United States v. Jaramillo-Garcia ( 2000 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
JUN 27 2000
TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
No. 99-2226
v.
(D.C. No. CR-98-653)
(District of New Mexico)
GENARO JARAMILLO-GARCIA,
Defendant - Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before BRISCOE, ANDERSON and LUCERO, Circuit Judges.
A jury convicted defendant-appellant Genaro Jaramillo-Garcia (“Genaro”)
of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute more than 100 kilograms of
marijuana in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846, possession with intent to distribute
more than 50 kilograms of marijuana and aiding and abetting in violation of 21
U.S.C. § 841 and 18 U.S.C. § 2, and knowing and intentional use of a minor to
commit possession with intent to distribute marijuana in violation of 21 U.S.C.
§ 861(a)(1) and 18 U.S.C. § 2. The district court sentenced him to 135 months
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. This court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
imprisonment and eight years supervised release. He appeals his conviction on
the grounds that mere inferences connect him to the marijuana conspiracy and that
there is insufficient evidence of his constructive possession of the marijuana
seized. We exercise jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and affirm.
I
The facts as they emerged at trial paint a picture of a “family-style” drug
smuggling operation. 1 Events leading to Genaro’s arrest began on February 2,
1998, when customs officials at a New Mexico border station found drugs stashed
in a van driven by Genaro’s sister-in-law, Ani Lou Jaramillo. Also present in the
van were San Juana Jaramillo (Genaro’s mother), Ester Lugo (Genaro’s common-
law wife), and other relatives including Maria de Rosa Jaramillo, Norma
Jaramillo, and numerous children. Search of one of the passengers in the van also
revealed a key to a room at the Crossroads Motel in Albuquerque, New Mexico.
About one hour later, a second vehicle arrived at the same customs
checkpoint, carrying Genaro, his father, Raymundo Jaramillo, Sr. (“Raymundo
Sr.”), and his brother, Raymundo Jaramillo, Jr. (“Raymundo Jr.”), who was
driving. Although the three of them appeared to be interested in ascertaining who
was being detained and a detector dog alerted the agents to the presence of drug
1
Because most of those involved in the drug conspiracy are part of the
Jaramillo family, the members of the Jaramillo family are identified by their first
names.
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odors in their car, the customs agents found no drugs on them. Genaro and
Raymundo Jr. admitted to having been married to Ester and Ani Lou, respectively,
but claimed they were divorced and had not seen the women in a long time.
Customs agents arrested Ani Lou and Ester, Raymundo Sr., and others, but
not Genaro and Raymundo Jr. Ani Lou and Ester later became cooperating
witnesses, and provided information which led to the arrests of Genaro and
Raymundo Jr. Ani Lou testified at trial that the family, including Genaro, had
gathered together in a Mexican border town immediately prior to apprehension to
plan the smuggling of the marijuana. This plan consisted of sending the van with
the women and children first, in the hope that customs inspectors would be less
suspicious of the women and children than of the men. The men would follow the
van to Albuquerque, New Mexico, alert the drug source if the van was stopped,
and meet at the Motel 6 or Crossroads Motel in Albuquerque. Ani Lou testified
that Genaro, along with Raymundo Jr. and Sr., loaded the marijuana into the van.
She also described previous similar trips, during four of which Genaro had been
physically present. Raymundo Jr. and Genaro allegedly forced the women to
participate in the operation with threats and had them register the motel rooms at
the Motel 6 and Crossroads in their names in order to deflect suspicion from the
men in case of apprehension. She also testified that San Juana would distribute
the proceeds of their drug trips among all adults present including Genaro.
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Ester testified that Genaro recruited her into selling drugs with his parents.
She had been on several smuggling trips prior to the February 2, 1998, trip which
resulted in her arrest. Her testimony corroborated that of Ani Lou’s to the effect
that the group would take their children to distract suspicion and that they stayed
in motels in Albuquerque often registered in Ester’s name under threats from
Genaro. These threats often materialized into beatings. Genaro paid Ester for her
participation. Although he was not physically present on all of the trips in which
Ester participated, he was, according to Ester, an active participant in the
smuggling operation.
Records obtained during the investigation further corroborate the drug
smuggling operation described by Ani Lou and Ester. Hotel records from the
Motel 6 and Crossroads Motel in Albuquerque verify the Jaramillos’ stays at those
motels during the course of the drug operation on the dates alleged by Ani Lou
and Ester. Customs records show other dates on which the van apprehended on
February 2 crossed the international border, corroborating both Ani Lou and
Ester’s testimony and the motel records. Agents testifying at trial stated that
based on their experience, the use of two cars, one to transport the drugs and a
second car further behind to track the first was consistent with drug smuggling
operations.
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After the close of the government’s case, Genaro made a motion for
judgment of acquittal pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 29. The district court denied
the motion and the jury found him guilty of conspiracy to possess with intent to
distribute marijuana, possession with intent to distribute marijuana and aiding and
abetting, and knowing and intentional use of a minor to commit possession with
intent to distribute marijuana. This appeal followed. 2
II
In reviewing both the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction
and the denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal, this Court must review the
record de novo to determine whether, viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to the government, any rational trier of fact could have found the
defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. See United States v. Schluneger, 184
F.3d 1154, 1158 (10th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 800 (2000); United
States v. Voss, 82 F.3d 1521, 1524-25 (10th Cir. 1996). The evidence necessary
to support a verdict “need not conclusively exclude every other reasonable
hypothesis and need not negate all possibilities except guilt.” United States v.
Wilson, 182 F.3d 737, 742 (10th Cir. 1999) (internal quotation and citation
omitted). When reviewing the denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal made
2
Raymundo Jr. only contested his sentence on appeal, which we affirmed.
See United States v. Jaramillo-Garcia, No. 99-2229, 2000 WL 289614 (10th Cir.
March 20, 2000).
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at the close of the government’s case-in-chief, we look only to evidence on record
at the time of the motion, that is, at the time the government rested. See Fed. R.
Crim. P. 29(a) & (b).
A
The elements of conspiracy are as follows:
To prove conspiracy, the government must show “[1] that two or
more persons agreed to violate the law, [2] that the defendant knew
at least the essential objectives of the conspiracy, . . . [3] that the
defendant knowingly and voluntarily became a part of it,” and [4]
that the alleged coconspirators were interdependent.
United States v. Evans, 970 F.2d 663, 668 (10th Cir. 1992) (quoting United States
v. Fox, 902 F.2d 1508, 1514 (10th Cir. 1990)). 3 Genaro argues there was
insufficient evidence to establish his involvement in the drug conspiracy.
Viewed in the light most favorable to the government, the facts include the
following: Genaro recruited Ester to participate in the conspiracy, he knew of it,
3
According to Genaro, his conviction should be reversed because “[t]he
‘initial idea’ for the conspiracy was not shown to be [h]is.” (Appellant’s Br. at 24
(quoting United States v. Davis, 965 F.2d 804, 812 (10th Cir. 1992).) It is simply
not an element of conspiracy that the defendant be the leader, organizer, or
initiator of the conspiracy. Cf. Evans, 970 F.2d at 668 (setting forth the elements
of conspiracy). Our reference in Davis, 965 F.2d at 812, to the fact that the initial
idea for the conspiracy derived from someone other than the defendant rebutted
the government’s argument that because the defendant benefitted from the
conspiracy, the jury could infer that the defendant was “illegally benefitting
from,” or illegally involved in, the conspiracy. We rejected the government’s
theory and reversed the conviction because there was insufficient evidence to
prove that the defendant had agreed with one or more other persons to violate the
law. See id. at 814. Here, there is evidence that Genaro not only agreed to
violate the law, but also coerced others into participation.
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he paid her for her work in it, and he instructed her to register motel rooms in her
name to avoid connecting him with the drug smuggling trips. Ani Lou likewise
testified as to his participation. 4 The corroborating evidence consists largely of
motel records and testimony from customs agents. We resolve conflicting
evidence in favor of the government, see United States v. Parker, 53 F.3d 1500,
1516 (10th Cir. 1995), and are mindful that the credibility of witnesses is for the
jury to evaluate, see United States v. Davis, 965 F.2d 804, 811 (10th Cir. 1992).
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, we conclude
that a reasonable jury could have found Genaro guilty of conspiracy to possess
with intent to distribute marijuana.
Despite the testimony of Ani Lou and Ester directly implicating him in the
conspiracy and the evidence corroborating that testimony, Genaro directs us to
United States v. Anderson, 981 F.2d 1560, 1563 (10th Cir. 1992), in which we
held that a court “cannot sustain a conspiracy conviction if the evidence does no
more than create a suspicion of guilt or amounts to a conviction resulting from
piling inference on top of inference.” Id. at 1564 (quoting United States v.
Austin, 786 F.2d 986, 988 (10th Cir. 1986)) (further citations omitted). Genaro is
4
Relying on United States v. Jones, 808 F.2d 754, 756 (10th Cir. 1987),
which discounted ambiguous testimony regarding participants in a conspiracy
because it was not possible to discern “who ‘they’ were,” Genaro contends there
is insufficient evidence to support his conviction because Ani Lou and Ester’s
testimony is similarly vague. This argument is meritless because there is ample
testimony from both women implicating Genaro by name.
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correct that in several cases, we have “reversed conspiracy convictions because
the evidence created only a suspicion of association with criminal activities.”
United States v. Esparsen, 930 F.2d 1461, 1474 n.14 (10th Cir. 1991) (citing
cases). Moreover, “we may not uphold a conviction obtained by piling inference
upon inference,” United States v. Valadez-Gallegos, 162 F.3d 1256, 1262 (10th
Cir. 1998) (citing United States v. Jones, 44 F.3d 860, 865 (10th Cir. 1995)), but
a “jury may draw reasonable inferences from direct and circumstantial evidence,”
United States v. Yoakam, 116 F.3d 1346, 1349 (10th Cir. 1997) (citation omitted).
In Anderson, the lack of direct testimony implicating Anderson created the
necessity to pile inference upon inference. Anderson was linked to the conspiracy
by the following facts: he was twice seen at the doorway of a house in which
nearly 2,000 pounds of marijuana were found; his photograph with two
conspirators was found at the house; and phone records showed Anderson calling
numbers also called by conspirators. See Anderson, 981 F.3d at 1563. In the
instant case, inferences drawn from Genaro’s family relationships, his presence in
a car following the drug van, and other circumstantial evidence are not the core of
the evidence presented, but rather merely corroborate the direct testimony of Ani
Lou and Ester implicating him.
Genaro’s reliance on Evans, 970 F.2d at 673-74, is likewise misplaced. In
Evans, we were faced with the question of whether a defendant who purchased
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four ounces of crack on one occasion and lent scales to conspirators knowing that
they would be used to measure drugs, thereby had agreed to participate in an
extensive drug distribution conspiracy. See id. We found that evidence
insufficient to establish the defendant’s agreement to participate in the
conspiracy. See id. at 671-73. Contrasting the large scope of the conspiracy with
the defendant’s single four-ounce purchase, we concluded there was no evidence
she was aware of, or joined, the larger conspiracy alleged, see id. at 673-74, and
“at the most, [the defendant] joined [the other defendants] in a much smaller
conspiracy to distribute crack cocaine on one instance,” id. at 674. We reasoned
that “[m]ere knowledge of illegal activity, even in conjunction with participation
in a small part of the conspiracy, does not by itself establish that a person has
joined in the grand conspiracy.” Id. at 670; see also United States v. Slater, 971
F.2d 626, 630 (10th Cir. 1992) (stating that one does not “become a member of a
conspiracy merely by associating with conspirators known to be involved in crime
. . . because guilt is always dependent on personal and individual conduct”
(citations omitted)).
Attempting to analogize his circumstances to that of the defendant in
Evans—based on the fact that he was not present on all of the drug smuggling
trips—Genaro contends that at most the government presented evidence of mere
knowledge of small parts of the conspiracy, but not of his involvement in the
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larger smuggling operation. However, direct testimony implicated him as a major
organizer in the entire scheme of smuggling trips. Evans, like Anderson, is
conspicuous for the lack of testimony by co-conspirators affirmatively
establishing the defendant’s involvement. That distinction is an important one
that cannot be overlooked.
The testimony of Ani Lou and particularly that of Ester could lead a jury to
infer beyond a reasonable doubt that Genaro was an organizer and leader of the
conspiracy and that he coerced the two women into traveling with the drugs and
registering for the hotels in their own names in order to divert attention from
himself and avoid apprehension and detection.
B
As to Genaro’s conviction for possession with intent to distribute
marijuana, we are presented with the issue of whether there was sufficient
evidence to establish his constructive possession of the drug. A court may find
constructive possession “if a person knowingly has ownership, dominion, or
control over the narcotics and the premises where the narcotics are found.”
United States v. Reece, 86 F.3d 994, 996 (10th Cir. 1996) (quoting United States
v. Jones, 49 F.3d 628, 632 (10th Cir. 1995)). “Where possession is not clear,
such as when the contraband may be attributed to more than one individual,
constructive possession requires some nexus, link, or other connection between
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the defendant and the contraband.” Id. (citing United States v. Mills, 29 F.3d
545, 549 (10th Cir. 1994)). “The government may prove constructive possession
by circumstantial evidence.” Mills, 29 F.3d at 549 (citation omitted).
Because he did not physically possess the drugs due to his presence in a
different car, Genaro argues there was insufficient evidence to establish his
constructive possession of the marijuana. Contrary to Genaro’s contention, the
evidence to support constructive possession was substantial and raised more than
“a mere suspicion of guilt.” United States v. Taylor, 113 F.3d 1136, 1144 (10th
Cir. 1997) (quoting United States v. Sanders, 929 F.2d 1466, 1470 (10th Cir.
1991)). The government presented evidence that Genaro loaded the drugs,
followed the van, planned to meet the van in Albuquerque, and although he
denied exercising control over the van, he exercised control over Ester’s actions
by means of beatings and threats. This evidence supports “at least a plausible
inference that the defendant had knowledge of and access to the . . contraband.”
Id. at 1145 (internal quotations and citations omitted). A jury could reasonably
infer that this gave him control over the van and its contents.
Relying on Reece, 86 F.3d at 994, Genaro argues the government failed to
meet its burden to prove that he knowingly and intentionally possessed the
marijuana. In Reece, 86 F.3d at 996-97, the court found no constructive
possession on the part of a driver who denied prior knowledge of his passenger’s
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drugs. Although the government offered a theory that the driver and passenger
were acting in concert to distribute the drugs, see id. at 996, absent from Reece
was any testimony by either of the participants in the alleged conspiracy
implicating the defendant. There, the court properly rejected an attempt to infer
constructive possession from mere proximity. The evidence in the instant case, as
noted, involves more than mere proximity, but also includes direct testimony
implicating Genaro in coordinating the smuggling scheme and in loading the
drugs into the van.
Also without merit is Genaro’s reliance on Mills, 29 F.3d at 545, for the
proposition that the government has failed to show constructive possession. In
Mills, the defendant lived in the same house as another occupant, Judy Hall. See
id. at 547. At the instruction of police seizing a truck parked at the house, the
defendant removed several guns from the truck and put them in the garage. See
id. One week later, the guns were found in a compartment of a table owned by
Hall. See id. at 547, 550. Again, no one testified that the guns belonged to Mills.
The court rejected the theory that his placement of the guns in the garage, and
their later presence in the table, was sufficient evidence to establish constructive
possession. See id. at 550. “[T]he government had to come forward with
evidence to connect Mills with knowing constructive possession of the firearms
extending beyond his handling them” a week before. See id. Here, Genaro’s
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loading of the truck is much more proximate in time than the unloading at issue in
Mills. Evidence that Genaro loaded the contraband and that he, at least in part,
was organizing and exercising control over the shipment is sufficient to meet this
threshold. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, a
reasonable jury could find him guilty of possession with intent to distribute
marijuana.
III
The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Carlos F. Lucero
Circuit Judge
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