Adame v. Apfel , 4 F. App'x 730 ( 2001 )


Menu:
  •                                                                           F I L E D
    United States Court of Appeals
    Tenth Circuit
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FEB 27 2001
    FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
    PATRICK FISHER
    Clerk
    JOSE R. ADAME,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    v.                                                   No. 00-3151
    (D.C. No. 98-CV-4144)
    KENNETH S. APFEL, Commissioner                         (D. Kan.)
    of Social Security,
    Defendant-Appellee.
    ORDER AND JUDGMENT            *
    Before EBEL, KELLY, and LUCERO , Circuit Judges.
    After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
    unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
    this appeal.   See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
    therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
    *
    This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
    doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
    generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
    and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
    Claimant Jose Adame appeals from a district court order affirming the
    Commissioner’s decision that he was not disabled before the expiration of his
    insured status on September 30, 1988, and therefore was not eligible for disability
    insurance benefits. We affirm.
    I.
    Mr. Adame filed his application for social security disability benefits on
    April 28, 1995, claiming disability since December 31, 1979, due to
    post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), depression, and anxiety and panic
    disorder. 1 His application was denied initially and on reconsideration. Following
    a hearing, the ALJ denied Mr. Adame’s application at step two of the five step
    evaluation process, see Reyes v. Bowen, 
    845 F.2d 242
    , 243 (10th Cir. 1988),
    concluding that he had no impairment except drug addiction prior to September
    30, 1988, the date he was last insured for disability benefits. The Appeals
    Council denied review. The United States District Court for the District of
    Kansas adopted the magistrate judge’s recommendation affirming the ALJ’s
    decision. On appeal, Mr. Adame, acting pro se, asserts that the ALJ erred in not
    finding him disabled due to PTSD prior to 1988. He claims that the reason there
    1
    The Veterans’ Administration considers Mr. Adame 100% disabled. At the
    time Mr. Adame filed his application for social security disability benefits, he was
    receiving, and as far as we know is continuing to receive, benefits from the
    Veterans’ Administration for his service-connected disability.
    -2-
    is no evidence that he was experiencing PTSD symptoms before 1988 was
    because he was in denial and because he was self-medicating the symptoms with
    alcohol and drugs.
    II.
    Claimant, Jose Adame, served in Vietnam from 1969 to 1971. Prior to
    entering the service, he averred that he had never used alcohol or drugs. He
    began abusing both alcohol and drugs while in Vietnam. His drug and alcohol
    abuse continued and increased after he was discharged. In April 1987, after being
    arrested for possession of marijuana, he entered a Veterans’ Administration
    rehabilitation program and, as a result, stopped using heroin, LSD, and other hard
    drugs. In his group therapy progress notes, the therapist observed that Mr. Adame
    continued to wear his beret, to dwell on the past, and was hostile and bitter about
    the war. He stopped attending the group therapy meetings in November 1987, and
    his case was closed on January 19, 1988. His participation in the group therapy
    during this period was considered good.
    It appears from the record that, although Mr. Adame did not return to using
    hard drugs, he did continue to abuse alcohol and marijuana until 1993 when he
    was hospitalized at the Veterans Administration Medical Center (VAMC) in
    Dallas for a surgical repair of a Mallory-Weiss tear caused by his alcohol
    consumption. The record indicates that it was during this hospitalization that he
    -3-
    was first diagnosed as having PTSD. He was treated as an outpatient at the
    Dallas VAMC from August 1993 through May 1995. During this period he also
    completed a PTSD program at the VAMC in Topeka. The record indicates that he
    has remained free of drugs and alcohol. Once he was clean and sober, however,
    his PTSD symptoms intensified.
    III.
    Mr. Adame began excessive use of alcohol and drugs while in Vietnam.
    Although his substance addictions have been in remission since 1993, the
    symptoms of PTSD and his problems with coping with that disorder became
    apparent at that time and have continued. According to the most recent
    evaluation in the record, he is considered totally disabled because of his PTSD.
    Therefore, the question this case presents is not whether Mr. Adame is totally
    disabled and unable to work, but whether the ALJ erred in finding he was not
    totally disabled and unable to work prior to September 30, 1988.
    This court reviews the Commissioner’s decision “to determine whether the
    findings are supported by substantial evidence and whether the [Commissioner]
    applied correct legal standards.” Reid v. Chater, 
    71 F.3d 372
    , 373 (10th Cir.
    1995) (quotation omitted).
    Mr. Adame claims he became unable to work on December 31, 1979, due to
    drug and alcohol abuse related to his PTSD. The record, including the 1987
    -4-
    records of his court-mandated hospitalization for drug dependence, contains no
    evidence that Mr. Adame was experiencing symptoms of PTSD prior to
    September 30, 1988. Although his work history following his return from
    Vietnam was sporadic, and he did not remain with any one job for any length of
    time, he did work between 1979 and his last job in 1987. The ALJ, however,
    found that Mr. Adame had not engaged in any substantial gainful activity since
    1979. In denying Mr. Adame’s application the ALJ concluded that he had not
    established that he had any medically determinable severe impairment other that
    drug and alcohol abuse prior to September 30, 1988.
    PTSD is defined as
    the development of characteristic symptoms following exposure to an
    extreme traumatic stressor involving direct personal experience of an
    event that involves actual or threatened death or serious injury, or
    other threat to one’s physical integrity; or witnessing an event that
    involves death, injury, or a threat to the physical integrity of another
    person; or learning about unexpected or violent death, serious harm,
    or threat of death or injury experienced by a family member or other
    close associate. . . . The person’s response to the event must involve
    intense fear, helplessness, or horror . . . .
    American Psychiatric Ass’n Diagnostic & Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders
    at 424 (4th ed. 1994) (DSM-IV). The DSM-IV does indicate that PTSD can be
    subject to a delayed onset. See 
    id. at 425
    . The DMS-IV states that victims of
    PTSD may have an increased risk of substance abuse disorders, but “[i]t is not
    known to what extent these disorders precede or follow the onset of Posttraumatic
    -5-
    Stress Disorder.” 
    Id. at 425
    . The DMS-IV does not further mention or discuss
    substance abuse as symptomatic of or related to PTSD.
    “An individual shall not be considered to be disabled for purposes of this
    subchapter if alcoholism or drug addiction would (but for this subparagraph) be a
    contributing factor material to the Commissioner’s determination that the
    individual is disabled.” 
    42 U.S.C. § 423
    (d)(2)(C). The “key factor . . . in
    determining whether drug addiction or alcoholism is a contributing factor material
    to the determination of disability is whether we would still find [the claimant]
    disabled if [he or she] stopped using drugs or alcohol.” 
    20 C.F.R. § 404.1535
    (b)(1). The focus of the inquiry, therefore, is on the impairments
    remaining if the substance abuse ceased, and whether those impairments are
    disabling, regardless of their cause. See 
    id.
    In this case, the question then becomes whether, if Mr. Adame had stopped
    using drugs and alcohol prior to September 30, 1988, his PTSD would have been
    disabling. Mr. Adame was in drug rehabilitation from April 1987 to November
    1987. His attendance and participation in the group therapy sessions during this
    time was considered good, and he reported that he was remaining drug free.
    There is no indication, however, that he was not using alcohol during this period.
    As the ALJ found, during this period of rehabilitation participation, he did not
    -6-
    report any symptoms of PTSD nor did the professionals supervising his
    rehabilitation program report observing any of these symptoms.
    In this light, the ALJ’s finding that there was no substantial evidence to
    support Mr. Adame’s claim that he was disabled by PTSD prior to September 30,
    1988, cannot be found to be error. This, however, does not end our inquiry. We
    must address the question of whether, due to his alcohol and drug abuse and
    inability to hold a job, disability from PTSD can be inferred.
    In November 1996, one of Mr. Adame’s treating physicians, Dr. Carol
    Padilla, described Mr. Adame in a “Medical Assessment of Ability to do
    Work-Related Activities (Mental)” evaluation as:
    100% service connected for Posttraumatic Stress Disorder which is
    based on his experiences as a combat soldier in Vietnam. He
    demonstrates all major symptoms of this disorder including more
    than one symptom based on persistently reexperiencing the traumatic
    event(s), three or more symptoms having to do with numbing of
    general responsiveness and all noted DSMIV manifestations of
    increased arousal. None of these symptoms are noted before the
    combat trauma.
    R. Supp. Vol. I at 300. Dr. Padilla indicated that the earliest date Mr. Adame’s
    PTSD existed at this severity level was 1970. 
    Id. at 308
    . This is the only
    indication in the record that Mr. Adame may have had PTSD prior to
    September 30, 1988. In her decision, the ALJ acknowledged this statement by Dr.
    Padilla, but found that there was no evidence in the record to support a finding
    that Mr. Adame “had any medically determinable impairment before September
    -7-
    30, 1988, other than drug dependence.” 
    Id. at 13
    . In the district court’s
    memorandum and order affirming the ALJ, the court recognized the substantial
    weight that must be given to the opinion of a treating physician, unless the
    opinion “is brief, conclusory, and unsupported by medical evidence.” R. Vol. I,
    tab 11 at 9 (quotation omitted). The court, relying on Coleman v. Chater, 
    58 F.3d 577
    , 579 (10th Cir. 1995) and Hoffman v. Apfel, 
    62 F. Supp. 2d 1204
    , 1207 (D.
    Kan. 1999), concluded that Dr. Padilla’s retrospective diagnosis was without
    supporting evidence and therefore, insufficient. Id. at 10. We agree. 2
    In Flint v. Sullivan, 
    951 F.2d 264
     (10th Cir. 1991), a case factually on
    point, the claimant was a Vietnam veteran with a history of drug addiction. In
    affirming the ALJ’s denial of benefits because the claimant had not established a
    disability prior to the expiration of his insured status, this court rejected the
    claimant’s arguments that a finding of disability could be based on his subjective
    testimony concerning the onset of PTSD and his sporadic employment history. 
    Id. at 267
    . In so doing, we stated that although “retrospective diagnosis and
    subjective testimony can be used to diagnose a physical or mental condition, this
    2
    Even if the court accepted Dr. Padilla’s retrospective diagnosis, the
    question is not whether Mr. Adame had PTSD prior to the expiration of his
    insured status, but whether he was actually disabled prior to the expiration of his
    insured status. See Potter v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 
    905 F.2d 1346
    ,
    1348-49 (10th Cir. 1990).
    -8-
    type of evidence alone cannot justify an award of benefits.” 
    Id.
     The only
    evidence before the ALJ in Flint, was evidence of the claimant’s drug problem
    and evidence that, although he had problems holding a job, he was willing to
    work and could find employment. This court rejected the claimant’s argument
    that the reason his PTSD was not diagnosed until after expiration of his insured
    status was “because it existed in a latent state.” The court agreed with the
    Appeals Council’s reasoning that “while the onset of the claimant’s impairments
    may be traceable to events which occurred during a period of coverage, there is
    no evidence to suggest that the claimant experienced disabling effects of these
    impairments during the relevant period.” Id. at 267-68 (quotation omitted).
    We agree with the district court that Dr. Padilla’s opinion as to Mr. Adame’s
    onset date is speculative, conclusory, and without supporting evidence. Mr.
    Adame made numerous trips to the VAMC during 1987 while receiving treatment
    and attending group therapy sessions for his drug addiction. During this time he
    never mentioned PTSD symptoms nor did any of his physicians or care givers
    observe or note any PTSD symptoms. The court concluded that, although his drug
    addiction and inability to hold a job provided some evidence of PTSD, they were
    not “‘specific findings’ sufficient to establish a disability.” R. Vol. I, tab 11 at 10
    (quoting Washington v. Shalala, 
    37 F.3d 1437
    , 1441 (10th Cir. 1994)). Moreover,
    -9-
    Mr. Adame himself reported that his inability to meet the requirements of a job
    was a result of his drug and alcohol addiction.
    The only remaining question is whether there was sufficient ambiguity as to
    the onset date of Mr. Adame’s PTSD that the ALJ was required to enlist the
    opinion of a medical expert. In Reid, 
    71 F.3d at 373-74
    , this court discussed
    Social Security Ruling 83-20 which defines the onset date as “the first day an
    individual is disabled as defined in the Act and the regulations.” West’s Soc. Sec.
    Rep. Serv. Rulings 1983-91, at 49 (1992). “Factors relevant to the determination
    are the claimant’s allegation of an onset date, his work history, and the medical
    evidence, with medical evidence being the primary element in determining onset
    date.” Reid, 
    71 F.3d at 373
    . The Reid court recognized that it was sometimes
    necessary “to infer the onset date,” and in that event, the ALJ should obtain the
    opinion of a medical expert at the hearing. 
    Id. at 374
    . “However, a medical
    advisor need be called only if the medical evidence of onset is ambiguous.” 
    Id.
    Here, the medical evidence is not ambiguous, it is just nonexistent. Therefore,
    considering that a medical expert would be required to review the evidence and
    render a retroactive opinion, he or she could do nothing more than infer that
    because prior to September 30, 1988, Mr. Adame suffered from drug addiction and
    had trouble holding a job, and because in 1993 he exhibited the symptoms of
    severe PTSD, he must have had PTSD prior to September 30, 1988. Even if this
    -10-
    inference could be accepted as true, it still does not answer the question of
    whether Mr. Adame’s PTSD was disabling prior to September 30, 1988.
    The evidence indicates that Mr. Adame’s only disabling impairment prior to
    the expiration of his insured status was his drug addiction. Because, under the
    applicable law and the regulations, this is not compensable, 
    42 U.S.C. § 423
    (d)(2)(C), 
    20 C.F.R. § 404.1535
    (b)(1), we conclude that the ALJ’s decision
    denying Mr. Adame’s application for benefits was supported by substantial
    evidence and in accord with correct legal standards.
    The judgment of the United States District Court for the District of Kansas
    is AFFIRMED.
    Entered for the Court
    David M. Ebel
    Circuit Judge
    -11-