Duncan v. Barreras ( 1999 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
DEC 1 1999
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
TIMOTHY WAYNE DUNCAN,
Petitioner-Appellant,
v. No. 98-2289
(D.C. No. CIV-95-131-SC)
LAWRENCE BARRERAS, Warden, (D. N.M.)
N.M. State Penitentiary; ATTORNEY
GENERAL FOR THE STATE OF
NEW MEXICO,
Respondents-Appellees.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before BRORBY, EBEL , and HENRY , Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
Petitioner was originally convicted in state court on fourteen counts
including charges of aggravated burglary, criminal sexual penetration, and armed
robbery and was sentenced to forty-one and one-half years’ imprisonment. After
petitioner’s successful appeal of this conviction, see State v. Duncan , 830 P.2d
554, 563 (N.M. Ct. App. 1990), he was retried and found guilty on two counts of
armed robbery. Applying an habitual offender enhancement, which had not been
part of the original sentence, the trial court then sentenced petitioner to a total
term of thirty-four years’ imprisonment. That second sentence was affirmed on
appeal. See State v. Duncan , 872 P.2d 380, 388 (N.M. Ct. App. 1994).
Petitioner then brought this action in the federal district court pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 2254, arguing that he had been the victim of prosecutorial
vindictiveness. The magistrate judge, without holding an evidentiary hearing,
recommended that petitioner’s application be denied. The district court adopted
the magistrate judge’s proposed findings and recommendation and dismissed the
petition with prejudice. This appeal followed.
On appeal, petitioner again argues he was denied due process when the
prosecutor pursued habitual offender proceedings after his successful appeal, and
-2-
further maintains that he is entitled to an evidentiary hearing on his claim of
prosecutorial vindictiveness.
Because this case was filed before the AEDPA’s enactment,
pre-amendment standards of review apply. Thus, while we review
the legal bases for the district court’s dismissal of the petition de
novo, we afford deference to the state court’s construction of state
law. We lack authority to correct errors of state law made by state
courts. We presume that the state court’s factual findings are
correct, and we review the district court’s factual findings for clear
error. Where the district court’s factual findings are based solely
upon a review of the state court record, however, they are subject to
this court’s independent review.
See Tyler v. Nelson , 163 F.3d 1222, 1226-27 (10th Cir. 1999) (quotation and
citations omitted).
A criminal defendant cannot be punished, consistent with due process, for
exercising his constitutional rights to appeal and to trial de novo. See United
States v. Raymer , 941 F.2d 1031, 1040 (10th Cir. 1991). Thus, when a defendant
successfully appeals a conviction, as did this petitioner, he may not be given a
harsher sentence after retrial unless cogent reasons appear on the record to
support the resentencing decision. See North Carolina v. Pearce , 395 U.S. 711,
726 (1969). The rule of Pearce has been read to apply a rebuttable presumption
of vindictiveness under those circumstances. See Wasman v. United States , 468
U.S. 559, 565 (1984).
The Pearce rule also applies to prosecutors, effectively preventing them
from “‘[upping] the ante’ by filing felony charges when a convicted
-3-
misdemeanant exercises his statutory appellate right to trial de novo. ” Raymer ,
941 F.2d at 1040 (citing Blackledge v. Perry , 417 U.S. 21, 27-29 (1974)). “A
person convicted of an offense is entitled to pursue his statutory right to a trial de
novo , without apprehension that the State will retaliate by substituting a more
serious charge for the original one, thus subjecting him to a significantly
increased potential period of incarceration.” Blackledge , 417 U.S. at 28.
“The test [for prosecutorial vindictiveness] is whether, as a practical
matter, there is a realistic or reasonable likelihood of prosecutorial conduct that
would not have occurred but for hostility or punitive animus towards the
defendant because he exercised his specific legal right.” United States v. Wall , 37
F.3d 1443, 1448 (10th Cir. 1994) (quotations omitted). As with vindictiveness in
sentencing, the State can rebut the presumption of prosecutorial vindictiveness by
advancing “a legitimate nonvindictive justification for the greater charge.”
Wasman , 468 U.S. at 566.
At the sentencing hearing on the habitual criminal enhancement, the State
submitted evidence that it had offered petitioner a plea bargain before his first
trial in which the State agreed to dismiss certain counts and to forego filing
habitual criminal charges in return for petitioner’s guilty plea to other counts.
Petitioner rejected this offer and was later convicted. In explaining why she had
not initially asked for the habitual criminal enhancement, the prosecutor testified
-4-
that the trial judge in the first case had indicated to her that he would not sentence
petitioner for a longer term than that received by his co-defendant. This evidence
was undisputed. Because petitioner and his co-defendant had roughly equal
sentences, even without the habitual offender enhancement, the prosecutor did not
ask for the enhancement after the first trial. The judge in the second trial,
however, had no such qualms about equality of sentences and did not limit the
prosecutor in requesting the habitual enhancement. We have held that refusal by
the government to reinstate a previously rejected plea offer prior to a second trial
does not raise a presumption of vindictiveness. See United States v. Carter , 130
F.3d 1432, 1442-43 (10th Cir. 1997), cert. denied , 118 S. Ct. 1856 (1998). As in
Carter , the granting of the new trial here had nothing to do with the plea
negotiations. Additionally, because the second trial judge had a different
sentencing philosophy than the first judge, the prosecutor was able to ask for the
habitual criminal enhancement she would have requested the first time. There
was no evidence that the prosecutor would not have pressed for the habitual
enhancement after the second trial “but for hostility or punitive animus toward the
defendant because he exercised his specific legal right” to appeal his first
conviction. See Raymer , 941 F.2d at 1042 (quotation omitted). We thus conclude
that, under the circumstances of this case, no presumption of prosecutorial
vindictiveness should attach.
-5-
Petitioner can still prevail without the presumption if he can show actual
vindictiveness. To the extent petitioner argues such, we agree with the State that
the prosecutor’s opinions and/or feelings toward petitioner, as established in the
felony enhancement hearing held by the State court, do not constitute
“vindictiveness” as that term is used in a constitutional sense. “[T]he mere
presence of a punitive motivation behind prosecutorial action does not render
such action unconstitutional.” Carter , 130 F.3d at 1443. The hostility or punitive
animus necessary to establish vindictiveness must arise from the defendant’s
exercise of his constitutional rights. See id. As mentioned above, there was no
evidence that the prosecutor pressed for the habitual enhancement in an effort to
retaliate against petitioner for his successful appeal. Her anger and fear of
defendant was predicated on perceived threats by him and information received
from third parties, not on petitioner’s exercise of his constitutional rights.
Petitioner’s second issue is his contention that he should have received an
evidentiary hearing in the district court. Petitioner, however, did not move for an
evidentiary hearing until after the magistrate judge had issued his proposed
findings and recommended disposition. 1
Thus, his motion was untimely. Further,
1
The district court had originally scheduled an evidentiary hearing because
the State had been unable to locate the relevant sentencing transcripts. See R.
Vol. I at tab 30. After the State located those transcripts, however, respondent
filed an unopposed motion to vacate the evidentiary hearing. See id. at tab 34. In
(continued...)
-6-
because the issues in this case can all be determined by reference to the state
court transcript, there is no factual dispute about any material issue which would
justify a federal evidentiary hearing. See Dever v. Kansas State Penitentiary , 36
F.3d 1531, 1535 (10th Cir. 1994).
The judgment of the United States District Court for the District of New
Mexico is AFFIRMED.
Entered for the Court
David M. Ebel
Circuit Judge
1
(...continued)
a letter to the court, petitioner’s attorney agreed that, at that time, an evidentiary
hearing did not appear necessary. See id. at tab 42 attachment “A”. The letter
further stated, however, that “Mr. Duncan would like to reserve the right to
request that the court reconsider his motion for an evidentiary hearing should the
state raise any arguments in their response to Mr. Duncan’s Brief-in-Chief that
pertain to matters not contained in the transcripts.” Id.The state then filed its motion to dismiss and supporting brief. It was at
this time that petitioner should have renewed his motion for an evidentiary
hearing. Petitioner’s brief in response, however, makes no mention of the need
for an evidentiary hearing and no renewed motion was filed. By waiting until
after the magistrate judge had entered his proposed findings and recommended
disposition, petitioner waived his right to an evidentiary hearing.
-7-