Newell v. K-Mart Corporation ( 2000 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
JUL 12 2000
TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
JENNIE R. NEWELL,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. No. 99-3067
(D.C. No. 97-CV-2258-RDR)
K-MART CORPORATION, (District of Kansas)
Defendant-Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before EBEL, KELLY, and ELLISON **, Circuit Judges.
Plaintiff-Appellee Jennie R. Newell brought an action against her former
employer, Defendant-Appellant K-Mart Corporation (“K-Mart”), alleging that K-
Mart fired her in retaliation for exercising her rights under Kansas’ workers’
compensation statute. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Newell. K-Mart
then filed a renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law and, alternatively, for
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. This court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
**
The Honorable James O. Ellison, Senior District Judge, United States
District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma, sitting by designation.
a new trial. The district court denied K-Mart’s motion, and K-Mart now appeals.
We exercise jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and REVERSE.
BACKGROUND
Newell was employed at K-Mart’s Lawrence, Kansas, distribution
warehouse from 1980 until June 7, 1995. Most recently, Newell worked in the
shipping department, where she was typically responsible for loading and
unloading tractor trailers of merchandise. Newell was terminated for allegedly
violating K-Mart’s absenteeism policy.
As an employee with fifteen years’ seniority, Newell was entitled to twenty
days of paid vacation each year. Ten of these days could be taken as “single
days” of vacation, while the remaining ten had to be taken in five-day blocks.
Newell also received an additional 120 hours (fifteen days) of personal leave, 80
hours of which were paid and 40 of which were unpaid. Under K-Mart’s
absenteeism policy, an employee was to be terminated if he or she exceeded the
allotted days of vacation and paid and unpaid personal leave.
Newell took off June 7, 1995, and was informed upon returning to work the
next day that she had been terminated. K-Mart told Newell that she had no single
days of vacation remaining and only insufficient personal time remaining. As a
result, K-Mart informed her, she exceeded her available leave and was terminated.
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Newell sued K-Mart, alleging, inter alia, that K-Mart had in fact terminated
her in retaliation for sustaining an injury for which she could assert a claim under
the Kansas Workers’ Compensation Act, K.S.A. § 44-501 et seq. See Newell v.
K-Mart Corp., 35 F. Supp. 2d 1312, 1314 (D. Kan. 1999). K-Mart denied this
allegation, contending that Newell was terminated because of her excessive
absenteeism. Specifically, Newell claimed that K-Mart had improperly docked
her vacation time for days of work she missed due to an earlier work-related
injury, and that caused her to have an inadequate number of vacation days
remaining to cover her absence on July 7; thus, according to Newell, K-Mart had
indirectly terminated her for potentially exercising her workers’ compensation
rights.
The jury agreed with Newell, awarding her “$15,000 in back pay and
$30,000 for embarrassment, humiliation and emotional distress.” Newell, 35 F.
Supp.2d at 1314. The district court denied K-Mart’s post-trial motion challenging
the verdict. See id. at 1316-18.
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DISCUSSION
K-Mart appeals the denial of its post-trial motion for judgment as a matter
of law pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(b) and, alternatively, for a new trial
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(a). 1
K-Mart first claims that the jury’s verdict in favor of Newell was not
supported by the evidence and should therefore have been reversed as a matter of
law.
We consider de novo a district court's denial of a motion for
judgment as a matter of law under Rule 50, using the same standard
as the district court. We may find error in the denial of such a motion
only if the evidence points but one way and is susceptible to no
reasonable inferences supporting the party opposing the motion. We
construe the evidence and inferences most favorably to the
nonmoving party.
Vining v. Enterprise Fin. Group, Inc., 148 F.3d 1206, 1213 (10th Cir. 1998)
(internal citations, alterations, and quotation omitted).
“Where a new trial motion asserts that the jury verdict is not supported by
the evidence, the verdict must stand unless it is clearly, decidedly, or
overwhelmingly against the weight of the evidence.” Anaeme v. Diagnostek, Inc.,
164 F.3d 1275, 1284 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 50, 145 L. Ed. 2d 44
This case apparently arose under the district court’s diversity jurisdiction
1
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332. Accordingly, we apply the substantive law of the
forum state, Kansas. See Barrett v. Tallon, 30 F.3d 1296, 1300 (10th Cir. 1994).
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(1999) (internal citation and quotation omitted). In conducting our review, we
consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party,
remembering that “determining the weight to be given to the testimony, drawing
inferences from the facts established, resolving conflicts in the evidence, and
reaching ultimate conclusions of fact,” are the exclusive functions of the jury.
Thunder Basin Coal Co. v. Southwestern Pub. Serv. Co., 104 F.3d 1205, 1212
(10th Cir. 1997) (citation and quotation omitted).
Legal Standard
Under Kansas law, an employee asserting a claim of retaliatory discharge
for exercising or potentially exercising rights under the workers’ compensation
statute “can recover by proving that the discharge was ‘based on,’ ‘because of,’
‘motivated by’ or ‘due to’ the employer’s intent to retaliate. Employees do not
need to show that retaliation was the employer’s sole motive or reason for the
termination.” Sanjuan v. IBP, Inc., 160 F.3d 1291, 1298 (10th Cir. 1998)
(quoting Brown v. United Methodist Homes for the Aged, 815 P.2d 72 (Kan.
1991)) (additional citation omitted). Moreover, the Supreme Court of Kansas has
declared that employers may not use a facially neutral absenteeism policy to
disguise retaliatory discharge:
Allowing an employer to discharge an employee for being absent or
failing to call in an anticipated absence as the result of a work-
related injury would allow an employer to indirectly fire an employee
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for filing a workers’ compensation claim, a practice contrary to the
public policy of this state . . . .
Coleman v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 752 P.2d 645, 652 (Kan. 1988). Thus, although
K-Mart maintained a facially neutral attendance policy that resulted in Newell’s
termination, Newell may nevertheless succeed on her retaliation claim if her
termination was in fact based upon her sustaining an injury for which she could
assert a workers’ compensation claim.
The Supreme Court of Kansas has prescribed a particular method by which
workers’ compensation-retaliatory discharge claims must proceed:
A party having the burden of proving a discharge from employment
in retaliation for having filed a workers compensation claim must
establish that claim by a preponderance of the evidence, but the
evidence must be clear and convincing in nature. It is clear if it is
certain, unambiguous, and plain to the understanding. It is
convincing if it is reasonable and persuasive enough to cause the trier
of facts to believe it.
Ortega v. IBP, Inc., 874 P.2d 1188, 1198 (Kan. 1994). Kansas has further defined
the clear and convincing evidence requirement to
mean[] that the witnesses to a fact must be found to be credible; the
facts to which the witnesses testify must be distinctly remembered;
the details in connection with the transaction must be narrated
exactly and in order; the testimony must be clear, direct and weighty;
and the witnesses must be lacking in confusion as to the facts at
issue.
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Modern Air Conditioning, Inc. v. Cinderella Homes, Inc., 596 P.2d 816, 824
(Kan. 1979). 2
With these standards in mind, we turn to the evidence presented in the
present case.
There was evidence presented at trial that Newell had sustained injuries
implicating her rights under Kansas’ workers’ compensation statute. In February
of 1994, Newell sustained a shoulder injury while sliding boxes of merchandise
onto a pallet. She aggravated this injury in May of that year, ultimately requiring
surgery in July and a two-month absence from work. Newell testified that she had
some difficulty getting K-Mart to issue workers’ compensation checks to her for
this injury, and that she only received these checks upon retaining an attorney.
Newell returned to work in October of 1994. She received a lump-sum payment
from K-Mart for this injury in May of 1995.
In January of 1995, Newell sustained an injury to the middle of her
shoulders. She reported the injury to her supervisor at the time, Rocky Daniels,
and asked that he complete the appropriate paperwork. Daniels told her that he
2
Modern Air Conditioning announced this definition in the context of civil
fraud, but courts have applied it in the context of workers’ compensation
retaliation claims as well. See Chaparro v. IBP, Inc., Nos. 95-3078, 95-3098,
1996 WL 733771, at *5 (10th Cir. Dec. 24, 1996) (unpublished); Dougherty v.
Venator Group Retail, 94 F. Supp. 2d 1206, 1209 (D. Kan. 2000); McClurg v.
GTECH Corp., 61 F. Supp. 2d 1150, 1162 n.7 (D. Kan. 1999).
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would fill out an accident report, but Newell never received a copy of the
document. Apparently, no accident report documenting this incident was ever
found.
During the first week of February, 1995, Newell was having neck pain in
connection with her work. On Friday, February 3, Newell called in and
complained to her supervisor at the time, Rocky Daniels, that she was having
difficulty moving her neck and would not be able to come into work. However,
this call came too late in the day to qualify as a call-in so she was considered a
“no call-in” that day. 3 The following Monday, February 6, Newell called Daniels
to report that she was still having difficulty moving her head and neck and would
not be in to work, but again she was reported as a “no call-in.” During this call,
Newell reported to Daniels that she had made an appointment to see a doctor the
next day. Newell went to see the doctor as scheduled on Tuesday, February 7th,
but, because she had previously informed her supervisor of the appointment, she
did not call to tell him she would not be at work that day. The doctor imposed
work restrictions on Newell and gave her documentation of these restrictions to
present to K-Mart. Newell gave this document to her supervisor upon returning to
Newell testified that her first call to her supervisor, on Friday, February 3,
3
was not until after the time (8:15 A.M.) by which employees were required to
notify their supervisor if they were not going to come into work. As a result, she
was (apparently legitimately) listed as “NCI,” or “no call-in” for that day.
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work. Thus, there was evidence that K-Mart was aware Newell had sustained
work-related injuries that might be compensable as workers’ compensation
claims, and that her absences on February 6 and 7 were related to these injuries.
There was also evidence presented at trial describing some hostility among
K-Mart supervisors toward employees’ workers’ compensation claims. Mr.
Steven Rafferty, Newell’s co-worker, testified that he had an ongoing
disagreement with K-Mart concerning the use of personal leave time for his work-
related injury. Mr. Don Nowling, a former employee at K-Mart’s Lawrence,
Kansas, facility, testified to his own difficult experience with supervisors
regarding his work-related injury. Newell also testified at trial that she felt she
had been intimidated by her supervisors after seeking work restrictions due to a
work-related injury.
On the morning of June 7, 1995, Newell informed her supervisor, Gary
Coffman, that she wished to take the next day off as a single day of vacation.
There was no suggestion that this particular vacation request was linked in any
way to a work-related injury. Newell asked Coffman to verify that she had an
available single day of vacation remaining, and Coffman informed her “that he
would check and get back with me.” Newell testified that, although K-Mart’s
official policy was that employees were responsible for verifying their remaining
vacation before taking time off, she had previously been advised by Martha
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Engnehl to make these inquiries through her department manager. Newell
testified that she had previously relied on her supervisors to verify her remaining
vacation time and occasionally in the past she had been advised that she could not
take requested time off because she did not have enough accrued vacation time
available. Coffman never got back to Newell regarding the vacation on this
occasion. In fact, Newell did not have sufficient vacation time available for this
day off. As a result, and pursuant to K-Mart’s standard policy, Newell was fired
the next day for taking time off that exceeded her available single days of
vacation and available personal time. Martha Engnehl testified that Newell would
have had available time to take June 8 off if Newell had not been charged for her
absences back on February 6 and 7.
The problem is that Newell was discharged for her unauthorized vacation
on June 8, and that particular day off was not caused by, or related to, any work-
related injury. Thus, in order to succeed on her claim, Newell needed to prove
either that her supervisor intended wrongfully to record her February 6 and 7
absences in order to eventually terminate her some six months later, or that her
supervisor intended to mislead her on June 7 as to her remaining vacation
available for June 8 for the purpose of retaliating against her for her work-related
injuries that occurred back in February. Newell did not, however, introduce any
evidence to this effect, let alone any “clear and convincing evidence” as required
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by Kansas law. Rather, the most that appears from the record, drawing all
inferences in favor of Newell, is that her supervisors may have been negligent or
careless when dealing with vacation time and that they perhaps mistakenly
charged her for the February absences. There was simply no evidence introduced
at trial that Newell’s supervisors intended to achieve her termination through
these errors or misrepresentations or that her termination as of June 8 was “based
on,” “because of,” “motivated by,” or “due to” K-Mart’s intent to retaliate for her
earlier work-related injuries or claims.
Kansas law requires that Newell offer clear and convincing evidence of
intent, and Newell failed to meet this burden. On the evidence presented in this
case, a jury would have to speculate as to the motives of Newell’s supervisors.
The evidence presented as to whether K-Mart intended to retaliate against Newell
for her work-related injuries was not “certain, unambiguous, and plain to the
understanding.” Ortega, 874 P.2d at 1198. To the contrary, the evidence
produced neither compelled nor suggested the conclusion that Newell’s
supervisors intended to use her absences as a smokescreen for retaliation. Thus,
we conclude that Newell failed to meet the heightened evidentiary burden Kansas
law imposes upon plaintiffs alleging workers’ compensation retaliation. 4
4
Because we agree with Appellant’s contention that the verdict was not
supported by the evidence, we need not address Appellant’s additional arguments
regarding the sufficiency of Newell’s alleged injury and certain evidentiary
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CONCLUSION
We find that the district court erred in denying Appellant’s post-trial
motion for judgment as a matter of law or, in the alternative, for a new trial.
Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is REVERSED, and this case is
REMANDED for proceedings not inconsistent with this order and judgment.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
David M. Ebel
Circuit Judge
rulings by the district court.
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