Smith v. Department of Human ( 2000 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
OCT 6 2000
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
PATSY A. SMITH, an Individual,
d/b/a Little Peoples Ltd.,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. No. 00-6046
(D.C. No. 99-CV-615)
DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN (W.D. Okla.)
SERVICES, State of Oklahoma,
The ex rel; KATHY CALVIN,
individually, and in her official
capacity as a Department of Human
Services Employee; VIVIAN
CARLISLE, individually, and in her
official capacity as a Department of
Human Services Employee; JUDY
COLLINS, individually, and in her
official capacity as a Department of
Human Services employee; KAY
DODSON, individually, and in her
official capacity as a Department of
Human Services employee; SUSAN
HALL, individually, and in her
official capacity as a Department of
Human Services employee; SHERRI
KLYE, individually, and in her
official capacity as a Department of
Human Services employee; PAM S.
LAFERNEY, individually, and in her
official capacity as a Department of
Human Services employee; GEORGE
A. MILLER, individually, and in his
official capacity as Director of the
Oklahoma Department of Human
Services; TREENA S. ROSS,
individually, and in her official
capacity as a Department of Human
Services employee; MARLENE
SMITH, individually, and in her
official capacity as a Department of
Human Services employee; DARLA
YELL, individually, and in her
official capacity as a Department of
Human Services employee,
Defendants-Appellants.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before BRORBY , PORFILIO , and MURPHY , Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument.
Plaintiff Patsy Smith operated a day care center until the State of Oklahoma
revoked her child care facility license and canceled her Day Care Provider
Contract and her participation in the Child and Adult Care Food Program.
Defendants are employees, supervisors, and the present and past directors of the
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
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Oklahoma Department of Human Services. Plaintiff sued defendants under
42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985, alleging that they conspired to violate her property
and liberty interests and her right to due process in violation of the First, Fourth,
Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments. Defendants appeal from the
district court’s order denying their motion to dismiss plaintiff’s complaint under
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 because
the district court denied defendants’ claim that their absolute or qualified
immunity warranted dismissal. See Tonkovich v. Kansas Bd. of Regents ,
159 F.3d 504, 515 (10th Cir. 1998).
Defendants argue on appeal that: (1) the district court is without
jurisdiction under the Eleventh Amendment to hear plaintiff’s § 1983 claim for
declaratory relief; (2) defendants Carlisle, Collins, Smith, Ross, and Yell are
absolutely immune from suit based on their testimony at plaintiff’s license
revocation hearing; (3) defendant Miller is entitled to qualified immunity on
plaintiff’s claims against him; and (4) the facts alleged in the complaint do not
overcome defendants’ qualified immunity defense.
We review de novo the district court’s denial of Eleventh Amendment
immunity. See ANR Pipeline Co. v. Lafaver , 150 F.3d 1178, 1186 (10th Cir.
1998). Defendants contend that the district court lacks jurisdiction over
plaintiff’s § 1983 claim because she seeks only a declaratory judgment. In fact,
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plaintiff seeks a declaratory judgment that defendants’ actions were
unconstitutional; general, special, and punitive damages; and prospective
injunctive relief. See Appellants’ App. at 59. “[T]he Eleventh Amendment has
been interpreted to bar a suit by a citizen against the citizen’s own State in
Federal Court.” Johns v. Stewart , 57 F.3d 1544, 1552 (10th Cir. 1995) (quotation
omitted). This bar is not absolute, however. See id. at 1553. The district court
lacks jurisdiction to enter a declaratory judgment alone in a § 1983 action.
See id. However, the district court has jurisdiction to hear a § 1983 claim for
prospective injunctive relief, and may enter an ancillary declaratory judgment in
such a case. See id. Defendants’ first argument is therefore without merit.
We are also not persuaded by defendants’ argument that defendants
Carlisle, Collins, Smith, Ross, and Yell are absolutely immune from suit based on
their testimony at plaintiff’s license revocation hearing. We review the denial of
absolute immunity de novo. See Scott v. Hern , 216 F.3d 897, 908 (10th Cir.
2000). Whether a witness is entitled to absolute immunity or only qualified
immunity hinges on whether the witness was more like a lay witness or
a complaining witness under the common law. See Anthony v. Baker , 955 F.2d
1395, 1399-1400 (10th Cir. 1992); see also Malley v. Briggs , 475 U.S. 335,
340-43 (1986) (deciding that police officer having function of complaining
witness is entitled only to qualified immunity, as at common law). “[W]hether [a
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given defendant] was a complaining witness or a lay witness is a factual question
to be resolved by the district court.” Anthony , 955 F.2d at 1399-1400. Further,
“[l]ike federal officers, state officers who ‘seek absolute exemption from personal
liability for unconstitutional conduct must bear the burden of showing that public
policy requires an exemption of that scope.’” Malley , 475 U.S. at 340 (quoting
Butz v. Economou , 438 U.S. 478, 506 (1978)). The district court therefore did
not err in determining that the immunity question as to defendants Carlisle,
Collins, Smith, Ross, and Yell depended on the resolution of factual issues that
would be improper under Rule 12(b)(6). See Appellants’ App. at 63.
Defendants next argue that defendant Miller is entitled to qualified
immunity on plaintiff’s claims against him. Mr. Miller is alleged to have been the
Director of the Department of Human Services while most of the actions occurred
about which plaintiff complains. See id. at 44. “Qualified immunity shields
government officials performing discretionary functions from individual liability
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless their conduct violates ‘clearly established statutory
or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.’”
Baptiste v. J.C. Penney Co. , 147 F.3d 1252, 1255 (10th Cir. 1998) (quoting
Harlow v. Fitzgerald , 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). Because defendants’ qualified
immunity defense was raised in the context of a motion to dismiss under
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), our review is de novo. See Breidenbach v. Bolish ,
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126 F.3d 1288, 1291 (10th Cir. 1997). We consider only the amended complaint,
construing plaintiff’s allegations and any reasonable inferences drawn from them
in her favor. See Dill v. City of Edmond , 155 F.3d 1193, 1203 (10th Cir. 1998).
Because qualified immunity is asserted, however, the standard is somewhat
different than in the typical Rule 12(b)(6) case. See Breidenbach , 126 F.3d
at 1291. That is, “we apply a heightened pleading standard, requiring the
[amended] complaint to contain ‘specific, non-conclusory allegations of fact
sufficient to allow the district court to determine that those facts, if proved,
demonstrate that the actions taken were not objectively reasonable in light of
clearly established law.’” Dill , 155 F.3d at 1204 (quoting Breidenbach , 126 F.3d
at 1293). 2
In addition, because defendant Miller was a supervisor, plaintiff
cannot state a claim against him under § 1983 unless she “establish[es] ‘a
deliberate, intentional act by the supervisor to violate constitutional rights.’”
Jenkins v. Wood , 81 F.3d 988, 994-95 (10th Cir. 1996) (quoting Woodward v.
City of Worland , 977 F.2d 1392, 1399 (10th Cir. 1992)). “[I]t is not enough for
2
This court has not yet decided whether the Supreme Court’s decision in
Crawford-El v. Britton , 523 U.S. 574 (1998), requires us to modify this
heightened pleading standard and we have continued to employ it. See Ramirez
v. Department of Corrections , 222 F.3d 1238, 1241 n.2 (10th Cir. 2000). Because
the parties do not challenge this standard, we need not consider that question
here.
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a plaintiff merely to show a defendant was in charge of other state actors who
actually committed the violation.” Id. at 994.
Plaintiff alleges in her seventh cause of action that Mr. Miller failed to
provide the same process of law to child care facility license holders as is given
to other professional license holders. See Appellants’ App. at 53. In her eighth
and ninth causes of action, plaintiff alleges that defendant Miller caused the
violation of her civil rights through his negligent supervision and training of other
defendants who were his employees. See id. at 54-56.
The allegations in plaintiff’s seventh cause of action are insufficient to
state an equal protection claim against defendant Miller. In her complaint, she
asserts that child care facility license holders are treated differently than other
professional license holders. See id. at 53. In her brief on appeal, she argues
that her day care center was treated differently than other centers. See Appellee’s
Br. at 26. In either case, her allegations are conclusory and nonspecific, and she
fails to allege that defendant Miller knew about and acquiesced in the alleged
violations of her rights by other defendants. See Jenkins , 81 F.3d at 995.
Plaintiff’s eighth and ninth claims, alleging that Mr. Miller failed to train
his employees, are likewise insufficient. Plaintiff alleges no more than that
Mr. Miller was director when his subordinates took actions about which she
complains. See Appellants’ App. at 44-46, 54-55. In essence, these claims assert
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liability on the part of Mr. Miller under the theory of respondeat superior. That
doctrine, however, cannot support liability under § 1983. See Monell v.
Department of Social Servs. , 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978). Plaintiff’s claims against
defendant Miller must be dismissed.
We do not address defendants’ argument that plaintiff had no property
interest in her day care license because defendants did not raise this issue in
the district court. See Singleton v. Wulff , 428 U.S. 106, 120 (1976).
Appellee’s motion to certify questions of state law is denied. The judgment
of the United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma is
AFFIRMED in part and REVERSED in part, and the case is REMANDED for
additional proceedings.
Entered for the Court
Michael R. Murphy
Circuit Judge
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