Walker v. Saffle ( 1999 )


Menu:
  •                                                                              F I L E D
    United States Court of Appeals
    Tenth Circuit
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    APR 1 1999
    TENTH CIRCUIT
    PATRICK FISHER
    Clerk
    MICHAEL D. WALKER,
    Petitioner - Appellant,
    v.
    Nos. 98-7125 & 98-7144
    (D.C. No. 98-CV-95-B)
    JAMES SAFFLE; THE ATTORNEY
    (Eastern District of Oklahoma)
    GENERAL OF THE STATE OF
    OKLAHOMA,
    Respondents - Appellees.
    ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
    Before BRORBY, EBEL and LUCERO, Circuit Judges.
    Petitioner Michael D. Walker seeks a certificate of appealability (“COA”),
    pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A), to appeal the denial of his petition for a
    writ of habeas corpus, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. 1 We have jurisdiction
    pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2253 and deny the application for COA.
    *
    The case is unanimously ordered submitted without oral argument pursuant to
    Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2) and 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). This order and judgment is not
    binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and
    collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments;
    nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th
    Cir. R. 36.3.
    1
    This decision resolves two appeals that have been consolidated for procedural
    purposes: 98-7125 appeals dismissal of Walker’s habeas petition, and 98-7144 appeals
    denial of his application for a certificate of appealability.
    The district court dismissed Walker’s petition as untimely under the one-
    year statute of limitations imposed by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death
    Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). Because of
    retroactivity concerns, we have determined that for prisoners like Walker who
    were convicted prior to the effective date of AEDPA, April 24, 1996, the one-year
    limitations period for filing of a habeas petition begins to run on April 24, 1996. 2
    See United States v. Simmonds, 
    111 F.3d 737
    , 745-46 (10th Cir. 1997). Under 28
    U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2), “[t]he time during which a properly filed application for
    State post-conviction or other collateral review” is pending tolls the limitations
    period of AEDPA, including the limitation period that applies to prisoners whose
    convictions became final prior to April 24, 1996. See Hoggro v. Boone, 
    150 F.3d 1223
    , 1226 (10th Cir. 1998).
    Walker filed an application for post-conviction relief in state district court
    on April 23, 1996. Thus, his AEDPA limitations period was tolled during the
    pendency of that application. The state district court denied his application on
    February 12, 1997, at which time his one-year limitations period began to run.
    On March 12, 1997, Walker filed an appeal of the denial of post-conviction
    relief. On May 8, 1997, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals entered an
    2
    Walker’s conviction was affirmed by the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals
    on December 19, 1994.
    -2-
    order directing Walker to file a certified copy of the state district court order on
    appeal and to show cause for his failure to file such with his petition in error.
    After Walker failed to file a copy of the order, on August 12, 1997, the Oklahoma
    Court of Criminal Appeals declined jurisdiction and dismissed Walker’s appeal.
    Walker filed a petition for habeas relief in federal court on March 6, 1998.
    The district court concluded that, because of Walker’s failure to file a copy
    of the district court’s order denying post-conviction relief, his appeal of that
    denial was not “properly filed” under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2), and therefore did
    not toll AEDPA’s statute of limitations. Therefore, Walker’s deadline for filing
    his petition was one year from the date of the denial of his application for post-
    conviction relief, or February 11, 1997.
    We agree with the district court that Walker’s improperly filed appeal did
    not, under the plain language of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2), toll the limitations
    period for his filing a petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254.
    See Duvall v. State, 
    869 P.2d 332
    , 333-34 (Okla. Crim. App. 1994) (holding that
    the Court of Criminal Appeals lacks jurisdiction over an appeal that has not been
    perfected by the filing of a copy of the order of the district court), motion for
    reconsideration denied, 
    871 P.2d 1386
    (Okla. Crim. App. 1994). Therefore,
    Walker’s habeas petition was untimely under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d).
    -3-
    On appeal, Walker complains that errors by the state district court clerk
    resulted in his failure to file the copy of the district court order necessary to
    perfect his appeal. However, the record indicates that in its order of May 8, 1997,
    the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals clearly informed Walker of his
    obligation to file a copy of the district court’s order, and ordered the clerk of that
    court to provide Walker with such a copy, if he or she had not previously done so.
    Walker offers no explanation for his failure to respond to this order. Therefore,
    we agree with the district court that Walker’s appeal was not “properly filed”
    within the meaning of 28 U.S.C § 2244(d)(2), and can see no extraordinary
    equitable reason that mandates additional equitable tolling of the limitations
    period at issue in this case. See Miller v. Marr, 
    141 F.3d 976
    , 978 (10th Cir.
    1998).
    Because Walker has made no “substantial showing of the denial of a
    constitutional right,” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2), his application for a certificate of
    appealability is DENIED. Walker’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis is
    GRANTED. These appeals are DISMISSED.
    The mandate shall issue forthwith.
    ENTERED FOR THE COURT
    Carlos F. Lucero
    Circuit Judge
    -4-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 98-7125

Filed Date: 4/1/1999

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 4/17/2021