Powell v. Embry ( 1999 )


Menu:
  •                                                                           F I L E D
    United States Court of Appeals
    Tenth Circuit
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    DEC 15 1999
    TENTH CIRCUIT
    PATRICK FISHER
    Clerk
    CONNIE RAYMOND POWELL,
    Petitioner - Appellant,                     No. 99-1175
    v.                                                (D.C. No. 97-WM-356)
    LARRY EMBRY and ATTORNEY                                 (D. Colo.)
    GENERAL OF THE STATE OF
    COLORADO,
    Respondents - Appellees.
    ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
    Before TACHA, McKAY, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.
    After examining Petitioner’s brief and the appellate record, this panel has
    determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the
    determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G).
    The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
    This is a pro se appeal from the district court’s dismissal of Petitioner
    Connie Raymond Powell’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed pursuant to
    *
    This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
    doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
    generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
    and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
    
    28 U.S.C. § 2254
    . Petitioner was convicted in Colorado state court of first degree
    sexual assault and was sentenced to 34 years’ imprisonment. On direct appeal,
    his conviction was reversed and he was granted a new trial for a potential due
    process violation. Petitioner subsequently was convicted a second time. His
    second conviction was affirmed on appeal and the Colorado Supreme Court
    denied certiorari.
    In his habeas corpus petition, Petitioner alleged three claims: (1) a denial
    of the right to a speedy trial under Colorado statutes; (2) a violation of his Fifth
    Amendment protection from self-incrimination because the prosecutor used his
    testimony from the first trial during the second trial; and (3) the failure of the
    state trial court to offer a Curtis advisement concerning his right to testify.
    The magistrate judge recommended that the petition be dismissed for
    procedural default because Petitioner had not claimed in state court that his
    federal constitutional rights were violated and he did not establish cause for the
    default nor did he establish that failure to consider his claims would result in a
    fundamental miscarriage of justice. See R., Doc. 18 at 3-5. After consideration
    of Petitioner’s objections, the district court adopted the magistrate judge’s
    recommendation for dismissal on the basis of procedural default as to all of
    Petitioner’s claims except the Fifth Amendment claim. Noting that it was not
    deciding the procedural bar issue, the district court addressed the merits of this
    -2-
    claim. The district court denied the § 2254 habeas corpus petition on the Fifth
    Amendment argument, explaining that “[i]t is well established that the
    introduction of a defendant’s testimony at a former trial is admissible against him
    in later proceedings.” Id., Doc. 27 at 5 (citing Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(A) and
    Harrison v. United States, 
    392 U.S. 219
    , 222 (1968)). The court also summarily
    rejected a belated claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. After dismissing the
    habeas petition with prejudice, the district court denied Petitioner a certificate of
    appealability and denied his motion for leave to proceed on appeal in forma
    pauperis.
    On appeal, Petitioner renews his motion for leave to proceed on appeal in
    forma pauperis with this court and requests a certificate of appealability. He
    argues that (1) the speedy trial claim was presented to the state court as a
    deprivation of his federal constitutional rights; (2) the district court should have
    considered Petitioner’s claim of actual innocence and the state court record; and,
    (3) based on the first two claims, the district court erred in refusing to grant a
    certificate of appealability.
    After reviewing Petitioner’s brief, the record on appeal which included a
    record of certain state court proceedings, the report and recommendation of the
    magistrate judge, and the district court’s Order filed March 29, 1999, we conclude
    that the district court’s dismissal of habeas relief was correct for the reasons
    -3-
    stated in its order. Petitioner fails to meet either the cause and prejudice or
    fundamental miscarriage of justice standards, or any other exception required to
    overcome his state procedural default, see Anderson v. Harless, 
    459 U.S. 4
    , 6-7
    (1982); Miranda v. Cooper, 
    962 F.2d 392
    , 397 (10th Cir. 1992), and his Fifth
    Amendment complaint is plainly without merit. For these reasons, Petitioner has
    not made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right as required
    by 
    28 U.S.C. § 2253
    (c)(2). We GRANT leave to proceed on appeal in forma
    pauperis, and we DENY the application for a certificate of appealability.
    It is ordered that the appeal is DISMISSED.
    Entered for the Court
    Monroe G. McKay
    Circuit Judge
    -4-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 99-1175

Filed Date: 12/15/1999

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 4/17/2021