Hopkins v. O'Melveny & Myers ( 1999 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
DEC 22 1999
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
In re:
RICHARD RAMSEY HOPKINS and
CHERILYN BAKER HOPKINS,
No. 99-1080
Debtors. (D.C. No. 97-K-888)
(D. Colo.)
O’MELVENY & MYERS;
GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER,
LLP,
Plaintiffs-Appellees,
v.
RICHARD RAMSEY HOPKINS,
Defendant-Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before BALDOCK , PORFILIO , and BRORBY , Circuit Judges.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
Defendant, an attorney appearing pro se , appeals the district court’s
affirmance of the bankruptcy court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of
plaintiffs. The bankruptcy court granted plaintiffs’ motions for summary
judgment in two adversary proceedings arising from two complaints filed by
plaintiffs for determination of dischargeability of debts in defendant’s bankruptcy
proceeding. In granting the motions, the bankruptcy court found that three
sanctions entered by a California court against defendant were not dischargeable
debts under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6). Defendant appealed both summary judgments.
The district court consolidated the appeals and agreed with the bankruptcy court
that the debts were not dischargeable. Because this appeal involves only legal
issues, our review is de novo. See Phillips v. White (In re White) , 25 F.3d 931,
933 (10th Cir. 1994). We affirm.
Before defendant filed for relief under the Bankruptcy Code, a California
court entered sanctions against defendant, finding that he had violated California
law by engaging in bad faith litigation tactics in representing a client who was
ultimately found to be a vexatious litigant. When defendant sought to have the
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sanction debts discharged in bankruptcy, the bankruptcy court held that the
sanctions were nondischargeable under § 523(a)(6) because the sanctions were the
result of willful and malicious injury by defendant. The bankruptcy and district
courts found that defendant was collaterally estopped from denying
nondischargeability of the debt because the California court findings, establishing
that defendant engaged in sanctionable bad faith conduct, were equivalent to
findings that defendant wilfully and maliciously injured plaintiffs within the
meaning of § 523(a)(6).
In its decision, the district court carefully considered the California court
sanction orders, California law on bad faith, and federal law relating to willful
and malicious conduct under § 523(a)(6). The court correctly found that the
sanction orders contained particular and specific findings establishing willful and
malicious conduct under § 523(a)(6). We agree with the district court that there
may be cases in which a finding of bad faith litigation tactics under California
law would not be the equivalent of finding willful and malicious conduct for
purposes of § 523(a)(6), but in this particular case the findings in the two
sanction orders are such that defendant is collaterally estopped from arguing that
he did not willfully and maliciously injure the plaintiffs. The district court’s
memorandum decision is thorough and well-reasoned, and any legal analysis we
could offer would be redundant. Therefore, we affirm the district court judgment
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for substantially the reasons stated in its memorandum decision of January 28,
1999.
Defendant raises one issue on appeal not addressed by the district court in
its decision. He argues that the bankruptcy court erred in denying his motion to
dismiss plaintiffs’ complaint to determine the dischargeability of two of the three
sanction awards. Defendant maintains that the complaint should have been
dismissed as untimely. Plaintiffs’ original complaint in Adversary Proceeding
No. 96-1554 sought only determination of the dischargeability of one sanction.
Plaintiffs moved to amend their complaint to include a request for determination
of dischargeability of two later sanctions, and the bankruptcy court originally
allowed amendment. Upon reconsideration, however, the bankruptcy court
denied the amendment and ruled that the adversary proceeding would include
determination of only the one sanction award included in the original complaint
for determination of dischargeability.
After the bankruptcy court denied amendment, defendant voluntarily
converted his Chapter 7 bankruptcy to a Chapter 11 proceeding. The Notice Of
Commencement of the Chapter 11 case set a new deadline for creditors to file
a complaint to determine the dischargeability of debts. Plaintiffs filed their
complaint for determination of the dischargeability of the remaining two sanctions
in the new Chapter 11 proceeding well before the deadline. The conversion to
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Chapter 11 constituted an order for relief, which required a new meeting of
creditors, which, in turn, triggered a new sixty-day period in which creditors
could file a complaint to determine dischargeability of a debt. See 11 U.S.C. §§
348(a); 341(a); Bankr. R. 4007(c) F & M Marquette Nat’l Bank v. Richards , 780
F.2d 24, 25 (8th Cir. 1985) (holding that “[t]he time fixed for filing a complaint
to determine dischargeability of a debt is keyed to the first date set for the
meeting of creditors,” and that, because creditor’s meeting held in previous
proceeding is unrelated to creditor’s meeting required upon conversion, the
creditor’s meeting set in the new proceeding is “the first date set for the meeting
of creditors”); In re Stanton , 136 B.R. 562, 564-65 (D. Kan. 1992) (applying
reasoning in F & M Marquette to case involving conversion from Chapter 7 to
Chapter 13). The bankruptcy court was correct to deny the motion to dismiss the
second complaint to determine dischargeability as untimely.
Defendant’s request to proceed without prepayment of costs or fees and the
motion to supplement the record are GRANTED. The judgment of the United
States District Court for the District of Colorado is AFFIRMED for substantially
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the same reasons stated in its order dated January 28, 1999. The mandate shall
issue forthwith.
Entered for the Court
Wade Brorby
Circuit Judge
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