Richardson v. Dept. of Corrections ( 1999 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
OCT 14 1999
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
JOSHUA YOUNG RICHARDSON,
Petitioner-Appellant,
v. No. 99-1108
(D.C. No. 98-Z-2150)
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS; (D. Colo.)
ARISTEDES W. ZAVARAS; GALE
A. NORTON, Attorney General,
Respondents-Appellees.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before TACHA , KELLY , and BRISCOE , Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
Petitioner Joshua Young Richardson, appearing pro se, appeals the district
court’s denial of his habeas corpus petition brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.
The district court determined that because Richardson failed to exhaust his
available state court remedies, his habeas issues were procedurally barred. We
have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.
In reviewing the denial of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, we accept
the district court’s findings of fact unless clearly erroneous and we review the
court’s conclusions of law de novo. Hill v. Reynolds , 942 F.2d 1494, 1495
(10th Cir. 1991). We construe Richardson’s pro se pleadings liberally. See
Haines v. Kerner , 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). Applying this liberal construction to
Richardson’s appellate brief, we discern his appellate arguments as alleging that
the district court erred in denying his habeas corpus petition because (1) there
were special circumstances which should have excused Richardson from his
failure to exhaust state court remedies, and (2) Richardson established cause for
his procedural default.
Richardson was sentenced to sixteen years’ imprisonment plus up to five
years of supervised release for aggravated robbery and eight years’ imprisonment
plus up to five years of supervised release for theft. These sentences were to run
concurrently. Since his initial incarceration, Richardson has twice been paroled
and has twice been returned to prison on parole violations. In his habeas corpus
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petition, he claimed that his parole revocation was illegal, the computation of his
sentence following his parole revocation was incorrect, that he had served more
prison time than his original sentence, and that he should be released immediately
from prison.
Richardson has raised these issues in several state court actions. In 1997,
the Colorado Supreme Court denied Richardson’s original petition for writ of
habeas corpus without reaching the merits. 1
On November 10, 1997, Richardson
filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in state district court, Arapahoe County,
Colorado. He moved to dismiss this petition six weeks later on January 29, 1998,
claiming that the court had refused to take action on his petition. Richardson then
filed his petition in state district court in Crowley County, Colorado. On March
25, 1998, the Crowley County District Court denied the petition on the merits.
While his petition in Crowley County District Court was still pending, in
February 1998, Richardson filed a Colo. R. Civ. P. 106 claim in the district court
for the City and County of Denver. Denver District Court denied the claim on
1
Colo. Const. art. VI, § 3 grants the Colorado Supreme Court the power to
issue original writs of habeas corpus. See Colo. App. R. 21. The exercise of this
original jurisdiction is discretionary, see McConnell v. District Court , 680 P.2d
528, 530 (Colo. 1984), and will not be exercised “when the question may be
properly submitted and determined and the rights of the petitioner fully protected
and enforced, in the lower court,” Rogers v. Best , 171 P.2d 769, 770 (Colo. 1946)
(en banc). The state appellate court’s denial of an original petition under Rule 21
does not indicate consideration of the merits. See Bell v. Simpson , 918 P.2d 1123,
1125 n.3 (Colo. 1996) (en banc).
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May 26, 1998, for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.
A copy of this order, mailed to Richardson, was returned to the court as
undeliverable because Richardson had been transferred to another prison. On
August 31, 1998, after Richardson had sought leave to file an amended complaint,
the court mailed a copy of its order to Richardson at his current prison address.
Richardson then filed a petition for writ of mandamus with the Colorado
Supreme Court requesting relief from the order issued by the Denver District
Court. The court denied the mandamus petition without consideration of the
merits of Richardson’s claims. At this point, Richardson filed his § 2254 petition
in federal district court.
The district court issued an order directing Richardson to show cause as
to why his petition should not be dismissed for failure to exhaust state court
remedies. In his response, Richardson did not challenge the allegation that he had
not exhausted his state court remedies, but instead argued that deliberate delay in
the state courts constituted cause for his failure to seek available avenues of state
court relief. In addition, Richardson contended that the prison’s failure to
forward his mail when he was transferred prevented him from appealing the
Denver District Court’s dismissal of his Rule 106 action. In dismissing
Richardson’s federal habeas corpus petition, the district court concluded that the
issues raised were procedurally defaulted and that Richardson failed to show the
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requisite cause and prejudice, or fundamental miscarriage of justice. See
Coleman v. Thompson , 501 U.S. 722, 750 (1991).
A state prisoner cannot petition for federal habeas corpus relief “unless it
appears that . . . the applicant has exhausted the remedies available in the courts
of the State.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A). “The exhaustion requirement is
satisfied if the federal issue has been properly presented to the highest state court,
either by direct review of the conviction or in a postconviction attack.” Dever v.
Kansas State Penitentiary , 36 F.3d 1531, 1534 (10th Cir. 1994).
Generally, when a petitioner fails to exhaust his state court remedies, his
federal habeas petition should be dismissed so that the petitioner can return to
state court to pursue those remedies. See Demarest v. Price , 130 F.3d 922, 939
(10th Cir. 1997). In Coleman , however, the Supreme Court, held that if “the
petitioner failed to exhaust state remedies and the court to which the petitioner
would be required to present his claims in order to meet the exhaustion
requirement would now find the claims procedurally barred,” petitioner’s claims
are procedurally defaulted for purposes of federal habeas corpus “regardless of
the decision of the last state court to which petitioner actually presented his
claims.” 501 U.S. at 735 n.1; see also Dulin v. Cook , 957 F.2d 758, 759
(10th Cir. 1992) (holding that a petitioner’s failure to properly present his claims
in state court for exhaustion purposes constitutes “procedural default for the
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purposes of federal habeas review”). Here, Richardson’s failure to seek timely
review by the Colorado appellate court constituted failure to exhaust his available
state remedies. However, because it is clear that a return to state court at this
point would be futile, his claims are procedurally defaulted for purposes of
federal habeas corpus review. See Coleman , 501 U.S. at 735 n.1.
Federal habeas corpus review of procedurally barred issues is precluded
“unless the prisoner can demonstrate cause for the default and actual prejudice
as a result of the alleged violation of federal law, or demonstrate that failure
to consider the claims will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice.”
Id. at 750.
Initially, Richardson attempts to establish cause for his default by alleging
that the state courts deliberately delayed action on his petitions. It appears that
Richardson had unreasonable expectations as to the expediency of the courts. He
filed various state court petitions only to request dismissal after only a few weeks,
or in the alternative, to file another action in a different jurisdiction before his
pending action was resolved. While his impatience is unfortunate, it does not
establish cause for his failure to exhaust his state court remedies.
Next, Richardson contends that the prison’s failure to forward his mail to
him in a timely manner following his transfer precluded him from filing a timely
appeal of Denver District Court’s denial of his Rule 106 action. In order to
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satisfy the “cause” prong of the standard, Richardson must establish that “some
objective factor external to the defense” prevented him from complying with the
state court’s procedural rules. McCleskey v. Zant , 499 U.S. 467, 493 (1991)
(quotation omitted). We agree with the district court, that it was Richardson’s
duty to keep the court informed as to his current address. Moreover, we note that
Richardson did not even attempt to appeal the state court’s denial of his Rule 106
action once he received the order. Instead, as had been his pattern, he filed a new
action in a different jurisdiction. Therefore, his argument that the prison
prevented him from complying with state procedural rules is unavailing.
Because Richardson failed in the district court and fails on appeal to
demonstrate cause for his procedural default, we do not need to address the issue
of prejudice. See Steele v. Young , 11 F.3d 1518, 1522 n.7 (10th Cir. 1993). We
may, however, address his claims if a fundamental miscarriage of justice would
result if we failed to consider them. See Coleman , 501 U.S. at 750. The
fundamental miscarriage of justice exception applies only when a petitioner
“‘supplements his constitutional claim with a colorable showing of factual
innocence.’” Herrera v. Collins , 506 U.S. 390, 404 (1993) (quoting Kuhlmann v.
Wilson , 477 U.S. 436, 454 (1986)). Here, Richardson does not supplement his
claim with any allegation of actual innocence. Therefore, the district court
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properly held that federal review of the issues in his habeas petition was
procedurally barred, and Richardson’s claims cannot be considered on the merits.
The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. The mandate shall issue
forthwith.
Entered for the Court
Mary Beck Briscoe
Circuit Judge
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