived him of due process by preventing him from arguing his theory of
the case to the jury. In order to be entitled to habeas relief, however, he must go
further and show that failure to give the instruction, under the circumstances of
his case, resulted in a “serious miscarriage of justice.” Nickerson v. Lee , 971 F.2d
1125, 1138 (4th Cir. 1992) (quotation omitted); see also Maes v. Thomas , 46 F.3d
979, 985 (10th Cir. 1995). Having carefully reviewed the record, we conclude
that petitioner has failed to show a miscarriage of justice from the failure to give
the requested instruction. We therefore deny habeas relief on his due process
claim.
Petitioner also argues that the district court violated his right to avoid
incriminating himself by conditioning his receipt of a self-defense instruction on
his willingness to testify. We reject his claim, because the record does not bear
out his contention that the state court required him to testify in order to receive
the instruction.
Petitioner’s counsel did not mention self-defense in his opening statement.
He told the jury that the evidence would show that he killed his victim in the heat
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of passion and was at most guilty of manslaughter. See Appellant’s App. at 53.
After both sides had rested, however, petitioner’s counsel informed the court that
he was considering asking for a self-defense instruction. The court replied, “But
your man has to take the stand, doesn’t he, and-- or somebody has to tell --” id. at
245 (emphasis added). Counsel replied that self-defense could reasonably be
inferred from the evidence. At the jury instruction conference the next day, the
court rejected petitioner’s proffered self-defense instruction. The court outlined
the evidence pertaining to petitioner’s claim of self-defense, finding it insufficient
to justify the instruction, and also noted that “self-defense has not been mentioned
up to this point in the trial.” Id. at 253.
We cannot conclude from these facts that the Oklahoma trial court
conditioned the giving of a self-defense instruction on petitioner’s willingness to
testify. Instead, the court appears to have been concerned about the sufficiency of
the evidence presented to justify the giving of the instruction, whether that
evidence was presented through petitioner’s testimony or through
cross-examination of the prosecution’s witnesses and presentation of other
testimony on behalf of petitioner. See, e.g. , Smallwood v. State , 907 P.2d 217,
230 (Okla. Crim. App. 1995) (noting that self-defense instruction depends on
evidence to support it).
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Petitioner argues that the district court’s reliance on his failure to mention
self-defense prior to the close of the evidence indirectly penalized him for failing
to testify. He contends that he could not have mentioned self-defense in his
opening statement without committing himself to a theory which might not be
borne out by the evidence, and that the only other way for him to bring that issue
before the jury would have been to take the stand. Under Oklahoma case law,
however, the trial court may consider whether a defendant referred to self-defense
in his opening statement in determining whether a self-defense instruction should
be given. See Cordray v. State , 268 P.2d 316, 319 (Okla. Ct. Crim. App. 1954)
(“With this claim of self-defense interposed at the commencement of the trial, it is
our conclusion that the court should have given a requested instruction on
self-defense . . . .”). The trial court was entitled to rely on petitioner’s failure to
raise a claim of self-defense in his opening statement when determining whether to
give the requested instruction.
The judgment of the United States District Court for the Eastern District
of Oklahoma is AFFIRMED.
Entered for the Court
Deanell Reece Tacha
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Circuit Judge
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