Fullmer v. United States ( 1999 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
JAN 25 1999
TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
JERRY FULLMER, as the
conservator and husband for and on
behalf of DEANNA FULLMER, an
incapacitated person, and DEANNA No. 97-4136
FULLMER, (D.C. No. 95-CV-9)
(D. Utah)
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
vs.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Defendant-Appellee.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before BALDOCK, KELLY, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.
Jerry and Deanna Fullmer brought this medical malpractice action against
the government under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b),
as a result of injuries suffered by Mrs. Fullmer while being treated by medical
personnel at a military clinic. Following a two week bench trial, the district court
ruled against the Fullmers on each of their claims, and this appeal followed. Our
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. This court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
jurisdiction arises under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.
Background
Because the parties are well-versed in the underlying facts, we forego their
recitation unless necessary for the issue on review. On appeal, the Fullmers
contend that the district court erred in (1) finding that the physician who restored
Mrs. Fullmer’s breathing within five minutes after his arrival at the clinic acted
within the relevant standard of care; (2) concluding that the emergency medical
technician (EMT) was under no state law duty to intubate; and (3) dismissing the
claim challenging the military’s policies concerning clinic staffing and personnel
training as excluded by the FTCA’s discretionary function exception.
Discussion
A.
We review the district court’s factual finding that the clinic physician’s
conduct was within the relevant standard of care for clear error. See Fed. R. Civ.
P. 52(a). This standard applies both to “subsidiary” and “ultimate” factual
findings. See Tinkler v. United States, 982 F.2d 1456, 1466 (10th Cir. 1992).
Under this standard,
[i]f the district court’s account of the evidence is plausible in light of
the record viewed in its entirety, the court of appeals may not reverse
it even though convinced that had it been sitting as the trier of fact, it
would have weighed the evidence differently. Where there are two
permissible views of the evidence, the factfinder’s choice between
them cannot be clearly erroneous.
-2-
Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573-74 (1985); see also
FDIC v. Hamilton, 122 F.3d 854, 860 (10th Cir. 1997).
After reviewing the record, we are unable to say that the district court’s
finding was clearly erroneous. Numerous medical experts testified as to the
appropriateness of the physician’s conduct, with conflicting testimony whether
the amount of time taken to intubate was reasonable. Although the government’s
experts agreed with the Fullmers that, under certain hypothetical situations, the
physician’s conduct would be negligent, the circumstances actually faced by the
physician in this case were controverted. In addition, each of these experts
reiterated on redirect that the physician’s conduct was within the relevant
standard of care under the circumstances.
B.
The district court dismissed the remaining two issues due to lack of subject
matter jurisdiction. Such dismissals are reviewed de novo. See Ayala v. United
States, 49 F.3d 607, 611 (10th Cir. 1995); Daniels v. United States, 967 F.2d
1463, 1464 (10th Cir. 1992).
The Fullmers assert that the EMT on duty should have intubated Mrs.
Fullmer before the clinic physician arrived. Under the FTCA, the United States is
liable for tort claims “in the same manner and to the same extent as a private
individual under like circumstances,” 28 U.S.C. § 2674, “in accordance with the
-3-
law of the place where the act or omission occurred.” 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b).
We agree with the district court that Utah law does not impose a duty for an
EMT Basic even with Advanced Cardiac Life Support (ACLS) training to intubate
a patient in Utah. The law in Utah, that intubation is not within the scope of
practice of an EMT Basic, does not yield to the standards of the ACLS Handbook
nor to the operating procedures of the military clinic. See Gammill v. United
States, 727 F.2d 950, 953 n.4 (10th Cir. 1984) (“It would be anomalous for us to
infer a private right of action based upon [an Army regulation and Standard
Operating Procedure] after having found no such right attaching to the underlying
civilian laws.”). Because there is no comparable liability for private persons in
Utah, there can be no liability for the government under the FTCA, and thus the
district court correctly dismissed this claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
C.
Finally, the Fullmers assert that the FTCA’s discretionary function
exception does not apply to the medical clinic in its allegedly negligent treatment
of Mrs. Fullmer. Under the FTCA, sovereign immunity is not waived for “[a]ny
claim . . . based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or
perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of a federal agency . . . ,
whether or not the discretion involved be abused.” 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a). If the
discretionary function exception applies, the district court lacks subject matter
-4-
jurisdiction over the claim. See Tippett v. United States, 108 F.3d 1194, 1196
(10th Cir. 1997). To determine whether the discretionary function exception
applies, we must decide “(1) whether the action at issue was one of choice for the
government employee; and (2) if the conduct involved such an element of
judgment, ‘whether that judgment is of the kind that the discretionary function
exception was designed to shield.’” Id. at 1197 (quoting Berkovitz v. United
States, 486 U.S. 531, 536 (1988)). “The exception . . . protects only
governmental actions and decisions based on considerations of public policy.”
Berkovitz, 486 U.S. at 537.
In essence, the Fullmers claim that the government was negligent in failing
to have someone constantly available at the clinic whose scope of duties included
intubation. The Fullmers agree that the first prong of the discretionary function
test is met, but contend that the second prong of the test is not met because
medical decisions fall outside considerations of public policy. They find support
for this in Barnson v. United States, 816 F.2d 549, 553 (10th Cir. 1987), where
we acknowledged that decisions involving medical treatment do not come within
the exception. However, the government’s staffing decisions at the clinic were
not medical treatment decisions. Instead, they were, as the district court found,
based upon military policy considerations which satisfy the second prong of the
discretionary function exception test. See Black Hills Aviation, Inc. v. United
-5-
States, 34 F.3d 968, 976 (10th Cir. 1994). Therefore the district court correctly
dismissed this claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
AFFIRMED.
Entered for the Court
Paul J. Kelly, Jr.
Circuit Judge
-6-