United States v. Ledford ( 1999 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
DEC 21 1999
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. No. 98-6444
(D.C. No. 96-CV-987-C)
ERNEST A. LEDFORD, JR. and (W.D. Okla.)
RUBY LEE LEDFORD,
Defendants-Appellants,
and
80 ACRES OF LAND SITUATED IN
COTTON COUNTY, STATE OF
OKLAHOMA, more or less, situated
in Cotton County, State of Oklahoma;
STATE OF OKLAHOMA, ex rel.
Oklahoma Tax Commission,
Defendants.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before BALDOCK , PORFILIO , and BRORBY , Circuit Judges.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument.
This is an action brought by the United States pursuant to 40 U.S.C. § 258a
to condemn land located in Oklahoma that was owned by Ernest and Ruby Lee
Ledford. The only issue presented on appeal is what is the correct date of the
government’s taking of the property. The Ledfords challenge the district court’s
determination that the date of taking was the date specified in the government’s
declaration of taking, contending instead that the date should be several years
earlier when the government’s lake construction project caused stored water to
interfere with use of their property. The government argues that the correct date
of taking for purposes of this action is whatever date it specified in its
declaration, and that the Ledfords’ claim that the taking occurred earlier is
effectively a counterclaim over which the district court did not have jurisdiction.
Determination of the manner of deciding the date of taking is a question of
law subject to de novo review. See Dang v. UNUM Life Ins. Co. , 175 F.3d 1186,
1189 (10th Cir. 1999); United States v. Eltzroth , 124 F.3d 632, 635 (4th Cir.
1997). Concluding that the government’s claim of complete control over
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establishing the date of taking is untenable, we vacate the district court’s
judgment and remand the case for further proceedings.
I
In 1971, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers began construction of Waurika
Lake on a tributary of the Red River northwest of Waurika, Oklahoma. Water
impoundment began in 1977, and the project was largely completed by the early
1980s. The Ledfords’ property lies about eighteen miles south of the Waurika
Dam, and they have claimed since at least 1976 that the project has caused
flooding to their property. The government countered that its project did not
cause the Ledfords’ problems. In 1976, the Ledfords filed a claim for damages
against the government pursuant to the Federal Tort Claims Act, but the district
court dismissed that claim on immunity grounds. See Ledford v. United States ,
429 F. Supp. 204, 205 (W.D. Okla. 1977). They subsequently made a number of
complaints to public officials, including two Presidents and three senators, that
eventually were successful, as in 1994 the Corps was ordered to purchase the
property.
In June 1996, the government filed its complaint pursuant to 40 U.S.C.
§ 258a for the taking of the Ledfords’ property. 1
At the same time, it deposited
1
Section 258a, which codified Section 1 of the Declaration of Taking Act,
provides as follows:
(continued...)
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$197,107.06 with the district court as the estimated compensation (including
interest) due the Ledfords. The declaration of taking stated that the date of taking
was July 1, 1983. A Corps official later admitted that the choice of that date was
arbitrary, but that they were trying to pick a date when property values were high,
since values had subsequently decreased. In their answer, the Ledfords denied the
date of taking stated by the government and contended that the taking occurred
sometime earlier. In August 1996, the court allowed the Ledfords to withdraw the
funds deposited with the court.
In January 1997, the district court appointed a three-member commission
and referred the question of just compensation to the commission, granting it the
powers set forth in Fed. R. Civ. P. 71A(h) and 53(c), (d)(1), (2). The commission
held a hearing at which the Ledfords presented evidence regarding the date of
1
(...continued)
Upon the filing said declaration of taking and of the deposit in
the court, to the use of the persons entitled thereto, of the amount of
the estimated compensation stated in said declaration, title to the said
lands in fee simple absolute, or such less estate or interest therein as
is specified in said declaration, shall vest in the United States of
America, and said lands shall be deemed to be condemned and taken
for the use of the United States, and the right to just compensation
for the same shall vest in the persons entitled thereto; and said
compensation shall be ascertained and awarded in said proceeding
and established by judgment therein, and the said judgment shall
include, as part of the just compensation awarded, interest . . . on the
amount finally awarded as the value of the property as of the date of
taking, from said date to the date of payment . . . .
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taking and both parties presented evidence of the property’s value. In June 1998,
the commission issued its report stating that the surface value of the property was
$85,440 on the date of taking of July 1, 1983. The report stated that the date of
taking was based on instructions from the court. The Ledfords filed objections to
the report which included an objection to the date of taking. They contended that
an engineer who testified at the hearing indicated that, based on flooding and
other damage, the actual date of taking was July 1978. Following the
government’s response, the district court adopted the commission’s report in full,
stating that the date of taking was July 1, 1983, though without identifying any
reasons why it chose this date. In its judgment of just compensation, the court
found that considering the valuation determined by the commission and the
stipulated value of mineral interests, the government owed the Ledfords an
additional $3,340 plus interest of $13,332.91 from the date of taking.
The Ledfords appeal from this judgment. They challenge only the
determination of the date of taking, but that determination obviously affects the
ultimate valuation of the property. Relying on United States v. Dow , 357 U.S. 17(1958), they contend that the date of taking is not the date arbitrarily chosen by
the government in its declaration of taking, but rather the date the government
actually took their property by adversely interfering with it, which they contend
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occurred on December 4 and 5, 1978. 2
In response, the government contends
essentially that it has discretion in choosing the date of taking in an action
pursuant to § 258a and that the Ledfords cannot challenge its exercise of that
discretion in this proceeding. It further contends that the Ledfords’ claim of an
earlier date of taking is effectively a counterclaim under the Tucker Act against
the government, and that since the amount of the counterclaim exceeds $10,000, 3
only the Court of Federal Claims and not the district court had jurisdiction to hear
it. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(a)(2), 1491. In support of its position, the government
cites, inter alia, United States v. 101.88 Acres of Land , 616 F.2d 762, 772
(5th Cir. 1980), and United States v. 3,317.39 Acres of Land , 443 F.2d 104,
105-06 (8th Cir. 1971).
2
It is unclear why this date differs from that contained in the Ledfords’
objections to the commission’s report.
3
It is not apparent from the record or the parties’ briefs what the amount of
the Ledfords’ additional claim is or how the government determined that it
exceeded $10,000.
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II
Before addressing the merits of the parties’ arguments, we need to address
the government’s contention that the Ledfords waived the date-of-taking issue in
either of two ways. It first argues that the Ledfords waived this claim by
withdrawing the estimated just compensation. It cites no authority supporting this
argument, and to the extent we consider it at all, see Phillips v. Calhoun , 956 F.2d
949, 953 (10th Cir. 1992), we find it inconsistent with the plain language of
§ 258a. This section allows the original property owner to withdraw the money
deposited in the court, with the court’s permission, and provides that if the final
determination of the amount of compensation exceeds the estimate withdrawn,
“the court shall enter judgment against the United States for the amount of the
deficiency.” Section 258a; see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 71A(j). Nothing indicates
that by withdrawing the estimated compensation, a party waives any right to
contest the determination of the final amount of compensation.
The government also argues that the Ledfords waived the date-of-taking
issue by failing to object to the district court’s instructions to the commission.
The government fails to identify, however, what exactly the Ledfords were
supposed to object to. The instructions to which it refers are form instructions
that do not direct the commission to use any particular date of taking. The only
references to the date of taking in the instructions tell the commission to use that
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date to determine the property’s fair market value and to identify the date in its
report. Though we have no reason to doubt that the court did instruct the
commission to use the July 1, 1983 date, 4
nothing in the record shows when or
how it gave this instruction. Thus, from what we can tell from the record, the
date of taking was an unresolved issue at the time of the hearing, and it seems
perfectly reasonable for the Ledfords to have presented evidence on this issue,
which they did. It also seems reasonable, and in fact, probably necessary, for
them to have included this issue in their objections to the commission’s report. 5
On the record before us, there is no basis for concluding that they waived this
issue.
III
Turning to the merits of the appeal, we agree with the Ledfords that the
Supreme Court’s decision in Dow controls the determination of the date of taking.
4
The commission’s report, in which the commission appears to be
responding to various predetermined requests for information regarding its effort,
stated: “Set forth separately the important material issues that were contested by
the parties which you had to resolve,” and the response was “1. Date of Taking.
2. Amount of compensation due to owners of [the property].” Appellants’ App.,
Ex. 5 at 5. In responding to a question regarding how it resolved these issues, the
report stated: “Date of taking, instructions from the Court that July 1, 1983 was
date of taking.” Id. at 7.
5
As will be evident below, it obviously would have been much preferable for
the Ledfords to have referred the district court to the Dow case in their objections,
but their objection included the substance of their challenge to the date of taking
and preserved the issue for appeal.
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Dow was a condemnation proceeding brought by the government under § 258a in
the Southern District of Texas. The issue in that case was the determination of
the date of taking where the government entered into possession of the property
(a pipeline easement) in 1943, 6
but did not file a declaration of taking until 1946.
The question arose because ownership of the property changed hands in between
the two dates, and Dow, the owner at the time the government filed its declaration
of taking, claimed he was entitled to the compensation for the taking.
In rejecting Dow’s claim, the Court first noted that there were two ways
in which the government may take property pursuant to its power of eminent
domain: through physical possession or seizure of the property, in which case
“the property owner is provided a remedy under the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1346(a)(2) and 1491, to recover just compensation;” and condemnation
under various statutes. See Dow , 357 U.S. at 21. The Court explained that
[a]lthough in both classes of “taking” cases--condemnation and
physical seizure--title to the property passes to the Government only
when the owner receives compensation, or when the compensation is
deposited into court pursuant to the Taking Act, the passage of title
does not necessarily determine the date of “taking.” The usual rule is
6
The government initially instituted a condemnation action in 1943 under
various statutes and obtained a court order allowing it immediate possession,
which was followed shortly by physical entry and possession. The fact that the
government entered into possession based on a court order does not appear to be
relevant to the Court’s decision, see Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. United States ,
568 F.2d 1316, 1320 (Ct. Cl. 1978), and the government in this appeal attempt to
distinguish Dow on this basis.
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that if the United States has entered into possession of the property
prior to the acquisition of title, it is the former event which
constitutes the act of taking. It is that event which gives rise to the
claim for compensation and fixes the date as of which the land is to
be valued and the Government’s obligation to pay interest
accrues. . . .
Id. at 21-22 (citations omitted). The Court then held that when the government
has filed a declaration of taking after entering into possession of the property,
“a number of considerations have led us to the view that in such cases the date
of ‘taking’ is the date on which the Government entered and appropriated the
property to public use.” Id. at 23. The primary consideration was concern over
how the property would be valued if the date were otherwise:
As already noted, in cases where there has been an entry into
possession before the filing of a declaration of taking, such entry has
been considered the time of “taking” for purposes of valuing the
property and fixing the date on which the Government’s obligation to
pay interest begins to run. To rule that the date of “taking” is the
time of filing would confront us with a Hobson’s choice. On the one
hand, it would certainly be bizarre to hold that there were two
different “takings” of the same property, with some incidents of the
taking determined as of one date and some as of the other. On the
other hand, to rule that for all purposes the time of taking is the time
of filing would open the door to anomalous results. For example, if
the value of the property changed between the time the Government
took possession and the time of filing, payment as of the latter date
would not be an accurate reflection of the value of what the property
owner gave up and the Government acquired. . . .
There is another reason why we cannot regard the time of
filing as the time of the “taking” in cases where the Government has
already entered into possession. Because of the uncertainty when, if
ever, a declaration would be filed after the Government’s entry,
manipulations might be encouraged which could operate to the
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disadvantage of either the landowner or the United States. The
Government tells us that the declaration of taking procedure may be
invoked “solely in the discretion of the administrative officer.” It
would thus lie within the power of such an officer to reduce the
“just” compensation due the property owner by staying his hand until
a market situation favorable to the Government had developed.
Conversely, landowners might be in a position to increase unduly
the Government’s liability. . . .
Id. at 24-25. Thus, under Dow , the date of taking is the earlier of the date the
government entered into possession of the property or the date of the declaration
of taking. See Eltzroth , 124 F.3d at 636, 638 (following Dow in holding that date
of valuation of taking is date government entered and appropriated property for
its use, not date of declaration).
The government tries to distinguish Dow on the basis that it did not
expressly address the jurisdictional argument it raises here. That is a true but
insignificant distinction. The Court was well aware of the provisions of the
Tucker Act providing compensation to aggrieved property owners, see 357 U.S.
at 21, yet it clearly contemplated that any questions regarding the date of taking
for compensation purposes be resolved in one proceeding, see id. at 24, and gave
no indication that a district court would not be the proper tribunal for that
proceeding. Indeed, the Court described what the government wants here--two
different dates of taking for the same property--as “bizarre.” See id. at 24;
cf. Gaylor v. United States , 74 F.3d 214, 217 (10th Cir. 1996) (“[T]his court
considers itself bound by Supreme Court dicta almost as firmly as by the Court’s
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outright holdings, particularly when the dicta is recent and not enfeebled by later
statements.”).
Moreover, the Federal Circuit, which has appellate jurisdiction over the
court whom the government maintains has exclusive jurisdiction for the Ledfords’
“counterclaim,” specifically rejected the government’s theory that district courts
lack jurisdiction in such situations. See Georgia-Pacific , 568 F.2d at 1321-22. 7
In that case, Georgia-Pacific filed a claim for inverse condemnation in the claims
court alleging a taking in 1974-75. The government subsequently filed a
condemnation action and declaration of taking in the Southern District of West
Virginia. The claims court first noted that “[t]he theory of Dow , with its
insistence on the date of actual taking as the valuation date and the date from
which interest begins to run, seems to us to empower the condemnation court
[the Southern District of West Virginia], in a case like this, to find that the actual
taking . . . preceded the declaration of taking.” Id. at 1320. The claims court
further noted that only the district court would have jurisdiction over all phases
of the litigation, i.e., the government’s condemnation claim and the landowner’s
inverse condemnation claim, because the claims court did not have jurisdiction
over the condemnation claim. It then rejected the idea that the landowner was
7
The Federal Circuit is the successor to the appellate jurisdiction of the
Court of Claims and has appellate jurisdiction over the Court of Federal Claims.
See United States v. Kasler Elec. Co. , 123 F.3d 341, 342 n.2 (6th Cir. 1997).
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asserting a “forbidden counterclaim” and that the Tucker Act was somehow
implicated. See id. at 1321-22. “The condemnation action puts in issue the date
of taking if Georgia-Pacific so wills it; if Georgia-Pacific tells the condemnation
court, as we think it should, that in the company’s view the taking occurred
before [the declaration of taking], that court can (in our view) decide the question
and determine compensation accordingly--all in its capacity as the condemnation
court.” Id. at 1322. See also In re Stephenson , No. 441, 1995 WL 529610, at **4
(Fed. Cir. Aug. 30, 1995) (noting that Georgia-Pacific is still binding precedent
on that court) (unpublished). 8
IV
We therefore conclude that the district court should have considered the
Ledfords’ argument that the date of taking preceded July 1, 1983, the date stated
in the government’s declaration of taking. We do not mean to imply that the date
of taking is necessarily in December 1978 as the Ledfords claim. According to
the government, Mr. Ledford admitted that he continued to farm at least a portion
8
We note that except for one district court case, the cases the government
cites to support its position involve disputes not over when the property was
taken, but over what property was taken. See 101.88 Acres of Land , 616 F.2d
at 768; 3,317.39 Acres of Land , 443 F.2d at 105-06; Oyster Shell Prods. Corp. v.
United States , 197 F.2d 1022, 1023 (5th Cir. 1952). Although United States v.
255.21 Acres in Anne Arundel County , 722 F. Supp. 235, 239-40 (D. Md. 1989),
appears to be to the contrary, it did not discuss Dow , and we find it unpersuasive.
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of the property after that date. Thus, the correct date of taking is disputed and
will have to be resolved on remand.
The judgment of the district court is VACATED, and the case is remanded
for proceedings consistent with this order and judgment.
Entered for the Court
Wade Brorby
Circuit Judge
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