Slavens v. Scenic Aviation, Inc ( 2000 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
JUL 18 2000
TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
GARY D. SLAVENS,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
vs. No. 99-4197
(D.C. No. 99-CV-259)
SCENIC AVIATION, INC., (D. Utah)
Defendant - Appellee.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before SEYMOUR, KELLY, and LUCERO, Circuit Judges.
Plaintiff-Appellant Gary Slavens appeals from the district court’s grant of
summary judgment in favor of Defendant-Appellee Scenic Aviation (“Scenic”).
Scenic operates primarily as an air ambulance and charter service, while
occasionally carrying air cargo. Mr. Slavens worked for Scenic as its Vice
President of Medical Operations beginning in January of 1998. After he was
terminated, Mr. Slavens alleged that he should have been paid for approximately
600 hours of overtime that he worked while employed with Scenic. Mr. Slavens
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. This court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
argues that failure to pay him for his overtime was a violation of the Fair Labor
Standards Act (“FLSA”). The district court granted summary judgment in favor
of Scenic, holding that Scenic is governed by the Railway Labor Act (“RLA”)
and is therefore exempt from the FLSA. On appeal, Mr. Slavens argues that (1)
Scenic is not governed by the RLA; (2) he is not an “employee” as that term is
defined by the FLSA, and thus cannot fall under the RLA exemption; and (3) his
job duties are too far removed from any air carrier services to be governed by the
RLA. Our jurisdiction arises under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and we affirm.
Discussion
We review a grant of summary judgment de novo. In doing so, we apply
the same standard as the district court to determine whether there is a genuine
issue of material fact, and whether defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law. See Southwestern Bell Wireless, Inc. v. Johnson County Bd. of County
Comm'rs , 199 F.3d 1185, 1189 (10th Cir. 1999). We examine the entire factual
record and any reasonable inferences which may be drawn from it in the light
most favorable to the Plaintiffs. See Chessin v. Keystone Resort Management,
Inc. , 184 F.3d 1188, 1191-92 (10th Cir. 1999).
(1) Scenic is governed by the RLA
The Railway Labor Act covers “every common carrier by air engaged in
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interstate or foreign commerce.” 45 U.S.C. § 181. The FLSA expressly exempts
air carriers subject to the RLA from the FLSA’s overtime provisions. See 29
U.S.C. § 213(b)(3). Mr. Slavens is correct in asserting that exemptions to the
FLSA are to be narrowly construed against the employer. See Chessin , 184 F.3d
at 1192. However, in this case, the operations of Scenic are clearly within the
exemption’s terms and spirit. Thus, if Scenic is covered by the RLA, it is not
subject to the FLSA’s overtime provisions. See Northwest Airlines, Inc. v.
Jackson , 185 F.2d 74, 77 (8th Cir. 1950).
Mr. Slavens contends that Scenic does not itself provide any carrier
services, but rather simply owns and manages several other companies, which do
perform air carrier services. Therefore, Mr. Slavens argues, Scenic is not a
common carrier by air, and therefore not covered by the RLA. The evidence,
however, is undisputed. Scenic is not merely a management company.
Approximately 90-95 percent of Scenic’s revenues are attributable to its air
ambulance and charter service. Further, Scenic holds an Air Carrier Certificate
from the Federal Aviation Administration (“FAA”) authorizing Scenic to
“operate as an air carrier and conduct common carriage operations.” Scenic’s
sole purpose for existence is to provide air carrier services; the fact that it
conducts business using several other assumed names is irrelevant. See e.g. , In
re Rocky Mountain Holdings, L.L.C. d/b/a/ Eagle Airmed of Arizona , No. CJ-
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6638, 1999 WL 17850 (N.M.B. Jan. 12, 1999). We agree with the district court
that there is no genuine issue of material fact that Scenic is a common carrier by
air involved in interstate commerce. Therefore, it is governed by the RLA and
exempt from the overtime provisions of the FLSA.
(2) Mr. Slavens is an “employee” of Scenic
The FLSA exempts from its overtime provisions any “ employee of a carrier
by air subject to [the Railway Labor Act].” 29 U.S.C. § 213(b)(3) (emphasis
added). Mr. Slavens argues he is not an “employee” of Scenic for purposes of
the FLSA by pointing to the FLSA’s definition of employee (any person
“employed by an employer”) and its definition of employer (which “includes any
person acting directly or indirectly in the interest of an employer in relation to an
employee.”) 29 U.S.C. §§ 203(e)(1), 203(d).
Neither party disputes that Mr. Slavens, as Vice President of Medical
Operations, worked for Scenic in a management/supervisory capacity. Mr.
Slavens contends that, in doing this work, he was “acting directly or indirectly in
the interest of” Scenic, and should therefore be classified as an employer rather
than an employee under the FLSA. Further, he claims that, as a manager, he
would always represent management rather than employees in labor disputes, thus
making him an employer. If classified as an employer rather than an employee,
Mr. Slavens believes he would be eligible for overtime benefits under the FLSA,
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because the exemption only applies to employees subject to the RLA.
However, the FLSA also clearly exempts from its overtime provisions “any
employee employed in a bona fide executive, administrative, or professional
capacity.” 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(1). Mr. Slavens’ claim to be a manager would
appear to place him squarely in this exempt category, making him ineligible for
overtime pay. Mr. Slavens has given us no cases to support his position that he
can be a subordinate employee (thus falling outside of the § 213(a)(1) exemption)
while simultaneously being an employer for purposes of escaping the RLA
exemption. We agree with the district court that Mr. Slavens is an employee of
Scenic as defined by the FLSA.
(3) Mr. Slavens’ job duties were directly related to Scenic’s air carrier
services
Mr. Slavens correctly points out that even if Scenic is subject to the RLA,
not all of Scenic’s employees are necessarily covered by the overtime exemption
of the RLA. The RLA was not intended to apply to all types of work, regardless
of the connection to transportation, just because the company conducting the
work performed some carrier activities within its company functions. See
Northwest Airlines , 185 F.2d at 77. Rather, the Act “‘was intended to apply only
to transportation activities and that work which bears more than a tenuous,
negligible and remote relationship to the transportation activities [of the
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employer].’” Id. (citation omitted).
Mr. Slavens argues that, because he had no day-to-day responsibilities over
any pilots or airplanes, nor any knowledge of when various flights were taking
place, his duties were tenuous, negligible, and remote with respect to Scenic’s
transportation activities, and he is not covered by the RLA. However, Mr.
Slavens’ duties were directly related to Scenic’s operations as an air ambulance
company. In his affidavit, Mr. Slavens characterized his job duties as “primarily
focused on evaluating the medical background of potential medical staff for
proper qualifications, establishing medical protocols, establishing company
policies and procedures, informing hospitals of the services and resolving
personnel disputes.” Aplee. Supp. App. at 30 ¶15. Far from being “remote,
tenuous, or negligible,” these support activities are integral to Scenic’s air
ambulance services. Scenic, which derives 90-95 percent of its revenues from its
air ambulance services, simply could not perform these services without such
support activities. Cf. Pan American World Airways, Inc. v. United Bhd. of
Carpenters & Joiners of America , 324 F.2d 217, 220 (9th Cir. 1963) (finding that
preventive maintenance work at a nuclear research development station
performed by employees of an airline was too remote from transportation to be
within the application of the RLA); Marshall v. Pan American World Airways,
Inc. , 1977 WL 1772, at *5 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 8, 1977) (giving as an example of an
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activity that is remote, tenuous, or negligible the operation of a hotel by airline
employees). Because we hold that Scenic Aviation is a common carrier by
air subject to the RLA, that Mr. Slavens was an employee of Scenic for purposes
of the RLA, and that his job duties with Scenic were not remote, tenuous, or
negligible with respect to Scenic’s transportation activities, the district court’s
grant of summary judgment to defendant Scenic Aviation is AFFIRMED.
Entered for the Court
Paul J. Kelly, Jr.
Circuit Judge
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