Negron v. Adams ( 2000 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
AUG 15 2000
TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
BENITO NEGRON,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 00-1071
OFFICER CARL ADAMS, Adams (D.C. No. 88-D-1644)
County; OFFICER M.D. KENNEDY, (D.Colo.)
Adams County; ROBERT A.
FULLER, Adams County,
Defendants-Appellees.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before SEYMOUR , Chief Judge, EBEL and BRISCOE, Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
Benito Negron appeals the district court’s denials of his Fed. R. Civ. P.
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
*
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
60(b) motion to vacate judgment and his motion for free copies of the record.
We exercise jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, affirm the judgment of the
district court, deny Negron’s motion to reconsider this court’s denial of his
motion to appoint counsel, and deny Negron’s motion to strike appellees’ brief.
I.
In May 1989, Negron filed a complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983
alleging that police officers violated his constitutional rights during a search of
his apartment and his subsequent arrest. The trial court dismissed part of the
defendants prior to trial. A jury found against Negron and the court dismissed
Negron’s complaint with prejudice in July 1991. Negron appealed to this court,
arguing the trial court erred in dismissing some of the defendants, unspecified
officers committed perjury, the court erred in denying him attorney fees, and the
court improperly instructed the jury. This court concluded the trial court did not
commit reversible error. Negron v. Adams , Case No. 91-1241, 1992 WL 72948
at *1 (10th Cir. April 10, 1992) (unpublished disposition).
On December 8, 1998, Negron filed a motion in federal district court for a
free copy of the trial transcript in order to prepare a “petition for certiorari” to
this court. The district court denied Negron’s motion and denied leave to
proceed in forma pauperis. On December 31, 1998, Negron filed a motion for
reconsideration, which the district court denied.
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In June and July 1999, Negron filed motions in federal district court to
vacate the 1991 judgment and requesting a free copy of the record. The district
court denied the motions and denied leave to proceed on appeal in forma
pauperis. Negron filed a renewed application with this court to proceed in forma
pauperis. This court assessed costs and fees against Negron, payable in partial
payments. We remind Negron of his continuing obligation to make payments
until the entire filing fee has been paid. Negron also filed a motion for
appointment of counsel with this court, which was denied. Negron has filed a
motion for reconsideration of that denial.
II.
Denial of motion to vacate judgment
Negron sought to vacate the 1991 judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(3)
and (4). The district court denied Negron’s motion, concluding Negron failed to
present any reason to vacate the judgment after eight years had passed. The
district court noted Negron failed to demonstrate that any type of fraud,
misrepresentation, or other misconduct occurred. “‘We review . . . the
disposition of Rule 60(b) motions for an abuse of discretion. . . . Under this
standard, we will not reverse unless the trial court has made “an arbitrary,
capricious, whimsical, or manifestly unreasonable judgment.”’” Weitz v.
Lovelace Health Sys., Inc. , 214 F.3d 1175, 1181 (10th Cir. 2000) (quoting
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Woodworker’s Supply, Inc. v. Principal Mut. Life Ins. Co. , 170 F.3d 985, 992
(10th Cir.1999)).
Rule 60(b)(3) allows a district court to vacate a judgment based on “fraud
(whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or
other misconduct of an adverse party.” Rule 60(b)(4) allows the district court to
vacate a void judgment; Negron’s claim under this section is based on his
allegations of fraud. Although a Rule 60(b)(3) motion must be brought not more
than one year after the judgment was entered, that restriction does not limit the
power of a court to set aside a judgment for fraud on the court. Fed. R. Civ. P.
60(b). “When alleging a claim of fraud on the court, the plaintiff must show by
clear and convincing evidence that there was fraud on the court, and all doubts
must be resolved in favor of the finality of the judgment.” Weese v. Schukman ,
98 F.3d 542, 552 (10th Cir. 1996). “Generally speaking, only the most egregious
misconduct, such as bribery of a judge or members of a jury, or the fabrication of
evidence by a party in which an attorney is implicated will constitute a fraud on
the court.” Id. at 552-53. “Less egregious misconduct, such as nondisclosure to
the court of facts allegedly pertinent to the matter before it, will not ordinarily
rise to the level of fraud on the court.” Id. at 553.
In his motion to vacate, Negron offered to establish that the 1991 judgment
should be vacated because defendants had committed fraud on the court. Negron
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made no assertion concerning what fraudulent conduct had occurred, claiming
only that defendants had conspired to commit fraud on the court. Although
Negron contends he needed the trial transcript to detail the particulars of the
fraud, he failed to offer even general allegations of how the defendants acted
fraudulently. Although we are to construe pro se filings liberally, we are not
obligated to supply additional facts or “construct a legal theory for plaintiff that
assumes facts that have not been pleaded.” Peterson v. Shanks , 149 F.3d 1140,
1143 (10th Cir. 1998). We conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion
in denying Negron’s Rule 60(b) motion to vacate. Further, because Negron
failed to allege fraud on the court with any specificity, we conclude the district
court did not abuse its discretion in not holding a hearing on Negron’s motion.
See United States v. 8136 S. Dobson Street , 125 F.3d 1076, 1086 (7th Cir. 1997)
(noting that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not require the district court
to hold a hearing on a Rule 60(b) motion, leaving that decision to the district
court’s discretion).
Denial of Negron’s motion for free copy of record
Negron filed a motion requesting that the court provide him a free copy of
the record. He asserted he needed the file for evidence to support his motion to
vacate and he did not have money to pay for it. The district court denied the
motion, concluding Negron did not demonstrate sufficient evidence or good
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cause as to why he was entitled to copies of the record at the court’s expense.
Negron contends the district court’s denial of his motion for copies of the
record violated his constitutional right to equal protection. Negron argues that a
person with adequate means can obtain a record and prosecute his claims, while
he is denied the opportunity because of his indigency. In the context of a direct
appeal, this court has noted that “if state statutes provide for appeals from
convictions in criminal cases, the due process and equal protection clauses of the
14th Amendment require that the right shall not be limited to those who are able
to afford the expense of an appeal.” Patterson v. Medberry , 290 F.2d 275, 277
(10th Cir. 1961). “On direct appeal, a trial transcript is an absolute matter of
right for an indigent criminal defendant.” Ruark v. Gunter , 958 F.2d 318, 319
(10th Cir. 1992). “However, a [28 U.S.C.] § 2255 petitioner seeking collateral
relief must demonstrate that his claim is not frivolous before the court is required
to provide him with a free transcript.” Id. “[A]n indigent § 2254 petitioner does
not have a constitutional right to access a free transcript in order to search for
error.” Id. A § 2254 action is a civil action. Similarly, in this civil action
Negron does not have a constitutional right to a free transcript to search for error
when he has not demonstrated that his claim is not frivolous. We conclude the
district court did not err in denying Negron’s motion for a free copy of the
record.
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Denial of motion to appoint counsel
Negron argues the district court erred in denying his motion to appoint
counsel. “We review the denial of appointment of counsel in a civil case for an
abuse of discretion.” Rucks v. Boergermann , 57 F.3d 978, 979 (10th Cir. 1995).
In considering whether to appoint counsel, the factors the district court should
consider include “‘the merits of the litigant’s claims, the nature of the factual
issues raised in the claims, the litigant’s ability to present his claims, and the
complexity of the legal issues raised by the claims.’” Id. at 979 (quoting
Williams v. Meese , 926 F.2d 994, 996 (10th Cir.1991)). After careful review of
the record, we conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying
Negron’s motion to appoint counsel.
III.
The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. We DENY Negron’s
motion to reconsider this court’s denial of his motion to appoint counsel and
DENY Negron’s motion to strike appellees’ brief. The mandate shall issue
forthwith.
Entered for the Court
Mary Beck Briscoe
Circuit Judge
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