Headley v. Galetka ( 2000 )


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  •                                                                           F I L E D
    United States Court of Appeals
    Tenth Circuit
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FEB 14 2000
    FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
    PATRICK FISHER
    Clerk
    THOMAS CAMPBELL HEADLEY,
    Petitioner-Appellant,
    v.                                                   No. 99-4061
    (D.C. No. 96-CV-277)
    HANK GALETKA, Warden; STATE                            (D. Utah)
    OF UTAH,
    Respondents-Appellees.
    ORDER AND JUDGMENT            *
    Before TACHA , ANDERSON , and LUCERO , Circuit Judges.
    After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
    unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
    this appeal.   See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
    therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
    *
    This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
    doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
    generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
    and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
    Petitioner Thomas C. Headley, a prisoner of the State of Utah appearing
    pro se, appeals from the dismissal of his petition for habeas relief filed under
    
    28 U.S.C. § 2254
    . He has filed a motion for a certificate of appealability, which
    we construe as a motion for a certificate of probable cause,    1
    and a motion for
    leave to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal.     2
    We have jurisdiction under
    
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
    .
    Petitioner was charged in 1991 with several sex offenses against children.
    He pled guilty to one count of sexual abuse of a child, a second degree felony, in
    exchange for the State’s agreement to drop other, more serious, charged offenses
    and not bring any further charges. After petitioner completed a ninety-day
    diagnostic evaluation, the trial court sentenced him to one to fifteen years’
    imprisonment and ordered him to pay the costs of extradition and the victim’s
    therapy.
    1
    Because petitioner filed his habeas petition on April 15, 1996, before the
    April 24, 1996 enactment of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of
    1996, the certificate of appealability provisions of that act do not apply.       See
    Lindh v. Murphy , 
    521 U.S. 320
    , 336 (1997). Instead, we construe petitioner’s
    motion as an application for a certificate of probable cause.         Cf. United States v.
    Kunzman , 
    125 F.3d 1363
    , 1364 n.2 (10th Cir. 1997).
    2
    A habeas corpus action under § 2254 is not a civil action as contemplated
    by the Prison Litigation Reform Act, and petitioner is not required to submit a
    certified statement of his trust account. See United States v. Simmonds , 
    111 F.3d 737
    , 741, 744 (10th Cir. 1997).
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    After petitioner’s sentencing in 1992, petitioner’s appointed counsel sought
    and obtained permission to withdraw from representation on the basis that
    petitioner wished to assert a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel on appeal.
    Another attorney was appointed to represent petitioner, who perfected petitioner’s
    direct appeal. Counsel identified two issues in the amended docketing statement
    for petitioner’s direct appeal: (1) ineffective assistance of trial counsel; and
    (2) under Anders v. California , 
    386 U.S. 738
     (1967), no other meritorious issues
    could successfully be raised.     See R. Doc. 9, Ex. 12, at 1 ¶ 5. On September 30,
    1992, petitioner, through counsel, filed a motion to dismiss his appeal so that he
    could file a motion in the trial court to withdraw his guilty plea.   See 
    id.
     Doc. 9,
    Ex. 13. Counsel also filed petitioner’s affidavit declaring his desire that his
    appeal be dismissed.    See 
    id.
     Doc. 9, Ex. 14. Petitioner’s motion to withdraw his
    guilty plea was denied. Petitioner, at this point representing himself, proceeded
    to pursue state collateral relief, which was denied on the ground of procedural
    bar.
    In this § 2254 petition, petitioner asserts twenty-two claims. The district
    court referred the case to a magistrate judge, who summarized and addressed
    petitioner’s claims.   See id. Doc. 35. The magistrate judge recommended that
    most of petitioner’s claims be dismissed based on the state court’s procedural bar
    determination.   See id. at 6-8. The magistrate judge found that petitioner failed to
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    show either cause or prejudice to excuse the default, or that a miscarriage of
    justice would result from the failure of the federal court to review his petition.
    See id. The magistrate judge recommended that the rest of petitioner’s claims be
    dismissed because they challenged the conditions of his confinement and
    therefore should have been brought under 
    42 U.S.C. § 1983
     instead of 
    28 U.S.C. § 2254
    . See 
    id. at 8-9
    . After considering petitioner’s objections, but without
    holding a hearing, the district court adopted the magistrate judge’s
    recommendation, and dismissed the petition.         See 
    id.
     Doc. 37.
    We review the district court’s denial of habeas relief de novo.    See Sinclair
    v. Henman , 
    986 F.2d 407
    , 408 (10th Cir. 1993). We also review the denial of a
    hearing de novo.    See Medina v. Barnes , 
    71 F.3d 363
    , 370 (10th Cir. 1995). We
    construe petitioner’s pro se pleadings liberally.     See Haines v. Kerner , 
    404 U.S. 519
    , 520-21 (1972) (per curiam). In order to obtain a certificate of probable
    cause for appeal, petitioner must make a “substantial showing of the denial of [a]
    federal right.”   Barefoot v. Estelle , 
    463 U.S. 880
    , 893 (1983) (quotation omitted).
    On appeal, petitioner asserts in a conclusory fashion that the district court
    ignored his arguments showing cause for his procedural default, and that he is
    actually innocent of the crime to which he pled guilty. We have carefully
    reviewed the parties’ materials, the magistrate judge’s recommendation, and the
    district court’s order. We conclude that petitioner has failed to make a substantial
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    showing of the denial of a federal right for substantially the same reasons as those
    set forth in the magistrate judge’s recommendation, adopted by the district court
    in its March 19, 1999 order.
    Accordingly, petitioner’s motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis on
    appeal is granted, his application for a certificate of probable cause is denied, and
    the appeal is DISMISSED. The mandate shall issue forthwith.
    Entered for the Court
    Deanell Reece Tacha
    Circuit Judge
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