United States v. Hawkins ( 1998 )


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  •                                                                                  F I L E D
    United States Court of Appeals
    Tenth Circuit
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    DEC 11 1998
    TENTH CIRCUIT
    PATRICK FISHER
    Clerk
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    Nos. 96-2176 and 97-2168*
    v.
    (D.C. No. CR-96-206-BB)
    (D. New Mexico)
    QUANTIS HAWKINS,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    ORDER AND JUDGMENT**
    Before BRORBY, HOLLOWAY and EBEL, Circuit Judges,
    Defendant Quantis Hawkins was convicted by a jury on one count of bank robbery.
    Defendant filed a motion for a new trial which was denied by the district court. Defendant
    *
    On August 14, 1996, defendant, acting pro se, filed a letter with the district court
    which was construed as a Notice of Appeal. This notice was premature as judgment was not
    entered against the defendant until May 5, 1997. However, we assigned case number
    96-2176 to defendant’s notice of appeal. On May 14, 1997, after judgment had been
    entered, defendant’s appointed counsel filed a timely notice of appeal and our court assigned
    the case a second case number, 97-2168. On our own motion, on June 3, 1997, we ordered
    these two appeals consolidated for all purposes. This order and judgment shall be the
    disposition of both appeals.
    **
    This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law
    of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation
    of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under terms and
    conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3
    was then sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 51 months. Defendant appeals his
    conviction and the denial of his motion for a new trial. We exercise jurisdiction pursuant to
    28 U.S.C. § 1291 and affirm.
    I
    On March 25, 1996, a lone robber, described as an African-American male in his early
    twenties, wearing wrap-around sunglasses and a baseball cap, and carrying a gym bag,
    robbed the Norwest Bank San Mateo Branch on Zuni Street in Albuquerque, New Mexico.
    II R. at 35. The robbery occurred at about 10:10 a.m. 
    Id. at 110.1
    The robbery lasted less
    than five minutes. Both the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the City of Albuquerque
    Police Department responded to the bank robbery.
    Lori Figura was designated as the FBI agent. Ms. Figura received information that
    made defendant a suspect. She obtained a photograph of defendant, placed it in a photograph
    array, and showed the array to one customer and two bank tellers who had been inside the
    bank at the time of the robbery. 
    Id. at 184-85.
    Both bank tellers identified defendant as the
    robber. 
    Id. at 185.
    The customer did not identify any of the individuals depicted in the photo
    array as the robber. 
    Id. at 45.
    Defendant was arrested the next day.
    The trial commenced on July 30, 1996. The prosecution called eight witnesses: seven
    who were present at the bank at the time of the robbery and FBI Agent Figura. All seven
    eyewitnesses were within about three to fifteen feet of the robber during the robbery. Nearly
    1
    The bank is insured by the FDIC. 
    Id. at 132.
    -2-
    all of the witnesses estimated the bank robber’s height to be approximately between five feet
    seven inches and six feet. 
    Id. at 40;
    60; 76; 114. Defendant is six feet four inches tall. No
    witness described facial hair on the robber and several affirmatively remembered that the
    robber was clean shaven. 
    Id. at 61;
    87; 101; 114. At the time of the robbery, defendant had
    a mustache and sideburns.
    Despite the inconsistencies in their description of the robber, three of the seven
    witnesses identified defendant as the robber. 
    Id. at 44
    (Robert Chavez); 
    id. at 98-99
    (Raphael Martin); 
    id. at 141-42
    (Holly Revelles). Only two of the three witnesses
    identifying defendant at trial had been presented with a pretrial identification photograph
    array. One teller, Holly Roybal, testified that though she could not identify defendant as the
    bank robber, she was “almost positive” that the tattoo on defendant’s neck was the same as
    the tattoo on the robber. 
    Id. at 168-69.
    The other three witnesses could not identify
    defendant as the robber. 
    Id. at 63
    (Levi Scott); 
    id. at 77
    (Donna Burkholder); 
    id. at 116
    (Susan Moore). However, when questioned by the prosecutor, each testified that defendant
    had physical characteristics similar to those of the robber. 
    Id. at 64
    (Levi Scott); 
    id. at 78
    (Donna Burkholder); 
    id. at 116
    (Susan Moore). Of these three, Susan Moore had previously
    identified defendant as the robber in a photo spread conducted one week before trial. 
    Id. at 117-18.
    Defendant’s counsel cross-examined each witness on the issue of defendant’s
    identity. 
    Id. at 51,
    66, 81, 101, 121, 156, 176-77.
    -3-
    The defendant did not testify at trial. He did present an alibi defense by the testimony
    of two witnesses, Hawkins’s mother and stepfather. Both testified that Hawkins was at home
    at the time of the robbery. His mother testified that he talked with her at approximately
    10:00 a.m. that day and that he was still at home, just getting out of bed, when his parents
    arrived about 10:20 a.m. II R. at 243-45, 259-260.
    After the verdict of guilty and entry of judgment of conviction and sentence, this
    appeal followed.
    II
    Defendant raises two issues on appeal. First, he directly appeals the district court’s
    denial of his motion for a new trial. The basis for his request for a new trial is a claim of
    ineffective counsel. Second, defendant contends the district court erred in permitting the
    in-court identifications in violation of his due process rights.
    A
    Defendant’s Claim of Ineffective Counsel
    Defendant appeals the district court’s denial of his motion for a new trial based on a
    claim of ineffective counsel. However, such claims should be presented in collateral
    proceedings, not on direct appeal. United States v. Galloway, 
    56 F.3d 1239
    , 1240 (10th Cir.
    1995) (en banc); United States v. Jackson, 
    88 F.3d 845
    , 846 (10th Cir. 1996).2
    The preferred method of bringing a claim of ineffective counsel is by post-conviction
    2
    proceedings pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. A claim for relief under§ 2255 may afford an
    opportunity for the district court to hold an evidentiary hearing. See Galloway, 56 F.3d at
    -4-
    Ineffectiveness of counsel claims that are asserted on direct appeal are presumptively
    dismissible, and “virtually all will be dismissed.” 
    Galloway, 56 F.3d at 1240
    .
    In Galloway, we reasoned that the resolution of a claim of ineffective counsel requires
    a developed factual record. 
    Id. The district
    court is the forum appropriate for such
    development. 
    Id. The facts
    here are not so extraordinary that we find need to depart from
    our adherence to the Galloway rule. See 
    Jackson, 88 F.3d at 847
    . The record here has not
    been adequately developed by the district court prior to appeal for us to determine the merits
    of the claim of ineffective counsel. Compare United States v. Gallegos, 
    108 F.3d 1272
    , 1280
    (10th Cir. 1997)(defendant asserted conflict of interest argument at trial and in post-trial
    motion, which the district court, upon weighing the merits of the claim, denied in its
    post-trial order).
    We dismiss defendant’s claim of ineffectiveness of counsel without prejudice.
    B
    Defendant’s Claim That In-Court Identifications Were the Product of Questioning
    So Impermissibly Suggestive As to Violate Due Process.
    Defendant does not raise sufficiency of the evidence as an issue in this case. Instead,
    defendant contends that all of the in-court identifications were the product of questioning so
    impermissibly suggestive as to violate due process. It is a recognized ground of attack on a
    conviction that confrontation and interrogation were so unnecessarily suggestive and
    1240 n.1.
    -5-
    conductive to irreparable mistaken identification that the defendant was denied due process
    of law. Stovall v. Denno, 
    388 U.S. 293
    , 301-02 (1967). Such a claimed violation of due
    process depends on the totality of the circumstances surrounding it. 
    Id. at 302.
    Because the
    defendant did not object to the in-court identification at trial here, we review for plain error.
    See United States v. Lonedog, 
    929 F.2d 568
    , 570 (10th Cir. 1991). For plain error to be
    present, the error must be obvious or otherwise seriously affect the fairness, integrity or
    public reputation of judicial proceedings. United States v. Simmonds, 
    931 F.2d 685
    , 687
    (10th Cir. 1991).
    Three of the witnesses, Moore, Revelles and Roybal, were shown a pretrial photo
    array by FBI Agent Figura. Defendant does not challenge any pretrial identification
    procedures as violative of his due process rights. The government contends that because
    defendant failed to challenge the validity of the pretrial identifications, the subsequent
    in-court identification cannot violate the defendant’s due process rights. Romero v. Tansy,
    
    46 F.3d 1024
    , 1032 (10th Cir. 1995). “Any suggestiveness in the courtroom identification
    procedure is a matter for the jury to consider in weighing the persuasiveness of the witness’
    testimony.” 
    Id. We believe
    the proper analysis here is to examine the record to determine “whether
    the in-court identification procedure was so suggestive that it denied defendant due process
    of law.” United States v. Kimball, 
    73 F.3d 269
    , 273 (10th Cir. 1995); United States v.
    Robertson, 
    19 F.3d 1318
    , 1323 (10th Cir. 1994); United States v. Aigbevbolle, 772 F.2d
    -6-
    652, 653 (10th Cir. 1985). A defendant is denied due process of law when an impermissibly
    suggestive identification leads to a substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification.
    Manson v. Brathwaite, 
    432 U.S. 98
    , 116 (1977); 
    Aigbevbolle, 772 F.2d at 653
    . Our decision
    in Romero should not be taken to mean that an in-court identification is always
    constitutionally valid if a defendant fails to challenge a pretrial identification. Instead, our
    analysis as to impermissible suggestiveness of an in-court identification is identical, whether
    it concerns a witness who had a pretrial opportunity to identify defendant, or a witness who
    identifies the defendant for the first time at trial.
    Turning to the in-court identifications here, for purposes of defendant’s due process
    claim we hold that the district court did not commit plain error by allowing the in-court
    identifications because we do not view the prosecutor’s conduct as impermissibly
    suggestive.3 The prosecutor asked each witness if he or she recognized the bank robber in
    the courtroom. Some of the witnesses were able to identify defendant and others could not.
    The prosecutor then inquired if defendant had characteristics similar to the characteristics of
    the bank robber. While the procedure was not a reassuring model to support a conviction in
    a criminal case, the prosecutor’s questioning was not so impermissibly suggestive as to lead
    to a substantial likelihood of misidentification. 
    Manson, 432 U.S. at 116
    . The prosecutor’s
    inability to exact precise identifications gave defendant the opportunity to attack the
    We summarize critical portions of the identification testimony in the appendix
    3
    following this order and judgment.
    -7-
    reliability of each witness’ identification testimony on cross-examination. See 
    Kimball, 73 F.3d at 273
    ; 
    Romero, 46 F.3d at 1032
    (“Any suggestiveness surrounding the courtroom
    identification was a matter to be considered by the jury in weighing the reliability of [the
    witness’] identification testimony.”). Defendant’s counsel cross-examined each witness on
    the identification.
    Defendant’s principal argument is that the prosecutor goaded the witnesses into
    testifying that defendant resembled the bank robber even though all of the witnesses had
    some difficulty identifying defendant as the robber. An identification is not unreliable
    because it is phrased in uncertain terms. United States v. Peoples, 
    748 F.2d 934
    , 936 (4th
    Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 
    471 U.S. 1067
    (1985). We have previously held that there is no
    deprivation of due process rights by requiring a defendant to wear a cap and dark glasses
    worn by the bank robber for purposes of identification. 
    Robertson, 19 F.3d at 1322-23
    ; see
    also Burnett v. Collins, 
    982 F.2d 922
    , 927 (5th Cir. 1993)(compelling defendant to provide
    voice exemplar does not violate Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination);
    United States v. Walitwarangkul, 
    808 F.2d 1352
    , 1353 (9th Cir. 1987)(district court did not
    commit error in granting prosecutor’s request to have prisoner try on a jacket and hold up a
    pair of pants to facilitate identification). Here defendant was required to rise and state his
    name, address and age for a witness to make a voice comparison, II R. at 142-144; defense
    counsel did not object.
    -8-
    That defendant was only one of two African-Americans in the courtroom for most of
    the trial is not reversible error. See United States v. Davis, 
    103 F.3d 660
    , 670 (8th Cir.
    1997), cert. denied, 
    117 S. Ct. 2424
    (1997). If defendant had concern with the racial
    composition of the courtroom, defendant could have requested the district court to reduce the
    inherent suggestiveness of the in-court identifications by facilitating other seating
    arrangements, ordering in-court lineups, and/or altering the racial composition of the
    courtroom. 
    Robertson, 19 F.3d at 1323
    ; United States v. Matthews, 
    20 F.3d 538
    , 547
    (2d Cir. 1994).4
    We are persuaded that, considering the totality of the circumstances, the
    identifications were “reliable even though the confrontation procedure was suggestive.”
    
    Neil, 409 U.S. at 199
    ; see also Archuleta v. Kerby, 
    864 F.2d 709
    , 711 (10th Cir. 1989). Each
    witness on identification of defendant had an opportunity to view the defendant at the time
    of the crime. See 
    id. at 712.
    Although there was a time gap from the robbery on March 25,
    1996, until trial on July 30, 1996, and the witnesses all had some inconsistencies as to
    defendant’s identity as the robber, these factors do not require a reversal here. See 
    id. (underestimation of
    height and errors in not reporting tattoos to police not sufficient to make
    in-court identifications unreliable).
    4
    We note that defense counsel may tactically decide not to request such procedures.
    See 
    Matthews, 20 F.3d at 547
    (“counsel may well deem it preferable not to chance
    bolstering the in-court identification of his client in any way, permitting counsel to argue to
    the jury that the in-court identification was inherently weak.”).
    -9-
    The claim of ineffectiveness of counsel is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE;
    otherwise, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
    Entered for the Court
    William J. Holloway, Jr.
    Circuit Judge
    -10-
    APPENDIX
    We summarize below testimony of several government witnesses:
    Holly Revelles
    Holly Revelles testified she was an employee of Norwest Bank for about two years
    as a teller. II R. at 124. She first started October 19, 1994, and started working at the
    San Mateo Branch on Zuni Street in November 1994. She was working there on March 25,
    1996.
    She was helping a customer at about 10:10 that morning who was at her window.
    She was interrupted by a gentleman who said, “Excuse me.” 
    Id. at 127.
    She told him he
    would need to wait because she was with a customer. This man seemed to hesitate and then
    came forward and said, “Excuse me,” again. 
    Id. at 128.
    Then he told her: “No, I don’t think
    you understand. This is a bank robbery.”
    Ms. Revelles identified in a photograph, Government Exhibit 1, the man who said it
    was a robbery. 
    Id. at 129.
    He was a gentleman with a baseball cap and a plaid shirt behind
    her customer. The surveillance photograph said 9:20 a.m.         
    Id. at 129.
    The fourth
    photograph in Government Exhibit 1 showed the man handing her the backpack, and this
    was when he instructed Revelles to put all of the money in the bag. The photo showed
    Ms. Revelles as the teller. 
    Id. at 130.
    She did not see a gun and the robber never said
    anything about a gun. 
    Id. at 131.
    She put almost $3,000 in the bag. Ms. Revelles said the
    bank is insured by the FDIC. 
    Id. at 132.
    Ms. Revelles wears glasses and had them on at the time.        
    Id. at 134.
    She was
    approximately three feet from the robber and said she did get a good look at him. 
    Id. at 135.
    He was African-American, in his early twenties, and about 5'7" or 5'8" tall. 
    Id. at 136.
    She
    said that if she had told an FBI agent the robber was 6'1" that would be the height. 
    Id. at 137.
    He was average in build. She did not see any facial hair.
    Ms. Revelles testified she thought she would recognize the person who robbed her
    about five months ago. 
    Id. at 139.
    She was asked then to look around the room and she
    identified a man at the counsel table. The prosecutor asked permission to have defendant
    Hawkins rise, which was permitted. Ms. Revelles looked at him and then said: “Yes, I
    would say that is him.” This was because of his features and skin tone, and his whole
    appearance. 
    Id. at 140.
    She did not see any distinctive tattoos on the robber. She said that
    the man who stood was “in the same height category” as the robber. 
    Id. at 141.
    Defendant
    Hawkins had the same build as the robber and he had the same skin tone as the person who
    i
    robbed her. 
    Id. at 141-42.
    The prosecutor asked: “Are you sure that Mr. Hawkins is the
    robber, Ms. Revelles?” She replied, “Yes, I am.” 
    Id. at 142.
    She said this was because of
    his whole physical appearance and that “he looks like the person that robbed me.” 
    Id. at 142.
    The prosecutor asked whether there was anything distinctive about the robber’s
    voice, and Ms. Revelles said his tone was “very nice, very cordial . . . the man who came in
    just had a pleasant voice.” 
    Id. at 143.
    The prosecutor asked if the court would instruct
    defendant Hawkins to state his name, address and age, and with no objection by defense
    counsel, Hawkins did so. The prosecutor then asked about the voice, and Ms. Revelles said,
    “It strikes a memory in my mind of the voice that I heard when I was robbed. It is a familiar
    voice.” 
    Id. at 144.
    She concluded: “I am confident that this voice is similar to the man that
    robbed me on that day . . . I would say it was the same voice.” 
    Id. at 145.
    Looking at a photograph of defendant, Revelles said she recognized him. She saw
    there was a mustache on the picture, but said she did not recall seeing one the day of the
    robbery. 
    Id. at 146.
    On cross-examination, Revelles said that the subject who committed the robbery
    could have had a mustache. 
    Id. at 148.
    Revelles testified that her recollection at trial was
    the robber was 5'6" to 5'7", but he could have been 6'1". Her “recollection had diminished
    over the period of time.” 
    Id. at 151.
    Revelles said that looking at Hawkins, he was the same
    height as the robber. 
    Id. at 152.
    Revelles admitted that in his photo in Government
    Exhibit 1, the subject was clean-shaven and with no mustache. 
    Id. at 156.
    Susan Denise Moore
    Ms. Moore testified that she had been a bank teller at the Norwest Bank Branch on
    San Mateo and Zuni Streets for some six months. She was working there on March 25,
    1996. 
    Id. at 109-110.
    At about 10:10 a.m. she was serving as a teller along with Holly
    Revelles and Holly Roybal. She was shown Government Exhibit 1, a composite and the
    fourth photograph in the series showed the three tellers and a person who robbed the bank.
    
    Id. at 111.
    Moore was about two feet away from the point where the robbery took place.
    Moore heard the robber say, “Give me the money.” But she did not see a gun or any
    weapon. 
    Id. at 112.
    Moore saw Revelles put the money in the bag, and then the robber ran
    out the door. 
    Id. at 112.
    Moore got a “fairly good look at [the robber].” 
    Id. at 113.
    The robber was average
    in height, not taller than 6', and about 135 lbs. in weight. He was clean-shaven. 
    Id. at 114.
    ii
    Ms. Moore was asked to look around the courtroom and whether anyone looked like
    the person who robbed the bank. She replied: “I can’t say for sure.” 
    Id. at 116.
    Defendant
    was asked to rise, to which there was no objection. Moore was asked about similarities or
    dissimilarities to the bank robber. She said his skin tone was the same: “He was good
    looking. He wasn’t scruffy, about the same height, same build. I couldn’t say for sure that
    that would be him.” 
    Id. at 116.
    She did not see any distinctive tattoos on the robber. 
    Id. at 117.
    She testified that she had picked out photo number five on Government Exhibit 4
    “because of the skin tone and the good looking characteristics.” 
    Id. at 118.
    She was asked
    about facial hair and she said she was sure there was none “on the sides,” but she did not
    remember about a mustache. 
    Id. at 119.
    On cross-examination she testified she had been
    shown a photo lineup with six pictures on it. There was no suggestion made that the person
    was in the photo lineup. 
    Id. at 122.
    She did pick defendant Hawkins out on the photo
    lineup because of his complexion and color. 
    Id. at 122.
    She said she was asked whether
    from looking at defendant Hawkins she could say he was the bank robber, and she replied:
    “No, not for sure.” 
    Id. at 123.
    Holly Roybal
    Holly Roybal had been employed at the Norwest Bank for ten months in the branch
    at San Mateo on Zuni Street. A man came up to the teller next to her, Holly Revelles, and,
    after a couple of minutes, said: “This is a robbery.” 
    Id. at 162.
    In Government Exhibit No.
    1, Roybal recognized herself and saw the person who ultimately robbed the bank. 
    Id. at 163.
    The man said: “This is a robbery.” And then he leaned on the counter. 
    Id. at 164.
    She got
    a good look at his face. He had a black hat and black sunglasses on. 
    Id. at 165.
    The robber was an African-American, probably 5'10" or 6' in height. 
    Id. at 166.
    Ms.
    Roybal saw a tattoo on the right side of his neck. 
    Id. at 167.
    She said to the police that the
    tattoo looked “like a grapevine or a picket fence.” 
    Id. at 167.
    Looking at a photograph,
    Government Exhibit No. 3, Roybal testified that she was almost positive it was the same
    tattoo she saw on the bank robber. 
    Id. at 169.
    She was asked to look around the courtroom, and replied that she could not say from
    the glasses and hat she remembered that the robber appeared to be there. She said, “I don’t
    think it would be fair to point him out.” 
    Id. at 170.
    She was asked about the defendant’s
    relative build, which compared to the robber. She said he did fit the size, height and weight
    of the robber but that she still could not say Hawkins was the robber: “I just don’t think that
    is fair, I am sorry.” 
    Id. at 173.
    On cross-examination, Ms. Roybal said she did not
    remember the robber having any facial hair at all. 
    Id. at 176.
    She remembered the tattoo
    iii
    looking like “a grapevine.” 
    Id. at 176.
    On redirect, she was shown a photo in Government
    Exhibit 3, and had no doubt it was the same tattoo she saw on the bank robber. 
    Id. at 178.
    Lori Figura
    The government called Lori Figura as a witness for the prosecution. She testified she
    is an FBI agent. II R. at 179. Ms. Figura is assigned to the Violent Crimes Reactive Squad,
    which encompasses bank robberies. 
    Id. at 180.
    She responded to the bank robbery at the
    Norwest Bank on March 25th of 1996. She said that she arrived at the bank at approximately
    11:00 or shortly after 11:00, and was accompanied by other FBI agents; she thinks that there
    were three. 
    Id. at 181.
    Then another joined, so that there were five agents in all.
    When Ms. Figura and her fellow FBI agents got there at 11:00, Albuquerque Police
    Department officers were already there, three of them. II R. at 181. Ms. Figura was the case
    agent on this bank robbery. The Albuquerque Police Department and the FBI attempted to
    locate the robber, searching the neighborhood. 
    Id. at 183.
    The neighborhood search was
    not successful.
    Agent Figura received information making the defendant Hawkins a suspect and she
    then obtained a photograph of Mr. Hawkins. She put it in a photo spread with five other
    photographs. 
    Id. at 184-85.
    She then took the photo spread over to the Norwest Bank to
    show the two tellers, Holly Revelles and Holly Roybal. They identified position number five
    as the suspect, the position in which the photo of Mr. Hawkins was placed in the photo
    spread. This was on the day of the robbery. 
    Id. at 185.
    Agent Figura then prepared an
    affidavit for an arrest warrant for defendant Hawkins. Agent Figura was then asked and
    identified Mr. Hawkins as sitting at the defense table. She said he was in position number
    five on the photo spread. 
    Id. at 186.
    The arrest of Mr. Hawkins occurred the next day,
    March 26, about 4:25 p.m. 
    Id. at 186.
    Agent Figura also prepared a search warrant for the
    residence at which Mr. Hawkins lived with his parents at 1516 Williams. Other members
    of the FBI executed the search warrant. 
    Id. at 186.
    The search began at 4:40 p.m. after the defendant’s arrest in the neighborhood around
    his house where he was found a block away. 
    Id. at 187.
    Agent Figura identified in her
    testimony Exhibit 5, which was one of the photographs from the office where defendant was
    photographed and processed the day after the bank robbery. 
    Id. at 188.
    Exhibit 3 was
    identified as a photo of defendant taken of the right side of defendant’s neck. 
    Id. at 188.
    Ms. Figura also received four photographs from the bank’s surveillance camera which are
    represented in Government Ex. 1. 
    Id. at 189.
    The counter was “dusted” for latent or
    unknown fingerprints. One that was found did not match Mr. Hawkins’s print. II R. at 192.
    iv
    At the house on Williams Street, the agents searched defendant’s room and his
    possessions and the rest of the residence. 
    Id. at 193.
    Searching throughout the entire house,
    nothing was found that related back to either the money or items of clothing identified in the
    videotape or a Jansport Bag. 
    Id. at 193.
    The same was true of the residence of the girlfriend
    of defendant Hawkins. Nothing was found that would support what he was wearing or what
    he had taken from the bank. 
    Id. at 194.
    Hawkins was taken back to the FBI office and was given his Miranda warnings from
    a form. Hawkins waived his rights and gave a statement to Agent Figura. 
    Id. at 194.
    This
    was at approximately 4:45 or 4:50 p.m., when Hawkins began talking with the agents.
    Agent Tresder asked the questions, and they talked with Hawkins for approximately 45 or
    50 minutes. They asked Hawkins whether he had robbed the bank the day before, and he
    said he did not. 
    Id. at 196-97.
    He said he had awakened around 10:00 that day, when his
    mother called him. Hawkins walked around the neighborhood for a while and then went to
    his friend’s house around noon time.
    On cross-examination, Agent Figura said they found about $137 at defendant’s
    residence, but there were no $50 bills. 
    Id. at 201.
    None of the bait money was found there.
    A shirt that was seized was found not to be the correct shirt that defendant had warned. 
    Id. at 201.
    From the consensual search at the house of defendant’s girlfriend, no evidence was
    seized. II R. at 202. So far as Agent Figura knew, defendant did not own any vehicle. 
    Id. The agents
    searched everywhere that they knew of where defendant might have stored any
    money. 
    Id. The day
    Mr. Hawkins was arrested, he had a mustache. 
    Id. at 203.
    The mustache on
    defendant was about the same when Agent Figura saw him the day after the robbery as it
    appeared in the courtroom. 
    Id. Figura was
    asked to examine Government Ex. 2 and said
    that this photo looked the way defendant did. His sideburns, mustache and everything were
    a little cleaner, but almost the same as in the courtroom. Figura said the mustache was
    clearly visible. 
    Id. at 204.
    Agent Figura said that if she noted “clean-shaven,” that indicated
    that the person interviewed did not specifically mention facial hair. 
    Id. at 206.
    The photo
    identified as Government Ex. 2 was one taken a few months earlier, at least. 
    Id. at 206-07.
    v