Carleton v. City of Tulsa ( 1999 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
JAN 13 1999
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
JOHN R. CARLETON, Personal
Representative of the Estate of
Angela Nell Carleton, deceased,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
and
DEBORAH STURDIVAN
BAUGHMAN,
Plaintiff,
v. No. 96-5130
(D.C. No. 94-C-1033-E)
CITY OF TULSA, OKLAHOMA, (N.D. Okla.)
a municipal corporation; MIKE
HANLEY; DAN MCSLARROW,
Corporal; JOHN DOE, Officer,
Defendants-Appellees.
JOHN R. CARLETON, Personal
Representative of the Estate of
Angela Nell Carleton, deceased,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
and
DEBORAH STURDIVAN
BAUGHMAN,
Plaintiff,
v. No. 96-5140
(D.C. No. 94-C-1033-E)
CITY OF TULSA, OKLAHOMA, (N.D. Okla.)
a municipal corporation,
Defendant,
and
MIKE HANLEY; DAN
MCSLARROW, Corporal;
JOHN DOE, Officer,
Defendants-Appellants.
DEBORAH STURDIVAN
BAUGHMAN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 96-5131
(D.C. No. 94-C-1034-E)
CITY OF TULSA, OKLAHOMA, (N.D. Okla.)
a municipal corporation; OFFICER
MIKE HANLEY, CORPORAL
DAN MCSLARROW, OFFICER
JOHN DOE,
Defendants-Appellees.
DEBORAH STURDIVAN
BAUGHMAN,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
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v. No. 96-5141
(D.C. No. 94-C-1034-E)
CITY OF TULSA, OKLAHOMA, (N.D. Okla.)
a municipal corporation,
Defendant,
and
MIKE HANLEY; DAN
MCSLARROW, Corporal;
JOHN DOE, Officer,
Defendants-Appellants.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before TACHA , BARRETT , and MURPHY , Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The cases are
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
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These consolidated appeals arise from suits brought by plaintiffs pursuant
to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 involving a high speed police chase. The vehicle pursued by
the police crashed into the vehicle driven by Angela Carleton. Ms. Carleton was
killed, and her passenger, Deborah Baughman, was injured. Plaintiffs brought
individual suits, which were later consolidated, against the officers involved in
the chase and the City of Tulsa, alleging violation of plaintiffs’ substantive due
process rights as a result of the officers’ reckless behavior and deliberate
indifference to plaintiffs’ constitutional rights and the City’s failure to train the
officers. 1
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of defendants,
finding that the officers’ actions were not reckless and in complete indifference to
risk, and, therefore, plaintiffs could show no violation of their constitutional
rights. The district court also found that, because there was no constitutional
violation by the officers, plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims against the City must fail.
Plaintiffs appeal the district court’s ruling that defendants did not violate
plaintiffs’ constitutional rights, and the officer defendants cross-appeal the
district court’s refusal to grant them qualified immunity. Our review of the
district court’s grant of summary judgment is de novo, see Kaul v. Stephan , 83
1
Because the record on appeal does not contain the complaint or any of the
summary judgment pleadings or briefs, we discern the nature of plaintiffs’
allegations from their brief on appeal.
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F.3d 1208, 1212 (10th Cir. 1996), and we may affirm on any basis supported by
the record, see United States v. Sandoval , 29 F.3d 537, 542 n.6 (10th Cir. 1994).
These appeals were informally abated pending this court’s en banc decision
in Williams v. City and County of Denver , No. 94-1190, 1998 WL 380518 (10th
Cir. June 26, 1998), which was, in turn, abated pending the Supreme Court’s
decision in County of Sacramento v. Lewis , 118 S. Ct. 1708 (1998). Lewis
governs the outcome of these appeals. In that case, the Court held that
“high-speed chases with no intent to harm suspects physically or to worsen their
legal plight do not give rise to liability under the Fourteenth Amendment,
redressible by an action under § 1983.” Lewis , 118 S. Ct. at 1720; see also
Radecki v. Barela , 146 F.3d 1227, 1232 (10th Cir. 1998) (applying Lewis in
holding that officer’s exercise of instantaneous judgment in emergency situation
did not shock the conscience and was, therefore, not actionable under § 1983),
petition for cert. filed , 67 U.S.L.W. 3322 (U.S. Oct. 26, 1998) (No. 98-69).
Plaintiffs do not allege that the officers intended them physical harm.
Consequently, defendants’ actions in the emergency situation surrounding the
high-speed chase do not shock the conscience. There was no violation of
plaintiffs’ substantive due process rights necessary to maintain an action under
§ 1983. Because there was no constitutional violation, we do not reach the
question of whether defendants are entitled to qualified immunity. See Lewis , 118
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S. Ct. at 1714 n.5. Finally, plaintiffs’ § 1983 claim against the City must also fail
because there was no constitutional violation by the officers. See Webber v.
Mefford , 43 F.3d 1340, 1344-45 (10th Cir. 1994). AFFIRMED.
Entered for the Court
Deanell Reece Tacha
Circuit Judge
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