Mecca v. United States , 389 F. App'x 775 ( 2010 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
July 26, 2010
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
JOSEPH T. MECCA,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 09-1569
(D.C. No. 1:08-CV-02813-REB-CBS)
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA; (D. Colorado)
MICHAEL J. STARKEY; JOHN A.
JOHNSON; JAMES TERRIO; JACK
MARKUSFELD; JOHN CHO,
Defendants-Appellees.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before HARTZ, ANDERSON, and O’BRIEN, Circuit Judges.
Joseph T. Mecca, a former radiologist at Evans Army Community Hospital
(Evans Army) in Fort Carson, Colorado, appeals the dismissal of his suit brought
under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b) and 2671-2680,
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding
precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and
collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent
with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
and Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics,
403 U.S. 388 (1971). Dr. Mecca initiated this action after he resigned from Evans
Army, but the district court dismissed the FTCA claims for lack of jurisdiction
and the Bivens claim for failure to state a claim for relief. On appeal, Dr. Mecca
contends the district court dismissed his suit by applying an overly restrictive
pleading standard. We conclude the district court correctly evaluated Dr. Mecca’s
allegations, both jurisdictional and factual, and accordingly, we affirm. We
remand, however, to modify dismissal of the FTCA claims to be without
prejudice.
I
As alleged in the amended complaint, Dr. Mecca worked under contract as
a civilian radiologist at Evans Army. A year after obtaining staff privileges,
Dr. Mecca misdiagnosed a patient. He was advised by the Chief of Radiology,
Major Michael Starkey, that he could resign without adverse consequences or face
investigation, suspension, and referral to the National Practitioners Data Bank and
state licensing authorities. Dr. Mecca opted to resign, but Starkey went ahead
with proceedings to hold his privileges in abeyance pending the outcome of an
investigation and peer review. Dr. Mecca learned of the abeyance from Colonel
John Johnson, the Deputy Commander for Clinical Services, and although he
protested the measure based on the assurances given by Starkey, his complaints
went unanswered. Receiving no response, Dr. Mecca assumed the matter had
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been put to rest until he was notified by Colonel Jack Markusfeld that his
privileges had been suspended because he resigned during the investigation.
Once the investigation was concluded, Colonel James Terrio notified
Dr. Mecca that the matter had been referred to a peer review committee.
Thereafter, Colonel John Cho, Commander of the Army Medical Department,
confirmed that Dr. Mecca’s suspension was precipitated by his resignation during
the abeyance proceedings. Although Colonel Cho informed Dr. Mecca that he
had the right to a hearing before a credentials committee, he never received one.
Eventually, the Army referred the matter to the Surgeon General of the United
States, but the Surgeon General’s office found insufficient evidence to support the
suspension. By that time, though, Dr. Mecca was unable to find a new job, and
he thus sought redress through the courts.
In his amended complaint, Dr. Mecca pleaded eight claims under the FTCA
and a ninth claim under Bivens. The first three FTCA claims alleged negligence
per se for violations of Army Regulation (AR) 40-68, specifically, Chapter
10-6(a)(4) for the government’s wrongful suspension of his privileges following
his resignation; Chapter 10-6(f) for the government’s failure to notify him of the
peer review process and right to participate in that process; and Chapter 10-7(a)
for the government’s failure to inform him of the “deficiencies in his diagnosis
. . . and his right [to] request and be present at a formal hearing,” Aplt. App. at
35. Three additional FTCA claims alleged general negligence on similar grounds.
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The seventh FTCA claim charged a civil conspiracy to violate AR 40-68, and the
last FTCA claim, styled “Interference with Prospective Business Advantage,”
accused the government of preventing Dr. Mecca from forming employment
contracts with other hospitals. As for the individual defendants, Dr. Mecca
charged under Bivens that he was deprived of protected liberty and property
interests without due process of law.
On defendants’ motions, the district court dismissed the case. The court
ruled it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the first seven claims because the
FTCA imposes liability in accordance with state law, but the amended complaint
cited no source of substantive state liability. The court also noted the civil
conspiracy claim failed to state a claim absent any facts “suggesting a meeting of
the minds between defendants as to the object of the conspiracy.” Id. at 239.
Additionally, the court determined the prospective business advantage claim was
excepted from the FTCA because it sought to vindicate contract rights, while the
Bivens claim was deficient under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) because it failed to
allege a constitutionally recognized property or liberty interest.
II
We review de novo dismissals for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). Colo. Envtl. Coal. v. Wenker, 353 F.3d 1221, 1227
(10th Cir. 2004). We likewise review de novo dismissals under Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(6). Smith v. United States, 561 F.3d 1090, 1098 (10th Cir. 2009),
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cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 1142 (2010). Under both subsections of Rule 12(b), all
well-pleaded allegations are accepted as true and viewed in the light most
favorable to the non-moving party. Id. at 1097-98.
A. FTCA Claims
1. Claims 1-7
We begin with the FTCA claims alleging negligence per se, negligence, and
civil conspiracy. It is clear that no action may lie against the United States unless
authorized by Congress. Miller v. United States, 463 F.3d 1122, 1123 (10th Cir.
2006). Congress has, in the FTCA, granted a limited waiver of sovereign
immunity for claims against the government
for injury or loss of property . . . caused by the negligent or wrongful
act or omission of any employee of the Government while acting
within the scope of his office or employment, under circumstances
where the United States, if a private person, would be liable to the
claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act or
omission occurred.
28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1) (emphasis added). The phrase “law of the place” refers to
the law of the State where the act or omission occurred. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp.
v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 478 (1994); Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. U.S. ex rel. U.S.
Army Corp. of Eng’rs, 591 F.3d 1311, 1315 (10th Cir. 2010). Thus, we consult
state law to determine substantive liability under the FTCA. Miller, 463 F.3d
at 1123.
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Dr. Mecca, however, claimed only violations of AR 40-68, which, as a
federal regulation, cannot impose liability under the FTCA. See Klepper v. City
of Milford, 825 F.2d 1440, 1448 (10th Cir. 1987) (“[W]here a negligence claim is
based on a violation of a federal statute or regulation, no claim will lie under the
FTCA in the absence of some other duty under the applicable state law.”);
see also United States v. Agronics Inc., 164 F.3d 1343, 1347 (10th Cir. 1999)
(recognizing there can be no recovery for alleged violations of federal statutory or
regulatory duties absent a “specific basis for concluding that similar conduct by
private persons . . . would be actionable under state law” (quotation omitted)).
Dr. Mecca’s reliance on a federal regulation, without any analogous state law
duty, failed to bring the first seven claims within the scope of the FTCA’s waiver
of sovereign immunity and thus failed to invoke the court’s jurisdiction. See
Ayala v. United States, 49 F.3d 607, 610 (10th Cir. 1995) (recognizing absence of
federal jurisdiction unless state law recognizes a comparable private tort).
Dr. Mecca disputes this result and cites the Colorado Professional Review
Act (CPRA), Colo. Rev. Stat. § 12-36.5-101 to -106, as an analogous source of
state liability for purposes of the FTCA. The problem, however, is he never
mentioned this or any other state law in his amended complaint. Instead, he
pursued purely federal regulatory violations under AR 40-68, even after the
government highlighted the deficiency in his original complaint. Dr. Mecca
imparts knowledge of “Colorado law,” presumably the CPRA, to the district court
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because he cited that statute in his response to the government’s motion to
dismiss. Aplt. Br. at 16 n.2. But the claim should have been made in the
amended complaint. See Swoboda v. Dubach, 992 F.2d 286, 290-91 (10th Cir.
1993) (restricting analysis of the sufficiency of claims to the allegations in the
complaint). In any event, the argument is unavailing, as the CPRA does not
create a private cause of action for the claims Dr. Mecca presents here. See
N. Colo. Med. Ctr., Inc. v. Nicholas, 27 P.3d 828, 840-41 (Colo. 2001) (“[T]he
CPRA is designed to protect medical patients from unprofessional conduct by
persons licensed to practice medicine.” (emphasis added, quotation omitted)).
2. Civil Conspiracy
Apart from the absence of any substantive liability under the FTCA,
Dr. Mecca’s civil conspiracy claim also suffers from another pleading deficiency.
Dr. Mecca was obliged to plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). In
Colorado, a claim of civil conspiracy requires a plaintiff to show:
(1) an object to be accomplished; (2) an agreement by two or more
persons on a course of action to accomplish that object; (3) in
furtherance of that course of action, one or more unlawful acts which
were performed to accomplish a lawful or unlawful goal, or one or
more lawful acts which were performed to accomplish an unlawful
goal; and (4) damages to the plaintiff as a proximate result.
Magin v. DVCO Fuel Sys., Inc., 981 P.2d 673, 674-75 (Colo. App. 1999). The
amended complaint, however, alleges nothing to plausibly suggest defendants
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agreed on an object of the putative conspiracy. Instead, it generally avers that
defendants “agreed, by words or conduct, to accomplish an unlawful goal or
accomplish a goal through unlawful means.” Aplt. App. at 38. But this is a mere
“formulaic recitation,” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, of Colorado’s minimum
pleading standard for civil conspiracy claims, see Scott v. Hern, 216 F.3d 897,
918 (10th Cir. 2000) (“[Plaintiff] must at the very least allege ‘a course of
conduct and other circumstantial evidence providing some indicia of agreement in
an unlawful means or end.’” (quoting Schneider v. Midtown Motor Co., 854 P.2d
1322, 1327 (Colo. App. 1992) (ellipsis and brackets omitted))). Even
Dr. Mecca’s strongest allegation—that “Starkey, Johnson, and/or Markusfeld”
caused adverse action to be taken against him “in furtherance of the goal of
revoking [his] privileges”—fails to suggest a meeting of the minds. Aplt. App. at
28. At most, this might suggest the suspension was unlawful, but we cannot infer
from defendants’ independent acts an agreement to realize that goal. See Nelson
v. Elway, 908 P.2d 102, 106 (Colo. 1995) (“The court will not infer the agreement
necessary to form a conspiracy.”).
3. Interference with Prospective Business Advantage
As for the interference with prospective business advantage claim, the
district court determined it was barred because, notwithstanding its title, it alleged
interference with contract rights. See 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (restricting “[a]ny
claim arising out of . . . interference with contract rights”). Dr. Mecca disputes
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this characterization and distinguishes his claim as presenting a distinct tort for
interference with prospective business advantage. He cites Colorado Insurance
Group v. United States, 216 F. Supp. 787, 792-93 (D. Colo. 1963), where the
court acknowledged overlapping boundaries between contract claims and
interference with prospective business advantage claims, and asserts that like the
plaintiffs in Colorado Insurance Group, he seeks to recover for interference with
prospective business advantage.
As pleaded, however, Dr. Mecca’s claim expressly accused the government
of “prevent[ing] the formation of an employment contract with other hospitals.”
Aplt. App. at 39. It alleged the government interfered with his “ability to gain
privileges at other hospitals,” which caused “damages in the form of lost wages,
impaired ability to earn a living, and other economic damages.” Id. This claim
clearly seeks to vindicate prospective employment contracts allegedly impeded or
prevented by the government’s conduct. It is thus is a claim for interference with
contract rights barred by § 2680(h). See Cooper v. Am. Auto. Ins. Co., 978 F.2d
602, 613 (10th Cir. 1992).
4. Nature of Dismissal
The last issue bearing on the FTCA claims is the district court’s dismissal
of these claims with prejudice. “A longstanding line of cases from this circuit
holds that where the district court dismisses an action for lack of jurisdiction . . .
the dismissal must be without prejudice.” Brereton v. Bountiful City Corp,
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434 F.3d 1213, 1216 (10th Cir. 2006). Here, because the district court found
itself without jurisdiction over the FTCA claims, dismissal should have been
entered without prejudice, even if the court deemed further amendment futile.
See id. at 1219. We therefore remand with instructions to enter dismissal of these
claims without prejudice. 2
B. Due Process Under Bivens
Finally, Dr. Mecca challenges the dismissal of his due process claim for
failure to allege a cognizable property or liberty interest. 3 A successful
procedural due process claim requires a plaintiff to show (1) the deprivation of a
liberty or property interest and (2) the absence of due process. Stears v. Sheridan
Cnty. Mem’l Hosp. Bd. of Trs., 491 F.3d 1160, 1162 (10th Cir. 2007). Protected
property interests require “a legitimate claim of entitlement,” created not by the
Constitution but by independent sources such as statute, municipal ordinance, or
contract. Nichols v. Bd. of County Comm’rs, 506 F.3d 962, 969-70 (10th Cir.
2
One might argue that dismissal without prejudice of the FTCA
claims—indeed, the Bivens claim as well—precludes appellate review, since such
dismissals usually are not final decisions. We have jurisdiction, however,
because the dismissal order finally disposed of the case and effectively excluded
Dr. Mecca from federal court. See Amazon, Inc. v. Dirt Camp, Inc., 273 F.3d
1271, 1275 (10th Cir. 2001).
3
Defendants contend dismissal of this claim may be affirmed on any of three
alternate grounds: (1) the complaint failed to allege personal participation by
defendants; (2) defendants were entitled to qualified immunity; and (3) the claim
is barred by Colorado’s two-year statute of limitations. Our disposition obviates
any need to consider these issues.
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2007) (quotation omitted). “However, if an employee voluntarily relinquishes a
property interest, then no procedural due process violation has occurred.”
Narotzky v. Natrona Cnty. Mem’l Hosp., ___ F.3d___, 2010 WL 2510659, at *5
(10th Cir. June 23, 2010).
Here, although Dr. Mecca was working as an independent contractor when
he resigned from Evans Army, he does not contend his contract created a property
interest. Instead, he points to a provision of AR 40-68 that, according to him,
required “reasonable cause” to suspend his privileges. Aplt. Br. at 28. He also
asserts AR 40-68 conditioned the government’s authority to alter his staff
privileges on unsatisfactory patient care. Id. at 27. These limits on government
authority, Dr. Mecca contends, constitute a protected property interest because
they restrict the Army’s ability to adversely affect his privileges. The problem
with this argument, however, is that once again, none of these allegations are in
the amended complaint. Dr. Mecca answers that he was not required to
specifically cite the “reasonable cause” standard in the amended complaint, but
“[t]he court’s function on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is . . . to assess whether the
plaintiff’s complaint alone is legally sufficient to state a claim for which relief
may be granted,” Swoboda, 992 F.2d at 290. Thus, contrary to Dr. Mecca’s
assertion, he was required to plead these allegations in his amended complaint.
Nevertheless, even if Dr. Mecca had alleged a protected property interest
was created by AR 40-68 or his contract, his claim would still fail because he
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resigned. Indeed, Dr. Mecca’s resignation voluntarily relinquished any interest he
may have had. See Narotzky, 2010 WL 2510659, at *5; McBeth v. Himes,
598 F.3d 708, 723 (10th Cir. 2010) (holding that one who voluntarily relinquishes
some property or liberty interest cannot claim a due process violation because
there was no official deprivation). Accordingly, whether it be for the absence of
a protected property interest or the voluntary relinquishment of any such interest,
the claim was subject to dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6). 4
The liberty interest claim suffers from similar deficiencies. Dr. Mecca
predicates his claim on the harm done to his professional reputation and
information reported to the Surgeon General, which he contends has impeded his
ability to earn a living and practice his profession. To show a deprivation of
one’s liberty interest in professional reputation, a plaintiff must demonstrate
(1) “statements [that] impugn the good name, reputation, honor, or integrity of the
employee”; (2) “the statements [were] false”; (3) the “statements . . . occur[red]
in the course of terminating the employee or must foreclose other employment
opportunities”; and (4) “the statements [were] published.” Watson v. Univ. of
Utah Med. Ctr., 75 F.3d 569, 579 (10th Cir. 1996) (quotation omitted).
4
Dr. Mecca does not frame his claim as a constructive discharge, perhaps
because this court has not before recognized a cause of action for the denial of
procedural due process based on the constructive discharge of an independent
contractor. See Narotzky, 2010 WL 2510659, at *5 n.3.
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Dr. Mecca claimed hospitals decline to hire him when they learn of his
suspension and he cannot find work due to the defendants’ actions. There is no
indication who published the information, however. Instead, Dr. Mecca simply
concludes that based on defendants’ actions, “the Army submitted [his] name to
the . . . Surgeon General.” Aplt. App. at 31. But there must be something to
plausibly suggest that these defendants published false information about the
suspension. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (explaining that
Twombly’s plausibility standard “asks for more than a sheer possibility that a
defendant has acted unlawfully”); see also Ridge at Red Hawk, L.L.C., v.
Schneider, 493 F.3d 1174, 1177 (10th Cir. 2007) (“[T]he complaint must give the
court reason to believe that this plaintiff has a reasonable likelihood of mustering
factual support for these claims.”). Indeed, Twombly’s plausibility standard
requires “factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference
that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949.
Vague allegations against the entire Army do not suffice. Dr. Mecca asserts he
could show defendants’ culpability with discovery, but “[Fed. R. Civ. P.] 8 . . .
does not unlock the doors of discovery for a plaintiff armed with nothing more
than conclusions.” Id. at 1950. Dr. Mecca “has alleged—but . . . has not
shown—that [he] is entitled to relief,” id. (brackets and internal quotation marks
omitted), and as a consequence, the district court was correct to dismiss the claim.
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III
The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED, but the case is
REMANDED to the district court with instructions to modify dismissal of the
FTCA claims to be without prejudice.
Entered for the Court
Stephen H. Anderson
Circuit Judge
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