Moreland v. Attorney General ( 2000 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
OCT 25 2000
TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
HOWARD MORELAND,
Petitioner-Appellant,
v.
No. 99-2356
PATRICIA MADRID, ATTORNEY (D.C. No. CIV 97-812 JP/JHG)
GENERAL FOR THE STATE OF NEW (District of New Mexico)
MEXICO,
Respondents-Appellees.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
Before EBEL, PORFILIO, and LUCERO, Circuit Judges.
While awaiting trial in New Mexico state court on three counts of assault, one
count of misdemeanor battery, and one count of aggravated assault, Howard Moreland
was indicted for bribing a witness, possessing a deadly weapon in prison, and criminal
solicitation to commit murder. Following conviction on the assault and battery charges,
Mr. Moreland entered a no contest plea to the charges of bribing a witness and possession
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of
law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. This court generally disfavors the
citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under
the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
of a deadly weapon. As part of the plea bargain, the charge of solicitation to commit
murder was dropped. Mr. Moreland was sentenced to eighteen and one-half years’
incarceration. He did not file a direct appeal, but fully exhausted all of his state collateral
remedies and is now seeking a federal writ of habeas corpus. The United States District
Court for the District of New Mexico dismissed the petition and denied a certificate of
appealability on all issues.
Mr. Moreland has requested issuance of the certificate by this court. We have
examined the briefs and the issues and grant a certificate of appealability only on the
following issues: 1) whether the provisions of the Antiterrorist and Effective Death
Penalty Act (AEDPA) apply to this case; 2) the alleged use of perjured testimony; 3)
whether the no contest pleas were voluntary; and 4) whether Mr. Moreland received the
assistance of competent counsel. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c).1
Mr. Moreland filed a previous federal habeas corpus petition on January 27, 1993.
This petition was dismissed without prejudice to allow him to return to state court and
exhaust several claims. Having done so, Mr. Moreland filed the current petition on
June 13, 1997. Seizing upon language transported from McWillams v. Colorado, 121
F.3d 573, 575 (10th Cir. 1997), he argues this petition should be considered a
1
Mr. Moreland has briefed other issues in this court; however, we have determined
those issues fail to make “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right” as
required by § 2253(c)(2), nor are they debatable among reasonable jurists. See United
States v. Kennedy, ____ F.3d ____, No. 98-1421, 2000 WL 1352891 (10th Cir. Sept. 20,
2000).
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continuation of his 1993 petition. Upon this predicate, he posits AEDPA, which took
effect in 1996, should not apply here. Since the briefs were filed, we rejected this very
argument in Marsh v. Soares, 223 F.3d 1217, 1220 (10th Cir. 2000). That question
resolved, we will review the remaining issues of this matter within the AEDPA structure.
AEDPA mandates a petition for a writ of habeas corpus will not be granted on a
claim that was adjudicated on the merits in state court unless the state’s decision was “an
unreasonable application” of “clearly established Federal law.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).
At the time Mr. Moreland’s current habeas petition was before the district court, the
meaning of “unreasonable application” had not been decided by either this court or the
Supreme Court; therefore, the district court chose to apply the “reasonable jurist” standard
followed by the Fourth Circuit. See Sexton v. French, 163 F.3d 874 (4th Cir. 1998).
Since the briefs were submitted here, the issue has been resolved, and the Fourth
Circuit’s “reasonable jurist” standard has been invalidated. Williams v. Taylor, ____U.S.
____, ____, 120 S. Ct. 1495, 1521-22 (2000). The Court held:
a federal habeas court making the “unreasonable application” inquiry
should ask whether the state court’s application of clearly established
federal law was objectively unreasonable. . . . The “all reasonable jurists”
standard would tend to mislead federal habeas courts by focusing their
attention on a subjective inquiry rather than on an objective one.
We then further clarified the standard of review in Herrera v. Lemaster, ____ F.3d ____,
____, No. 98-2060, 2000 WL 1299023 (10th Cir. Sept. 14, 2000), holding a “presumption
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of correctness” shall no longer be applied to questions of law decided in state court. Id.,
at *2.
The district court’s utilization of what, in hindsight, turned out to be the wrong
standard to be applied to legal questions does not unduly burden our task as a reviewing
court, however. Because we review questions of law de novo in any case, we can correct
the district court’s error simply by reviewing Mr. Moreland’s claim under the “objectively
unreasonable” standard articulated in Williams v. Taylor.
Mr. Moreland claims his right to due process was violated by the prosecutor’s use
of perjured testimony to secure an indictment charging him with solicitation to commit
murder. Mr. Moreland requested, but was denied, an evidentiary hearing into
prosecutorial misconduct at every stage of the state court proceedings. Therefore, under
Miller v. Champion, 161 F.3d 1249 (10th Cir. 1998), we use pre-AEDPA standards to
judge his entitlement to a federal evidentiary hearing. Under these standards, an
evidentiary hearing is required if a petitioner has alleged facts which, if proven, would
entitle him to relief. Id. at 1253.
The state contends Mr. Moreland has no standing to contest the solicitation
indictment because it was dismissed pursuant to his plea bargain. Under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(a) the federal courts shall entertain applications for a writ of habeas corpus “in
behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court.” (emphasis
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added). The prosecution submits, without the support of case law, because the charge of
solicitation was dismissed, Mr. Moreland is not “in custody” for purposes of § 2254.
We do not need to resolve this problem. Mr. Moreland rests his claim of
constitutional deprivation on United States v. Basurto, 497 F.2d 781, 785-86 (9th Cir.
1974), a case in which the Ninth Circuit held the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment is violated when a defendant has to stand trial on an indictment which the
government knows is based partially on perjured testimony. Although we have never
explicitly adopted Basurto, we have, on two occasions, settled cases on the assumption it
is followed in this circuit. See Talamante v. Romero, 620 F.2d 784 (10th Cir. 1980)
(“assuming we were to follow the Basurto line of cases”); Doran v. Stratton, 930 F.2d 33(10th Cir. 1991) (unpublished opinion) (“assuming, without deciding, the Basurto test
applies”). Nonetheless, assuming Basurto is the law of this circuit, we believe Mr.
Moreland fails to assert facts which would support a constitutional violation.
As proof of prosecutorial misconduct, Mr. Moreland relies on four affidavits
attached to his habeas petition. Two of the affidavits are from his former cell-mates who
both allege at the behest of prison guards they fabricated claims Mr. Moreland was
plotting to kill the prosecutor in his case. The remaining two come from a psychiatrist
who examined Mr. Moreland, and from Mr. Moreland’s mother. Both contain hearsay
corroboration of the same story. Even assuming the affidavits are trustworthy, they do
not contain any suggestion the prosecutor knew these stories were fabricated or
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knowingly presented the fabricated evidence to the grand jury. Unless the prosecution
knowingly used the perjured evidence, no violation has occurred under Basurto. Thus,
we see no error in the district court’s denial of an evidentiary hearing.
Mr. Moreland pled no contest to charges of possession of a deadly weapon by a
prisoner and bribery of a witness in exchange for the state’s dismissal of the charge of
solicitation. In his first habeas petition (and consistently thereafter) he has claimed his
plea was not voluntary.
In 1995, the state trial court held an evidentiary hearing to address this claim. At
that hearing, Mr. Moreland testified to a long history of mental illness including
schizophrenia and borderline personality disorder. He testified that the day before his
plea hearing he became “stricken with terror” and attempted to commit suicide by
banging his head against his cell wall. Prison officials took him to a hospital where he
was diagnosed with a panic attack and administered Haldol. Mr. Moreland testified the
Haldol made him physically ill, and he was still ill when his counsel arrived the day of the
plea hearing. He testified his counsel told him to “stop playing games and take the plea.”
He claimed she threatened the state would prosecute his mother for the solicitation charge
if he did not take the plea. She also allegedly promised him he would be sentenced to a
clinic for anger management in Georgia.
At the same hearing, Mr. Moreland’s trial counsel testified after discussing Mr.
Moreland’s condition with Mr. Moreland himself and with his guards she believed he was
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completely competent to enter the pleas. She indicated she advised him several times the
plea hearing could be postponed, but he wanted to proceed. She recalled Mr. Moreland
had asked her about returning to Georgia for commitment to a mental institution, but
could not recall if that was on the day of the plea hearing or after his conviction on the
assault charges.
The doctor who treated Mr. Moreland for his panic attack testified he had
administered a 2 mg dose of Haldol. He stated Mr. Moreland did not appear to have any
negative reaction to the drug, and such a dose would not have affected Mr. Moreland’s
mental functioning the next day. The state also called a physician and a psychiatrist who
examined Mr. Moreland in the months prior to the plea hearing. Both testified Mr.
Moreland suffers from borderline personality disorder, but was competent to enter a plea.
The state trial court ruled Mr. Moreland was competent to knowingly enter a voluntary
and intelligent plea.
Because the state court’s determination of voluntariness is a mixed question of law
and fact, Castleberry v. Alford, 666 F.2d 1338, 1342 (10th Cir. 1981), we do not apply a
presumption of correctness to the result. Herrera v. Lemaster, ____ F.3d at ____, 2000
WL 1299023, at *2. Nonetheless, after considering the facts already developed in the
record we can exercise our responsibility to determine the issue de novo.
The claim here is based upon an assertion that Mr. Moreland’s mental disorder and
the medication he received inhibited his ability to act knowingly and voluntarily. Yet,
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uncontroverted evidence contradicts the claim. First, the medical testimony established
the dosage of Haldol given Mr. Moreland could not affect his mental capacity on the day
of the plea. Second, his counsel advised him the plea hearing could be postponed, but
Mr. Moreland insisted on proceeding. Third, a psychiatrist and a psychologist who had
examined Mr. Moreland stated he was competent to enter a plea. These uncontroverted
facts objectively support the state court’s finding the plea was entered voluntarily.
Moreover, mental disorders do not preclude a person from knowingly and
voluntarily entering a plea. See Miles v. Dorsey, 61 F.3d 1459, 1472 (10th Cir. 1995)
(“The presence of some degree of mental disorder in the defendant does not necessarily
mean that he is incompetent to knowingly and voluntarily enter a plea as well as aid and
assist in his own defense.”). When these factors are considered as a whole, we conclude
the state court’s holding was not objectively unreasonable. Therefore, the federal district
court did not err in its holding.
Mr. Moreland raises five separate claims of ineffective counsel. To prevail on a
claim of this nature, Mr. Moreland must demonstrate his attorney’s performance was
deficient, as measured against an objective standard of reasonableness, and there is a
reasonable probability that, but for his counsel’s deficient performance, the result of the
proceeding would have been different. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-94
(1984).
-8-
Mr. Moreland first asserts his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate
possible exculpatory evidence supporting the charges to which Mr. Moreland plead
guilty. Citing the affidavits which contain allegations the solicitation charge was
fabricated, he asserts counsel should have uncovered this evidence, and, had counsel done
so, the evidence would “aid” the plea negotiations. This claim is deficient on its face. In
Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52 (1985), the Court held the Strickland analysis applies to the
conduct of counsel during plea bargaining. However, “in order to satisfy the ‘prejudice’
requirement, the defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for
counsel’s error, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to
trial.” Id. at 59 (emphasis added). Mr. Moreland asserts merely that further investigation
would have aided the plea negotiations, not that it would have convinced him to plead not
guilty. Having failed to make that claim, Mr. Moreland also failed to sustain his burden
of proof here.
Mr. Moreland’s second claim is that his trial counsel coerced him into accepting
the plea agreement. Mr. Moreland presents this assertion completely unencumbered by
factual support. Indeed, the claim is predicated simply upon the hypothesis that counsel
threatened him with “the possibility of charges against his mother and friend.” The
validity of that “threat” was denied in the state evidentiary hearing and, on the basis of the
record before us, stands as a controverted argument. In addition, Mr. Moreland baldly
asserts counsel “played on his fear and panic to force him to accept the plea agreement.”
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Again, this is merely the hypothesis of present counsel, not an established fact. Yet, as
we have previously noted, even if established, those pressures “do not vitiate the
voluntariness of his plea.” United States v. Carr, 80 F.3d 413, 417 (10th Cir. 1996). In
the absence of factual support in the record, we find it impossible to conclude Mr.
Moreland has presented evidence to overcome the Strickland presumption that counsel’s
performance was reasonable.
Mr. Moreland next claims his counsel was ineffective for failing to present
evidence of his past and current mental illness and failing to investigate the possibility of
an insanity defense. The basis for this claim is unclear. The contention appears to be that
Mr. Moreland’s counsel requested and received a forensic evaluation, but thereafter
“failed to provide either the forensic psychologist who prepared the report or the trial
court with existing documentation of his mental illness and treatment in the past.” Thus,
it is argued, trial counsel failed to make an “adequate” investigation of the issue of
competency.
Because the argument is presented in the form of conclusions, we are left to
speculate upon its foundation. We have not been told, for example, what the “existing
documentation” was, nor is it suggested how further efforts of trial counsel would have
discovered it. Moreover, Mr. Moreland fails to tell us how or why the psychological
report which indicated he was competent was deficient. Indeed, it is not even asserted the
person making the examination and the report did not know about Mr. Moreland’s mental
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history. Finally, in light of the determination of competence, Mr. Moreland fails to
inform us why trial counsel should have even conceived the possibility of an insanity
defense. Once again, the bald arguments here fail to carry the day on this issue.
Mr. Moreland’s fourth ground for the alleged incompetency of his counsel is her
purported failure to present evidence at trial which would have supported his defense that
Ms. Noyes, the assault victim, fabricated the assaults. Specifically, Mr. Moreland asserts
counsel should have shown Mr. Moreland and Ms. Noyes shared a joint bank account.
He now theorizes this evidence would have contradicted Ms. Noyes’ testimony at trial
that she was not Mr. Moreland’s common-law wife. Therefore, he continues her
credibility would have been tarnished so much that doubt would have been cast on her
testimony that Mr. Moreland assaulted her. We believe this argument is more fanciful
than persuasive. Even assuming an objectively reasonable attorney would have presented
this evidence, Mr. Moreland cannot possibly demonstrate prejudice. There is not a
reasonable probability that had the jury heard the joint bank account evidence the
outcome of the trial would have been different.
Mr. Moreland finally faults his counsel for failing to seek the recusal of the trial
judge. This claim also lacks merit. First, there is no evidence the judge believed himself
to be the target of the solicitation charge at the time of the trial; indeed the judge’s
affidavit offered in the federal habeas proceeding states unequivocally that he did not. It
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is therefore undeniable there was no ground upon which recusal could have been sought
or granted. It is sophistic to claim otherwise.
A certificate of appealability is GRANTED upon the issues set forth above, and
the judgment of the district court denying habeas corpus is AFFIRMED.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
John C. Porfilio
Senior Circuit Judge
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