United States v. Garcia-Villapando ( 1999 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS APR 20 1999
TENTH CIRCUIT PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
No. 98-1336
v. (D.C. No. 98-CR-143-ALL)
(Colorado)
NICOLAS GARCIA-VILLAPANDO,
Defendant-Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before SEYMOUR, Chief Judge, BALDOCK and HENRY, Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The cause is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
Nicolas Garcia-Villapando appeals from the sentence imposed after his plea
of guilty to unlawfully reentering the United States after deportation for an
aggravated felony in violation of 8 U.S.C. §§ 1326(a) and (b)(2). Counsel
appointed to represent defendant on appeal filed a brief pursuant to Anders v.
California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). For the reasons set out below, we dismiss the
appeal.
The facts supporting defendant’s guilty plea are set forth in the Plea
Agreement and Statement of Facts Relevant to Sentencing. The plea agreement
anticipated a sentencing guideline range of 77 to 96 months. Defendant’s trial
counsel filed a Motion for Downward Departure, arguing that the district court
should exercise its discretion to depart downward under the authority of United
States v. Lipman, 133 F.3d 726 (9th Cir. 1998), based on defendants’s “cultural
assimilation” into the United States. The district court recognized it had
discretion to depart downward but declined to do so, sentencing defendant to 77
months imprisonment.
Trial counsel filed a notice of appeal on defendant’s behalf and moved to
withdraw. New counsel was appointed to represent defendant on appeal. Anders
holds that if counsel finds a case to be wholly frivolous after conscientious
examination, he should so advise the court and request permission to withdraw.
Counsel must in addition submit to both the court and his client a brief referring
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to anything in the record arguably supportive of the appeal. The client may then
raise any points he chooses, and the appellate court thereafter undertakes a
complete examination of all proceedings and decides whether the appeal is, in
fact, frivolous. If it so finds, it may grant counsel’s request to withdraw and
dismiss the appeal. See id. at 744.
In his Anders brief, counsel raises three possible points: the district court’s
refusal to depart downward; ineffective assistance of counsel; and defendant’s
argument that prior INS deportation procedures were not constitutional.
Defendant was notified of his right to file a pro se brief, and he has not chosen to
do so. Accordingly, we turn to an examination of the proceedings below to
determine if the appeal is wholly frivolous.
The district court refused to grant defendant a downward departure. In so
doing, the court clearly recognized that it had the discretion to depart downward
but declined to do so. Because the court acknowledged its authority to grant such
a departure, we have no jurisdiction to review its decision refusing to exercise
that authority. See United States v. Castillo, 140 F.3d 874, 887-89 (10th Cir.
1998); United States v. Rodriguez, 30 F.3d 1318, 1319 (10th Cir. 1994).
We have carefully examined the record to ascertain whether any other
ground exists to support a challenge to defendant’s sentence. We find nothing in
the record to indicate that the sentence imposed was in violation of the law or the
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result of a misapplication of the guidelines. Accordingly, we are without
jurisdiction to consider such a challenge. See United States v. Sanchez, 146 F.3d
796, 796-97 (10th Cir. 1998); 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a).
To the extent that Mr. Garcia-Villapando’s notice of appeal can be viewed
as an assertion that his counsel was ineffective, the issue must be raised
collaterally rather than on direct appeal. See United States v. Galloway, 56 F.3d
1239, 1240 (10th Cir. 1995) (en banc). We pointed out in Galloway that such
claims brought on direct appeal are presumptively dismissible because most
ineffectiveness claims need further record development. Id. Although we
recognized that in rare instances the merits of an ineffectiveness claim may be
reviewed on direct appeal because the claim needs no further development, id.,that rare exception is clearly not applicable here. To the extent defendant wishes
to raise ineffective assistance of counsel, therefore, the claim must be pursued in
a collateral proceeding.
Defendant asserts in his docketing statement that the INS deportation
proceedings did not pass constitutional muster, thereby making the actual charges
against him invalid. He did not raise this issue in the trial court. Counsel has
reviewed the record for any support for defendant’s stated issue and has been
unable to find anything to indicate to what defendant may be referring.
Moreover, “[w]e will not consider any argument raised for the first time on
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appeal.” See United States v. Mendoza-Lopez, 7 F.3d 1483, 1485 n.2 (10th Cir.
1993).
After review of the entire proceedings, we conclude that the record
establishes no non-frivolous ground for appeal. The appeal is therefore
DISMISSED and counsel’s motion to withdraw is GRANTED.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Stephanie K. Seymour
Chief Judge
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