Blum v. United States ( 2000 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
DEC 1 2000
TENTH CIRCUIT
__________________________ PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
REX A. BLUM,
Petitioner-Appellant,
v. No. 00-1266
(D. Colo.)
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, (D.Ct. No. 99-D-1872)
Respondent-Appellee.
____________________________
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before BRORBY, KELLY, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
Appellant Rex A. Blum, a federal inmate appearing pro se, appeals the
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent except under the doctrines of
law of the case, res judicata and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the
citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under
the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
district court’s decision denying his habeas corpus petition filed pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 2241. We exercise jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2253(a), and affirm. 1
On May 8, 1989, Mr. Blum was convicted in federal district court for
possession with intent to distribute and distribution of a controlled substance, and
received a fifteen-year term of imprisonment and a four-year term of supervised
release. The United States Parole Commission paroled Mr. Blum on December 5,
1991. At that time, Mr. Blum had 4,470 days to serve of his sentence and was
instructed to remain within the limits of the District of Colorado until the end of
his sentence, on March 5, 2004. Thereafter, Mr. Blum repeatedly violated his
parole, causing the Parole Commission to issue three different warrants in less
than four years to revoke his parole. Following each parole revocation hearing,
the Parole Commission eventually placed Mr. Blum on presumptive parole. On
July 16, 1999, the Parole Commission issued a fourth warrant, charging Mr. Blum
with use of dangerous and habit-forming drugs, and association with a person
having a criminal record or engaged in criminal activity. Following the
government’s detainment of Mr. Blum, he filed the instant § 2241 petition,
1
A federal inmate is not required to obtain a certificate of appealability to appeal
a final order in a proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. See Montez v. McKinna, 208 F.3d
862, 866-67 (10th Cir. 2000); McIntosh v. United States Parole Comm’n, 115 F.3d 809,
810 n.1 (10th Cir. 1997).
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challenging the government’s authority to detain him on the warrant. In support,
Mr. Blum claimed he fully served his fifteen-year sentence when he served his
four-year term of supervised release–starting from the date of his parole on
December 5, 1991 until his supervised release ended on December 5, 1995.
The district court conducted a thorough analysis of Mr. Blum’s claim and
held the government legally detained him. In so holding, the district court
reasoned Mr. Blum remained under the constructive custody of the Parole
Commission until March 5, 2004, even though his term of supervisory release
commenced on his parole date. The district court pointed out that Mr. Blum’s
supervisory release ran concurrent with his parole. In support, the district court
noted that each time Mr. Blum violated the conditions of his parole and was
subsequently re-paroled, he signed a parole certificate, showing he remained
under parole supervision until March 4, 2004. Thus, the district court concluded
the Parole Commission possessed constructive custody over Mr. Blum when it
issued its fourth warrant on July 16, 1999.
On appeal, Mr. Blum lists the grounds for reversing the district court’s
decision in seven short sentences:
1. “I’ve completed my supervised release so supervision should be
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completed.”
2. “I’ve completed my supervised release.”
3. “I shouldn’t be on supervision.”
4. “I should be released from parole.”
5. “I’ve done completed my supervised release.”
6. “Yes, Supervise Release takes place of parole.”
7. “Release me from supervision.”
As to his statement of the case, Mr. Blum simply refers this court to some
“transcripts,” which he fails to further identify or designate as a part of the record
on appeal.
We review de novo the district court’s decision to deny habeas relief under
28 U.S.C. § 2241. See Patterson v. Knowles, 162 F.3d 574, 575 (10th Cir. 1998).
While we construe a pro se litigant’s pleadings liberally, Riddle v. Mondragon, 83
F.3d 1197, 1202 (10th Cir. 1996), we are not required to manufacture a litigant’s
appeal argument when he fails his burden of citing and tying together the relevant
facts, specific citations to the record, and his legal contentions. See United States
v. Rodriguez-Aguirre, 108 F.3d 1228, 1238 n.8 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 522 U.S.
847 (1997).
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In reviewing Mr. Blum’s “grounds” for appeal, we note he merely raises
patently repetitive, vague and unsupported assertions, rather than articulating the
relevant facts, record citations, his legal contentions, or the district court’s
alleged error. Thus, Mr. Blum fails his burden of tying together a coherent
argument for our review. See Rodriguez-Aguirre, 108 F.3d at 1238 n.8.
Despite the inadequacies in Mr. Blum’s appeal pleadings, we have
nevertheless carefully reviewed the record. After conducting a de novo review,
we announce our agreement with the district court’s analysis of the parole issue
raised in Mr. Blum’s petition. Because the district court provided sufficient
analysis for denying Mr. Blum’s petition, we will not duplicate the same analysis
here.
Accordingly, we AFFIRM the district court’s June 16, 2000 Order. For
good cause shown, we further grant the government’s “Motion to Seal Appellee’s
Answer Brief,” requesting its brief, which includes copies of prison records and
sentencing information, be sealed.
Entered by the Court:
WADE BRORBY
United States Circuit Judge
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