United States v. Blanco-Munoz ( 1999 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
MAY 13 1999
TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
No. 98-4094
vs. (D.C. No. 97-CR-441-C)
(D. Utah)
JUAN BLANCO-MUNOZ,
Defendant-Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before KELLY, McKAY, and HENRY, Circuit Judges.
Juan Blanco-Munoz pled guilty to one count of illegal reentry into the
United States after deportation in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326. The district court
determined his sentence with reference to USSG § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A), which
provides a sixteen-level enhancement, based on Mr. Blanco-Munoz’ prior
conviction of an aggravated felony. Mr. Blanco-Munoz appeals the sixteen-level
enhancement, arguing that his prior state conviction did not presumptively qualify
as an aggravated felony under § 1326(b)(2) and 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(G). Our
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. This court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
jurisdiction arises under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a)(1). We
affirm.
Sentencing Guideline § 2L1.2 provides for a base offense level of eight and
mandates a sixteen-level increase if the defendant was deported after an
aggravated felony conviction. See USSG § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A). The commentary to
the guideline defines aggravated felony by reference to 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43),
see USSG § 2L1.2 commentary at n.1, which in turn defines aggravated felony as,
inter alia, “a theft offense (including receipt of stolen property) or burglary
offense for which the term of imprisonment [is] at least one year.” §
1101(a)(43)(G).
In seeking the enhancement, the government relied on a prior state court
conviction in 1993 for third-degree burglary which carried an indeterminate
sentence of zero to five years. We construe this as a sentence for a term of five
years. See United States v. Reyes-Castro, 13 F.3d 377, 379-80 (10th Cir. 1993).
Mr. Blanco-Munoz was deported in 1994.
Mr. Blanco-Munoz asserts that the term “burglary offense” in §
1101(a)(43)(G) is ambiguous, and argues that the district court erred by failing to
look at the state statutory definition of burglary to determine whether it contained
the same basic elements found in the Supreme Court’s “generic” definition of
burglary: “an unlawful or unprivileged entry into, or remaining in, a building or
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other structure, with intent to commit a crime.” Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S.
575, 598 (1990). In Taylor, the Court adopted this uniform definition for the
purpose of determining whether a defendant’s sentence could be enhanced due to
a prior burglary conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) (an enhancement
under the Armed Career Criminal Act for defendants having three prior
convictions for a violent felony or a serious drug offense). The government
responds that the burglary definition in Taylor is inapplicable because, unlike the
enhancement statute in Taylor, a prior “burglary offense” in 8 U.S.C. §
1101(a)(43)(G) need not be a crime of violence. According to the government,
any state burglary conviction for which the sentence imposed is at least one year
qualifies as an aggravated felony.
We need not decide between these two positions because, even if we were
to adopt Mr. Blanco-Munoz’ position, we would still find that his state burglary
conviction qualified as an aggravated felony under § 1101(a)(43). The statute
under which he was convicted, Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202 (1990), provides that
“[a] person is guilty of burglary if he enters or remains unlawfully in a building or
any portion of a building with intent to commit a felony or theft or commit an
assault on any person.” This definition has the same basic elements as found in
Taylor.
However, citing our decision in United States v. Barney, 955 F.2d 635-3-
(10th Cir. 1992), Mr. Blanco-Munoz argues that the Utah statute defines burglary
more broadly than does Taylor because “building” is defined, in addition to its
ordinary meaning, as “any watercraft, aircraft, trailer, sleeping car, or other
structure or vehicle adapted for overnight accommodation of persons or for
carrying on business therein.” Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-201 (1990). We disagree.
The Wyoming statutes at issue in Barney both defined burglary as entering or
remaining in a building or, inter alia, a vehicle. See Barney, 955 F.2d at 638-39
(citing Wyo. Stat. § 6-7-201 (1977) and § 6-3-301(a) (1988)). The Utah statute is
not so broad — although “building” is defined more broadly than its ordinary
meaning, it is restricted by the requirement that the “other structure or vehicle” be
“adapted for overnight accommodation of persons or for carrying on business
therein.” § 76-6-201. Thus entering or remaining in an ordinary unoccupied car
would not qualify as burglary under the statute, and the Supreme Court’s concern
in Taylor, 495 U.S. at 591, would not apply.
AFFIRMED.
Entered for the Court
Paul J. Kelly, Jr.
Circuit Judge
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