Aiken v. Continental Airlines ( 2000 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
AUG 1 2000
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
BRENDA AIKEN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 99-1462
(D.C. No. 97-S-2505)
CONTINENTAL AIRLINES, INC., (D. Colo.)
a Delaware corporation,
Defendant-Appellee.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before BRORBY , ANDERSON , and MURPHY , Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
Plaintiff Brenda Aiken started working as a reservations clerk for defendant
Continental Airlines in April 1994 at its Smith Road facility in Denver. In
October 1994, she began to experience difficulty breathing while at work and was
later diagnosed with occupational asthma and hypersensitivity to certain
bioaerosols. She requested in December 1994 that Continental transfer her to
another facility as an accommodation for her asthma. Continental did not transfer
her and terminated her employment in May 1995 because she had not worked
since October and her inactive leave status equaled her total length of service.
Ms. Aiken then brought this action alleging that Continental discriminated against
her based on her disability, asthma, in violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101-12213. The district court granted
Continental’s motion for summary judgment. Ms. Aiken appeals.
We review a grant of summary judgment de novo, applying the same
standards as the district court applied under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). See Lowe v.
Angelo’s Italian Foods, Inc. , 87 F.3d 1170, 1173 (10th Cir. 1996). To establish
a prima facie case under the McDonnell Douglas 2
burden-shifting scheme as
applicable to the ADA, Ms. Aiken must show that (1) she is a disabled person
within the meaning of the Act; (2) she is qualified, meaning that either with or
without reasonable accommodation, she can perform the essential functions of her
2
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green , 411 U.S. 792, 802-04 (1973).
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job; and (3) Continental terminated her under circumstances giving rise to the
inference that she was terminated because of her disability. See Hardy v.
S.F. Phosphates Ltd. , 185 F.3d 1076, 1079 n.2 (10th Cir. 1999). Relevant to her
claim, the ADA defines disability as “a physical or mental impairment that
substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such individual.”
42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A). In determining whether an individual is disabled under
this definition, a court must first determine whether the individual has an
impairment, then identify the life activity upon which the individual relies and
determine whether it is a major life activity under the Act, and, finally, determine
whether the impairment substantially limits the major life activity. See Doyal v.
Oklahoma Heart, Inc. , 213 F.3d 492, 495 (10th Cir. 2000). If an ADA plaintiff
establishes a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the employer to articulate a
legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for its action. See Hardy , 185 F.3d at 1079.
If it does, the burden returns to the plaintiff to present evidence that the proffered
reason is not worthy of belief. See id. at 1079-80.
In the district court, Ms. Aiken alleged that her asthma was a physical
impairment substantially limiting her major life activities of breathing, caring for
herself, and sexual relations. The district court held that Ms. Aiken had not
established her prima facie case. It determined that because her asthma was
controlled though medication, it did not substantially impair her breathing or
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sexual relations. See Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc. , 119 S. Ct. 2139, 2146
(1999). It also held that as Ms. Aiken described the activity of caring for
oneself--washing and styling her hair and cleaning her house--this was not a
major life activity, and that in any event, she had not demonstrated that she could
not perform these tasks. Alternatively, the court found that assuming Ms. Aiken
established her prima facie case, Continental had presented a legitimate
nondiscriminatory reason for her termination--its policy of terminating employees
who are on an inactive employment status for as long as they have been on active
employment status. The court concluded that she failed to present any evidence
indicating that this reason for her termination was false or that the real reason for
her termination was intentional discrimination based on her disability. It
therefore granted summary judgment to Continental.
On appeal, Ms. Aiken contends that she is disabled by her asthma, though
she does not address the district court’s determination that her asthma is
adequately controlled by medication. She also contends that Continental’s failure
to transfer her to another facility upon her request or take other steps to
accommodate her alleged disability creates a disputed factual issue regarding
whether Continental’s stated reason for terminating her was pretextual. We have
considered her arguments and reviewed the record, and we conclude that the
district court correctly determined that she not had met her burden of showing she
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was disabled under the ADA. Therefore, for substantially the same reasons as
stated by the district court, we affirm its decision on this basis, and need not
address its alternate reason for granting summary judgment to Continental.
AFFIRMED.
Entered for the Court
Wade Brorby
Circuit Judge
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