United States v. Silva-Solorzano ( 2000 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
JAN 11 2000
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. No. 99-4078
(D.C. No. 99-CR-32)
LEOBARDO SILVA-SOLORZANO, (D. Utah)
a/k/a Sergio Escolontez-Silva,
Defendant-Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before TACHA, McKAY, and PORFILIO, Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
Leobardo Silva-Solorzano (Silva), a Mexican national, appeals the sentence
imposed upon his pleading guilty to illegally entering the United States after
deportation, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326. Finding no error, we affirm the
sentence.
Silva, whose extensive criminal history includes an April 10, 1995
conviction for possession of a controlled substance, had been deported to Mexico
on at least four occasions, with the latest occurring on June 9, 1997. On
January 27, 1999, the government charged Silva with unlawful reentry of a
deported alien and, pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b)(2), filed a Notice of
Sentencing Enhancement due to conviction of at least one prior aggravated
felony. 1 Upon Silva’s entry of a guilty plea, the district court sentenced him to
1
Section 1326 provides, in pertinent part,
(a) In general
Subject to subsection (b) of this section, any alien who--
(1) has been denied admission, excluded, deported, or removed or
has departed the United States while an order of exclusion,
deportation, or removal is outstanding, and thereafter
(2) enters, attempts to enter, or is at any time found in, the United
States, . . .
shall be fined under Title 18, or imprisoned not more than 2 years, or
both.
(continued...)
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seventy months in prison followed by thirty-six months of supervised release.
The imposed term of imprisonment is at the low end of the applicable guideline
range, calculated with a sixteen-level enhancement based on a prior conviction for
an aggravated felony. See U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A). 2
On appeal, Silva’s appointed attorney submitted a brief pursuant to Anders
v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), and moved for leave to withdraw from the
case. Silva filed a pro se response to counsel’s brief. These two filings, taken
1
(...continued)
(b) Criminal penalties for reentry of certain removed aliens
Notwithstanding subsection (a) of this section, in the case of any
alien described in such subsection--
...
(2) whose removal was subsequent to a conviction for commission
of an aggravated felony, such alien shall be fined under such Title,
imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both. . . .
A felony conviction for possession of a controlled substance is an
aggravated felony within the meaning of § 1326(b)(2). See United States v.
Valenzuela-Escalante , 130 F.3d 944, 946 (10th Cir. 1997).
2
U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A) provides:
(b) Specific Offense Characteristic
(1) If the defendant previously was deported after a criminal
conviction, or if the defendant unlawfully remained in the United
States following a removal order issued after a criminal conviction,
increase as follows (if more than one applies, use the greater):
(A) If the conviction was for an aggravated felony, increase by 16
levels.
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together, make three arguments: (1) § 1326 and U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A) are
unconstitutional; (2) a downward departure for family circumstances was
warranted; and (3) appointed counsel failed to advise Silva of the availability of
downward departure and neglected to contest the prior offenses used to calculate
his criminal history points.
Silva’s argument against § 1326 and U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A) invokes a
blend of constitutional provisions. He asserts that the statute and guideline
violate his right to equal protection, subject him to double jeopardy, and deny him
the right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. We review constitutional
challenges to immigration provisions de novo. See Jurado-Gutierrez v. Greene,
190 F.3d 1135, 1152 (10th Cir. 1999). We must keep in mind, however, “the
limited scope of judicial inquiry into immigration legislation.” Fiallo v. Bell, 430
U.S. 787, 792 (1977). “[I]n the exercise of its broad power over immigration and
naturalization, Congress regularly makes rules that would be unacceptable if
applied to citizens.” Id. (quotation and footnote omitted).
In essence, Silva’s equal protection argument is that enhancing the sentence
of re-entering aliens with prior felony convictions makes an irrational distinction
between these aliens and citizens with prior felony convictions. We disagree.
The policy of deterring aliens who have been convicted of a felony from re-
entering the United States justifies distinguishing between the two groups of
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criminal defendants. See United States v. Adeleke, 968 F.2d 1159, 1160-61 (11th
Cir. 1992). Because there is “a rational basis for differentiation,” Jurado-
Gutierrez, 190 F.3d at 1152, § 1326 does not violate Silva’s equal protection
rights. Moreover, the accompanying guideline, U.S.S.G. 2L1.2(b)(1)(A), “treat[s]
all persons with aggravated felonies who commit this crime equally.” United
States v. Cardenas-Alvarez, 987 F.2d 1129, 1134 (5th Cir. 1993). Thus, the
guideline is not susceptible to an equal protection challenge.
The double jeopardy strand of Silva’s argument is similarly flawed. The
Double Jeopardy Clause “protects a criminal defendant from multiple
prosecutions and from multiple punishments for the same conduct.” United States
v. Overstreet, 40 F.3d 1090, 1093 (10th Cir. 1994) (citing United States v. Dixon,
509 U.S. 688, 695-96 (1993)). Generally, a statute does not violate double
jeopardy if it provides for enhanced punishment for a new crime, even though the
enhancement is premised on a defendant’s criminal history. See Witte v. United
States, 515 U.S. 389, 400 (1995); United States v. Hawley, 93 F.3d 682, 688 (10th
Cir. 1996). Here, § 1326 provides for sentence enhancement for the offense of
illegal re-entry into the United States, not punishment for a prior conviction. See
United States v. Valdez, 103 F.3d 95, 97 (10th Cir. 1996). Accordingly, Silva’s §
1326 conviction does not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause.
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The remaining constitutional argument, based on the Eighth Amendment
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment, also fails. “If the imposed
sentence is within the statutory limits . . . , an appellate court ‘generally will not
regard it as cruel and unusual punishment.’” United States v. Youngpeter, 986
F.2d 349, 355 (10th Cir. 1993) (quoting United States v. Hughes, 901 F.2d 830,
832 (10th Cir. 1990); see also Cardenas-Alvarez, 987 F.2d at 1134 (100-month
sentence for violation of § 1326(b) did not violate Eighth Amendment).
Silva’s second main argument is that he should have received a downward
departure from the guidelines for family responsibilities because his elderly
mother is in Mexico with health problems. Although “we retain the ability to
review a refusal to depart when the denial is based on an illegal factor, or an
incorrect application of the Guidelines,” we normally “lack jurisdiction to review
a sentencing court’s discretionary denial of a downward departure.” United
States v. Guidry, No. 98-3287, 1999 WL 1244487, at *10 (10th Cir. Dec. 21,
1999). Here, there is no contention that the district court based its sentencing
decision on an illegal factor, or an incorrect application of the guidelines.
Therefore, we have no jurisdiction to review the denial of Silva’s requested
downward departure.
Finally, Silva asserts that he received ineffective assistance of counsel,
claiming that his defense attorney did not inform him of his right to move for a
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downward departure and did not conduct an proper investigation of the
convictions which entered into the calculation of his criminal history points. Our
usual rule is that “[i]neffective assistance of counsel claims should be brought in
collateral proceedings, not on direct appeal.” United States v. Galloway, 56 F.3d
1239, 1240 (10th Cir. 1995) (en banc). “A factual record must be developed in
and addressed by the district court in the first instance for effective review.” Id.Although we recognized that in rare instances the merits of an ineffectiveness
claim may be reviewed on direct appeal because the claim needs no further
development, id., that rare exception is clearly not applicable here. In fact, the
record before us reflects that trial counsel was effective in obtaining an agreement
from the government to recommend a sentence at the low end of the guideline
range. We also note that the transcript of the sentencing hearing belies Silva’s
contention that he was not informed of his right to move for a downward
departure based on family circumstances. See R., Vol. II at 4-5 (counsel’s request
for a downward departure), 9 (the court’s denial of the request). To the extent
Silva wishes to raise counsel ineffectiveness issues not apparent on this record, he
must do so collaterally.
Accordingly, we AFFIRM defendant’s sentence. We grant counsel’s
motion to withdraw.
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Entered for the Court
John C. Porfilio
Senior Circuit Judge
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