Verner v. Reno ( 1998 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
NOV 3 1998
TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
JAMES EDWARD VERNER,
Petitioner - Appellant, No. 98-1119
v. (D.C. No. 97-Z-1338)
JANET RENO, U. S. Attorney (D. Colo.)
General, and WARDEN
HERSHBERGER,
Respondents - Appellees.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before ANDERSON, McKAY, and LUCERO, Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and the appellate record, this panel has
determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the
determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The
case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
Petitioner, a United States citizen, is currently serving three life sentences
for murders he committed in Canada. These sentences were imposed in 1976,
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
1985, and 1989. Petitioner began serving his sentences in Canada, but in 1990 he
was transferred at his own request to the United States to serve the remainder of
his sentences. This transfer was effected pursuant to the Treaty on the Execution
of Penal Sentences between the United States and Canada, Mar. 2, 1977, U.S.-
Can., 30 U.S.T. 6263.
In June 1996, the United States Parole Commission held two separate
hearings to consider Petitioner’s parole eligibility. With respect to his 1976 and
1985 sentences, the Commission denied Petitioner parole and scheduled a
reconsideration hearing for June 2011. In a separate hearing, the Commission
determined that the United States Sentencing Guidelines, as opposed to Canadian
sentencing laws, governed Petitioner’s 1989 sentence. The Commission
explained that the Guidelines prescribed life without parole for the crime
underlying the 1989 sentence and that it would not depart from that prescription.
Shortly after his parole hearings, Petitioner filed an application for a writ of
habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. In the application, Petitioner
challenged the Commission’s dispositions of each of his sentences and argued
that his consent to his transfer from Canada to the United States was invalid
because he did not understand that his 1989 sentence would be subject to the
sentencing guidelines of the United States. On November 3, 1997, the magistrate
judge recommended dismissal of Petitioner’s application, and on March 4, 1998,
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the district court adopted the magistrate judge’s recommendation and dismissed
the petition. Subsequently, the district court denied Petitioner leave to proceed in
forma pauperis on appeal. 1 In this appeal, Petitioner seeks leave to appeal in
forma pauperis and challenges the district court’s dismissal of his habeas corpus
petition.
Based on our review of Petitioner’s application and supporting materials,
we conclude that he has demonstrated an inability to pay the required fees and has
asserted a nonfrivolous argument in support of the issues he raises on appeal. See
DeBardeleben v. Quinlan, 937 F.2d 502, 505 (10th Cir. 1991). Therefore, we
grant Petitioner leave to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal. 2
With respect to Petitioner’s claim that the Commission incorrectly
calculated his 1989 sentence, the magistrate judge correctly concluded that the
district court did not have jurisdiction to address the merits of the claim. When
Petitioner filed his habeas corpus petition, his direct appeal concerning the
Commission’s determination of his 1989 sentence was already pending before this
1
The district court also denied Petitioner a certificate of appealability.
However, a certificate of appealability is not required to appeal a final order in a
28 U.S.C. § 2241 proceeding. See McIntosh v. United States Parole Comm’n,
115 F.3d 809, 810 n.1 (10th Cir. 1997); Bradshaw v. Story, 86 F.3d 164, 165-66
(10th Cir. 1996).
We note that 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2) and (b) do not apply to § 2241
2
proceedings. See McIntosh, 115 F.3d at 812.
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court. 3
The magistrate judge also correctly determined that Petitioner’s claims
regarding his 1976 and 1985 sentences were not properly before the court because
he had not exhausted the Bureau of Prison administrative remedies available to
him. See Fuller v. Rich, 11 F.3d 61, 62 (5th Cir. 1994) (A petitioner “is required
to exhaust his administrative remedies before seeking habeas relief in federal
court under 28 U.S.C. § 2241.”); Williams v. O’Brien, 792 F.2d 986, 987 (10th
Cir. 1986) (explaining that judicial intervention in habeas corpus proceedings is
generally deferred until administrative remedies have been exhausted). Petitioner
could have filed an administrative appeal to the National Appeals Board of the
United States Parole Commission pursuant to 28 C.F.R. § 2.26, 4 but he did not.
In requiring Petitioner to exhaust his administrative remedies, we are cognizant
that his appeal before the Board may be time-barred under the applicable
regulations. See 26 C.F.R. § 2.26(a) & (d). However, “until he actually appeals
and that appeal is acted on, we do not know what the appeals board will do with
In Verner v. United States Parole Comm’n, 150 F.3d 1172 (10th Cir.
3
1998), petition for cert. filed (U.S. Oct. 19, 1998) (No. 98-6575). This court
affirmed the Commission’s determination of Petitioner’s 1989 sentence.
In his recommendations, the magistrate judge incorrectly stated that the
4
appropriate administrative avenue for review of Petitioner’s complaints regarding
his 1976 and 1985 sentences was pursuant to 28 C.F.R. §§ 542.10-542.19, which
apply to complaints involving “aspect[s] of confinement.” Petitioner’s claims are
appealable pursuant to 28 C.F.R. §§ 2.1-2.67, which govern parole-related
complaints.
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[Petitioner’s] claim[s], and until the appeals board has been given an opportunity
to act, [Petitioner] has not exhausted his administrative remedies. . . . In short,
[Petitioner] has not shown that such an appeal would be futile.” Fuller, 11 F.3d at
62 (internal citations omitted). But see Gniadek v. Hurst, 25 F.3d 1048 (6th Cir.
1994) (Table) (holding that failure to file timely appeal of Parole Commission
decision constituted procedural default of administrative remedy). We conclude
that the district court properly dismissed Petitioner’s challenges to his 1976 and
1985 sentences. Although neither the magistrate judge nor the district court
explicitly so stated, we hold that Petitioner’s claims regarding his 1976 and 1985
sentences are dismissed without prejudice. See Demarest v. Price, 130 F.3d 922,
939 (10th Cir. 1997) (explaining that courts typically should dismiss petitions
containing unexhausted claims without prejudice).
Because we dismiss Petitioner’s unexhausted claims, we must determine
whether the district court properly addressed the merits of his remaining claim,
which involves the validity of his consent to transfer to the United States. The
Supreme Court has stated that “a district court must dismiss [28 U.S.C. § 2254]
habeas petitions containing both unexhausted and exhausted claims.” Rose v.
Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 522 (1982). However, “[t]he rule in Rose is not absolute.”
Harris v. Champion, 48 F.3d 1127, 1131 n.3 (10th Cir. 1995). The first
exception to the rule requiring dismissal of mixed petitions allows a court to
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address exhausted claims when it determines that the unexhausted claims would
be procedurally barred. See id. (citing Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 735
n.1 (1991)). The second exception applies “when the state fails to raise the issue
of exhaustion and the court determines that ‘the interests of comity and federalism
will be better served by addressing the merits [of any exhausted claims] forthwith
[than] by requiring a series of additional . . . proceedings before reviewing the
merits of the petitioner’s claim.’” Id. (quoting Granberry v. Greer, 481 U.S. 129,
134 (1987)). We conclude that the district court’s review of the merits of
Petitioner’s claim was proper under the second exception. Although the
Government raised the issue of exhaustion before the district court, it did not
raise the rule requiring dismissal of mixed petitions nor did it argue that the
district court should not have addressed the merits of the consent claim.
Therefore, we proceed to the merits of Petitioner’s remaining claim.
We review the factual findings underlying the district court’s determination
that Petitioner’s consent was voluntary under the clearly erroneous standard. See
United States v. Nguyen, 155 F.3d 1219, 1222 (10th Cir. 1998). We review the
court’s legal conclusions de novo. See id. The record indicates that Petitioner’s
transfer hearing was conducted before a magistrate judge who informed Petitioner
that if he consented to the transfer, his sentences would be subject to the parole
rules of the United States. While Petitioner would have been eligible for parole
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after twenty-five years on his 1989 conviction if he had remained in Canada, he
would not be eligible for parole on that conviction under the United States
Sentencing Guidelines. In accordance with these facts, the magistrate judge
repeatedly explained and sought to ensure that Petitioner understood that he
would lose the possibility of parole accompanying his 1989 sentence if he
consented to the transfer. See R., File 1, Exh. K at 8-11. After receiving this
information, Petitioner consented to the transfer. See id. at 22-25.
Notwithstanding the clear manner in which Petitioner was informed of his
rights at the transfer hearing, he claims that his consent to the 1990 transfer was
involuntary because he had relied on an outdated version of a booklet describing
the terms of the Treaty. He argues that, as a result of his reliance on the booklet,
he was unaware that his 1989 sentence would be governed by the United States
Sentencing Guidelines after his transfer. Petitioner contends that the failure of
Canadian prison officials to provide him with an up-to-date booklet describing the
terms of the Treaty was fraudulent, breached the terms of a contract, and rendered
his consent to the transfer involuntary.
We fail to see any merit in these arguments. Regardless of whether he was
given an out-of-date booklet about the Treaty, Petitioner was carefully informed
of the likely effects of his transfer on his 1989 sentence at his transfer hearing.
We agree with the magistrate judge’s conclusion, reflected in the transcript of the
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transfer hearing, that Petitioner understood the consequences of his transfer and
voluntarily consented to the transfer. Accordingly, we affirm the dismissal of the
petition.
Petitioner’s motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal is
GRANTED. We AFFIRM the district court’s dismissal without prejudice of
Petitioner’s claims involving the Commission’s determinations of his 1976, 1985,
and 1989 sentences. We also AFFIRM the district court’s dismissal with
prejudice of Petitioner’s claim involving his consent to transfer to the United
States. Petitioner’s Motions for Appointment of Counsel on Appeal and for Order
for Discovery and Production of Documents are DENIED.
Entered for the Court
Monroe G. McKay
Circuit Judge
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