Earls v. Greenpoint Credit ( 2000 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
OCT 6 2000
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
In re: BETTY ANN EARLS,
Debtor.
_____________________________ No. 00-7003
(BAP No. EO-99-061)
JOSEPH Q. ADAMS, Trustee, (Bankruptcy Appellate Panel)
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
GREENPOINT CREDIT
CORPORATION, INC.,
Defendant-Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before TACHA , EBEL , and LUCERO , Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument.
Defendant Greenpoint Credit Corp. appeals the Bankruptcy Appellate
Panel’s affirmance of the bankruptcy court’s decision authorizing the bankruptcy
trustee to avoid Greenpoint’s lien as a preference. We affirm.
The debtor bought a manufactured home in November 1998, and the dealer
assigned its security interest to Greenpoint. On February 1, 1999, Greenpoint
filed a lien entry form with a motor license agent of the Oklahoma Tax
Commission, and on March 16, 1999, the debtor filed her bankruptcy petition.
The bankruptcy trustee sued Greenpoint under 11 U.S.C. § 547, seeking to
avoid its lien as a preference. He argued that the lien was perfected when
Greenpoint filed the lien entry form, pursuant to Okla. Stat. tit. 47, § 1110(A)(1),
which was within ninety days of the petition. Greenpoint argued that the
manufactured home was a consumer good and thus its security interest was
automatically perfected under Okla. Stat. tit. 12A, § 9-302(1)(d). The bankruptcy
court held that because the manufactured home was a “vehicle” pursuant to
§ 1110(A)(1), Greenpoint’s security interest in the home was not perfected until
the lien entry form was delivered to the motor license agent. On this basis, the
bankruptcy court held the lien was avoidable as a preference. The bankruptcy
appellate panel affirmed, and this appeal follows.
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The sole issue in this case is whether, under Oklahoma law, a manufactured
home is a vehicle, as defined in Okla. Stat. tit. 47, § 1110, which requires that a
lien entry form be filed to perfect a security interest. We review this question of
state law de novo. See Salve Regina College v. Russell , 499 U.S. 225, 231 (1991)
(holding federal court determination of state law is reviewed de novo).
Greenpoint argues that its security interest was perfected automatically
upon purchase, pursuant to Okla. Stat. tit. 12A, § 9-302(1)(d), which provides that
a purchase money security interest in consumer goods is automatically perfected
unless the collateral is “a vehicle as provided in paragraph (i) of this subsection.”
Paragraph (i), in turn, provides that a financing statement need not be filed to
perfect a security interest “in a vehicle as defined in Section 1110 of Title 47 of
the Oklahoma Statutes for which a certificate of title may be properly issued by
the Oklahoma Tax Commission, except as otherwise provided for in Section 1110
of Title 47.” Okla. Stat. tit. 12A, § 9-302(1)(i). Section 1110 of title 47 states:
A. 1. Except for a security interest in vehicles held by a dealer . . .
and a vehicle being registered in this state which was previously
registered in another state and which title contains the name of a
secured party on the face of the other state certificate or title, a
security interest, as defined in Section 1-201 of Title 12A of the
Oklahoma Statutes, in a vehicle as to which a certificate of title may
be properly issued by the Oklahoma Tax Commission shall be
perfected only when a lien entry form, and the existing certificate of
title, if any, or application for a certificate of title and manufacturer’s
certificate of origin containing the name and address of the secured
party and the date of the security agreement and the required fee are
delivered to the Commission or to a motor license agent. . . . For the
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purposes of this section, the term “vehicle” shall not include special
mobilized machinery, machinery used in highway construction or
road material construction and rubber-tired road construction
vehicles including rubber-tired cranes. The filing and duration of
perfection of a security interest, pursuant to the provisions of Title
12A of the Oklahoma Statutes, including, but not limited to, Section
9-302 of Title 12A of the Oklahoma Statutes, shall not be applicable
to perfection of security interests in vehicles as to which a certificate
of title may be properly issued by the Commission.
....
E. The priority of a valid security interest in a manufactured home,
including without limitation a mobile home or sectional home,
perfected pursuant to this section, shall not be affected by reason of
the manufactured home becoming a fixture or otherwise being
permanently attached to real property after the date of perfection of
the security interest. A security interest in a manufactured home
perfected pursuant to this section shall have priority over a
conflicting interest of a mortgagee or other lien encumbrancer, or the
owner of the real property upon which the manufactured home
became affixed or otherwise permanently attached.
Okla. Stat. tit. 47, § 1110(A) & (E). In addition, a manufactured home must be
registered with the Oklahoma Tax Commission or a motor license agent, who
issues a certificate of title and a license plate for the manufactured home. See id. ,
at §§ 1113, 1117.
The bankruptcy court and the bankruptcy appellate panel both held that
Okla. Stat. tit. 47, § 1110(E), as quoted above, demonstrated that a manufactured
home was considered a vehicle, requiring perfection of a security interest in the
manner specified by § 1110. We agree that this is the most logical construction
of § 1110, and note that any other interpretation would make § 1110(E)
meaningless, which is contrary to well known rules of statutory construction.
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See, e.g. , Smith v. Midland Brake, Inc. , 180 F.3d 1154, 1161 (10th Cir. 1999) (en
banc); Gray v. State ex rel. State Election Bd. , 962 P.2d 1, 3 (Okla. 1998). In
addition, the Oklahoma Court of Appeals has held that § 1110 is the authority
under which a security interest in a mobile home must be perfected, noting that
the mobile home is considered a “vehicle.” See Shelter Am. Corp. v. Ray , 800
P.2d 743, 745 (Okla. Ct. App. 1990). Although a portion of that decision has
been superceded by statute, the court’s analysis under § 1110 remains good law.
Greenpoint does not really address the meaning of § 1110(E), arguing
instead that the definition of a “vehicle” in section 1102(29) of title 47 of the
Oklahoma statutes excludes manufactured homes. That section defines a
“vehicle” as:
any type of conveyance or device in, upon or by which a person or
property is or may be transported from one location to another upon
the avenues of public access within the state [but] does not include
bicycles, trailers except travel trailers and rental trailers, or
implements of husbandry as defined in Section 1-125 of this title.
Okla. Stat. tit. 47, § 1102(29). This definition does not necessarily exclude
manufactured homes, however, as many of these are equipped with wheels which
permit them to be transported from one location to another. See In re Gray , 40
B.R. 429, 431, 434 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1984) (construing a former version of
statute which defined vehicles as “‘[e]very device, in, upon, or by which any
person or property is or may be transported or drawn” to include mobile home).
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The definition section at the beginning of title 47 supports this conclusion,
providing that the term “‘[m]anufactured home’ means and includes every vehicle
defined as a manufactured home as defined in Section 22.1 [now section 1102] of
this title.” Okla. Stat. tit. 47, § 1-123 (emphasis added).
Based on these statutes, we conclude the bankruptcy court held correctly
that the debtor’s manufactured home was a “vehicle” requiring Greenpoint to file
a lien entry form to perfect its security interest in the collateral. As Greenpoint
filed its lien entry form within ninety days of the debtor’s bankruptcy petition, the
bankruptcy court correctly held the lien avoidable as a preference.
The judgment of the United States Bankruptcy Appellate Panel is
AFFIRMED.
Entered for the Court
Deanell Reece Tacha
Circuit Judge
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