United States v. Neill ( 2001 )


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  •                                                                                F I L E D
    United States Court of Appeals
    Tenth Circuit
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    MAY 29 2001
    TENTH CIRCUIT
    PATRICK FISHER
    Clerk
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    v.                                                          No. 00-4089
    ERIC LONNIE NEILL,                                    (D.C. No. 98-CR-273-K)
    (D.Utah)
    Defendant-Appellant.
    ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
    Before HENRY, BRISCOE and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.
    After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
    unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of this
    appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered
    submitted without oral argument.
    Defendant Eric Lonnie Neill appeals from his convictions on six counts of bank
    fraud and his sentence of fifteen months. His counsel has filed a brief pursuant to
    *
    This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of
    law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the
    citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited
    under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
    Anders v. California, 
    386 U.S. 738
     (1967), raising three issues: (1) whether the
    indictment should have been dismissed under the Interstate Agreement on Detainers; (2)
    whether the court erred in finding Neill was an organizer, leader, manager, or supervisor
    pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(c); and (3) whether the court erred in increasing Neill's
    base offense level both for being an organizer or leader and for being involved in more
    than minimal planning. We dismiss the appeal.
    Neill was charged with thirty-four counts of bank fraud. As a result of a plea
    agreement, he entered pleas of guilty to six counts, executing a Statement In Advance of
    Plea of Guilty, which provided in part:
    8. I know that there is no appellate review of any lawful sentence
    imposed under a plea of guilty.
    9. I know that, under 
    18 U.S.C. § 3742
    (a), I may appeal a sentence
    imposed under this plea of guilty in any of the following circumstances:
    (a) If the sentence was imposed in violation of the law.
    (b) If the sentence was imposed as a result of an
    incorrect application of the sentencing guidelines.
    (c) If the sentence is greater than the sentence
    specified in the applicable guideline range to the extent that
    the sentence includes a greater fine or term of imprisonment,
    probation, or supervised released than the maximum
    established in the guideline range, or includes a more limiting
    condition of probation or supervised release under 
    18 U.S.C. § 3563
    (b)(6) or 
    18 U.S.C. § 3563
    (b)(11) than the maximum
    established in the guideline range.
    (d) If the sentence was imposed for an offense for
    which there is no sentencing guideline, and the sentence is
    plainly unreasonable.
    10. As noted above, I understand that a sentencing guideline range
    for my case will be determined by the Court in accordance with the
    Sentencing Reform Act of 1984. . . . Acknowledging all this, I knowingly
    and voluntarily waive my right to appeal any sentence imposed by the
    2
    Court and the manner in which the sentence is determined, so long as my
    sentence is within the statutory maximums . . . I also waive any right to
    challenge or appeal the conviction in this case based on any claim of
    violation of the Speedy Trial Act or any claim of violation of the provisions
    of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers. I also waive any right to
    challenge the sentence or the manner in which the sentence is determined
    in any collateral attack, including, but not limited to, a motion brought
    under 
    28 U.S.C. § 2255
    .
    Statement at 3-4. At the plea hearing, the following exchange occurred:
    THE COURT: Let's see. You waive the right to challenge or
    appeal the conviction in this case based on any claim of violation of the
    Speedy Trial Act or any claim of violation of the provision of the Interstate
    Agreement on Detainers. “I also waive any right to challenge the sentence
    or the manner in which the sentence is determined and any collateral
    attack.” Do you understand those waivers?
    NEILL: Yes.
    Transcript at 7-8. The presentence report indicated that based on Neill's total offense
    level of 13 and a criminal history category of II, the guidelines range of imprisonment
    was fifteen to twenty-one months. U.S.S.G. § 5A. The court imposed a sentence of
    fifteen months.
    We enforce the terms of a lawful plea agreement. See United States v. Hernandez,
    
    134 F.3d 1435
    , 1437 (10th Cir. 1998). If a defendant knowingly and voluntarily waives
    his statutory right to appeal, a sentence is generally enforceable. See 
    id.
    We have examined the sentencing transcript, the plea statement, and the entire
    record on appeal and conclude the plea agreement was entered knowingly and voluntarily
    by the defendant in exchange for promises favorable to him. The sentence imposed was
    not an illegal sentence and was not greater than the sentence specified in the applicable
    3
    guidelines range.
    Neill waived his right to bring this appeal. Counsel's motion to withdraw as
    counsel for Neill is GRANTED. The appeal is DISMISSED.
    Entered for the Court
    Mary Beck Briscoe
    Circuit Judge
    4
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 00-4089

Judges: Henry, Briscoe, Murphy

Filed Date: 5/29/2001

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 11/5/2024